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ABSTRACT 
People who participate in policy-making, from government, academia, 
industry and civil society, would all prefer their perspectives be regarded 
as rational. There is little agreement, however, on what comprises 
rationality, with conflicting claims of 'scientific sense' and 'democratic 
sensibility', and disagreement on whether moral considerations are part of 
rational decision-making. 
Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey drew from the natural and social 
sciences, as well as his international political experience, to describe 
rationality as a characteristic of human agency. He posited that rationality 
should comprise scientific sense, democratic sensibility and moral 
imagination in order to resolve problematic situations and support 
individual and social flourishing. 
In instituting contemporary policy science, Harold Lasswell considered 
pragmatist philosophy to be its foundation. However, this pragmatist 
perspective has since been overlooked. Policy science developed with a 
primarily empirical focus on discrete aspects of policy-making. There is 
now an identified need for more integrative and normative theories to 
better understand and guide public policy. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that rationality, as 
defined in pragmatist philosophy, can integrate diverse considerations of 
policy theory and public participation. In order to make the philosophical 
concepts more operative, a new theory of policy-making - the Decision Cell 
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model - is developed. This model is structured according to key 'pillars' of 
pragmatist philosophy and shaped by contemporary theoretical and 
empirical analyses, particularly of health policy. Primary research on the 
impact of health services and policy research at LSHTM, and on UNICEF- 
civil society organisation partnerships with respect to children's rights, 
further informs the development and application of this model. 
The Decision Cell model also allows for a comparative analysis of 
normative frameworks for health policy. Mechanisms to facilitate 
adopting a pragmatist approach to rational policy-making are highlighted, 
as are the potential advantages and challenges of doing so. 
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Introduction: background & approach 
There has been, roughly speaking, a coincidence in the development of modern 
experimental science and of democracy ... 
does nature itself, as uncovered and 
understood by our best contemporaneous knowledge, sustain and support our 
democratic hopes and aspirations? Or if we choose to begin arbitrarily at the 
other end ... how shall we read reality 
(that is to say the world of existence 
accessible to verifiable inquiry) so that we may essay our deepest political and 
social problems with a conviction that they are to a reasonable extent sanctioned 
and sustained by the nature of things? 
John Dewey, 1919, Philosophy and Democracy 
The policy sciences were initially conceived by Harold Lasswell (1951) and others 
... as a means of 
improving the governmental decision process. They were 
designed to be problem oriented, multidisciplinary and explicitly normative (i. e., 
explicitly considering values) in their approach ... and 
"directed towards 
knowledge to improve the practice of democracy. " 
DeLeon & Longobardi, 2002, Policy Analysis in the Good Society 
This introductory chapter serves as a backdrop for the thesis. First, the 
need for policy theories that provide holistic, problem-solving and 
normative perspectives on policy-making is discussed. The historical links 
between pragmatist philosophy (which arguably provides such an 
integrated, problem-solving and normative perspective) and policy 
science are reviewed. This relationship is further examined in light of a 
brief biography of pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, whose work 
provides the conceptual foundation for this thesis. A personal preface then 
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sets out the PhD process, including the methods and approaches used. 
Finally, a synopsis of the succeeding chapters serves as a framework, or 
roadmap, of the organisation and development of the thesis. 
Policy science: integrative, problem oriented & normative? 
In the mid-20th century, Harold Lasswell and others instituted the policy 
sciences as an integrative, multi-disciplinary nexus between the social 
sciences, public policy and democratic practice (DeLeon & Longobardi, 
2002; Lasswell, 1951). The aim was to draw on insights across related 
disciplines - including law, sociology, psychology and political 
philosophy - in order to help understand public policy-making and 
inform public policy-makers. There was also an expectation that policy 
science would help develop knowledge and values to guide democratic 
practice and promote individual and societal flourishing (Ham & Hill, 
1993; John, 1998; Sabatier, 1999). Policy science was thus expected to be 
integrative, problem-oriented and normative, but these expectations were 
not met (DeLeon & Longobardi, 2002; Lasswell, 1951). 
Rather than continuing to be a meeting point for advances across related 
disciplines, policy science became a discipline in its own right. The 
seemingly intractable nature of some policy problems and the often long- 
term nature of expected policy outcomes, often extending beyond 
government and electoral cycles, meant that the problem-solving aspect of 
policy science was not seen to be of much relevance (Elster, 1989; Parsons, 
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1995). The advisory and normative role of policy science was constrained 
by the resistance of bureaucrats and politicians to direction or criticism 
from academics and technical experts (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Parsons, 
1995). 
Additionally, a heavily quantitative turn in the discipline meant that 
policy science increasingly focussed on the technical aspects of decision- 
making - including operations research, strategic modelling, social choice 
approaches and cost-effectiveness analysis (DeLeon, 1988; Fischer, 2003; 
Garrison, 2000). As a result, relatively incommensurable considerations, 
such as values, ethics and cultural contexts, were largely ignored. Some 
commentators also saw that the increasingly technical focus in policy 
science brought, "ever more rigorous quantitative analysis to bear on 
topics of narrower and narrower import" (Fischer, 2003, p. xi). 
In light of all these changes, the focus of policy science shifted from 
informing what governments should do, to explaining what governments 
do (Parsons, 1995). On the positive side, the analytical and descriptive 
focus in policy science led to the development of in-depth theoretical and 
empirical understandings of different aspects of policy-making. For 
example, there is now considerable knowledge of policy agenda setting 
(Kingdon, 1995) and implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984), on 
the allocation of goods and services (Ham & Hill, 1993) and on policy 
networks (Heclo, 1978) and institutions (Ostrom, 1999). However, the in- 
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depth focus on discrete aspects of the policy process has made it 
increasingly difficult to form a more integrated, or comprehensive, view of 
public policy processes. Such an overview is required so policy-making, as 
a whole, may better be understood, designed, managed and evaluated 
(deHaven-Smith, 1988; Ham & Hill, 1993; John, 1998; Sabatier, 1999). 
Descriptive and historical approaches to policy analyses limited its 
application to problem-solving and the management of policy change and 
consequences. Further, the focus in the policy sciences on describing the 
behaviour of governments meant that less attention was paid to the range 
of other actors who influence and, in turn, are affected by, policy (Buse, 
Mays & Walt, 2005; Fischer, 2003; Parsons, 1995). Other actors who are 
engaged with policy processes include scientists, corporations, civil 
society organisations, service providers and citizens. Walt and Gilson 
(1994) highlight the misplaced focus of policy analysis in health sector 
reform and caution that, 
Much health policy wrongly focuses attention on the content of reform, 
and neglects the actors involved in policy reform (at the international, 
national sub-national levels), the processes contingent on developing and 
implementing change and the context within which policy is developed. 
Focus on policy content diverts attention from understanding the 
processes which explain why desired policy outcomes fail to emerge 
(Walt & Gilson, 1994, p. 354). 
There is also the view, held by some analysts, that policy science protects 
the status quo by reflecting government priorities and institutional 
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agendas and by focusing on the work of unelected bureaucracies - such as 
civil services (DeLeon & Longobardi, 2002; Dryzek, 1989; Garrison, 2000; 
Richardson, 2002). Additionally, a focus in policy-making (catalysed by 
considerations of war and defence) on technological development and the 
arms race meant that less attention was paid to the wider range of socio- 
political concerns and values in policy-making (DeLeon & Longobardi, 
2002; Fischer, 2003; Richardson, 2002; Snider, 2000a). As a result, the field 
has been viewed as turning into "the policy sciences of tyranny" (Dryzek, 
1989, p. 98). 
As for policy science providing a normative orientation to decision- 
making, there is a growing realisation that value-neutral expertise is 
impracticable, that foundational accord is rare - as even experts disagree 
in making policy arguments, and that scientific findings are just one 
among many constitutive factors in socio-political deliberations (Kuruvilla 
& Mays, 2005; Majone, 1989; Wynne, 2003). Further, the forced separation 
of technical and value considerations in policy-making is considered both 
untenable and unreliable as a guide for democratic practice (DeLeon & 
Longobardi, 2002; Dryzek, 1989; Garrison, 2000). 
Policy analysts increasingly emphasise the need to develop more 
integrative policy theory to better understand and guide policy-making as 
a whole and to inform the participation of different groups in this process 
(deHaven-Smith, 1988; John, 1998; Sabatier, 1999). There is also an 
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identified need for policy theory to be more explanatory (rather than only 
descriptive) to help understand why, when and how policy variations and 
change occur, and to help manage the same (John, 1998; Sabatier, 1999). 
Finally, there is an identified need to develop normative theories of public 
policy to promote the development of values that to guide democratic 
practice and support individual and societal flourishing (DeLeon & 
Longobardi, 2002; Fischer, 2003; Lasswell, 1971; Parsons, 1995). 
The challenge to develop more integrative, explanatory and normative 
policy theory is less daunting than it may first seem, as giants have 
already lent their shoulders to this endeavour. In particular, Lasswell 
(1971, p. xiv), in founding the contemporary policy sciences acknowledged 
that, 
The policy sciences are a contemporary policy adaptation of the general 
approach to public policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his 
colleagues in the development of American pragmatism. 
Thus, pragmatist philosophy, arguably, already provides an overarching 
epistemology for policy science. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that pragmatist 
philosophy is still an empirically congruent and normative foundation for 
both public policy-making and democratic practice overall. It further aims 
to show that rationality, as defined in pragmatist philosophy, provides 
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common ground on which one may build policy theory that is integrative, 
problem-solving and normative. 
Historical inks between pragmatist philosophy and policy science 
There have been strong historical links between policy science and 
pragmatist philosophy that are now being reclaimed. As mentioned 
earlier, Lasswell (1971) affirmed that the modern policy sciences were 
founded on pragmatist philosophy, with particular reference to John 
Dewey's work. Related disciplines, including political philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, planning and organisational theory, education, art 
and architecture, also make reference to John Dewey's pragmatist 
philosophy (Collier, 2006; Friedman, 1987; Joas, 1993; Senge, Kleiner, 
Roberts, Ross et al., 1999). For example, in the management field, Senge et 
al. (1999) in setting out a 'timeline of learning organisation concepts', 
begin with the publication of John Dewey's (1938/ 1997) book, Experience 
and education. Dewey's treatise on Art as experience (1934/ 1980) and his 
emphasis on the integrated nature of aesthetics, functionality and ethics 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002) has found application in art and architecture (Collier, 
2006), as will be discussed in following chapters. 
In psychology, various schools claimed sanction from Dewey's work; 
however, this was not always justifiable. For example, Dewey's emphasis 
on the use of scientific method and inquiry has been likened to 
experimental methods in psychology. While this is partially true, 
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contemporary scholars have recognised that the connotation of 
experimental does not capture Dewey's integrated approach to inquiry and 
experience; as Manicas (2002, p. 268) explains, 
Dewey continued to argue that "the nature of all objects of philosophical 
inquiry is to be fixed by finding out what experience has to say about 
them, " instead of getting answers from "scientific psychology, " the 
problems he was interested in addressing would respond to a new 
conception of inquiry, work which culminated in his 1938 Logic: The 
Theory of Inquiry. This profound shift is missed primarily because 
Dewey's theory of inquiry is so fundamentally in opposition to the 
dominating logical empiricist theory of science, which had by then 
captured psychology, that it was misunderstood and then ignored. 
There are various reasons as to why there was a divergence from, and 
misunderstanding of, pragmatist philosophy as related to policy science as 
well. Accordingly, this introductory chapter continues with a brief 
biography of John Dewey that serves as a backdrop for his work and for a 
discussion on why pragmatist philosophy was, for a while - lost, and is 
now being reclaimed in policy science and public administration. 
A brief biography of John Dewey 
John Dewey along with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James are 
considered the founding triumvirate of classical pragmatist philosophy 
(Center for Dewey Studies, 1961 - current; Ryan, 1995; Westbrook, 1991). 
However, there were several others who contributed to the development 
of pragmatist philosophy, including Jane Addams, James H. Tufts and 
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George Herbert Mead. Dewey was a professor of philosophy and was also 
one of the most influential political voices of his time, both in the US and 
internationally (Evans, 2000; Ryan, 1995; Schilpp & Hahn, 1939/ 1989). 
He was born just before the American Civil War and died during the Cold 
War (Ryan, 1995). He advised the US government in both World Wars. 
However, Dewey was criticised both for not immediately recommending 
the US join the wars and for recommending that it did, when it seemed to 
be the lesser of two evils, considering the rising totalitarian and militaristic 
conflict (Bullert, 1989; Schilpp & Hahn, 1939/ 1989). Dewey emphasised 
the need to continually clarify the aims of war and the importance of 
academic freedom and democratic process through those times. Dewey's 
involvement in public service also extended to him chairing, at the age of 
78, the commission in Mexico that found Leon Trotsky 'not guilty' of the 
crimes alleged by Stalin. 
He engaged in extensive philosophical deliberations and debates on 
political philosophy and public policy with the leading minds of his 
generation, including commenting on the works of john Stuart Mill, Marx, 
Hegel, Darwin, T. H. Green and Bertrand Russell among others. While 
Dewey strongly disagreed with Russell on points of philosophy, as will be 
discussed in later chapters, "he sponsored Bertrand Russell's defence after 
Russell was dismissed from City College of New York for his "atheism" 
and "hedonism"" (Bullert, 1989, p. 79). 
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Dewey was known internationally for his work on governance and 
education, including in Japan, Turkey, Mexico, South Africa and Russia 
(Ryan, 1995; Schilpp & Hahn, 1939/ 1989; Westbrook, 1991). In China he 
was even considered a'second Confucius' (Ryan, 1995; Westbrook, 1991). 
In a New York Times book review, Rorty (2003) retells one example of 
Dewey's influence in China, 
Dewey's prestige in China was such that the State Department, in 1942, 
asked Dewey to write a message to be dropped from airplanes, 
encouraging the Chinese to keep on resisting the Japanese. 
Throughout his work, Dewey was concerned with, and committed to, 
studying how different individuals and cultural groups could realise their 
unique potential and collectively contribute to building society (Ryan, 
1995; Schilpp & Hahn, 1939/ 1989; Westbrook, 1991). He saw this 
pluralistic approach to democratic development as imperative in the US of 
the early 20th century, where unemployment was high, economic 
conditions were precarious, immigration was increasing, racial tensions 
were rising, and cities were rapidly expanding. Living in Chicago in the 
aftermath of the great fire of 1871, Dewey was familiar with both the 
logistics and aesthetics of city planning - especially the capacity of art and 
design to reflect and develop cultural sensibilities (Ryan, 2000). He was 
also an active participant in a range of professional associations, including 
unions and civil rights groups (Caspary, 2000; Westbrook, 1991). 
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Dewey saw his philosophy as practical; this was reflected in his 
engagement with society. He acknowledged as an important source of 
inspiration in his work, his collaboration with Jane Addams at the Hull 
House - one of the first resettlement homes for women in the US, focusing 
on social policy reform and providing services, including education and 
work programmes for underserved communities (Shields, 2003). As 
another example of Dewey's practical orientation, Ryan (2000, p. 168) 
recounts how Dewey had a small farm on Long Island where he kept 
hens. At one local reception, where Dewey was the guest of honour, a lady 
was heard to exclaim in surprise, "My goodness, it's the egg man. " 
Losing and reclaiming Deweyan pragmatism in public policy 
As is evident from even a brief synopsis of his life, Dewey was an 
influential and active citizen in his world and times. Upon his death in 
June 1952, he left behind a body of work including over 400 journal 
articles and 40 books (Center for Dewey Studies, 1961 - current). Dewey 
had also given public speeches and invited lectures, and had written 
essays, policy briefs, letters and articles in popular magazines and 
newspapers, including the New Republic and New York Times. 
Given this volume of work, it can be difficult to apprehend the scope, 
detail and progression of Dewey's philosophy. As a result, Dewey was, 
and often is, subject to criticism based on incomplete readings of his work 
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(Garrison, 2000; Ryan, 1995; Snider, 2000b). Snider (2000b, p. 489) cautions 
against a piecemeal approach to reading and applying pragmatist 
philosophy, saying, 
Peirce, James, and Dewey were not satisfied with proclaiming only a few 
of pragmatism's points. Rather, they went to great lengths to develop 
pragmatism as a comprehensive and integrated theory of thought. 
Others note that Dewey's detailed and dense writing style did not make 
matters easier in terms of facilitating the understanding and use of his 
work. Famously, US Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes is 
quoted (Westbrook, 1991, p. 341) as saying that, 
Dewey wrote as God would have spoken had He been inarticulate but 
keenly desirous to tell you how it was. 
Perhaps this was a reflection of the academic writing style of his time, or 
the expository nature of philosophical analysis in general. For my part, 
while getting acculturated to the language and logic of philosophy was 
challenging, reading John Dewey is a most rewarding experience. His 
insights are profound and well-founded, there are eminently quotable 
passages in his work, some of which are used in this thesis, and there are 
points where Dewey's writing can be laugh-out-loud funny; there is in fact 
a book titled, 'The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey' (Johnson, 1949). 
There were also far reaching changes in the worlds of politics, policy 
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science and philosophy that for a while distanced and alienated 
pragmatist philosophy from public policy-making. In US politics, these 
alienating factors included McCarthyism and the Cold War. The focus on 
war led to an emphasis in education and policy-making on building a 
scientific and technological elite. Governance shifted from coordinating 
societal planning to developing centralised leadership and focusing on 
technological 'fixes' (Snider, 2000a). This also led to increasingly 
reductionist, empiricist foci in public administration and its accompanying 
analysis (DeLeon, 1988; Fischer, 2003; Garrison, 2000; Parsons, 1995). All 
these factors contributed to policy science diverging from pragmatist 
philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. 
One notable illustration of how policy science moved away from 
pragmatist philosophy is contained within the work of Herbert Simon. To 
address the lack of theoretical underpinnings in public administration, 
Simon (1957) developed his thesis on Administrative Behavior. At the time, 
Simons approach was strongly influenced by 'logical positivism' that by 
then had achieved hegemony in the social sciences (Snider, 2000a). In this 
context, Simon developed a theory of rational decision-making that was 
'technical' in that it excluded value considerations and took an 
instrumental view of how to find efficient means to achieve pre- 
determined political ends. He also considered the determination and 
evaluation of these ends as outside the remit of rationality (Simon, 1957, 
1983). Thus, even though he extensively cited both James and Dewey and 
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claimed congruence between his thesis and Dewey's, Simon 's approach 
was incompatible with central traits of pragmatist philosophy as regards 
rationality, such as the mutually constitutive nature of means and ends 
and the integrity of facts and values (discussed in Chapter 3). Thus Snider 
(2000a, p. 346) notes that, 
It is ironic that Simon, in a work in which he claimed the sanction of 
James and Dewey, may actually have moved public administration even 
further from their pragmatism. 
Now, at the turn of the 21st century the value of classical Deweyan 
pragmatism is being rediscovered. There are also rich sources of empirical 
evidence regarding policy-making that are congruent with pragmatist 
philosophy; this evidence will be drawn on in following chapters. For 
example, there is a series of articles on the links between pragmatist 
philosophy and public administration in Administration and Society (Evans, 
2000; Garrison, 2000; Snider, 2000b). Papers in the Journal of Economic 
Methodology focussed on the relative value of pragmatist philosophy to 
other theories, for example, to better understand consumer behaviour and 
entrepreneurship (Mousavi & Garrison, 2003; Shook, 2003). Overall, Evans 
(2000, p. 309) notes a contemporary move toward "reclaiming the work of 
John Dewey as a frame for theorizing about public administration and 
public management. " 
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In turn, Dewey's work is now more accessible. For instance, reprints of his 
work, e. g. the Public and its Problems (Dewey, 1954/ 1927) and Freedom 
and Culture (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a), are increasingly available. There are 
also biographies, anthologies, articles and various other literature sources 
that are referenced throughout this thesis. As an introduction to Dewey's 
work, Alan Ryan (Warden of New College, Oxford University), a British 
political philosopher and self-confessed fan of Dewey, provides an 
informative and entertaining overview of Deweyan pragmatism (Ryan, 
1995). James Gouinlock edited a collection of Dewey's moral writings, 
which makes a very handy reference on this topic (Dewey, 1994). There 
are also anthologies of classical pragmatist writing; for example, there is a 
book edited by Thayer (1982) that includes key works by Charles Sanders 
Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. 
A range of electronic resources also catalogue and collate Dewey's works; 
most notably, the Center for Dewey Studies (Center for Dewey Studies, 
1961 - current) has compiled a thirty-seven-volume edition of Dewey's 
complete writings. The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953, 
published by the Southern Illinois University Press is divided into three 
series - Early, Middle, and Later Works; citations of EW, MW, and LW in 
the text refer to these sources. In cooperation with the InteLex 
Corporation, the Center for Dewey studies has also published a related 
Collected Works of John Dewey on CD-ROM (Boydston & Hickman, 1882- 
1953/ 1999). The ability to search Dewey's work by key words, highlight 
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sections and annotate, makes the CD-ROM an invaluable tool for research 
on Dewey and on pragmatist philosophy. 
As an aside - in the course of this PhD, I came across the website of artist 
Antony Harel who had drawn a sketch of Dewey; not coincidentally, 
Hare's father is a professor of education and a Dewey scholar. Hare kindly 
allowed his sketch, with a slogan, to be printed on T-shirts, which have 
since been worn by colleagues working on Dewey related topics. The 
sketch and slogan, (Figure 1), provided an entertaining excuse to get back 
to work on respective PhDs and also served to convey, at least 
symbolically and with a smile, a sense of solidarity with Dewey's work. 
I'd rather be with Dewey. 
Figure 1. John Dewey 
© Antony Hare 
1 www. siteway. com 
25 
The PhD approach: a personal preface 
At the conclusion of this PhD, I am left both humbled and exhilarated: 
humbled from the realisation that through the process of academic 
inquiry, I have engaged with just a minuscule part of the vast resources of 
human knowledge and understanding; humbled also upon realising that 
there is still much left to learn, particularly on how public policy can 
contribute to a way of life that supports individual and societal 
flourishing. 
There is also a sense of exhilaration from having seen the world from a 
viewpoint that I did not previously have access to - from the privileged 
position of one 'standing on the shoulders of giants', and from sharing in 
the perspectives of colleagues. There is exhilaration also on realising that, 
as does every individual, I have a unique vantage point that can be 
focused, refined and ultimately compiled in a way that contributes to the 
world of knowledge. 
The quest referred to in the title of this PhD is by its very nature one 
undertaken with reference to the academic literature. However, personal 
experiences, choices and events led to this quest and influenced the 
decisions taken en route. Recounting the entirety of my PhD experience 
would be impracticable, but saying that it was innately personal does 
correctly characterise the process. 
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First, I will speak to the tension between scientific and democratic 
considerations in policy-making that initiated this academic quest. Before 
joining the PhD programme at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, I worked at the World Health Organization (WHO). At 
WHO, I regularly interacted with policy-makers, scientists, health care 
providers, civil society groups, media professionals, private corporations 
and citizens across a range of projects and countries. Increasingly it 
became clear that, at least in health policy-making, opinions on how to 
reconcile scientific considerations and democratic sensibilities were, to say 
the least - polarised. Science without democratic sensibility was criticised 
for being removed from people's needs and values; democratic 
propositions made without scientific sense were eschewed as ideological; 
and public policy-making was seen as compromising both scientific sense 
and democratic sensibility. These different considerations did, on 
occasion, come together. When different groups were able to share 
perspectives, develop understandings and coordinate on action significant 
policy advances could be made. One reason I decided to do a PhD was to 
learn about how to more systematically facilitate this type of inclusive and 
results-oriented participation in policy-making. 
For example, reflecting on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
as one of the most successful and far-reaching public health policy 
negotiations in history, the then WHO Director General noted that, 
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Social scientists, economists, public health experts, women's groups and 
lawyers have worked with us for the last three years delivering accurate 
information to the treaty-making process, and taken public health science 
and research into the highest levels of political decision making 
(Brundtland, 2001). 
In other instances, however, different groups were not as well aligned. In 
my experience at WHO, policy-makers and experts expressed concerns 
about the basis on which different civil society organisations (CSOs) 
attended WHO meetings and the legitimacy of their agendas. Policy- 
makers, civil society organisations and academics raised concerns over 
WHO's judgements, for example in the World Health Report 2000 on what 
constituted 'goodness' and 'fairness' as desired qualities of health systems, 
and the basis on which decisions were made to compare countries. 
As for the involvement of the general public in decisions that affected 
their lives, the WHO Constitution (1946) states that, 
An informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are 
of the utmost importance in the improvement of the health of the people. 
How exactly this type of cooperation is to be achieved, however, was not 
clear. There was little agreement on strategies for participation or on the 
evidence on the costs and effectiveness of these strategies. There was also 
growing concern about the systemic spread of poorly articulated and 
uncritically adopted normative prescriptions for participation in policy- 
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making (Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Smith et al., 2003; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; 
Crawford, Rutter, Manley, Weaver et al., 2002). 
The private sector was often vilified, particularly as related to 
pharmaceutical firms' involvement in academic research and in policy 
lobbies on tobacco-related issues. However, in other instances, Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) were considered an innovative mode of health 
research and policy implementation (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005). I was 
closely involved with a project, the Health InterNetwork, which was 
explicitly set up as a PPP in the UN Millennium Development Initiative 
(Kuruvilla, Dzenowagis, Pleasant, Dwivedi et al., 2004). This project aimed 
to make best use of both public and private sector resources to support 
health systems by facilitating more equitable access to communication 
technologies and sources of health information. 
There was also dissension with respect to the conduct and utilisation of 
health research; for instance, 'science wars' (Jasanoff, 2000) between 
researchers espousing different worldviews or using quantitative or 
qualitative methodologies. Another project I was involved with at the 
WHO set out to understand how research evidence was utilised by policy- 
makers, health care providers, the mass media and the general public. The 
observed trend that spurred this work was that despite established 
evidence of cost-effective health interventions that could significantly 
prevent morbidity and mortality around the world, these interventions 
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were often not adequately taken up in policy and practice (Haines, 
Kuruvilla & Borchert, 2004). How to better understand and improve the 
linkages between science and wider society was another question I 
wanted to address in the PhD. 
Then, of course, there were ethical concerns related to policy-making. 
Ethics are a formal consideration in research proposals, institutional 
review processes and medico-legal decisions. However, the extent to 
which ethical and moral considerations were explicitly incorporated into 
the wider range of decisions made in health policy was less clear. 
Through these experiences and the accompanying questions that they 
raised, I was struck by how diverse perspectives need to be taken into 
account in order to make policies 'work'; rather than privileging any one 
perspective over another. 
Towards the middle of 2003, with the different projects that I was working 
on coming to a close, a new WHO Director General elected, organisational 
restructuring imminent, and my having more questions than answers on 
the theory and practice of policy-making, the time seemed right to leave 
for a PhD. 
One of my options was to wait a year to apply for grants, and another 
alternative was to figure out a work-study approach. However, by the end 
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of 2003, armed with some savings, I decided to start a PhD; a decision that 
I have since said has been excellent for my perspective, even if it wasn't so 
good for my purse. Methodologically, this gave me more flexibility; I was 
able to explore and chart an exploratory and developmental research 
course, something not always possible with a grant for a specific research 
project. I was also very fortunate to be able to work on projects and 
consultancies closely related to my thesis during this PhD, including for 
the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) and as a Research Fellow at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). These projects informed the 
development of this PhD, and vice versa. 
I was also most fortunate with regards to my supervisor, Nick Mays, with 
whom I found common ground early on in a shared repudiation of an 
elitist version of the 'two communities' approach in policy-making, 
particularly with respect to scientists' evidence-based 'prescriptions' for 
the same. These early discussions led to a commentary that we were 
commissioned to write for The Lancet; in it, we argued that, 
Although science provides a reliable source of knowledge in society, the 
dichotomy between the rational, or scientific, and the social is untenable. 
Science is a social enterprise with social implications, and social processes 
have rationality-e. g., in setting standards to evaluate success and guide 
practice (Kuruvilla & Mays, 2005, pp. 1417-1418). 
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This view of rationality - as a shared characteristic across the spheres of 
state, science and society, laid the foundation upon which this thesis was 
built. 
Methods and `Muße' 
This PhD was informed and developed by a range of methods, including 
primary research, multi-disciplinary collaborative work and iterative 
conceptual development. As discussed in preceding sections, one of the 
main objectives of this thesis was to address the need for more holistic, 
explanatory and normative theories of policy-making. Questions were 
occasionally raised during the PhD, on the extent to which theories could 
be both explanatory and normative. The following discussion on the 
philosophical and methodological foundations for building such 
integrative theory helps establish the basis on which such an endeavour 
was undertaken in this PhD. 
On developing explanatory and normative theory 
In the International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Bohman 
(2001) describes the nature of critical theory, and critical social inquiry in 
general, as necessarily comprising both explanatory and normative 
dimensions. 
Critical social theorists generally aim at constructing social theories that 
link explanation and criticism and thus have both normative and 
previous explanatory features. Furthermore, such previous theories must 
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also be 'practical, ' in the specific sense that they are oriented to human 
emancipation. As such, the best such works employ a variety of methods 
and styles of explanation and are often interdisciplinary in their mode of 
research. While thus methodologically and theoretically pluralistic in 
orientation, critical theorists provide two general answers to the question 
of what makes a form of social inquiry or a previous theory critical. The 
first is that it employs a distinctive comprehensive previous theory that 
unifies such diverse approaches and explanations and underwrites the 
epistemic authority of the critic. The second is practical... critical inquiry 
aims at creating the reflective conditions necessary for its own public and 
practical verification. As new forms of critical previous theory emerge 
related to racism, sexism and colonialism, reflective social agents test and 
transform even democratic ideals and practices in the interest of 
increasing human freedom and emancipation. 
This view on critical social inquiry is closely aligned with John Dewey's 
philosophical stance on empiricism and theoretical development. 
Pragmatism is an extension of historical empiricism with this 
fundamental difference, that it does not insist on antecedent phenomena, 
but on consequent phenomena, not upon precedents, but upon the 
possibilities of action. And this change in point of view is almost 
revolutionary in its consequences. An empiricism which is content with 
repeating facts already past has no place for possibility and for liberty 
(Dewey, 1925/1999, p. LW. 2.13). 
Goldkuhl and Cronholm (2003) discuss a'multi-grounded methodology' 
for theory development that addresses the limitations of inductive or 
deductive approaches alone. Deductive approaches apply established 
theories to analyse new situations; however, one problem with this 
approach is that new characteristics of situations may not be taken into 
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account or may be made to 'fit' within existing theoretical frameworks. 
Inductive approaches develop theory through analysis of empirical data in 
a particular context (c. f. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Inductive, or grounded, 
theory has also been criticised, but for being too 'introverted' and failing 
to contextualise new theoretical developments with existing theories. 
Multi-grounded theory development is an iterative approach of 
developing theory through the synthesis of related inductive and 
deductive perspectives (Figure 2) [which probably reflects social scientists' 
practice in the round]. 
Figure 2. A multi-grounded approach to theory development 
Thesis Antithesis 





(Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2003) 
With respect to inductive or grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 
65) introduced the concept of theoretical saturation, which is achieved 
when: 
No additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can develop 
properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over 
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again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is 
saturated. 
The concept of theoretical saturation could be usefully extended to the 
synthesis level of multi-grounded theory development, as was the case in 
this thesis. 
A related approach to multi-grounded theory, the realist review, 
underpinned the research proposal for this thesis (as presented in an 
'upgrading document' to the thesis advisory committee - constituted by a 
sociologist, a political scientist, a health services researcher/ geographer 
and a social scientist/ health policy expert. ). 
The realist review has its roots in both philosophy and social science and 
is positioned in the middle of the spectrum between relativist and 
positivist approaches to research synthesis (Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey 
& Walshe, 2005; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). It seeks to explicate the theories 
and assumptions that underlie complex social interactions and policy 
interventions. The realist review is useful to help develop a meta-theory, 
or overarching framework, that pulls together explanations from different 
disciplines and contexts. Other research synthesis methods, such as the 
systematic review used in health research, focus on analysing specific 
factors that influence specific health interventions across contexts and 
times, an approach that may not usefully translate to understanding what 
works (or does not) in complex social and policy interventions. 
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The realist review recognises that complex social and policy interventions 
rarely can be repeated in exactly the same circumstances, in the same way, 
and to the same effect. So rather than focussing on the question: 'Does it 
work? ' the realist review tries to answer the question: 'What works for 
whom, how, and in what circumstances? ' The realist review aims to 
synthesise both qualitative and quantitative evidence to identify the 
overarching mechanisms that explain the success or failure of social and 
policy interventions; for example on facilitating scientist and civil society 
participation in health policy-making. The principles thus generated can 
guide future implementation and be further tested through research 
(Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey & Walshe, 2005; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). 
Revisiting the thesis methods at the conclusion of the PhD, particularly in 
relation to theory development, elements of critical social inquiry, multi- 
grounded theory and realist review were all incorporated, both at the 
stage of the thesis research proposal and as analysed in an ex-post 
descriptive sense. 
Multi-disciplinary collaborations and Muße 
My thinking has been influenced by a range of colleagues and projects 
during this PhD. 
John Dewey asserted that, 
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Ideas which are not communicated, shared and reborn in expression are 
but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought. It, like 
the acquisition of material wealth, marks a diversion of the wealth created 
by associated endeavour and exchange to private ends. It is more genteel, 
and it is called more noble. But there is no difference in kind (Dewey, 
1954/ 1927, p. 218). 
I sincerely hope that the communication, compilation and expression of 
ideas in this thesis sufficiently acknowledges the diverse perspectives 
from colleagues, and in the literature, that have influenced my thinking 
during the PhD process. It is also hoped that my synthesis of these ideas 
and experiences and the resultant analysis can contribute something 
useful to the world of knowledge. 
With reference to method, the general approach in this PhD could be 
described as one of Muße (pronounced 'mooz-uh'), which is a German 
concept with apparently no accurate translation in English. It involves 
having the leisure to experience and explore, before formalising thought 
(which in this case, was a kind of immersion in a primordial soup of 
academic ideas and interactions). At times, this is very much what this 
PhD felt like, with no clear indication, or guarantee, of the final form it 
would take. This approach was a little disconcerting, and much more 
challenging to describe than the more traditionally described process of 
moving from aa research question, through methods, data collection and 
analysis and finally to a write-up. However, this developmental approach 
allowed for greater openness to exploration in the 'old-fashioned' sense of 
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scholarship, and also demanded some creativity and innovation in the 
synthesis of diverse ideas and perspectives. 
Looking back, developing an integrative concept of rationality without 
reference to John Dewey's work seems unthinkable. Yet being introduced 
to his work was serendipitous; though I prefer to view this as a case of 
being academically prepared, as in Pasteur's aphorism that "Chance 
favours the prepared mind". The introduction to Dewey came via a pile of 
books in the Goodenough College2 library with titles that corresponded 
closely to topics I was working on, but by authors with whom I was not 
familiar. 
These books belonged to Philipp Dorstewitz, who was doing his PhD in 
Philosophy at the London School of Economics (LSE). His PhD focused on 
developing John Dewey's work as an epistemological foundation for 
agency and planning. We started talking and soon saw that philosophical 
and policy analyses could be mutually informative on the topic of rational 
agency. We collaborated on a paper, "Reviewing rationality: a pragmatist 
perspective on policy and planning processes". This paper was presented 
at a conference on philosophy and management in Oxford on the 8th of 
July 2005. This was one day after the London bombings, which lent a 
sense of import to discussions at the conference regarding the need for an 
integrative and normative approach to rational decision-making. This 
2A multidisciplinary residence hall for post-graduates in Bloomsbury, London. 
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paper, which introduced an early version of the Decision Cell model, was 
also favourably peer reviewed and published (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 
2007). This collaboration, and ongoing dialogue, on rationality and 
pragmatism, provided the philosophical and epistemological foundation 
for this thesis. 
This new pragmatist theory of rational agency was applied to health 
policy in order to make the philosophical framework operative3 in this 
context and to test the Decision Cell model against contemporary 
theoretical and empirical policy analyses. This process of application and 
testing led to further development of the theory, as did the other 
conceptual and empirical work undertaken during the course of this PhD, 
including further primary readings of pragmatist philosophy. The main 
projects and collaborations undertaken during this PhD, that informed the 
development of the Decision Cell model, are described below. 
Many of the operative examples discussed in relation to the health policy 
and the key pragmatist tenets in this thesis, were identified in a review I 
was commissioned to do by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 
The Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) coordinates the Civil 
Society Partnerships Programme at ODI, funded by DFID, which aims to 
3 The word 'operative', rather than 'practical' or 'operational', is used here based on the 
Oxford English Dictionary (http: //dictionary. oed. com) definition of operative as "having 
the power to produce effects; productive of something. (Law) ... that which expresses the 
intention to effect the transaction concerned. 
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improve the capacity of civil society organizations to influence pro-poor 
policy. As part of the ODI Working Paper series, I wrote a paper on how 
civil society can participate in, and influence, health research and policy 
(Kuruvilla, 2005). 1 worked with Julius Court at ODI, and with peer 
reviewers, to develop this paper. An earlier version of the Decision Cell 
model was also published in this working paper and readers provided 
valuable feedback that informed the further development of the model. 
The ODI work also included compiling an annotated bibliography on 
'methods, mechanisms and measures of civil society participation in 
health research and policy, ' highlighting experiences across a range of 
high, mid and lower income countries (Efthymiades & Kuruvilla, 2005). 
Another collaboration undertaken in this thesis was with respect to 
explicating standards for participation and accountability in policy- 
making, which was done from the perspective of human rights and 
international law. An early concern in this PhD, as previously discussed, 
was the widespread dissension on the definition of, and requirements for, 
participation in policy-making. To address this issue, it made sense to start 
with established definitions and standards on participation as set out in 
human rights treaties, particularly since a majority of countries had 
ratified these in international law. To explicate and synthesise these 
standards, I collaborated with Amarjit Singh, from the Department of Law 
at the LSE. Human rights standards and other normative frameworks for 
policy-making, such as the Accountability for Reasonableness framework 
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(Daniels & Sabin, 1998), are analysed in Chapter 7 with reference to the 
new model of rational policy-making developed in this thesis. 
In addition to the projects and collaborations discussed so far, I was also 
invited as an observer to a Swiss government publiforum, a mechanism 
being developed and tested by the Swiss government where citizens, 
scientists and policy-makers deliberate on the policy implications of 
various issues, in this case biotechnology and "research on humans". 
Sergio Bellucci, Director of the Swiss Technology Assessment programme, 
coordinated this project. I also worked with Johan Siebel a manager at 
Shell Corporation, who was trained as a philosopher, on looking at the 
application of management techniques to public sector decision-making, 
including scenario development, which is discussed in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. 
Some of the thesis influences were also dialogical. Nick Goodwin and 
Justin Parkhurst, respectively senior lecturer and lecturer at LSHTM, who 
were on my thesis advisory committee, provided strategic advice on the 
PhD process and valuable feedback on drafts of this thesis, which shaped 
its final form. Similarly, conversations with Steve Harney, Senior 
Research Fellow at the Health Economics Group in Brunel University also 
influenced the thinking in this thesis, particularly as related to the 
organisation of health research systems and analysis of research 
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utilisation. Steve also provided constructive feedback on earlier drafts of 
this thesis. 
Empirical work 
In addition to the literature review, conceptual and theoretical work, there 
were also two main pieces of empirical analysis, or primary research, 
conducted during this PhD. One study was an analysis of the impact of 
health services and policy research conducted at LSHTM. As a Research 
Fellow, I collaborated with Nick Mays, Professor of Health Policy, and Gill 
Walt, then Head of the Department of Public Health and Policy, on this 
analysis (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007). There were two publications 
from this project and the paper on developing a Research Impact 
Framework (Kuruvilla, Mays, Pleasant & Walt, 2006), additionally 
included collaboration with Andrew Pleasant, Assistant Professor at 
Rutgers University, particularly as related to health literacy and science 
communication. 
The second project was a review of UNICEF and civil society organisation 
(CSO) partnerships. I was one of two external consultants on this review, 
along with Anne Bernard, a consultant from Canada. This project was 
developed in collaboration with Peter Crowley, Director of the Office of 
Public Partnerships at UNICEF, Simon Lawry-White and Xavier Foulquier 
at the UNICEF Evaluation Office, and the Review Steering Group that 
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comprised senior management at UNICEF Headquarters and Country 
Offices (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). 
The research proposal for this PhD included seeking grants to undertake 
both the conceptual development and related empirical work. A couple of 
grant proposals submitted for an overarching project were unsuccessful, 
given the largely exploratory and theoretical approach of the project, 
which is relatively uncommon in the health field. Funding for individual 
'bits' of the project was easier to acquire, for example, explicitly based on a 
presentation of my thesis work, I was contacted by ODI to do a literature 
review and develop a working paper on civil society participation related 
to health research and policy. 
In this context, the thesis advisory committee recommended applying for 
grants for empirical studies on civil society organisation and scientist links 
with policy-making. It was clear that in the course of a PhD, no single 
study would, or could, cover all the aspects of this thesis. Nevertheless it 
was thought that any studies on the general topic of different groups' 
interactions with policy-making would provide opportunities to analyse, 
test and inform the key aspects of the conceptual development in the 
thesis. 
Around this time, UNICEF put out a call for proposals to analyse the 
organisation's partnerships with CSOs. I submitted a concept note, as 
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required, based on the thesis framework completed till that point 
(including an earlier version of the Decision Cell model that was 
published in the ODI working paper). I also requested that the UNICEF 
analysis could be used in my PhD; this proposal was accepted. 
With the LSHTM study on 'scoping' the impact of health policy research, 
again I was contacted explicitly because I was working on this topic in my 
PhD. The LSHTM Ethics Committee and the LSHTM Senior Management 
Team reviewed the project proposal. Further, I explicitly sought 
permission from the ethics committee and the project respondents to use 
the analysis in my thesis. 
Similarly the opportunity to discuss private perspectives arose from thesis 
work as well. For instance, the opportunity to discuss scenario 
development and Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives with Johan 
Siebel from Shell Corporation arose as a result of the presentation on 
pragmatist rationality at Oxford University (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 
2005b). 
Thus the projects undertaken in this PhD were explicitly done so in 
relation to the thesis. Empirical studies are sometimes undertaken to test 
aspects of a previously established theory. However, at other times a 
theoretical model develops as a product of literature reviews, empirical 
work and conceptual analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Goldkuhl & 
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Cronholm, 2003; Yin, 1994); in the case of this thesis, these studies both 
informed, and were informed by, the ongoing theoretical development in 
an iterative process. 
Limitations of scope and sectoral focus 
Given the range of conceptual ground covered in this thesis, beyond 
policy science, pragmatist philosophy and health policy, the extent to 
which the literature from other fields is drawn on is necessarily limited, 
for example with reference to political science, decision studies, 
development studies, participation literature and feminist critiques of the 
same, sociology, the sociology of scientific knowledge etc. References to 
other fields are made to indicate areas of congruence or dissension, and to 
highlight potential linkages for further multidisciplinary work. 
The scope of this thesis is further limited in that analytical examples are 
primarily drawn from health policy. John (1998, pp. 7-8) notes that a key 
development in policy analysis arose from Lowi's sectoral focus on policy- 
making. 
However, it is not the exact application of Lowi's typology that is 
important, but the idea that each policy sector should be studied in its 
own right and that it has a unique politics of its own. The change today is 
that ... 
books on education, crime and the economy [now include] studies 
on the politics of education and crime and managing the economy ... 
Each sector has a unique combination of technological attributes; 
problems to be solved; demands of managing the policy; and the 
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combinations of producer and consumer interests groups that conflict or 
cooperate to achieve common or group-based goals. There is also 
variation caused by the history of past decisions and programmes that 
affect current policy choices. 
For instance with respect to private sector considerations discussed in this 
thesis, Public Private Partnerships, Corporate Social Responsibility, the 
implication of growing corporate influence, and the changing nature of 
production may be relevant across social policy fields. However, issues 
related to private sector involvement in health care, for example through 
Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) in the US, or with respect to 
the need for the public sector to mitigate externalities in health services 
provision, or with respect to the role of the pharmaceutical industry, are 
issues that are more specific to health policy. 
Developing a thesis outline 
To regroup, this thesis proposes that the concept of rationality, as defined 
in pragmatist philosophy, provides common ground to develop an 
integrative theory of policy-making and that pragmatist philosophy 
provides an empirically congruent, normative and operative foundation 
for this purpose. 
A range of different projects and perspectives informed the development 
of this thesis. Deciding how to write the thesis in a cohesive way was 
therefore a challenge. Given the range of philosophical and theoretical 
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issues covered, no single empirical study was sufficient to address all of 
the issues raised, therefore, a range of resources in the literature, from 
health policy, political philosophy, policy science and sociology, had to be 
drawn on to inform, illustrate and help develop key concepts. During the 
course of this PhD, papers on some of the individual studies and projects 
were published. This presented the opportunity to draw on these analyses 
as additional sources in the literature. Ultimately, the new model of 
rational public policy developed in this thesis, the Decision Cell model, 
served as framework to bring together the individual strands of 
conceptual and empirical work. 
The following chapter outline serves as a 'roadmap' to the development 
and organisation of the thesis: 
" Chapter 2. There is no 'point' in decision-making: rethinking rationality 
in policy processes & participation. Chapter 2 reviews the notion of 
'rationality' in policy processes and participation, and highlights 
the need for a 'rethink' in policy theory and practice. The main 
proposition that rationality provides common ground to build a 
more integrative and normative theory of policy-making is also 
established. 
" Chapter 3. A pragmatist reconstruction of rationality. In Chapter 3, the 
concept of rationality is reconstructed and redefined based on key 
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tenets of pragmatist philosophy, drawing particularly on John 
Dewey's work. 
Building on this reconstructed concept of rationality and to make the 
philosophical concepts more operative, a new model of policy-making - 
the Decision Cell model - is developed over the course of three chapters. 
Mechanisms and methods, related to health policy-making, that 
correspond to key concepts in the model, are also highlighted. 
" Chapter 4. The Decision Cell Model (I): dealing with indeterminate 
situations & coordinating rational agency. 
" Chapter 5. The Decision Cell Model (II): the decision activities of Define, 
Design & Realise. 
" Chapter 6. The Decision Cell Model (III): Deliberation and 'good' policy 
theory. The focus in this chapter is on the role of deliberation, norms 
and moral imagination in policy-making, which lie at the core of 
the Decision Cell model. In this chapter, the Decision Cell model is 
also analysed with reference to the feminist critiques of deliberative 
theories and criteria for 'good policy theory' set out by Lasswell 
(1951), Sabatier (1999) and Fischer (2003). 
" Chapter 7. Comparing norms and ethics for health policy. Chapter 7 uses 
the Decision Cell model to structure an analysis of key normative 
and ethics frameworks related to health policy-making, including 
Accountability for Reasonableness (Daniels & Sabin, 1998), the UK 
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Cabinet Office's Professional Decision-making Competencies 
(Cabinet Office, 1999), the Capability and Health Account (Ruger, 
2006), the Ethics Framework for Public Health (Kass, 2001), Good 
Decisions Criteria reviewed in the context of environmental policy 
(Dietz, 2003), and Human Rights standards on participation and 
accountability in public affairs (UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007). 
" Chapter 8. Conclusion: advantages, challenges & looking forward. The 
concluding chapter of this thesis discusses the advantages and 
challenges likely to be faced in applying the Decision Cell model 
and highlights examples where a pragmatist approach to rational 
policy-making has been successfully applied. 
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There is no `point' in decision-making: rethinking rationality in policy 
processes & participation 
The relationship between science and society should not be about the search for 
universal solutions and institutional fixes, but rather the development of an open 
and critical discussion between researchers, policymakers and citizens. 
Alan Irwin, 2001, Constructing the scientific citizen: 
Science and democracy in the biosciences 
In decision-centered models, the climax of the entire process is a dramatic 
moment of political decision. 
John Friedman, 1973, Retracking America: a theory of transactive planning 
All those who participate in policy-making, from the spheres of state, 
science, civil society and the private sector, would prefer that their 
requirements and contributions be considered rational, rather than 
irrational. Rationality can thus provide a common plane for policy 
interaction. However, when different socio-political spheres interact, 
rather than resonate, as with the Pythagorean music of the spheres, there 
is often discord. Conflicting claims of 'scientific sense' and 'democratic 
sensibility' are made and there is further disagreement on whether 
morality should feature in rational decision-making. 
The predominant conception of rationality in policy-making is an 
intellectual approach employed to determine the best means to address 
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identified problems and meet defined goals or ends. This 'means-ends' or 
'linear instrumental' concept of rationality is outlined in Figure 3. 





e. g. evidence 








The 'linear instrumental', means-ends, model of rationality is rooted in the 
Humean or 'folk psychology' model of rational agency. Hume (1739-40/ 
1994) considered that 'passion' was "an original existence". He posited 
that actions were purely initiated or driven by passions, not by reason, 
therefore, 
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them (Hume, 1739-40/ 
1994, p. 119). 
This 'Humean', linear instrumental, understanding of rational agency has 
been taken up in various forms, including in 'stages' models of policy- 
making, utility maximising models in economics and ethics, and in 
technical, or procedural, rationality models of policy-making (Mousavi & 
Garrison, 2003; Sabatier, 1999; Simon, 1957; Singer, 1994). 
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The linear instrumental approach to rationality can be summarised as 
being based on four main intuitions (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 2007): 
i. Passions, preferences and 'ends' precede and initiate rational 
agency. They are therefore established and defined before 
determining the means to their realisation and the consequences of 
these means. Constraints to achieving ends are also 'given', though 
they may need to be identified through rational inquiry. 
ii. Rationality does not influence what ends, passions and purposes 
are pursued. It only informs what means should be employed to 
attain them. In this scenario, 'values' are associated with ends and 
'facts' are associated with means; thus, facts and values are 
considered independent of each other, as in the 'fact-value' 
dichotomy. 
iii. In a linear instrumental approach to rationality, agents (and offices) 
can be separated according to the demands of different stages or 
tasks. For example, policy problems and preferences, which are 
outside the remit of rationality in this model, are identified by 
politicians or citizens' preferences. Scientists and experts employ 
rational methods to examine evidence, constraints and the 
feasibility of addressing these problems and preferences. Policy- 
makers, at some authoritative decision point, select suitable policy 
'means', which are then implemented by bureaucrats and 
implementing agencies in order to meet the pre-defined 'ends'. 
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iv. A central decision point distinguishes earlier perceptual and 
preparatory stages (where problems and purposes are identified 
and strategies considered) from later action, implementation and 
evaluation stages. This progression imputes a transition from 
passive orientation to a problem to active implementation to 
resolve it. 
Problems with linear instrumental or means-ends rationality 
The linear instrumental view of rationality is far removed from much 
contemporary philosophical, theoretical and empirical understanding. So 
much so, that 'rationality bashing' has become a popular sport. 
Academics, from different disciplines, attack different aspects of 
rationality and provide alternative empirical explanations and normative 
positions. Politicians and civil society groups put forward alternative, 
rational views that include practical, political and moral considerations. 
Examples of this type of dissension are seen in making the case for, or 
against, going to war or policy debates on climate change. 
A first step in building a more integrative and empirically congruent and 
morally oriented model of rational policy-making, is to review the main 
problems with the predominant linear instrumental model. A pragmatist 
reconstruction of rationality can then help integrate those aspects of linear 
instrumental rationality that remain standing, as well as build on the 
abundance of theoretical and empirical insights that have been developed 
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as alternatives. Some of the main problems with the linear instrumental 
model of rationality are discussed below, building on a related discussion 
in the paper on reconstructing rationality (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 2007). 
i. Ends as external to rationality. In linear instrumental rationality, ends are 
set apart, or external, to rational deliberation. Evaluating the nature and 
worth of 'ends' themselves is not considered to be part of reasoning, or 
rationality; notably, this position was held by both Bertrand Russell (1954) 
and Herbert Simon (1983), 
Reason has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies the choice of 
the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing 
whatever to do with the choice of ends (Russell, 1954, p. viii). 
Reason is wholly instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can 
tell us how to get there. It is a gun for hire that can be employed in the 
service of any goals we have, good or bad (Simon, 1983, pp. 7-8). 
Elster (1991) discusses how ends and desires that are not subject to 
rational deliberation can be perverse, as they are not based on assessing 
the merits of these desires. To illustrate this point, he recounts the fable of 
Aesop's fox who, upon unsuccessfully trying to reach a much desired 
bunch of grapes, mitigated his disappointment by deciding that the 
"grapes were sour". Conversely the "grass is greener on the other side of the 
fence" syndrome is continually associated with desires that are always 
beyond reach (Elster, 1991). There are thus serious implications of using 
decision models based on linear instrumental rationality, where ends and 
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preferences are taken as given, a common practice in economics. If 'given 
and unexamined desires can be perverse, finding ways to gratify them, 
may neither be in anyone's interest nor a rational exercise according to a 
wider view of rationality. 
Ends also evolve, and to keep with the phraseology of 'the grapes must 
have been sour' and 'the grass is greener on the other side of the fence', 
one could term this concept of ends as 'getting to like foreign food'. While the 
idea of trying sushi, or a hamburger, may at first seem abhorrent to some 
people, it is often the case that on trying these foods, people can develop 
an appreciation and taste for them. Here again, ends cannot be taken as 
'given' or'fixed'. 
Dewey (1994) referred to evolving ends as "ends-in-view" (further 
discussed in Chapter 3). To explain this concept, Dewey used the example 
of having the 'end' of meeting a romantic partner. Finding a partner, or 
getting married, however, then becomes a means to some other ends, 
perhaps of having children or a particular type of home life. Thus, for the 
purposes of the current discussion, the concept of 'ends-in-view' could be 
characterised, in a somewhat politically incorrect turn of phrase, as, ' Got 
the guy/gal, now what? ' 
ii. The fact-value/ objective-subjective divide. The distinction between'value- 
driven, irrational' political stages and 'value-free, rational' technical stages 
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of policy-making drawn in linear instrumental models is another problem. 
The impracticability and implications of trying to separate facts and 
values are highlighted in de Leori s (1988) analysis of US policy-making 
failures during the Vietnam War. The 1960s were considered the epitome 
of 'rational' decision-making in the United States. The 'objective' nature of 
the logistical or strategic modelling concealed the 'subjective', political 
and social assumptions that shaped these exercises. This approach also 
failed to take into account less commensurable, 'subjective' differences in 
socio-political values and cultural norms between the US and Vietnam 
and this, in part, contributed to the strategic defeat of the US in this war. 
Further, the widespread protests against the Vietnam War were primarily 
based on moral objections, a further 'value' dimension that had not 
figured in the strategic calculations. In this context, the notion of 
rationality as the 'value-free and technical' pursuit of ends led Garrison 
(2000) to observe that, 
The separation of means from ends in the name of more scientific 
management is a moral disaster from which the United States, along with 
most other Western democracies, has yet to recover (Garrison, 2000, pp. 
468-469). 
iii. Pre-allocation of specific actors to stages. Linear instrumental models tend 
to allocate specific actors to different policy stages. This detracts attention 
from the wide range of actors and their interactions across a spectrum of 
policy-making processes, from setting policy agendas to influencing 
policy formulation, carrying out implementation and effecting and 
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evaluating societal change (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Ham & Hill, 1993). 
Further, the roles, interests and nature of involvement of actors may 
change during policy processes. For example: someone may be an expert 
in one policy area, but not another; or, actors' affiliations may change 
when new information becomes available. 
iv. Central decision point. The focus on a single, central decision point 
further distorts an understanding of policy-making, which comprises a 
series of decisions made throughout the process. For example, policy 
research clearly shows that the formulation of policy ends and the 
implementation of means cannot be taken as given or automatic, as these 
stages also involve appraisal, negotiation and decision-making by a range 
of agents (Kingdon, 1995; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). For example, 
'non-scientist' groups (politicians, citizens and bureaucrats) would reject 
the notion that their requirements are somehow 'pre-rational' or that 
policy implementation is somehow 'post-rational" - against the view that 
only expert deliberation on means leading to a central decision point 
involves rationality (Kuruvilla & Mays, 2005; Wynne, 2003). 
v. Dichotomies of intellect and emotion, mind and body, science and morals. 
Finally, by primarily focusing on the intellectual aspects of rational 
agency, the physical, emotional and socio-political dimensions of rational 
agency are neglected. In the book "Descartes' error", Antonio Damasio 
(2006), a professor of neuroscience, neurology and psychology, draws on a 
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range of empirical research to emphasise the integrated nature of human 
experience and rational agency. Mind cannot exist or operate without 
body and the survival of the body, in turn, depends on the mind. 
Rationality and emotion, rather than being discrete, separate forces, are 
both integrated in, and integral to, decision-making. Damasio discusses a 
case where a person with the frontal lobe of his brain removed, an area of 
the brain associated with emotion, was unable to make reasoned 
decisions. 
Damasio (2006) also takes an evolutionary perspective on rationality in 
which humans initially relied on biological regulation and instinct to 
guide action, and then considered more complex environmental, 
emotional and intellectual processes as their concerns extended to more 
distal and complex problems and prospects. These considerations 
included those of social life and meeting the challenges of living in 
complex, interconnected and changing environments. Failure to 
appreciate the integrated nature of rational agency and the interplay 
between mind and body, passion and reason, Damasio says, was 
Descartes' error (an error also made by Plato, Hume, Russell, Simon and 
several others since then who have propagated dichotomies and 
reductionism that lead to fragmented understandings of human 
experience and agency). 
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By contrast, John Dewey's work was an overarching project in the 
reconstruction of philosophy to integrate understandings of difference 
facets of human experience (Dewey, 1939/1989b). He explicitly recognised 
that both knowledge and emotion were involved in rational agency. He 
also emphasised that agency had moral implications, in that it had 
consequences and influenced human flourishing. He recommended that 
philosophy should employ a more scientific approach to developing 
knowledge, that science should be guided by a philosophical 
understanding of human nature, and that moral development was integral 
to both philosophy and science. Dewey saw that it was only through an 
appreciation of the integrated nature of experience that human beings 
could successfully act with integrity, and ensure the flourishing of 
individuals, societies and the world itself. 
Rationality in policy theory 
In policy theory, one manifestation of the linear instrumental concept of 
rationality is the seemingly ubiquitous linear 'stages' model or heuristic. 
Policy-making is commonly depicted as comprising distinct stages of 
policy agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation and 
evaluation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Sabatier, 1999). Central to the stages 
models is a climactic decision 'point', to, and from which, all-else flows. 
Friedman (1973, p. 68) describes decision-centred models as entailing 
three basic activities: Diagnosis & study of alternatives and consequences, 
Decision-making and Implementation. These three policy activities are 
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respectively attributed to three institutionalised bodies of agency: 
Planning, Politics and Administration. 'Preferences' of different groups 
and technical plans made by experts are subject to definitive and 
authoritative judgements by 'political' agents. Implementation is then 
mainly a matter of administering policies as per political directives and 
may also include evaluative activities (Friedman, 1973 p. 69). The point or 
moment of decision-making by the political agent thus gains an almost 
autonomous status in these models. 
Much contemporary policy theory and empirical analysis explicitly 
repudiates the linear instrumental or stages model of policy-making. For 
example, analyses show that policy agenda setting, rather than getting 
predefined 'ends' and problems into policy-making, involves a range of 
decisions, such as on how issues are framed, and this has implications for 
other related processes in policy-making (Kingdon, 1995; Roth, Dunsby & 
Bero, 2003). US policy-making on facilitating access for people with 
disabilities to buildings and public spaces is an apt illustration; this issue 
had at least two policy 'frames', as a transportation problem and as a civil 
rights problem (Kingdon, 1995; Richardson, 2002). These different frames 
had very different implications for related policy processes, participation 
and outcomes. 
The idea that implementation follows from a central decision-point 
without further decision-making is also untenable. The now classic 1960s 
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and 70s studies of bureaucrats' and managers' interactions at 'street-level' 
establish that there is ongoing, discretionary decision-making in 
implementing or administrating policies and programs (Lipsky, 1976; 
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Discretionary decisions can render policy 
processes and outcomes quite different to those envisaged at some 
political 'decision point'. 
Policy-making activities may also occur concurrently rather than in stages. 
For example, in Kingdon's (1995) analysis of policy-making in US health 
and transport sectors, he observed that policy-making occurred in 
concurrent streams of activity related to 'problem', 'policy' and 'politics' 
that intersected through 'windows of opportunity' leading to policy 
change. Even if policy-making activities or stages do occur separately, 
they may not necessarily follow a linear chronological sequence. For 
example, policy formulation may precede policy agenda setting when 
'solutions seek problems' to which they can be applied, as in the 'garbage- 
can' model of policy-making (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 
1995). 
Policy formulation may also be a post hoc formalisation of a range of 
policy-related processes and practice. An analysis of tuberculosis control 
strategies in different countries indicated that concepts and strategies that 
were finally codified in international health policy had been developed 
and adopted in practice prior to that point (Cliff, Walt & Nhatave, 2004). 
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Related practice had been developed through formal and informal 
networks of health researchers, policy-makers, practitioners and a range of 
other actors from the private and public sectors communicating within 
and across countries. Policy changes thus evolved from activities across a 
range of policy-related processes and networks rather than stemming 
from a central decision point or agent. 
The idea of a central 'point' decision taken by a political office thus 
detracts attention from the range of decisions made by a range of actors in 
the course of policy-making. This also inhibits analysis and coordination 
of issues of power and participation across policy processes, including 
'non decision-making', where certain social issues or problems are 
systematically kept off policy agendas (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Crenson, 
1971), as will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
This linear instrumental, or stages, model of policy-making is associated 
with several other pitfalls of linear instrumental rationality. There is an 
inbuilt idea in the stages models that policy ends or agendas need to be 
either fixed or have to be pre-defined to initiate policy-making. This 
contrasts with the pragmatist approach where indeterminate situations 
initiate the formation of rational agency, and problems and ends are 
defined through rational inquiry and informed by implementation. As 
Garrison (2000, p. 473) notes, 
63 
Astute administrators see their ends clearly and revise them as necessary; 
only a fool would bypass a greater good merely to execute the original 
plan, although that is what linear, detached instrumentalism will often 
require the administrator to do. 
One caveat on discretionary decisions and revising ends in policy-making, 
is that the process by which ends are revised in should also be subject to 
rational deliberation. Otherwise, changes may be made in an autocratic, 
undemocratic or arbitrary manner (Richardson, 2002). For rational 
deliberation on the ends of policy, morality and values related to these 
ends need to be explicitly addressed (DeLeon & Longobardi, 2002; 
Garrison, 2000; Richardson, 2002). 
A further problem in linear instrumental models is the artificial separation 
of political values from technical facts or of preferences from plans. Values 
and morals need to be explicitly addressed in policy theory and analysis. 
This would serve not only to develop normative guides for policy-making, 
but also help make the policy sciences relevant to socio-political 
deliberations and decisions that are based on values, whether explicitly or 
implicitly (DeLeon & Longobardi, 2002; Garrison, 2000; Richardson, 2002). 
Linking policy theory and rationality 
There are several textbooks on public policy that discuss an abundance of 
contemporary policy theories (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Ham & Hill, 1993; 
John, 1998; Parsons, 1995; Sabatier, 1999). Providing an overview of these 
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theories, Peter John (1998) organises policy theories into ten broad 
categories of discrete and synthetic approaches. The first set of theoretical 
approaches described below focuses on discrete aspects of policy-making. 
1. Stages theories focus on discrete phases of policy-making, such as 
policy agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation. 
These stages may be described sequentially or separately (Pressman 
& Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Each involves 
distinct sets of policy actors and issues; for example, politicians and 
the media in agenda-setting, experts in analysing facts and 
proposing solutions, policy-makers in formulating policies and 
making authoritative decisions, and bureaucrats in implementing 
policies (Friedman, 1973). 
2. Incrementalist theories move away from the sequential and 
hierarchical schema of stages models. Incrementalism describes 
how a wide range of policy-makers make, and negotiate, ongoing 
adjustments to policy processes, leading to small changes in policy 
(Lindblom, 1979; Wildavsky, 1979) e. g. in budgeting systems. Policy 
change thus comprises minor variations to ongoing processes. 
3. Institutional theories examine how public organisations (such as 
parliaments, legal systems and bureaucracies) influence policy- 
making through their structure and rules, norms and processes. 
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Institutional factors differ across political systems and thus lead to 
variations in policy-making (Ostrom, 1986). 
4. Group and network theories consider how formal and informal 
relationships, within and outside policy institutions, shape policy 
decisions and outcomes (Heclo, 1978; Sabatier, 1988). Patterns of 
association, strength of relationships and the openness of networks 
to new ideas and membership are used to explain policy stability 
and variation. 
5. Socio-economic theories look at how resources are allocated and 
distributed and at how socio-economic factors influence the 
decisions of public actors. Analyses focus on regulation, socio- 
economic constraints and ideologies related to decision-making on 
resources, for example as influenced by Marxist or market 
perspectives (Ham & Hill, 1993). 
6. Rational choice or social choice theories typically view decision-making 
as being driven by a priori preferences of individual actors. Actors 
then engage in a 'series of games' or bargains and trade-offs against 
their preferences, given different constraints in different contexts 
(Heap, Hollis, Lyons, Sugden & Weale, 1992). 
66 
7. Knowledge-based theories consider that knowledge and ideas have a 
life of their own and can be analysed independently of other factors 
in the policy process; for example, in the literature on evidence- 
based policy, research utilisation and knowledge translation (Lavis, 
Robertson, Woodside, McLeod et al., 2003; Weiss, 1979). 
John (1998, pp. 194-195) also highlights three main synthetic approaches in 
the policy literature that incorporate various elements of the more discrete 
theoretical approaches described above: 
8. Policy advocacy coalition theory discusses how formal and informal 
networks influence policy-making and how these networks in turn 
are influenced by socio-economic factors and external events 
(Sabatier, 1988). 
9. Policy streams theory describes how ongoing activity in problem, 
policy, and politics 'streams' converge and open policy 'windows' 
at various points and lead to policy change (Kingdon, 1995). 
10. Punctuated equilibrium theory describes the shifts between periods 
of stability and instability in policy-making, for example as applied 
to changes in policy agendas (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). 
These theoretical approaches offer compelling accounts of different 
aspects of policy-making that have been supported by empirical analyses. 
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There are also extensive analyses in the literature of the advantages and 
disadvantages of different policy theories (Ham & Hill, 1993; John, 1998; 
Parsons, 1995; Sabatier, 1999). Rather than summarise these comparative 
analyses here, the advantages and disadvantages of different policy 
theories will be discussed when relevant in the thesis; specifically, as 
related to reconstructing rationality for policy-making in order to build a 
more integrative, explanatory and normative theory. 
To begin the task of integrating policy theory, it is important to see how 
the different contemporary policy theories relate to each other. As a first 
step towards developing a more holistic and integrative theory of policy- 
making, some common ground can be found by interpreting many 
contemporary policy theories as being united by a 'common enemy': linear 
instrumental rationality. To briefly revisit this concept, the linear 
instrumental model of rationality, starts with specific ends or desires; 
then, options to meet these ends are rationally deliberated and decided 
upon, particularly with respect to how efficient they would be at 
achieving the given end; finally, action, or implementation towards the 
defined end, is instituted. Linear instrumental models contain a central 
decision point where a specific means is selected; this separates initial 
'perceptual', or preparatory, stages where options are developed from 
later 'active' stages where means are implemented. Further, in this linear 
instrumental view of rationality, the ends themselves, be they good or 
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bad, are not subject to rational deliberation (Richardson, 2002; Russell, 
1954; Simon, 1983). 
Much contemporary policy theory and empirical analysis explicitly 
repudiates the idea that political, policy and administrative offices and 
policy-making activities can be neatly distinguished along these 
temporally and logically distinct stages, either for heuristic or for 
normative purposes. 
Contemporary theoretical and empirical analyses provide a vivid 
assortment of images to counteract linear instrumental models in policy- 
making: 'the layered formation of a pearl' (Weiss, 1980), 'cubist paintings' 
and'mosaics' (Shields, 1996), 'garbage cans' (Cohen, March & Olsen, 
1972), 'concurrent streams of policy, politics and problems' and 'windows 
of opportunity'(Kingdon, 1995). If these authors are right, then policy- 
making has little in common with the linear instrumental concept of 
rationality. In an ex post descriptive sense this is rarely in doubt, but the 
idea that linear instrumental rationality could serve as a normative guide 
also becomes questionable when empirical practice and guiding norm are 
too disparate. Thus in terms of guiding practice the normative model of 
linear stages rationality may be as useful as a recipe for cup cakes when 
one has the ingredients for a T-bone steak (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 2007). 
However, philosophical, theoretical and empirical understandings that 
contradict the linear instrumental model have not fully counteracted its 
use, either in theory or practice (deHaven-Smith, 1988; Howlett & Ramesh, 
2003; John, 1998). One of the main reasons for this lack of translation, as 
deHaven Smith (1988, p. 126) asserts in Philosophical critiques of policy 
analysis, is that related theories and analyses have tended to focus on 
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discrete aspects of policy-making with no overarching framework to 
integrate these understandings: 
The facts confront us like pebbles in a kaleidoscope, capable of being 
rearranged and reinterpreted with a twist of the theoretical lens. It is time 
to discard this fruitless approach to policy analysis and to explore 
alternatives grounded in comprehensive social and political theory. 
As highlighted in the introductory chapter, policy analysts have 
increasingly recognised the need for more integrative policy theory in 
order to better understand and guide policy-making as a whole (DeLeon 
& Longobardi, 2002; Ham & Hill, 1993; John, 1998; Parsons, 1995; Sabatier, 
1999). 
Though it is possible to use the [different policy theories and] approaches 
as useful tools to investigate the policy process, especially if a particular 
set of relationships are prominent in one context, only an integrated 
framework of all the approaches, can fully explain the variety and 
complexity of the practice of policy-making and implementation. The 
approaches and theories are not rivals; they can complement each other, 
and be part of an overall explanation (John, 1998, pp. 17-18). 
This thesis proposes that rationality provides common ground on which 
to build an integrative theory of policy-making, with pragmatist 
philosophy providing an empirically congruent, normative and operative 
foundation. 
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Participation in policy-making 
In addition to being an integrative factor for policy theory, rationality also 
provides common ground for different groups, who would all consider 
themselves rational, to participate in policy-making. However, it is often 
difficult to find common ground with regards to who should participate 
in policy-making, and how. 
From a policy science perspective, the 'who', as in who should participate 
in policy-making, is a contentious issue (DeLeon & Longobardi, 2002; 
Parsons, 1995). Those aligned with Lippman (1927/ 1993) posit that the 
public does not have sufficient knowledge or skill for self governance and 
that policies are best made by the intellectual elite. However, others who 
are more aligned with Lasswell (1951), see policy-making as a more 
inclusive, social learning and problem-solving process. Finally, those 
taking a more contingent position agree with Hogwood and Gunn (1984, 
p. 62) that, 
Some issues will always require a highly political, pluralist, bargaining, 
and incremental approach. But some other issues ... will 
both require and 
lend themselves to a much more planned and analytical approach ... 
there is no 'one best way' of making decisions. 
Tensions also arise as a result of seemingly conflicting considerations of 
scientific sense and democratic sensibility. As Nelkin (1975, p. 37) notes, 
The complexity of public decisions seems to require highly specialized 
and esoteric knowledge, and those who control this knowledge have 
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considerable power. Yet democratic ideology suggests that people must 
be able to influence policy decisions that affect their lives. 
With respect to health policy, there are currently at least three particularly 
notable streams of thinking that influence different groups' participation 
in policy-making: imperatives for evidence-based policy, public 
participation initiatives, and privatisation or market factors in health care. 
Evidence and policy 
While many people assume that research evidence can be regarded as fact, 
the nature and role of evidence in policy-making is not fully understood 
(Black, 2001). The use of evidence in policy-making involves the selection, 
interpretation and framing of data, as well as argumentation (Fischer, 
2003; Majone, 1989). There may not always be agreement on whether the 
available evidence is sufficient to guide policy-making, or that the 
evidence is appropriate with respect to particular problems and different 
socio-political contexts (Black, 2001). Further, considerations when 
framing evidence in policy-making go beyond technical considerations 
and extend to considerations of the meaning, risks and consequences 
(Wynne, 2003). Whereas physical sciences rely solely on causal analysis, 
analysis in the social sciences also requires explanations of people's 
motivations, capabilities and behaviour, which may not always be explicit, 
or elicited, in research studies (Elster, 1991; Heap, Hollis, Lyons, Sugden & 
Weale, 1992; Wynne, 2003). 
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Much of the focus in evidence-based policy analyses is on communicating 
research evidence to influence health policy and practice. Paradoxically, 
when health researchers communicate their findings to influence policy, 
they do not seem to based their strategies on evidence 4. Eccles et al. (2005, 
p. 117) concluded from a "review of 235 evaluations of guideline 
dissemination and implementation strategies conducted over 25 years ... 
that few authors gave any rationale for their choice of interventions and 
presumably used their common sense to choose the interventions". 
The lack of a strong empirical and theoretical base for health research 
communication, risks duplication of efforts, propagates ineffective 
strategies, hinders evaluation and learning, and provides little guidance 
for further research, policy, and practice (Eccles, Grimshaw, Walker, 
Johnston & Pitts, 2005; Figueroa, Kincaid, Manju & Lewis, 2002). Yet, 
communication and policy studies, and the philosophy and sociology of 
science have long focused on the complex relationships and 
multidirectional influences between science, the state, and society at large 
(Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Dewey, 1939/ 1989b; Figueroa, Kincaid, Manju 
& Lewis, 2002; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Kogan, Henkel & Harney, 2006; 
Longino, 2002; Salwen & Stacks, 1996). In short, health research 
4 This section on evidence and policy is drawn from a commissioned commentary written 
for The Lancet on Reorienting Health Research Communication (Kuruvilla & Mays, 2005). 
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communication would benefit greatly from consistently consulting this 
multi-disciplinary, theoretical and empirical base. 
Like their religious forebears, the 'high priests' of medical research and 
other health sciences typically issue 'messages' that are stated as if those 
who hear these 'decrees' should unquestioningly accept them; that society 
will be automatically transformed as a result of these messages is a further 
assumption. While there are exceptions to this characterisation of health 
research communication, the overall tenor tends to be dogmatic and, 
therefore, anachronistic. Aware of this tendency, Lord Winston - an 
eminent UK health scientist, called for a re-evaluation of the role of 
scientists in society in a June 2005 BBC interview (Winston, 2005). He cited 
the drop in infant immunisation rates after the MMR vaccine controversy 
as one example of research communication failures and of declining social 
trust in science (Winston, 2005). 
The broader context for these observations is that around the world, cost- 
effective health interventions are underutilised or misused resulting in 
significant costs to societies, including the loss of lives (Haines, Kuruvilla 
& Borchert, 2004). Responses to contemporary health problems are 
increasingly dependent on the involvement of those who need to adhere 
to treatment regimens and change behaviours and lifestyles. At the same 
time, people are less deferential and more demanding of health research, 
policies, and services (Irwin, 2001; Sabin & Daniels, 2001). 
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There is also scepticism about authoritative claims and the 'truthfulness' 
of scientific messages (Irwin, 2001; Longino, 2002); this is due in part to 
orthodoxies being periodically overturned. A striking example of such 
change was the shift in eighteenth century medical science from the 
concept of 'humours' to the constructs of anatomy and physiology 
(Foucault, 1973/ 1963). There are more everyday examples of knowledge 
shifts,, for example, related to revelations about the side effects of drugs 
in the long-term. Additionally, it is clear that there are uncertainties in 
science; for instance, the public's confusion with available evidence 
regarding BSE in the UK was in part due to contradictory messages from 
scientists (Irwin, 2001). Experts can, and do, interpret evidence differently 
and, indeed, use evidence to lobby for different policies and interests, or to 
support different positions, as in a court of law (Irwin, 2001; Longino, 
2002; Salwen & Stacks, 1996; Smith, 1989). Ultimately, what is at stake in 
failures of health research communication is not only the support for and 
utilisation of research, but also more generally, social trust and wellbeing. 
While there may be considerations unique to health research 
communication, building on (rather than rebuilding) theoretical and 
empirical advances in communication research would seem prudent; 
however, this is often not the case. For example, an ostensibly state-of-the- 
art 'knowledge transfer' approach recently proposed by Lavis et al. (2003), 
and taken up in WHO's World Report on Knowledge for Better Health 
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(World Health Organisation, 2004), in effect restates a communication 
model set out by Harold Lasswell in 1948 which focused on, "Who says 
what to whom in which channel with what effect? " (Lasswell, 1948). 
Today, such 'input-output' models occupy just one chapter in 
communication texts. Advances in communication research, policy 
science, and science studies offer an extensive range of other theoretical 
and empirical perspectives to draw on (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; 
Figueroa, Kincaid, Manju & Lewis, 2002; Irwin, 2001; Longino, 2002; 
Salwen & Stacks, 1996). 
In line with this multidisciplinary thinking, Bowen and Zwi (2005) 
usefully draw on the theories of diffusion of innovations, and of epistemic 
communities and networks to develop their action framework for 
"evidence-informed" policy and practice. However, there is still a need to 
draw more deeply on current understandings in communication research. 
For instance, diffusion of innovations theory has been extensively 
criticised for promoting a pro-innovation bias, wherein the adoption of a 
particular innovation is considered an end in itself without taking into 
account alternative approaches that may be more appropriate in different 
contexts; this also has consequences for social equity as related to the 
definition of social problems and deployment of solutions (Figueroa, 
Kincaid, Manju & Lewis, 2002). Figueroa et al. (2002) address these 
criticisms and draw on theories of communication, dialogue and collective 
action to develop their "integrated model of social change". 
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Theories of epistemic communities and networks also show promise as a 
framework to understand the dynamics of health research communication 
and of how different actors influence, and are influenced by, policy- 
making (6, Goodwin, Peck & Freeman, 2006; Bowen & Zwi, 2005). There 
are several other perspectives that could usefully inform different aspects 
and contexts of health research communication, including theories and 
analyses of science, political, organizational, risk, and mass 
communication (Andreason, 1995; Figueroa, Kincaid, Manju & Lewis, 
2002; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Isaacs, 1999; Salwen & Stacks, 1996); see Table 
1 for examples of multidisciplinary theories and perspectives on 
communication. 
There is now increasing recognition also of the value of 'knowledge 
brokers' to mediate communication and collaboration between health 
researchers and potential research users (Kogan, Henkel & Hanney, 2006; 
Lavis, Robertson, Woodside, McLeod et al., 2003; World Health 
Organisation, 2004). This idea of brokerage and collaboration could 
profitably extend to the theory, design, and evaluation of health research 
communication strategies. 
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Table 1. Research on communication 
Examples of multidisciplinary perspectives on communication 
Science communication Deficit model, Contextual model, Epistemic 
communities... 
Political communication Policy networks and coalitions, Public opinion and 
the Spiral of silence, Deliberative democracy... 
Organizational communication Theory of Bureaucracy, Organizational assimilation/ 
socialisation, Structuration... 
Persuasion and communication Belief congruency, Elaboration Likelihood Model, 
Attribution theory... 
Risk communication Protection motivation, Uncertainty reduction, Risk 
perception theory... 
Health communication Health Belief Model, Theory of Reasoned Action, 
Subjective expected utility... 
Development communication Diffusion of innovations, Participation theories, 
Social marketing... 
Intrapersonal communication Perception and thought, Linguistic determinism and 
relativism, Gestalt psychology... 
Interpersonal communication Relational dialectics, Social exchange, Coordinated 
management of meaning... 
Group communication Personality and interpersonal behaviour, 
Groupthink, Symbolic convergence theory... 
Mass communication Media agenda setting, Gate-keeping, Cultivation 
theory... 
Intercultural communication Critical theory, Cultural/ anthropological approach, 
Nonverbal typologies... 
Information and chaos theories Cybernetics, Information processing theory, Chaos 
and communication... 
Social marketing and Behaviour segmentation, Branding and brand 
consumer behaviour loyalty, Symbolic meaning of goods... 
Much 'high priestly' health research communication still unconsciously 
perpetuates a version of the 'two communities' notion wherein scientists 
are an elite, conscientious community disseminating wisdom to other (less 
able and less concerned) communities (e. g. policy-makers). This elitist 
position is difficult to defend, especially when one realises that the 
academic/ scientific community is not the only community to hold these 
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attributes. Other communities are concerned about societal wellbeing, 
possess specialised knowledge and expertise, and differ from scientists 
mainly in terms of their roles and responsibilities (Buse, Mays & Walt, 
2005; Dewey, 1939/ 1989b; Kogan, Henkel & Hanney, 2006). In fact, the 
contractual nature of much funded research implies that scientists could 
be viewed as "servants" of these other communities (Winston, 2005). 
Philosophers and sociologists of science have argued that the dichotomy 
between the 'rational' or scientific and the 'social' is untenable (Dewey, 
1939/ 1989b; Longino, 2002). As noted in Chapter 1, science involves 
social deliberation and has social implications, and social processes rely on 
rationality, for example, to evaluate evidence and address problems 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989b; Longino, 2002). 
To move beyond the hierarchies and dichotomies between science and 
society, better opportunities for regular discussion between diverse 
groups in society (journalists, scientists, business leaders, government 
policy-makers, health service providers, patients and civil society 
organisations) are required in order to develop a mutual understanding of 
differing roles, ideas and values (Bowen & Zwi, 2005; Buse, Mays & Walt, 
2005; Dewey, 1939/ 1989b; Irwin, 2001; Kogan, Henkel & Hanney, 2006; 
Longino, 2002). 
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Given the ever-changing nature of both science and society, deliberations 
on evidence need to be continuous and integrated across a range of 
science and socio-political 'interfaces', including educational curricula 
development and research, policy and programme deliberations (Dewey, 
1939/ 1989b; Haines, Kuruvilla & Borchert, 2004; Irwin, 2001; Kogan, 
Henkel & Hanney, 2006; Longino, 2002; Winston, 2005). Such 
communication opportunities would facilitate building networks and 
'communities of practice', which can be a powerful way of integrating 
diverse perspectives and resources in order to meet complex health 
challenges (6, Goodwin, Peck & Freeman, 2006; Bowen & Zwi, 2005; Buse, 
Mays & Walt, 2005). 
Participation: citizens, consumers and civil society organizations 
The public's participation in health policy was in part catalysed by 
changes that occurred at a global level. The mid-20th century saw a 
formalisation of the normative view, for example in Human Rights 
treaties, that all citizens should have the right to participate in decision- 
making that influences their lives (UNDP, 2002; UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007). 
Disease patterns also changed, and in the 21s' century it is recognized that 
the prevention and treatment of disease increasingly depended on lifestyle 
and behaviour change (Nutbeam, 1998; Wanless, 2002). Vertical 
immunisation campaigns and the prescriptive approach to medical care, 
for example with respect to antibiotic use, were effective against the major 
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killers of the previous century - infectious diseases. Prevention and 
treatment of illnesses linked to health behaviours and lifestyle, however, 
need the informed and active participation of the people who have to 
adhere to treatment regimens and make the required behaviour changes 
and lifestyle choices. 
The information revolution and education campaigns of the latter half of 
the 20th century also resulted in better public access to a range of 
information sources on health, albeit of varying reliability. Publics5 are 
also seen to be increasingly less deferential and more critical and 
demanding of the quality and accountability of research, policies, and 
services (Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Smith et al., 2003; Irwin, 2001; Sabin & 
Daniels, 2001). 
Contemporary publics are also more openly engaged in deliberations on 
values, risks and opportunities they face in everyday life (Fischer, 2003; 
Irwin, 2001). Sociological analyses discuss the phenomenon of 
'detraditionalisation', where established beliefs and habits are increasingly 
called into question (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994). This happens when 
societies need to continually respond to new and changing risks and 
opportunities, and cannot solely rely on established traditions and ways of 
life. Defining and dealing with new and continually changing risks and 
5'Publics' is a deliberate plural given the pluralistic nature of individuals' roles and 
perspectives with respect to different policy issues. This idea is further discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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opportunities requires new and more flexible ways of thinking, and 
ongoing deliberation and negotiation, rather than unquestioning 
adherence to fixed rules and traditions (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994). 
Informed socio-political participation is therefore not merely a matter of 
filling a societal deficit with 'objective' scientific fact, but involves ongoing 
interaction to build shared understanding on risks and opportunities in 
society (Irwin, 2001; Jasanoff, 1996). 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a key role in facilitating public 
engagement with health policy and services. Civil society can be defined 
as "people organizing to influence their world " through political means 
(Glasius, 2005, p. 240). The political dimension of their work distinguishes 
CSOs from non-governmental organisation (NGOs). 
A civil society organization is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
that has as one of its primary purposes, influencing policy. Thus not all 
CSOs are NGOs ... A purely service oriented NGO 
(say, in the health 
sector) could become a CSO if it added policy advocacy to its agenda, and 
by the same token a CSO could become an NGO if it dropped its 
advocacy activities to concentrate solely on service delivery (Blair, 1997, 
p. 24). 
This is an important distinction. In the UNICEF civil society partnership 
review (described in Chapter 1) it was ascertained that in the politically 
repressive environment of Zimbabwe, NGOs were allowed to operate, but 
not CSOs (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). Thus while the general definition of 
NGOs and CSOs may be understood, their specific structure and role can 
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significantly vary across political and cultural contexts (Glasius, Lewis & 
Seckinelgin, 2004). Some resource-strapped and capability-strapped 
countries depend on civil society organisations to supplement government 
health services. In Kenya, 87 percent of the clinics and hospitals are run by 
civil society organisations (World Resources, 2004). Another role of CSOs 
is to demand accountability from policy-makers, as seen in protests at 
forums such as the World Economic Forum (Glasius, 2005). However, 
assigning CSOs the role of ensuring state and market accountability could 
detract from the role civil society could play in defining what the state and 
market should be (Howell & Pearce, 2001). 
While civil society participation is seen as instrumental to encouraging 
political responsiveness and accountability, it is not clear to whom, or for 
what, civil society groups are accountable. Chinkin (2000, p. 144) raises 
concerns about civil society organisations' participation in the context of 
international law, 
[CSOs) are often non-democratic, self-appointed, may consist of only a 
handful of people, and determine their own agendas and priorities with a 
missionary-like or elitist zeal. Their own decision-making processes may 
not be transparent and are concealed behind a deluge of information. 
They do not have to address the full range of options that must be 
considered by State elites, but can limit themselves to their own concerns. 
The other side of the coin of representation is accountability. [CSOs] are 
acquiring a measure of international legal personality through procedural 
rights of access qnd standing, but their accountability has barely been 
addressed. 
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In addition to participation in policy-making, civil society participation is 
also increasingly seen in collaborative research, or action research 
(Kuruvilla, 2005). Analysts note how consumers' and civil society's 
participation in health research and policy has led to the generation of 
new data sources, more sensitised, knowledgeable and empowered 
stakeholders, and more grounded and sustainable programmes (Inns, 
1998; Khilnani, 2001). However, while localised and lay perspectives are 
valuable in research, there are also cautions against a 'neoromantic 
construction of the social actor' (Atkinson, 1997). 
Local perspectives may be 'partial', constructed from positions of 
cognitive and material deprivation, and constrained within existing social 
structures and power dynamics (Atkinson, 1997; Narayan, 1997). Thus, 
research generated from participatory research and local narratives should 
be subject to the same rigorous analysis as other forms of research. 
Further, it is important to recognise that different imperatives and 'ways 
of knowing' in society - experiential, cultural, faith-based, scientific, or 
creative - could be incompatible with each other and lead to conflict, 
unless they can be channelled into critical debates that inform public 
decision-making (Gould, 2003; Innes, 1998; Leach, Scoones & Thompson, 
2002; Nelkin, 1975; Wertheim, 1996). 
Initiatives by national health services and research bodies to incorporate 
greater interaction with the public in their internal advisory and review 
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processes are generally well-received (Leshner, 2003; U. S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2000). However, it is not clear how effective 
or efficient these initiatives are. In the UK, a study showed that 42% of 
NHS providers reported that they had involved consumers in some way 
in their R&D activities, but there was some confusion about what this 
entailed, as well as a lack of awareness about National Health Service 
(NHS) performance indicators for consumer involvement (Buckland & 
Gorin, 2001). A systematic review on consumer involvement in health 
research agenda-setting showed that ongoing collaboration had the 
greatest impact compared with one-off consultations (Oliver, Clarke- 
Jones, Rees, Milne et al., 2004, p. 102), but concluded that, 
What we know about the advantages and disadvantages of methods 
involving consumers in agenda setting rests on weak short-term evidence 
and almost entirely speculative long-term evidence. 
Similarly, a systematic review of studies on deliberation methods in 
health, "identified only one systematic attempt to evaluate a particular 
method - the citizen's jury - using pre-defined evaluation criteria. " 
(Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Smith et al., 2003, p. 243) Logistics related to the 
design and management of participation initiatives also need to be ironed- 
out. For example, one of the problems with the 1993-94 health care reform 
initiative in the United States, is that only certain demographic groups and 
those with a previous interest in the issue participated, thus skewing the 
results (Brodie, 1996). 
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There are growing concerns about recommendations to increase public 
participation and consultation in decision-making without evaluating the 
effects and costs of doing so. Empirical evidence regarding the cost- 
effectiveness of additional participation is difficult to come by; this is in 
part due to the lack of poorly-defined evaluation criteria (Abelson, Forest, 
Eyles, Smith et al., 2003; Crawford, Rutter, Manley, Weaver et al., 2002). 
Given the lack of evaluation, the systemic spread of poorly articulated and 
uncritically adopted normative prescriptions for civil society participation 
is considered by some to be a'New Tyranny' (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). 
However, while the general perception, particularly with respect to health 
research and policy, seems to be that there is little evidence on the costs 
and consequences of participation, there is, increasingly, a range of 
evidence demonstrating the value of public participation for health, as the 
following examples show. Leichter and Tyrens (2002) set out to answer 
two questions in relation to the Oregon Benchmark experience, one of the 
more commonly cited participation initiatives in health care decision- 
making. 
First we asked, "Are Oregonians healthier than they would otherwise be 
as a result of the Oregon benchmarks? " Our conclusion is "probably not, 
although we cannot be certain. " During the past decade, Oregon has done 
better than the national average on some health outcomes but worse on 
others... We believe, however, that systemic changes that are slowly 
taking shape should eventually lead to better health for Oregonians. 
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Second we asked, "Is the public health community better off because of 
the Oregon benchmarks? " Our conclusion is "yes. " The increased visibility 
that the benchmarks have brought to public health issues is universally 
recognized as beneficial. Even the controversial grades assigned by the 
Progress Board have drawn attention to issues that might otherwise have 
been overlooked. 
Compelling links between participation and improved health services and 
health outcomes also have been established. Importantly, findings from 
one of the first randomised control trials of participation showed that 
there were significant improvements in birth outcomes in a poor rural 
population in Nepal as a result of a low-cost community-based 
participatory intervention with women s groups (Manandhar, Osrin, 
Shrestha, Mesko et al., 2004). 
Likewise, researchers in the LSHTM study on research impact discussed 
how, traditionally, malaria control strategies rely on the free distribution 
of insecticide treated bed nets through public health and donor agencies 
(Kuruvilla, Mays, Pleasant & Walt, 2006). However, the evidence shows 
that the more cost-effective methods are those that raise awareness in 
communities about the causes and prevention of malaria and promote 
community skills and capacities to purchase and treat bed nets on their 
own. This participatory approach to malaria control is also found to be a 
sustainable and equitable method that can significantly improve health 
outcomes (DFID Malaria Knowledge Programme, 2006; Oommen, Henry 
& Pidikaka, 1999). 
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A strong case for increased public participation is also made in the 
Wanless Report (2002), which is considered the first evidence-based 
assessment of the long-term resource requirements for the National 
Health Service (NHS) in the UK. Wanless (2002) projected three possible 
scenarios for improving health services and promoting health in the UK, 
by 2020: 
" Slow uptake - there is no change in the level of public engagement, 
health services lack responsiveness to new technologies and 
productivity is low, and there is little change or deterioration in health 
status. 
" Solid progress - people are more engaged with their health and 
appropriately use primary care services. Health services appropriately 
use technology and are more efficient. 
" Fully engaged - there are high levels of public engagement with 
confidence in, and demand for, high quality health services. Health 
services are technologically proficient and efficient and there are 
dramatic improvements in health status. 
By these projections, there would be over £ 30 billion savings in health 
care spending in the fully engaged scenario compared with the slow 
uptake scenario; smoking prevalence would be 10 percent less and there 
would be an increase of at least 2 years in life expectancy (Wanless, 2002). 
The challenge for the UK government, and for the NHS, is to ensure that 
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the country moves forward on the 'fully engaged' track to better health 
services and health. Barriers to realising this scenario include the lack of 
information about preventive care in the population, increasing social and 
health inequalities and the need to improve the evidence base and 
management skills in health services (Wanless, 2004). 
Another classic example of the effectiveness of public participation in 
health is Project Piaxtla, based in rural Mexico. In the 1960s, villages in the 
foothills of Mexico's Sierra Madre Mountains were not served by 
government health services. In establishing a village-based health 
programme in Piaxtla, David Werner (2002) trained local health workers 
and health promoters, worked with the local community to communicate 
health information in easy-to-understand language and pictures, and 
adapted health technologies using locally available resources. This 
collaborative process helped people diagnose their health needs and work 
together to overcome them. Over the next two decades in Piaxtla, people's 
health dramatically improved. For example, there was an 80 percent 
reduction in childhood deaths in the villages (Werner, 2002)6. 
The initial focus of the Project Piaxtla was on curative and preventive 
healthcare. However, through the process of 'community diagnosis' -a 
method inspired by the 'education for liberation' approach of Brazilian 
lawyer and educator Paulo Freire, villagers identified a major cause of 
6 www. healthwrights. org 
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their ill health - poverty (Werner, 2002). Furthermore, they identified a 
major cause of their poverty - land ownership; instead of owning land, 
most citizens work for meagre wages on farmland unconstitutionally 
appropriated by a few powerful landholders. 
The villagers organised themselves in order to demand their constitutional 
land rights. This process included farm invasions and violent 
confrontations with the landowners and police. The government and the 
landowners eventually made changes; 55 percent of fertile riverside land 
was redistributed to landless farmers. This example's message is clear: 
community participation is a powerful catalyst of social change. However, 
is it possible for change to be managed constructively, through 
participation in policy-making, for example, rather than through violent 
means? 
This is a key challenge for public policy, and for social development in 
general. 
The backdrop for public engagement with health policy is thus one of 
myriad and compelling imperatives, but with mixed reviews on the 
mechanisms, costs and consequences of related initiatives. Constructively 
managing conflicting needs, knowledge and approaches is an additional 
challenge in the management of participation in policy-making. 
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Privatisation 
None of the groups in this discussion particularly emerges as a knight that 
saves the day. However, if there were to be a 'knave' in this plot, this role 
would traditionally go to the private sector (Le Grand, 2003; Titmuss, 
1968). The private sector is primarily profit-driven and, therefore, ridden 
with conflicts of interest when providing public goods, such as health 
information and services. Ongoing confrontations between public health 
researchers and the tobacco industry typify this conflict. 
However, around the world, the private sector plays an important role in 
health, from conducting research on drugs, to providing health care 
services and insurance coverage. In fact, it was both the pervasive 
influence of capitalist economies, and the failure of the public sector to 
adequately provide health care, that led to the increasing role of the 
private sector, in hitherto 'public' domains, including health (Buse, Mays 
& Walt, 2005; Ham & Hill, 1993). The shift to private sector provision of 
health care, and the interplay between private and public sector that led to 
these changes, is clearly illustrated in the history of how Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) developed in the US (Oliver, 2004; 
Anthony Robbins, personal communication). 
During the Great Depression in the US, Sidney Garfield, a young surgeon, 
built a 12-bed hospital to provide health care for labourers working on an 
aqueduct by the river Permanente. Financing these services was a 
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challenge. One of the engineers, Harold Hutch, had previously worked in 
insurance and suggested that Garfield apply the principle of up-front 
payment for hospital care. 
This would solve the hospital's immediate money troubles, and also let 
Dr. Garfield put one of his pioneering medical ideas into practice: 
emphasizing prevention. By keeping people healthy and treating them 
early on to prevent more serious problems later-rather than merely 
treating illness and injury-Dr. Garfield introduced a new kind of care. 
And so, along with preventive care, prepayment was born. For only 5 
cents per day, workers received this new form of health coverage. For an 
additional 5 cents per day, workers could also receive coverage for non- 
job-related medical problems. Thousands of workers enrolled, and Dr. 
Garfield's hospital became a financial success (Kaiser Permanente, 2007). 
There were other similar groups formed as well, including with consumer 
cooperatives (Oliver, 2004). Given the origin of this health care approach 
with workers' cooperatives and trade unions, these groups were initially 
considered somewhat subversive or even Marxist. However, analyses 
soon showed that these organisations were better at responding to, and 
meeting communities' health needs. By addressing preventive care, 
hospitalisation rates were also lower (as compared with fee-for-service 
modes of health care). 
During World War II, the ship builder Kaiser asked Sidney Garfield to 
apply his model to the shipping industry to provide health care for his 
workers. With this collaboration, Kaiser Permanente, that is now the 
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largest HMO in the US, was established (Kaiser Permanente, 2007). In an 
another development, 
Paul Ellwood, a physician specializing in rehabilitation medicine, who 
through his Minnesota-based think tank InterStudy promoted the term 
HMO and saw it as the building block for an entirely different approach 
to health care. Ellwood had the notion that organizational integration, 
better management, and competition would improve health services and 
that policies based on consumer choice were preferable to the command- 
and-control regulation then dominating proposals for national health 
insurance in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Oliver, 2004, p. 706). 
Through these developments, the American Medical Association (AMA) 
had continually blocked the US congress from adopting this mode of 
health care, as it believed that the change would happen at the expense of 
fee-for-service programs, which were seen to benefit physicians. As HMOs 
became increasingly privatised, the concepts of health care 
correspondingly changed, for example, from 'doctor' and 'patient', to 
'provider' and 'consumer'. The continuing failure of the US government to 
coordinate public health care services was seen by some as a sell-out to the 
private sector, 
The failure to rationalize medical services under public control meant that 
sooner or later they would be rationalized under private control. Instead 
of public regulation, there will be private regulation, and instead of public 
planning, there will be corporate planning. [Starr, 1982 in (Oliver, 2004)]. 
Others saw that it was not a question of either public or private sector 
involvement in health care, but of ensuring a synergy between the two. 
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For instance, in the history of HMO development, the private sector 
provided much needed resources and management know-how (Kaiser 
Permanente, 2007; Oliver, 2004). 
The market alone is not best placed to provide public goods and services, 
particularly with respect to public health and education (Buse, Mays & 
Walt, 2005; Ruger, 2006). In the US heath care system, which is now 
largely based on private provision, inequities are well documented and on 
the rise; these problems affect already vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups. In addition, the focus on medical care as a product detracts from 
the emphasis on public health as a process that is key to maintaining and 
promoting health. 
The inability of markets to meet public health needs can be attributed to 
various factors. Buse, Mays and Walt (2005, p. 50) summarise some of the 
main reasons for market failure in health services provisioning. 
" Optimal levels of health services may not be produced or 
consumed because externalities (costs and benefits) are not fully 
taken into account by producers and consumers, e. g. as related to 
the individual versus public health risks and benefits of 
vaccination. 
" Markets have no incentive to provide public goods as these are 
usually 'non-rival' (consumption of the good by one individual 
does not significantly reduce the amount of the good available for 
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consumption by others) and 'non-excludable' (it is not possible to 
exclude individuals from the good's consumption) and, therefore, 
often'non profit' as well. 
" In the market economy there may be monopolies, overcharging and 
information asymmetry that put consumers at risk or in a 
disadvantaged position, thus necessitating state regulation. 
There is, however, growing recognition of the comparative advantages of 
private, public and civil society sectors with respect to their access to 
different types of resources and communities, and with respect to their 
different ways of working. Some private sector organisations are also 
taking it on themselves to be more socially responsible through 'Corporate 
Social Responsibility' policies and programmes, through both 
philanthropy and partnerships with civil society and public sector 
organisations. In this context Public Private Partnerships are increasing 
and are seen to be mutually beneficial to partners (Buse, Mays & Walt, 
2005; Crisp, 2007; Oliver & Exworthy, 2003). Thus responding to market 
failures by simply opting for monopoly state provision and finance does 
not seem prudent. Building health policy strategies based on the 
comparative strengths of different actors in different policy contexts seems 
the rational approach. 
Approaches to rational participation in policy-making 
In the UK, during the 1990s, conflicts between policy, science, corporate 
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interests and public perceptions came to a head in debates on BSE and 
genetically modified foods. The UK Public Consultation on Developments 
in the Biosciences was set up to facilitate dialogue between different 
groups on a range of topics in the biosciences, to try and understand and 
address these conflicts. Irwin (2001, p. 4), analysed this consultation and 
its implications for policy-making. 
Between 1997 and 1999, this government-led consultation aimed to build 
up a public assessment of the "biosciences" (including 
xenotransplantation, animal and human cloning, genetic modification of 
food, and genetic testing). In British terms, this represented a path- 
breaking exercise-and one intended to have wide consequences for the 
operation of national regulatory policy. Announced by the minister of 
science, commissioned by the UK Office of Science and Technology 
(OST), and conducted by one of Britain's best-known market research 
companies (MORI, or Market & Opinion Research International), this was 
a high-profile and forward-looking consultation in a politically, and 
economically, sensitive area. 
Analysing the types of interactions involved in these consultations, Irwin 
(2001) identified two main approaches, the social research approach and 
the deliberative democracy approach. He recommended that interactions 
of science, state and society move beyond these two models to a third, 
contextual or localised model of socio-political interaction. 
The social research model is a professional approach driven by public 
policy and research institutions. It aims to elicit public views in a 
representative manner across the population, and in a timely manner for 
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policymaking. The relevance of the pre-framed social research agendas 
and questions for participants outside the research and policy systems is 
variable. This approach does not allow for much interpersonal interaction 
among the various actors; in fact, in the context of research, this could be 
seen to bias the process. The advantage of this model is that interaction 
through public policy institutions has the potential to directly inform 
policy-makers and influence related resource allocation and programme 
implementation. 
The deliberative democracy participation model is largely defined by civil 
society goals, where CSOs and interest groups take a more active role in 
setting the agenda for policy interaction. Although this approach allows 
for more flexibility than the social-research model, it is often limited in 
scope, restricted in terms of the range of people and resources involved, 
including institutional mechanisms to support these processes. Thus this 
model may have relatively weak policy links and influence. [The point on 
resources and mechanisms having been noted, the deliberative democracy 
approach in the HIV/AIDS-related activist movement, did have 
widespread impact and influenced health research and policy agendas, 
facilitated more affordable and equitable access to antiretroviral drugs and 
catalysed changes in public health behaviours (Epstein, 1996; Piot, 2000). ] 
A third model, the localised and contextual model, takes into account the 
contextual nature of the relationship among between science, state and 
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society and the need for ongoing interaction in different contexts. Irwin 
(2001, p. 16) notes that the localised model "fits less easily into the 
operational frameworks of policymaking institutions - although it does 
have important policy implications in terms of the advocacy of greater 
contextual sensitivity and the establishment of more open and two-way 
knowledge relations". 
Empirical analyses, for example, on detraditionalisation in negotiating risks 
and values (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994) and on the desirability of full 
public engagement in health care to improve health outcomes and health 
services efficiencies (Wanless, 2002), support Irwin's conclusion. Rather 
than seeking "universal solutions and institutional fixes", policy-making 
should focus on developing open and ongoing dialogue with different 
groups in society, with respect to specific issues in particular contexts 
(Irwin, 2001, p. 16). Parsons (1995) reached a similar conclusion based on a 
review of public policy in general. 
Whereas the predominant focus of policy analysis in the 1960s was 
speaking truth to rulers, the mission of policy analysis [at the turn of the 
21st century] must be to help in fostering a genuine dialogue between 
policy-makers, policy specialists and an 'active' society (Parsons, 1995, p. 
615). 
An appreciation for the comparative value of different groups' 
perspectives and the need for better dialogue was also evinced in the 
studies conducted during this PhD (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007; Kuruvilla, 
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Mays & Walt, 2007). Researchers, policy-makers and civil society groups, 
cited networks and partnerships as crucially important in policy 
deliberations, including in policy research, formulation, communication, 
implementation and evaluation. 
In the LSHTM study and the UNICEF review, policy networks comprised 
researchers, policy-makers and civil society organisation staff in addition 
to patients and the general public. There was also some movement of 
personnel between these groups; for example researchers were seconded 
to policy posts, people who had worked in civil society organisations 
moved to academic or government institutions and vice versa. While the 
different groups often had different roles within the projects, they 
generally followed a similar approach with respect to identifying and 
inquiring into problems and seeking ways to address them; though the 
specific methods used to conduct inquiry may have been different. For 
example, researchers used more empirical and experimental methods, 
while civil society and policy groups tended to use more deliberative 
approaches. However, noting the lack of scientific and analytical 
capacities in their organisations as a gap that needed to be addressed, 
policy and civil society organisations interviewed in the UNICEF review, 
were setting up policy analysis and impact assessment units in order to 
inform their work. 
While individual staff were cognisant of the broader societal, moral and 
emotive issues related to their work, the degree to which the institutions 
in which they worked formally took account of these dimensions of socio- 
political inquiry varied. For example, LSHTM researchers were unclear 
about what the institutional requirements were as related to the UK 
Research Assessment Exercise criteria. As one researcher noted, "We often 
feel that we are walking a tightrope between trying to meet some research 
assessment target and trying to be socially engaged citizens. " (Kuruvilla, Mays 
& Walt, 2007). These and other considerations for a more holistic approach 
to rationality in public policy-making are addressed in the following 
chapters. 
This thesis proposes that rationality, both as a desired characteristic of 
different groups participating in policy-making and as a unifying point in 
policy theory, is an integrative factor for both policy theory and 
participation. However, as discussed, there are contentious views on 
rationality and the concept needs to be clarified. To accomplish this 
clarification, Chapter 3 reconstructs, and redefines, rationality based on 
key tenets of pragmatist philosophy. 
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A pragmatist reconstruction of rationality 
Rationality ... is the attainment of a working harmony among 
diverse desires, 
[habits and impulses]... Method is their effectual organization into continuous 
dispositions of inquiry, development and testing. It occurs after these acts and 
because of their consequences. 
John Dewey, 1922, Human nature and conduct 
Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality not just on top of the 
apparatus of biological regulation, but also from it and with it. 
Antonio Damasio, 2006, Descartes' error: 
Emotion, reason and the human brain 
To reconstruct rationality as an integrative framework for policy processes 
and participation, four conceptual 'pillars' of pragmatism are constructed 
as a philosophical foundation (See Figure 4). These pragmatist 'pillars' are 
based on a review and categorisation of the key concepts and postulates in 
Deweyan pragmatism that relate to rational agency and public policy7. 
1. Rhythm of situations 
2. Socially intelligent inquiry 
3. Via media to knowledge (between foundationalism and relativism) 
4. Deliberation, norms and moral imagination to orient practice. 
7 This chapter builds on, and adapts, a paper that was presented and discussed at a 
conference on the'Philosophy of Management' at Oxford University, 2005. This paper 
was also peer reviewed and published by the journal of Philosophy of Management 
(Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 2007). 
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Figure 4. Pragmatist pillars for public policy 
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1. The rhythm of situations 
A primary consideration in a discussion on rational agency is how rational 
agency is initiated. Linear instrumental models cast rationality as a 'slave 
of passion', along the lines of Hume, Russell and Simon as discussed 
earlier. In this view, desires or problems occur in some antecedent, passive 
or perceptual stage, for example as represented by utilities and 
preferences in econometric models, rationality is then employed to satisfy 
these ends. Dewey rejected this view of rationality and drew on insights 
from the natural and social sciences, and a review of philosophical 
traditions, to put forward an empirically congruent concept of the rhythm 
of situations as the template of human agency. Dewey's (1922/ 2002) 
definition of rationality, in the introductory quotation to this chapter, 
states that agency requires 'method' in order to be rational, and pillars 
two, three, and four set up a methodological orientation for rational 
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agency. First, the rhythm of situations provides an epistemology, or 
template, for human agency. 
Habitual situations and interruptions of equilibrium 
All living organisms and systems are continually engaged in activity. At a 
basic cellular level, such activity relates to biological regulation and 
maintaining equilibrium with respect to the environment. When faced 
with challenges and change, response is oriented to restore equilibrium; 
this is a well-established scientific concept (Damasio, 2006; Dewey, 1910/ 
1997,1994). 
Dewey extended this concept of dynamic equilibrium to human 
experience; regarding humans as continually engaged in actions and 
interactions, self-referentially, with each other and within socio-political 
and natural environments; he termed the composite of transactions as a 
situation. The word 'transaction' is specifically used in pragmatist 
philosophy based on the distinction between three historical or 
evolutionary levels of "organising and presenting inquiry" (Dewey & 
Bentley, 1946, p. 509): 
9 SELF-ACTION: Where things are viewed as acting under their own 
powers. 
" INTER-ACTION: where thing is balanced against thing in causal 
interconnection. 
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" TRANS-ACTION: where systems of description and naming are 
employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final 
attribution to "elements" or other presumptively detachable or 
independent "entities"... 
Transaction is thus analogous to the concept of interaction in 'systems', 
where constituent parts have a relative independence, in that together 
they constitute the whole. Dewey (1886) describes transactions that occur 
in biological systems as analogous to those in a "well-organised society". 
The various sensory and muscular stimuli, almost infinite in number, are 
always co-ordinated and harmoniously combined.. . At times it may seem 
as if one part were functioning alone, but it is always found (unless the 
action be pathological) that it is a relative independence. The end of the 
organism is best gained by allowing a certain amount of originative and 
self-executed action by the particular part... It signifies the division of 
labor in order that the whole task, the development of the organism, may 
be the more speedily and economically effected. There is no communistic 
level, but the due gradation and subordination of the various factors in 
the unity of the whole, as in a well-organized society. 
With respect to human agency, when a situation comprises habitual 
actions and interactions, that are functionally coordinated, a dynamic 
equilibrium is achieved. In a habitual situation, intentional action, or agency 
- as contrasted with habitual action - is not required. Dewey saw this as a 
matter of intellectual efficiency and as a matter of course (Dewey, 1994). 
When there is a disruption, or change, in functional coordination or a 
challenge to maintaining dynamic equilibrium, an indeterminate situation is 
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experienced. In the policy science literature, Baumgartner and Jones (1991) 
describe a similar transition between stability and instability in their 
punctuated equilibrium model of policy-making. However, the punctuated 
equilibrium model has been criticised on the grounds that it does not 
satisfactorily explain the transition between periods of stability and 
change and the return to stability (John, 1998), nor does it provide an 
explanation of the nature and role of rational agency in policy-making, 
which pragmatist philosophy does. The links between pragmatist 
philosophy and policy theory will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 
To return to the concept of indeterminate situations - pragmatist 
philosophy regards any interruption of habitual activity, and equilibrium, 
as initially being quite ill defined, or indeterminate. An indeterminate 
situation may arise as a result of changes in environments, but also from 
agents thinking differently about a situation. An indeterminate situation 
also could be sensed as a passion or preference for a different situation or 
state of affairs, or indeed diverse passions and preferences may be 
experienced. 
While pragmatism acknowledges that passions are a motivating factor for 
agency, there is a divergence from Hume's (1739-40/ 1994) position on 
passions, described earlier, on at least three points. First, passions, in the 
context of pragmatist rational agency, are not "original existences" present 
in some passive, predefined or perceptual state that precedes activity. 
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Action is ongoing in every situation, including in the generation of 
passions and preferences; it is the nature of action that changes when an 
indeterminate situation is experienced. When habitual action ceases to be 
harmonious, certain or functional, this necessitates the initiation of 
intentional action, or agency. 
Second, there may be alternative, or conflicting, ends and desires that 
comprise an indeterminate situation. Thus there would need to be some 
rational process to inform choice and guide action to resolve the situation. 
Further, as discussed in the 'sour grapes' and 'grass is greener' critique of 
linear instrumental rationality (Elster, 1991), an initial sense of a passion or 
preference needs to be subject to reason, as it may not be rational or 
beneficial otherwise (Dewey, 1922/ 2002). 'Ends' also evolve and are 
shaped by learning and experience. Finally, an indeterminate situation is, 
by definition, ill defined and uncertain. In this view, defining ends, 
passions and preferences with respect to an indeterminate situation 
requires agency. Agency is thus initiated by an indeterminate situation, 
not by pre-existing passions or ends. 
Thus, the initiation of agency is, in effect, the move from a habitual, well- 
rehearsed mode of transaction to a mode of intentional action and active 
inquiry, in order to define and address a challenging situation. The 
current policy response with reference to inquiry and deliberation about 
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climate change is an example of this phenomenon, as is the pursuit of 
'loose ends' in scientific inquiry. 
If in response to an indeterminate situation, only initial, ill-defined and 
poorly examined impulses, or preferences, drive further action, i. e. at a 
basic stimulus-response level, this would not necessarily be rational 
agency. According to Dewey's (1922/ 2002) definition, rationality requires 
method. When method is employed to define an indeterminate situation, to 
explore options and consequences and make choices to resolve the 
impasse, this comprises rational agency. In this instance, a problematic 
situation is instituted. 
As part of the method used to resolve problematic situations, concepts 
such as ends & means, resources & constraints, that are present in linear 
instrumental models, may be used. However, in the pragmatist view, 
unlike in linear instrumental rationality, these concepts are only methods 
or tools to help organise inquiry and resolve problematic situations. These 
concepts are therefore products, not prerequisites of rational agency. 
Dewey explained that categories such as ends and means, or intentions 
and knowledge, co-evolve in efforts to resolve problematic situations. As 
earlier discussed, ends are often but "ends-in-view", in that they are 
defined with respect to the means to achieve them, and ends themselves 
may be means to some other end. Buying a bigger house may be an end, 
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but it is also a means to other ends such a certain quality of life or being 
able to comfortably accommodate a larger family. Thus ends are not 
'given' or 'fixed' and therefore cannot be relegated to preliminary or 
preparatory stages of rational decision-making. 
'Ends in view' and transactive change 
Dewey saw concepts, such as 'ends' and 'means', as organising tools or 
methods to help resolve problematic situations. Dewey also saw ends only 
as "ends-in-view" for the following reasons. 
i) An end or aim for rational agency is formulated "only when it is worked 
out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in 
terms of "means"" that are available and actionable (Dewey, 1994, p. 73). 
The course of forming aims is as follows. The beginning is with a wish, an 
emotional reaction against the present state of things and a hope for 
something different ... it projects itself in an imagination of a scene which 
it were present would afford satisfaction. This picture is often called an 
aim, more often an ideal.... at its best it is material for poetry or the novel. 
It becomes an aim or an end only when it is worked out in terms of 
concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of 
"means". 
Dewey (1939/ 1989a) saw poetry and art as being able to convey emotions 
and aspirations better than scientific information could, but emphasised 
that rationality was achieving a working harmony between diverse 
perspectives so that together they constituted a `whole'. 
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Similarly ideals can be constituent of rational method; however, Dewey 
cautioned that ideals on their own were not reliable guides for rational 
agency. Ideals are so far removed from immediate situations and practical 
considerations that they can incapacitate, or frustrate, rational agency. 
Dewey (1897/ 1999, p. EW. 4.262) considered ideals as "working 
hypotheses for action", not as "remote goals"; "ideals are like stars, we 
steer by them not towards them. " 
ii) Ends-in-view also refers to ends often being the more foreseeable 
means to some other end. For example better health can be viewed as an 
end of health policy-making, but health can also be viewed as a means to a 
better quality of Life, as one among a variety of other possible ends. 
iii) Finally, "ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of 
activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and to 
direct its further course" (Dewey, 1992/ 2002, p. 225). Ends are thus 
concomitant with consequences, some of which one may be able to 
anticipate early on and others which only become clear in the course of 
action. Thus ends need to kept open to revision in order that agency may 
be rationally guided. 
In keeping with the concept of ends-in-view, change, in Deweyan 
pragmatism, involves both responsibility - in the examination of choices 
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and consequences, and creativity - in the'intelligent creation of purpose' 
and in resolving indeterminate situations (Dewey, 1922/ 2002). 
Joas (1996) discussed how in pragmatism, change is an inherently creative 
process that is linked with the rhythm of situations. 
According to this model, all perception of the world and all action in the 
world is anchored in an unreflected belief in self-evident given facts and 
successful habits. However, this belief, and the routines of habit based 
upon it, are repeatedly shattered: what has previously been a habitual, 
apparently automatic procedure of action is interrupted.... and the only 
way out of this phase is the reconstruction of the interrupted 
context... This reconstruction is a creative achievement on the part of the 
actor. If [the actor] succeeds in reorienting the action on the basis of 
changed perception and then continuing with it, then something new 
enters the world: a new mode of acting, which can gradually take root 
and thus itself becomes an unreflected routine (Joas, 1996, pp. 128-129) 
Dewey described three modes of change resulting from rational agency in 
problematic situations: adaptation, accommodation and adjustment (Dewey, 
1934; Joas, 1996). Linear instrumental rationality deals with only one of 
these three types of change, i. e. adaptation, where means are employed to 
achieve goals by changing external conditions. 
Dewey (1934), and later Vickers (1965) in discussing the Art of Judgement in 
policy-making, discussed that change was pervasive throughout 
situations and systems. A situation may comprise a range of transactions 
that include, but are not limited to 'individual and society', 'mind and 
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body', 'human beings and the physical environment', 'reason and 
emotion' and of 'morality', 'scientific sense' and 'democratic sensibility'. 
Change occurs in, and through, these different constituents of situations 
and human agency. Aligned with this transactive, systems view, Dewey 
(1934) discussed two additional modes of change: accommodation and 
adjustment. 
In accommodation, agents deal with a problematic situation by changing 
their own attitude towards that situation, by modifying their goals and 
preferences, or by learning to live with the status quo. This mode of 
change goes beyond the concept of "deciding to do nothing" (Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003). Accommodation additionally involves an internal, 
cognitive process directed at changing the agents' evaluation of a 
situation. Agents learn to accept intractable conditions rather than persist 
with a desire to change them (Dewey, 1934; Joas, 1996). However, goals, 
desires and preferences can be altered in view of changing circumstances 
and as a result of learning and experience. Thus accommodation is not a 
passive attitude or surrender, but an active and constructive approach to 
organise cognitions in response to problematic situations, even though 
external conditions may not be changed. 
Adjustment, the third mode of transactive change that Dewey describes, is 
a more fundamental change that affects the character of an agent and the 
structure of a problematic situation, and may also effect changes in the 
112 
surrounding environment. This type of change is perhaps closest to a 
concept in contemporary organisational theory, termed by Argyris and 
Schön (1978) as "'double loop learning". Here a fundamental change in 
prevalent beliefs and practice of agents results from transactive learning 
from the consequences and effects of rational agency. Organizations that 
are able to learn and make structural adjustments for effective and 
evolutionary change, including in their goals and modes of operation, in 
this way are referred to as learning organizations. 
The concepts of adaptation, accommodation and adjustment describe the 
nature of change resulting from rational agency and through which 
equilibrium is restored. While resultant changes may continue to be 
integrated into individual and institutional practice, the initial problematic 
situation itself will cease to exist and rational agency need no longer be 
employed with respect to that situation. Instead, changes that successfully 
resolve problematic situations can develop into knowledge and new 
habitual interactions that constitute new and transformed situations. Thus 
rational agency is not a persistent mode, but rather something that comes 
into effect only in an indeterminate situation, or in response to 
disequilibrium. In periods of equilibrium, relying on habitual interactions 
is a matter of intellectual efficiency and a natural mode of operation. 
Thus, there is an overall rhythm of situations in human experience (Dewey, 
1925), an underlying pulse - or beat, between states of equilibrium, 
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disequilibrium and, again, equilibrium. This rhythm of situations provides 
an alternative to the linear instrumental model of rational agency. Figure 5 
provides an outline, or template, of the rhythm of situations. 
Figure 5. The rhythm of situations outlined 
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Satisfactory resolution and aesthetic consummation 
In the successful resolution of an indeterminate situation, there is an 
immediate and present quality of satisfaction. Dewey did not see 
satisfaction or utility as something that was external, or distal, to present 
situations, or that as something that was to be calculated in some future 
accounting exercise (c. f. utilitarian views). Additionally, in the pragmatist 
view, rational agency is not forever subordinated to some intangible ideal 
of rationality or bounded with respect to 'fixed' ends and 'given' 
constraints (c. f. Simons (1957) idea of 'bounded rationality' and 
'satisfycing'). A pragmatist sense of satisfaction is based on 'fitness for 
purpose' with respect to successfully resolving concrete situations. 
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Successful resolution, however, includes both restoring immediate 
harmonious experience, as well as ascertaining that the consequences of 
present actions would support learning and rational agency to resolve 
future problematic situations (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b, 1994). There is thus an 
'evolutionary' dimension to pragmatist rational agency, in that it supports 
learning and individual and societal flourishing. This forward-looking 
definition of successful rational decision-making is not that common, 
though it is increasingly apparent in contemporary deliberations on 
sustainable development (Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs, 2005). 
Finally, satisfactory, rational resolution is also unifying and integrative (of 
diverse desires, impulses and perspectives) and is, in this sense, 
'consummatory' (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b). The unification of experience 
through rational agency has an aesthetics akin to the classical Greek 
composite of ens, bonum, verum, pulchritudum - of Being, the Good, the 
True and the Beautiful - or of experience, ethics, science and art. In 
classical Greece, this composite was seen the natural order towards which 
all gravitated. This concept of deterministic natural order changed with 
the Scientific Enlightenment. Since then, while these different dimensions 
of human experience have been explored and developed, there has been 
no real unifying framework to bring them together. As a result, these 
considerations often seem to be fragmented, or disparate, in contemporary 
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analyses and experiences. Dewey saw rational agency as a way to 
"consummate", or bring together and make complete, diverse dimensions 
of human experience. Not that such a unification was antecedent or pre- 
ordained, only that it was possible through rational agency (Dewey, 1922/ 
2002,1939/ 1989). An aesthetic 'consummation' of problematic situations 
is thus one of the main promises of pragmatist rationality. To achieve this, 
however, rationality requires method, as is discussed in the next 
pragmatist 'pillar' of socially intelligent inquiry. 
2. Socially intelligent inquiry 
In describing socially intelligent inquiry, Dewey differed with both John 
Stuart Mill and Walter Lippman, who held diametrically opposing views 
on the public's capacity for governance (Dewey, 1954/ 1927; Ryan, 1995). 
Ryan (1995, p. 218) discusses how John Stuart Mill, writing On Liberty, 
thought that, 
Democracy had sprung up first as a resistance to monarchs and 
aristocrats, essentially on a defensive basis. Then it had triumphed, and 
the sense that the public is always right - vox populi vox Dei - that was 
useful as a slogan of resistance became dangerous. Once public opinion 
was omnipotent, what was needed was some way of curbing its intrusion 
into matters that did not concern it. 
Dewey, writing a century later than Mill, agreed with this historical 
analysis of democracy, but disagreed with the implications of this 
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analysis. Dewey believed that coercion and control as a means of social 
coordination could be replaced in a more constructive manner by cohesion 
and cooperation (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). Further, it was not the case that the 
problems of elitism and aristocracy had been forever resolved with a shift 
to democratic modes of governance. As Ryan (1995, pp. 218-219) notes, 
Dewey also believed that modern society has become so amorphous, so 
sprawling, so generally unmanageable and incomprehensible to its 
individual members that they are simply lost. At the same time, new 
aristocracies unknown to Mill had sprung up in place of the old. The 
bankers and the captains of industry did not simply control the state - 
they, too, were not so well organized as that - but they were the most 
potent and organized of contemporary social forces. 
A contemporary of Dewey's, Walter Lippman, who is sometimes referred 
to as the 'Dean of American Journalism', famously argued, in The Phantom 
Public, that the issue of democratic practice was moot, as the public just 
did not have the capacity to govern themselves. 
When public opinion attempts to govern directly it is either a failure or a 
tyranny. It is not able to master the problem intellectually, nor to deal 
with it except by wholesale impact. The theory of democracy has not 
recognized this truth because it has identified the functioning of 
government with the will of the people. This is a fiction. The intricate 
business of framing laws and of administering them through several 
hundred thousand public officials is in no sense the act of the voters nor a 
translation of their will (Lippman, 1927/ 1993, pp. 60-61). 
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Lippman also presaged, though some would say 'spawned', the rise of 
spin-doctors and propaganda in politics. 
The process by which public opinions arise.. . and the opportunities 
for 
manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain 
enough-The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one 
which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. 
But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, 
because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb.... None 
of us begins to understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy 
to say that the knowledge of how to create consent will alter every 
political calculation and modify every political premise (Lippman, 1922/ 
1991, p. 248). 
Dewey and Lippman had several heated debates on the role of the general 
public in democratic governance (Dewey, 1954/ 1927; Ryan, 1995; 
Westbrook, 1991). Dewey agreed with Lippman that the public was, as 
yet, insufficiently educated and without the required skills and 
sensibilities for effective democratic practice. However, he disagreed with 
Lippman on the conclusion that democratic practice was therefore an 
illusion and that publics should be guided and controlled through elite 
political propaganda, even if the elitism was liberal in intention. 
Dewey (1939/ 1989a, p. 109) also asked, "Is it possible to admit the power 
of propaganda to shape ends, and deny that of science? " 
In emphasising the role of wants, impulse, habit, and emotion, it often 
denied any efficacy whatever to ideas, to intelligence (Dewey, 1939/ 
1989a p. 115). 
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However, Dewey recognised that scientific information, and so-called 
rational ideas, needed to be more emotive in order to counteract 
propaganda and to catalyse moral reasoning and rational agency. 
Ideas are effective not as bare ideas but as they have imaginative content 
and emotional appeal. I have alluded to the extensive reaction that has set 
in against the earlier over-simplified rationalism (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a p. 
115). 
Dewey (1939/ 1989a) also observed the ways in which religion, for 
centuries, not only included, but also relied heavily on art, music and 
imagery to convey its ethos and message. He advised that science, in 
aiming to replace religion as a reliable source of knowledge and beliefs, 
had to connect at an emotional level with people (recognising that 
appealing to emotion is explicitly eschewed in many scientific traditions). 
If science fails to connect with the public in this way, people would be 
more motivated to act by appeals to their emotion that come from a range 
of other sources, including political, capitalist or religious propaganda, 
that may not be as reliable as sources of information. 
Dewey's method for rational agency, based on the idea of socially 
intelligent inquiry, addressed five main concepts: 
a. Individual preferences do not add up to social purposes 
b. The need for reference communities and public coordination 
c. Social intelligence as pluralism, not panaceas 
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that they evolve through experience and inquiry was previously 
discussed. In addition, through deliberation in a process of socially 
intelligent inquiry, new understandings and purposes are created (Dewey, 
1922/ 2002). This goes beyond an aggregation of individual knowledge or 
preferences, and is more a 'sublimation , and unification, of diverse 
desires that leads to new understanding and social purposes to guide 
rational agency. 
Further, it is impracticable to translate individual preferences into social 
purposes. Kenneth Arrow (1963), a Nobel prize-winning economist, 
challenged the idea of aggregating individual preferences as the basis of 
rational decision-making at the societal level. He proved that if there were 
two or more individuals involved in decision-making, and at least three 
options to decide from, in every situation there would be a violation of at 
least one of four minimal criteria for rational aggregation of choices: 
i. Universality: there should be a complete ordering of societal 
preference based on every set of individual preferences ranked 
relative to each other. 
ii. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: if attention is restricted to a 
particular subset of options, changes in individuals' ranking to 
irrelevant options (outside the subset) should not influence the 
societal ranking of the relevant subset. 
iii. Pareto inclusiveness: if all individual preferences change in favour 
of one alternative, then the social preference should change in 
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favour of that same alternative. Phrased as Pareto efficiency, this 
criterion states that no system can be called efficient if there is an 
alternative arrangement that improves the situation of some 
people without any worsening in the situation of other people. 
iv. Non-dictatorship: the social preference scheme should not favour 
one individual's preferences while ignoring others. 
Dewey (1954/ 1927) argued against the notion that individual preferences 
and social purposes could be neatly separated, given that societies and 
individuals are mutually constitutive and interrelated. In this respect, 
pragmatism is more aligned with Mill's utilitarianism, than Bentham's, in 
that, 
We cannot think of ourselves save as to some extent social beings. Hence 
we cannot separate the idea of ourselves and of our own good from our 
idea of others and of their good (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 1999, p. 268). 
However, pragmatism differed from utilitarianism in the notion that 
individuals were separate entities from the societies in which they lived. 
This individualist concept had its roots in early liberal philosophies, for 
example those of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. In Liberalism and Social 
Action, Dewey (1935/ 1999, p. LW. 11.30) points out that, 
The underlying philosophy and psychology of earlier liberalism led to a 
conception of individuality as something readymade, already possessed, 
and needing only the removal of certain legal restrictions to come into full 
play. It was not conceived as a moving thing, something that is attained 
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only by continuous growth. Because of this failure, the dependence in fact 
of individuals upon social conditions was made little of. . . social 
arrangements were treated not as positive forces, but as external 
limitations. 
b. The need for reference communities and public coordination 
Dewey argued that inhibition and coercion as means of social coordination 
could be replaced by cohesion and cooperative intelligence (Dewey, 1954/ 
1927). Rational agency forms, and evolves, within the attempt to clarify 
and settle indeterminate situations (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b). Cooperative 
intelligence extends this idea to communities of inquiry that coordinate and 
communicate in order to resolve particular problematic situations 
(Shields, 2003). This is an analogous process to how scientific communities 
define, develop and test concepts to address scientific problems; Dewey 
recommended that this approach be extended to democratic practice. One 
connection between communities of inquiry and policy science, are the 
theories and empirical analyses on policy networks, partnerships and 
'advocacy coalitions' that can influence how particular policy issues are 
addressed (Heclo, 1978; Sabatier, 1992). These policy theories, however, 
tend to be more empirical than normative, as will be further discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Dewey recommended that communities of inquiry be the foundation for 
rational agency, for effective problem solving, moral deliberation and 
democratic practice overall. Dewey thus held a position, aligned with 
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Jefferson's, that the community was the foundation of democratic practice, 
Unless local communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately 
resolve its most urgent problem, to find and identify itself (Dewey, 1954/ 
1927, p. 216). 
However, Dewey recognised that communities are not built on physically 
contiguity alone, as they also have a functional basis. In fact, Dewey 
foresaw that "to a very considerable extent, groups having a functional 
basis will probably have to replace those based on physical contiguity. In 
the family both factors combine. " (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 123). 
The concept of a reference community is not used in pragmatist philosophy, 
but this phrase is employed in this thesis to convey the idea of 
communities as a locus for socially intelligent inquiry and as a reference for 
moral deliberation (as will be discussed in the fourth pragmatist pillar). 
Individual and societal development also occur through reference 
communities be they at school, work or in social groups and fora. 
Dewey was concerned, however, by how difficult it was to locate and 
build and sustain functional communities. In particular, with the rapid 
development and dispersal of communication technologies and the means 
of production for goods and services, people are increasingly subject to 
'readymade' and pre-packaged items, over the composition and content of 
which they have little control. 
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The new mechanisms resulting from application of scientific discoveries 
have, of course immensely extended the range and variety of particular 
events, or "news items" which are brought to bear upon the senses and 
the emotions connected with them. The telegraph, telephone, and radio 
report events going on over the face of the globe. They are for the most 
part events about which individuals who are told of them can do nothing, 
except to react with a passing emotional excitation. For because of lack of 
relation and organization in reference to one another, no imaginative 
reproduction of the situation is possible, such as might make up for the 
absence of personal response. Before we engage in too much pity for the 
inhabitants of our rural regions before the days of invention of modern 
devices for circulation of information, we should recall that they knew 
more about the things that affected their own lives than the city dweller 
of today is likely to know about the causes of his affairs (Dewey, 1939/ 
1989a, p. 40). 
The importance of building linkages with reference communities has been 
discussed in the context of health care decision-making. Mays (2000) 
argues that the legitimacy and sustainability of 'solidaristic', or universal 
publicly financed, health systems can be enhanced through linkages with 
'intermediate organisations'. 
The main threat to the sustainability of such systems lies in the inability of 
so-called 'advanced' societies to develop institutions that are capable of 
acceptably reconciling inevitably scarce resources with individual and 
collective desires to have all the health care we want. Many'advanced' 
societies lack, or fail to incorporate into their health systems, the range of 
intermediate institutions that could potentially help in more effectively 
reconciling individual wants with collectively determined levels of 
resources (Mays, 2000, p. 122). 
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Mays (2000) identifies intermediate institutions (after Durkheim's 
'occupational associations' or'guilds') as including professional institutes, 
religious organisations, ethnic associations and trade unions. Similarly, 
Glasius (2005) discusses the role of "deliberative forums", including those 
on the Internet, that are key to helping organise and develop the global 
civil society movement. As discussed in the UNICEF partnership review 
(Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007), the Child Rights Information Network 
(CRIN) 8, is one such an online forum and has a membership of more than 
1,700 organisations in over 140 countries. In policy-making, intermediate 
organisations and deliberative forums could serve as reference communities, 
in the pragmatist sense. 
While Dewey emphasised the importance of decentralised, situation- 
specific collaborative inquiry in functional communities, he also stressed 
the importance of public coordination. The public coordination Dewey 
envisaged went beyond the putative regulating mechanism of the 
'invisible hand' in market economics. 
Dewey (1954/ 1927, p. 13) defined the 'public' as comprising situations 
where human acts had consequences that "extend beyond [those] directly 
concerned and affect the welfare of many others". However, he cautioned 
that the public should not be confused with the 'social' or even with the 
'socially useful'. Dewey proposed that the boundaries of the public should 
8 http: //www. crin. org 
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be, "drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts 
which are so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or by 
promotion"; in addition, public officials and organisations should perform 
this regulatory role (Dewey, 1954/ 1927, p. 13). Thus, Dewey posited that 
public coordination was necessitated, and authorised, to manage 
externalities with respect to particular problematic situations, rather than 
by generalised or a priori social contracts. The latter approach being the 
case in early theories of liberalism and in later theories of social justice 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, 1954/ 1927). 
In essence, Dewey asserted that public coordination is particularly 
important in the provision of key public services, such as education and 
public health. He initially drew on philosopher T. H. Green's work, which 
influenced liberal thinking on the role of government and social welfare 
policies in Britain (Ryan, 1995). Dewey identified that in education, as in 
public health, the state was best placed to organise systems and services. 
At the level of the state, there would be a more comprehensive perspective 
that would not be limited, necessarily, by more local prejudices and 
pressures. There would also be more resources at this level to coordinate 
and support the progressive development of both individuals and society 
overall (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, 1954/ 1927). 
At the same time, Dewey stressed the importance of education to build 
individuals' intelligence and skills to resolve problematic situations and 
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contribute to democratic practice (Dewey, 1916,1954/ 1927). A 
considerable portion of his work was dedicated to the development of 
education systems that would support democratic practice and individual 
and societal flourishing. 
More recently, the need to both build individuals' capabilities and have 
state coordination to support human welfare, is reflected in the work of 
Amartya Sen's and Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach (Clark, 2005; 
Nussbaum & Sen, 1993; Ruger, 2006). They argue that promoting 
individuals' functional capabilities (such as the ability to access health care 
and participate in economic transactions and political affairs), rather than 
end-state utilities (for example, health, happiness, or desire-fulfilment), 
should be the objective of human welfare systems and that this 
development requires public or state investment and coordination. Ruger 
(2006) has adapted this approach for health, in the Capability Health 
Account, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
c. Social intelligence as pluralism, not panaceas 
However, as with individual and social preferences, Dewey did not 
consider that social capacity and intelligence were equal to the sum of the 
intelligence or capabilities of participating individuals. He considered as 
problematic, the purely individualistic notion of intelligence. 
Alleged scientific findings about hereditary and by impressive statistics 
concerning the intelligence quotient of the average citizen, rest wholly 
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upon the old notion that intelligence is a ready-made possession of 
individuals (Dewey, 1935/ 1999, p. LW. 11.38). 
Dewey considered such measures of individual intelligence as 
abstractions that were removed from the social dimension of intelligence. 
This individualistic view also was of little use in coordinating social 
intelligence to resolve problematic situations. 
Dewey (1954/ 1927) and Mead (1913/ 1982) appreciated that individuals 
developed unique capacities and perspectives, but emphasised that 
uniqueness, by definition, was considered with respect to others and 
developed through individuals' interactions in society. Further, social 
intelligence, or the social organisation of knowledge, supported building 
individuals' intelligence and capacities. 
Dewey emphasised the importance of making knowledge available at the 
level of social organisation. Few individuals have the capacity to invent 
new technologies, such as the telephone or the computer, or to create 
works of art. However, the social organisation of knowledge enables 
individuals to understand and use new technologies, and enjoy art. 
A mechanic can discourse of ohms and amperes as Sir Isaac Newton 
could not in his day. Many a man who has tinkered with radios can judge 
of things which Farraday did not dream of ... It is aside from the point to 
say that if Newton and Faraday were now here, the amateur and the 
mechanic would be infants beside them ... A more intelligent state of 
social affairs, one more informed by knowledge, more directed by 
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intelligence, would not improve original endowments one whit, but it 
would raise the level upon which the intelligence of all operates (Dewey, 
1954/ 1927, p. 210). 
There are other imperatives for the social extension of knowledge and 
intelligence. Societies are held together by shared systems of knowledge, 
behaviour, symbols and values (Nieva & Hickson III, 1996). If all members 
of society do not have access to the knowledge that defines and drives 
their society, there is a risk of social fragmentation, inequity and conflict. 
As long as our culture continues to refract reality through the lens of 
science there is an obligation to make the science accessible to everyone. 
What is at stake here is not just individual sanity, but ultimately social 
cohesion (Wertheim, 1996, p. 9). 
Dewey recommended that intelligence at the level of society be 
ascertained by (Dewey, 1954/ 1927): 
i. The number and range of pluralistic intellectual resources in a 
society, particularly for the resolution of problematic situations. 
(This is a similar concept to the one of a larger sample size 
facilitating more robust and reliable results in scientific inquiry. ) 
ii. The extent to which these resources are organised and made 
available in society. 
Dewey considered pluralist perspectives to be an invaluable resource for 
resolving problematic situations in society and for supporting both 
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individual and societal development (Dewey, 1954/ 1927; Ryan, 1995). 
This approach also involves openness to viewing pluralism in societies as 
a resource, rather than as a risk. This shift in thinking, from risks to 
resources, was discussed in the LSHTM study on research impact 
(Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007). Researchers in one project noted that they 
had used categorisations of risk to describe young people's access to health 
care, particularly with respect to young people from immigrant 
communities in London. This view changed when researchers recognised 
how resourceful these young people were in facilitating health care access 
for themselves and their families. In addition to seeking and setting up 
health care appointments for their families, these young people also 
undertook other necessary tasks, such as translating clinical consultations 
and medical prescriptions (Green, Free, Bhavani & Newman, 2005). As a 
result, one partner institution in the study changed its policy to focus on 
resources, rather than risks, in programmes aimed at improving young 
people's access to health care. 
With respect to pluralism, Dewey also cautioned against the search for 
panaceas, noting, for example, that advances in health had been made as a 
result of developing solutions to deal with specific problems. 
The problem of production of change is one of infinite attention to means; 
and means can be determined only by definite analysis of the conditions 
of each problem as it presents itself. Health is a comprehensive, a 
"sweeping" ideal. But progress toward it has been made in the degree in 
which recourse to panaceas has been abandoned and inquiry has been 
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directed to determinate disturbances and means for dealing with them 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 129). 
Dewey did not see why this should not be the case also in socio-political 
and economic research. He cautioned that the search for unitary 
explanations and solutions led to 'totalitarianism'. He often commented 
on the pervasiveness of "totalitarian economics"; with one such example 
present in Marxist accounts: 
In claiming to replace "Utopian" socialisms, Marxism throws out 
psychological as well as moral considerations. Whether the theory is in 
fact able to live up to its claim - without which its "materialism" is 
meaningless - is another matter. For it would seem as if certain organic 
needs and appetites at least were required to set the "forces of 
production" moving. But if this bio-psychological set of factors is 
admitted, then it must interact with "external" factors, and there is no 
particular point at which its operation can be said to cease (Dewey, 1939/ 
1989a, p. 79). 
Dewey also considered that "laissez-faire individualism indulged in the 
same kind of sweeping generalisation, but in the opposite direction" 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 71). 
The more rational approach would be to draw on a range of pluralistic 
perspectives, developed through inquiry in particular problematic 
situations. Having pluralistic intellectual resources and alternatives would 
best support socially intelligent inquiry across a range of diverse and 
continually changing circumstances (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a). 
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d. The rational use of power 
Dewey explicitly recognised the role of power in rational agency. Several 
contemporary theories focus on'power' as a primary force in shaping the 
nature and outcomes of policy discourse (Foucault, 1984; Habermas, 1987; 
Lukes, 1974). A negative understanding of power views it as being exerted 
through coercion, barriers to inclusion, by inhibiting or distorting 
information (Lukes, 1974) and through restrictions and limits imposed by 
previously established concepts, norms and institutions (Foucault, 1984). 
Habermas (1987) posited that power can also operate as a positive force to 
mobilise change through collective and communicative action. However, 
given the somewhat intangible nature of the "ideal speech conditions" 
that he proposed as a means to exercise constructive power, Habermas 
committed much of his critical theory to resolving the more tangible 
asymmetric power-relations that caused distortions in communication 
between individuals and groups. 
Dewey recognised that power had both creative and destructive 
connotations and he found it of interest that power was usually seen as a 
negative force in others, but a constructive force in oneself. 
We attribute a will to power to others but not to ourselves, except in the 
complementary sense that being strong we naturally wish to exercise our 
strength ... the will to power is imputed only to a comparatively small 
number of ambitious and ruthless men ... 
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So far we have no generalized will to power, but only the inherent 
pressure of every activity for an adequate manifestation. It is not so much 
a demand for power as a search for an opportunity to use power already 
existing. If opportunities corresponded to the need, a desire for power 
would hardly arise: power would be used and satisfaction would accrue 
... when social conditions are such that the path of least resistance 
lies 
through subjugation of the energies of others, the will to power bursts 
into flower (Dewey, 1922/ 2002, pp. 141-142). 
Dewey recommended that individuals and societies focus on the 
constructive use of power to resolve indeterminate situations. This social, 
collaborative dimension of pragmatist philosophy opens up the possibility 
of developing and sharing concepts and practices and promoting the 
creative and constructive use of power in society. Or as Dewey put it, 
societies could, and should, "replace coercion with cohesion" in order to 
support democratic practice as well as individual and societal flourishing 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 124). However, to realise the full potential of 
democratic inquiry and to facilitate the constructive exercise of power, 
Dewey considered that democratic pluralism, scientific temperament and 
moral imagination as well as tested methods of inquiry and deliberation 
were required (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). 
e. Logic: a theory of inquiry 
In order to develop a theory and method of inquiry, Dewey studied a 
range of methods and approaches used to resolve problematic situations. 
For example, he analysed modes of inquiry used in scientific experiment, 
134 
common sense, mathematical logic and even musical exposition. His aim 
was to establish a common foundation for different types of inquiry and 
he explained that, "I have tried in my Logic to ... go to specific sorts of 
inquiry and reach a generalized account of knowing through analyses of 
the features they present" (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b, p. 557). In his analysis, 
Dewey (1938/ 1999) reveals five main elements in the logic of inquiry: 
i. Indeterminate situations are experienced where harmonious, habitual 
and functional interaction is interrupted or challenged, and this 
stimulates or initiates intentional action. 
ii. Institution or intellectualisation of a problem: This phase refers to the 
process of modifying an indeterminate situation, or sensation of 
disrupted equilibrium, into a 'problematic' situation where the 
issue is delimited or framed in way that it may be addressed. 
iii. The determination of problem-solutions: Dewey's inquiry gives new 
meaning to the expression that "a problem well-put is half-solved" 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989b). In this activity a problem is defined or 
formulated with respect to possible solutions or hypotheses. Of 
particular interest for policy theory is the implication that here the 
concepts of having a problem and finding a solution are 
interrelated and mutually constitutive and thus cannot be 
considered as temporally distinct or separate stages. 
iv. Deliberation and judgement: This activity is analogous to testing 
hypotheses, but also includes deliberation and judgement on 
concomitant intentions, values and potential consequences. Shared 
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purposes can be developed through reflection on imagined models 
or scenarios related to situations and this can seamlessly lead to 
commitments on action. However, conflict or uncertainty on 
purposes and values would necessitate further reasoning and 
deliberation. The process of deliberation, including the role of 
imagination and valuation in the process, is detailed in Chapter 4. 
v. Restoration of harmonious experience: The warrant of successful 
inquiry is that it manages systematically to harmonise conceptions 
with experience, resolve problematic experience and restore 
equilibrium and functional coordination. 
These phases of inquiry closely relate to the phases in the rhythm of 
situations, discussed earlier. Dewey defined inquiry in terms of the 
rhythm of situations, as the "directed or controlled transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into a determinately unified one" (Dewey, 1938/ 
1999, p. 117). With this common foundation for inquiry and human 
agency, he affirmed that 'democratic' and 'scientific' inquiry were 
analogous, and this understanding is at the core of this thesis. 
This thesis refers to democratic sensibility rather than to a fixed definition of 
democracy per se. Democracy, as defined in pragmatist philosophy, is an 
evolving concept based on a "consciousness of a communal life" rather 
than a fixed concept or end state. In Dewey's words: 
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Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of 
associated life. It is the idea of community life itself. It is an ideal in the 
only intelligible sense of the word ideal: namely, the tendency and 
movement of something which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as 
completed, perfected. Since things do not attain such fulfilment but are in 
actuality distracted and interfered with, democracy in this sense is not a 
fact and never will be. But neither in this sense is there or has there ever 
been anything which is a community in its full measure ... Wherever there 
is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all 
singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the 
good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in 
being just because it is a good shed by all, there is in so far a community. 
The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, 
constitutes the idea of democracy (Bernstein, 1998, p. 155). 
This pragmatist concept of communal or democratic sensibility is further 
explicated throughout the thesis, particularly in terms of Mead and 
Dewey's concept of the Social Self discussed in this chapter, the need for 
functional communities of inquiry and reference communities as 
discussed in Chapters 3,4 and 6, and other related concepts throughout 
the thesis. 
Similarly, the term scientific sense rather than science is used in the thesis 
title to denote a systematisation of social inquiry, the use of method and 
testing applied to the logic of inquiry found even in everyday modes of 
thinking (Dewey, 1938/ 1999). Dewey saw a clear link between the 
democratic and scientific orientation. Alan Ryan (1995) explains this 
position: 
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Dewey thought of democratic processes as a search procedure in which 
we look for policies, laws, and administrative techniques that will allow 
us to continue a common life in a way that all of us can find fruitful and 
fulfilling 
... The nearest 
he got to a single account of democracy's virtues 
was that they were like those of science: It excluded the fewest 
alternatives, allowed all ideas a fair shot at being tried out, encouraged 
progress, and did not rely on authority (Ryan, 1995, pp. 313-314). 
Inquiry in public policy-making, from a pragmatist perspective, should 
thus have an appreciation that different forms of democratic inquiry are 
not, in principle, different from scientific inquiry and vice versa. Scientific 
excellence (as contributed by experts), political acumen (as the purvey of 
elected politicians), administrative planning (as carried out by 
bureaucrats) and participatory enfranchisement (by the involvement of 
citizens) are not necessarily conflicting ideals of rationality. 
Dewey considered the scientific method as an extension, or refinement, of 
problem-solving efforts in societies and governance. Thus the logic of 
inquiry underlying 'scientific sense' and 'democratic sensibility' can be 
regarded as one and the same even though both can be usefully informed 
and improved by developing and using'methods' of inquiry. Dewey held 
that one did not need to be an expert in order to value and evaluate the 
recommendations of experts, which is the key for democratic deliberation 
(when one assumes that, by definition, the presence of experts implies that 
on any policy issue there are likely to be people who are 'non-experts'. 
Further, experts on one topic may not be so on another). However, 
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valuation and evaluation processes are also predicated on rationality. The 
'catch' is that rationality is not some antecedent, fully developed quality, 
whether in scientists, politicians, bureaucrats or citizens, but rather an 
attribute developed by systematic, laborious and iterative efforts to 
resolve problematic situations through cooperative inquiry (Dewey, 1922/ 
2002). 
Dewey emphasised that in inquiry, it was important to recognize the 
tentative and evolving nature of knowledge. In his view, the best outcome 
of inquiry was warranted assertability, or the extent to which assignment of 
meaning and agreement on the facts of a situation could successfully 
coordinate action within inquiry and resolve problematic situations. As in 
science, knowledge generated by any process of socially intelligent inquiry 
should then open to being tested in other problematic situations. 
This section on socially intelligent inquiry can be concluded profitably by 
recounting a discussion on logic and pragmatism in Ian Hacking's book, 
Probability and Inductive Logic. 'Probability' is a concept that underpins 
much of the evidence on which health research and policy are based. 
Hacking, a philosopher of science, discusses the single-case objection to 
logic and probability made by Charles Sanders Peirce9, who, along with 
Dewey and James, was one of the main founders of pragmatist 
philosophy. 
9A major focus in Peirce's work was on methods of logic and scientific measurement. 
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Hacking (2001, p. 264) sets out Peirce's 'single case' challenge using this 
scenario: A standard pack of 52 cards is divided into two packs, one with 
red cards and the other with black. One black card is placed in the red 
pack and one red card is placed in the black pack, with both red and black 
packs having a total of 26 cards. 
The chance of getting a black card from the red pack is 1/26. Now 
consider this gamble for a prize P. 
(i) P if a red card is drawn from the red pack. 
(ii) P if a red card is drawn from the black pack. 
We would all choose option (i). Why?... 
Most of the time, if you take option (i) you will get your prize; not so with 
option (ii). 
But suppose you are offered this gamble just once, by a mad kidnapper. 
The prize P is your release; if you don't win he'll murder you in an 
especially horrible manner. 
We would all choose (i) and hope. That is the only reasonable thing to do, 
in the circumstances. 
Peirce searched for ways to explain this choice as rational inductive 
behaviour, but saw that this would only work if the choice were one of 
many possible choices, or if it were possible to choose again till the desired 
result was obtained. In a single, finite case, as would be the case in making 
most individual choices in life, there was usually just one chance. Peirce 
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came to the conclusion that in order to view the choices that human beings 
make as logical, and rational, inductive choices, the scope of choices had 
to be extended beyond the individual. Hacking (2001, pp. 265-266) 
continues with the story, 
Peirce concludes in an astounding way: 
It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably 
requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our 
own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, 
again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with 
whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It 
must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all 
bounds.... 
It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely 
interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this 
interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of 
intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic... It interests 
me to note that these three sentiments seem to be pretty much the same as 
that famous trio of Charity, Faith and Hope, which, in the estimation of 
St. Paul, are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts. 
Peirce's conclusion, which was one of logic and not of religion, can be 
extended to both scientific and democratic inquiry. Further, because this 
approach to inquiry takes into account considerations of the influences of, 
and on, other human beings, it is also a moral approach, and serves as a 
foundation for understanding how human beings can learn to live and 
learn together in a way that promotes individual and societal flourishing. 
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3. Via media to knowledge 
The two 'pillars' of pragmatism discussed so far, the rhythm of situations 
and socially intelligent inquiry have led to conflicting sets of criticisms being 
levelled at Dewey. Dewey's subscription to the scientific method has led 
to him being accused of scientism and technical elitism. Given Dewey's 
efforts to extend the scientific method to society and to establish a 
common foundation for the logic of inquiry, this criticism seems unfair. 
Other critiques cast Dewey as afoundationalist for making the assertion 
that there is an immutable 'rhythm of situations' that underpins all human 
agency. Others misread the concept of pragmatist inquiry as a purely 
subjective or relativist process where ends, knowledge and values can be 
recreated and reinterpreted in response to changing situations by agents at 
their will10. For example, Pawson and Tilley (1997) in Realistic Evaluation, 
launched a scathing, albeit misinformed, critique of pragmatism along 
these relativist lines, 
Ever since the term 'pragmatism was first coined by C. S. Peirce (1931), 
its notion of 'truth' (ideas which promote satisfactory relations with other 
parts of our experience) has been assailed as obscurantist and relativistic. 
In the last analysis, it rests on a theory of the social acceptability of ideas, 
rather than on their 'correctness'. Our view is that once researchers 
abdicate the claim for privileged knowledge based upon their 
methodological strategy, then someone else will claim warrant for them. 
10 Pragmatism" is sometimes referred to in current debates synonymously with 
relativism. This is partially due to the sceptical writings of neo-pragmatists like Richard 
Rorty who see individuals as authors with licence to more or less freely invent'reality' in 
the form of (incommensurable) narratives. This is a very different philosophical position 
from that in the classical pragmatism as set out by Peirce, Dewey and James. 
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We speak from the heart since the usurpation of the criteria for 
knowledge is happening in the UK as we speak: 
The main principle governing any Government funding of R&D is 
the Rothschild principle ... 'the customer says what he wants, the 
contractor does it, if he can, and the customer pays'... 
(Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p. 14). 
Before setting out the pragmatist via media to knowledge, these criticisms 
about scientism, relativism and foundationalism in pragmatist philosophy 
will be addressed and related misinterpretations clarified. 
Pragmatist inquiry versus scientism 
First, with regard to his use of the scientific method and empiricism, 
Dewey saw logic as being present in everyday forms of inquiry, including, 
as discussed earlier, in'common sense' approaches to resolving problems. 
Dewey explained that in science, the logic of inquiry was further 
developed and applied through the use of 'method'. He stressed that to 
the extent possible, the scientific method should be made accessible to all, 
but emphasised that in any case, scientific findings should be made 
widely accessible for the resolution of problematic situations in society. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Dewey (1925/1999) distinguished 'methods' in 
pragmatist inquiry from those in historical, or traditional, empiricism. 
Pragmatist method focused on ascertaining consequences in order to 
guide action in concrete situations, not just on understanding past or 
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'given' phenomena and concepts in the abstract. By focusing on 
consequences and the 'possibilities of action', pragmatist methods have a 
progressive, and forward-looking, disposition (Dewey, 1910/ 1997; Ryan, 
1995). 
Dewey also saw pragmatist inquiry as rooted in a unified, transactive 
'systems' view of human experience. This contrasted with the atomism, 
reductionism and abstraction in predominantly empiricist approaches. 
Dewey particularly rejected dualisms and dichotomies such as those 
between mind and body, passion and reason, fact and value. In this 
respect, pragmatism was influenced by Hegelian philosophy - with some 
important distinctions. In his earlier works, Dewey found the unifying 
nature of Hegelian idealism, both intellectually satisfying and liberating. 
My earlier philosophic study had been an intellectual gymnastic. Hegel's 
synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the 
human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an 
immense release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of 
institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution of hard-and-fast 
dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me (Dewey, 1930/ 1999, 
p. LW. 5.153). 
In his later work, Dewey differed from Hegel with respect to the practical 
relevance and usefulness of intellectual concepts developed in the 
abstract, and not through experience and learning in actual problematic 
situations (1930/ 1999; Dewey, 1938/ 1999). Dewey did not see how any 
abstract or purely intellectual approach could successfully orient practice. 
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For knowledge to usefully guide human agency, he saw that inquiry, 
experimentalism and deliberation, needed to be grounded in concrete 
problematic situations, in order to help individuals and societies solve 
existential problems, learn and evolve. 
With regard to resultant knowledge from inquiry, Dewey emphasised 
that, in principle, no perspective is privileged. No feature of the world can 
be taken as 'given' or beyond doubt and no law or standard is absolute 
and beyond investigation and revision. Knowledge by nature evolves and 
is therefore fallible. This position is not unfamiliar. There is always some 
scepticism about authoritative claims and the "truthfulness" of scientific 
messages, in part because orthodoxies are periodically overturned 
(Kuruvilla & Mays, 2005). For example, a contemporary randomised trial 
indicated that the widely accepted use of corticosteroids to treat head 
injuries could be harmful (Edwards, Arango, Balica, Cottingham et al., 
2005). 
The acknowledgement in pragmatism that knowledge is fallible, however, 
is very different from concluding that everything is 'relative' and should 
be placed under the auspices of doubt. Contrary to Pawson and Tilley's 
(1997) interpretation (quoted earlier), Peirce's position was that doubt, just 
as belief, needs good reasons (Peirce, 1931-1935). Dewey strongly endorsed 
this position, which goes beyond Rorty's neo-pragmatist proposal to reject 
"wholesale scepticism" in favour of more selective "retail scepticism". In 
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the classical pragmatist view, not only do beliefs need warrants, but 
equally, doubts also need clear and present warrants in order to challenge 
previously held beliefs. Joas (1993) explains the role of doubt in pragmatist 
inquiry, 
Doubt becomes necessary only when well-established certainties no 
longer stand the test of reality or when subjects raise objections to the 
certainties of other subjects. The purpose of this doubt is to bring about 
new certainties through creative problem solving (Joas, 1993, p. 61). 
Rational doubt, therefore, rather than the mere possibility of inserting 
arbitrary question marks, should be a response to practical and existential 
problems arising from the inability of available knowledge and beliefs to 
satisfactorily guide rational agency and resolve problematic situations. At 
the point where a well-coordinated habitual situation changes and 
becomes indeterminate and problematic, rational doubt helps to identify 
knowledge (concepts and beliefs) that can helpfully guide rational agency 
and knowledge that needs to be revised in order to solve the impasse and 
restore equilibrium. 
Hilary Putnam (1995, p. 152), a contemporary pragmatist philosopher, 
makes the point that a unique contribution of pragmatist philosophy is the 
integration of antiscepticism, wherein doubt requires justification just as 
much as belief, and fallibilism, wherein there is no metaphysical guarantee 
to be had that any belief can be above revision. 
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A rational path between foundationalism & relativism 
In response to critiques of his work as either foundationalist or relativist, 
Dewey vehemently argued against both extremes, with equal force, as 
philosophical and methodological pitfalls (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b). 
Throughout his work, he consistently paved a via media between 
relativism and foundationalism as the reliable path to knowledge; this 
position is the basis for this third pragmatist pillar. 
Dewey drew extensively on both the methods and the findings of the 
natural sciences in his work. That there is a physical or material 'reality' 
was never a question for Dewey, however, he saw this area of inquiry as 
the domain of the natural sciences (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b). He saw the 
concern of philosophy and the social sciences as the development of 
knowledge about human experience and transactions, including with 
material 'objects' and physical environments (Dewey & Bentley, 1946). For 
Dewey, this knowledge evolved from human experience in concrete 
situations, and in response to problematic situations. He emphasised that 
it was a situation itself that became problematic, not just the interpretation 
or intellectual description of the situation. The change between a settled 
and a problematic situation is existential (a term used to avoid using the 
misleading term 'objective'). However, one must remember that attitudes 
and cognitions are as constitutive of transactions and situations as are the 
'matter' of natural science. 
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To illustrate the concept of how both 'things' and 'thoughts' constitute 
situations, Dewey discussed the case of a table: there may be different 
situations in which humans interact with tables, where the specifics of 
situation determine the nature of human experience, and agency, related 
to that table. For example, a student may see the table as a place to put 
down books or a family may view the table as a place on which to eat a 
meal. A physicist, however, may see the table as a swarm of "electrons, 
deuterons, etc", comprising more space than matter (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b, 
p. 537). However, as Dewey noted, "one would hardly put books or dishes 
on the latter or sit down before it to eat. " 
Thus there is a functional, or 'fitness for purpose', component in the 
pragmatist via media to knowledge. In this respect, realist evaluation is 
more closely aligned with pragmatist philosophy than its authors (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997) are prepared to recognise. For instance, the realist 
approach has been defined as a method of inquiry, which instead of 
asking the question 'What works? ' tries to answer specifically, 'What works 
for whom, in what circumstances, in what respects and how? ' (Pawson, 
Greenhalgh, Harvey & Walshe, 2005). This realist approach is aligned with 
the pragmatist concept of inquiry in that both are conducted with respect 
to particular problematic situations. 
Where pragmatism would diverge from the realist approach is with 
regard to the earlier quote from Pawson & Tilley (1997) that viewed 
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scientists as having a privileged perspective on knowledge and holding 
the ultimate warrants for knowledge in society. This goes against Dewey's 
approach of socially intelligent inquiry that recommends drawing on a 
range of pluralistic resources in society to resolve problematic situations 
and further recognises that there are diverse dimensions and definitions 
possible in any situation. Dewey did see a specific, but not 'privileged', 
role for scientific expertise in policymaking, that lay not in "framing and 
executing policies, but in discovering and making known the facts, upon 
which the former depend", as well as in carrying out specific technical 
functions as part of a larger community of inquiry working to resolve a 
problematic situation (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). 
To further attend to relativist critiques of pragmatism, the concept of the 
rhythm of situations is not the same as the idea that the relevance of policy 
initiatives is arbitrarily dependent on any individual's or group's 
descriptions and definitions. The problematic character of a situation is 
existential. However, it is not beyond further conceptualisation or 
description by the groups involved; in fact, there are often disagreements 
about whether a situation is actually problematic and requires policy 
intervention. Only rarely is the transition from a harmonious to a 
problematic situation unanimously accepted by all involved in a particular 
situation, though this may sometimes occur, for example, in response to 
large scale or cataclysmic events (like 9/11 or a tsunami). More frequently, 
drivers of rational agency are more subtle and open to negotiation. Even 
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within the scientific community, it is clear that experts can and do 
interpret problems and evidence differently (Kuruvilla & Mays, 2005; 
Majone, 1989). Scientists can disagree even when conducting and 
interpreting systematic reviews, a method promoted in medical research 
for its reliability (Ferreira, Ferreira, Maher, Refshauge et al., 2002). Experts 
also use evidence to lobby for different policies and interests (Irwin, 2001; 
Majone, 1989; Salwen & Stacks, 1996). 
The realist critique of pragmatism, cited earlier (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), 
highlighted the Rothschild reforms of UK government research as an 
example of how reliable knowledge was being placed in jeopardy by 
forcing scientists to respond to policy-makers' needs and thus taking away 
scientists' autonomy. The Rothschild report (1971) did propose a system 
aimed at producing scientific knowledge to support policymakers in 
government departments, including in health and social services. These 
reforms positioned government as the 'customer' for research and the 
scientific community as the 'contractors' (contentious terms at the time 
and since then). 
Debates on the relationship between science and state can be traced back 
at least to Bacon's 1626 essay, New Atlantis. Bacon described a utopian 
society where wise rulers sponsored scientists to conduct experiments and 
sent delegates across seas and countries to collect and synthesise 
knowledge that could then be strategically deployed for the good of 
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society (Bacon, 1626/ 1905). Since then there has been support for Bacon's 
ideology that states should systematically attempt to organise the agenda 
and activities of science so as to serve the interests of society (Bernal, 
1939). However, this approach has also been associated with the potential 
of the state to suppress scientific autonomy and curiosity-driven research 
and innovation. 
The 'Republic of Science' side of the science and society debate, on the 
contrary, argues that science should be solely guided by the internal 
norms of science (Bush, 1945; Merton, 1973; Polyani, 1962). This position 
was widely backed in the scientific community that argued that this 
approach led to the production of the best science, which could then best 
inform policies from which society could ultimately benefit. It is unlikely 
that either position is tenable in an absolute sense. Dewey certainly did 
not see much value in scientific enterprise that was not oriented towards 
gaining a better understanding of human experience and to resolving 
problematic situations (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). 
To better understand the logistics and implications of the Rothschild 
reforms, the UK health department commissioned a seven-year formative 
evaluation of the reforms, one of very few participant observations of the 
workings of a government department (Kogan & Henkel, 1983; Kogan, 
Henkel & Hanney, 2006). 
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Based on this participant analysis of the Rothschild reforms, Kogan and 
Henkel (1983) showed that rather than either the scientists or the policy- 
makers being 'right' or 'wrong', there were fundamental differences in 
imperatives, roles and approaches within, and between, research and 
policy systems (Kogan, Henkel & Hanney, 2006). Despite their 
commonalties (for example, researchers and policy-makers may have had 
similar educational backgrounds and there were secondments between 
the two systems), government rarely found it possible routinely to devote 
the time and resources to being an informed customer, or receptor, of 
research. For institutional and epistemological reasons, scientists often 
struggled to produce the knowledge relevant for policy-making. These 
different perspectives needed to come together to build new 
understandings and effectively tackle policy problems. 
One of the main recommendations from Kogan and Henkel's analysis was 
to develop better linkages and brokerage mechanisms at the 'interfaces' 
between research and policy systems (Kogan & Henkel, 1983; Kogan, 
Henkel & Hanney, 2006). They saw that linkage mechanisms were 
required to enable scientists and policymakers to improve communication, 
facilitate understanding of their respective roles with respect to policy- 
making, and to foster better collaboration. The need for linkage 
mechanisms, knowledge brokers and regular interaction has been 
increasingly highlighted in empirical analyses since then, and in strategies 
to improve the relevance and utilisation of evidence in policy-making 
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(Innvaer, Vist, Trommald & Oxman, 2002; Kogan, Henkel & Hanney, 2006; 
Lomas, 2000). 
The need for 'linkages' extends beyond those required between 
researchers and policy-makers. For example, the current R&D strategy of 
the English Department of Health moves beyond the objective of 
supporting policy-makers to supporting patients and health professionals, 
and to promote an environment conducive to increasing knowledge to 
improve health services (Department of Health, 2006). This would 
necessitate the need for further linkage mechanisms across society, 
including at interfaces shared by government and civil society, consumer 
groups and the private sector. Such linkage mechanisms are envisaged in 
the new R&D strategy, including clinical research networks that have both 
'comprehensive and topic-specific' participation (Department of Health, 
2006). 
This need for knowledge linkages is quite closely aligned with the idea of 
a pragmatist via media that not only builds on existing knowledge, but 
also recognises that the knowledge necessary to resolve problematic 
situations develops from pluralistic perspectives that constitute these 
situations. Therefore, walking the pragmatist via media requires openness 
to pluralistic perspectives and ongoing inquiry in order to develop shared 
understandings and to successfully coordinate rational agency. These 
issues are further discussed in the following chapters. 
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Knowledge that is operative 
The ultimate pragmatist test of socially intelligent inquiry is the successful 
resolution of problematic situations. However, if rational agency were 
solely associated with resolving immediate problematic situations as 
measured against the standard of 'what works', this view of rationality 
would again lay itself open to criticisms of opportunism, convenience and 
amorality. This interpretation is wrongly associated with pragmatist 
philosophy and exacerbated by the colloquial use of the word 'pragmatic' 
in contemporary business and politics to prioritise expedient action over 
both theoretical and moral qualms. 
As a further complication, establishing `what works' in terms of resolving 
problematic situations in public policy may not be easy, given the long- 
term nature of impacts from societal interventions and conflicting views in 
society of what constitutes successful resolution of problems. Highlighting 
this problem, Elster (1989, p. 116) states that, 
'Learning from experience' proceeds by largely unreliable inferences from 
small-scale, short-term, transitional effects to large-scale, long-term, 
equilibrium effects. In addition, the very notion of 'experimenting with 
reform' borders on incoherence, since the agents' knowledge that they are 
taking part in an experiment induces them to adopt a short time horizon 
that makes it less likely that the experiment will succeed. 
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To address this problem, Elster considers "justice as an alternative guide 
to political action" (Elster, 1989, p. 116). He argues that democratic process 
should be guided by justice (and socially agreed-upon criteria for the 
same) as opposed to consequentalism. 
Dewey, writing before Elster, differed with this view of justice and agreed 
with John Stuart Mill that the proper principles of justice were those that 
had just consequences (Dewey, 1933/1989a). So while Dewey appreciated 
the importance of norms to guide rational agency and democratic practice, 
he disagreed with the position that any norm or 'good' was above revision 
and further inquiry, or an end in and of itself. A key characteristic of 
pragmatist inquiry is a need for intellectual responsibility with respect to 
consequences. Responsibility, in this context, also requires a willingness to 
reengage in inquiry and revisit norms if harmonious experience between 
established beliefs and current practice is not achieved. 
To be intellectually responsible is to consider the consequences of a 
projected step; it means to be willing to adopt these consequences when 
they follow reasonably from any position already taken. Intellectual 
responsibility secures integrity; that is to say, consistency and harmony in 
belief (Dewey, 1933/1999a, p. LW. 8.138). 
Dewey recognised that there was inequity in the extent to which different 
actors had influence in societies and access to material welfare, and that 
there was a need for social norms and rules to mitigate these inequities 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, 1954/ 1927). However, Dewey saw norms 
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functioning as part of, and subject to - not in lieu of -a socially intelligent 
process of inquiry that addressed societal problems and that was 
cognisant of consequences. 
4. Deliberation, norms and moral imagination 
In the pragmatist view, rational agency develops in relation to specific 
problematic situations. The question then arises, is there any room in this 
view for general concepts and norms that apply to more than one 
situation? If this possibility were denied, the very idea of constructing a 
generalised, or normative, concept of rational policy-making based on 
pragmatist premises would be pointless. Dewey did not have this 
conclusion in mind when he postulated the uniqueness of qualitative 
immediate experience. 
Dewey did state that, "everything directly experienced is qualitatively 
unique" (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b, p. 545). However, he also emphasised the 
socio-historical interdependence of situations, in that "situations are 
immediate in their direct occurrence, and mediating and mediated in the 
temporal continuum constituting life-experience" (Dewey, 1939/ 1989b, p. 
546). Showing some bemusement at criticisms that came from readings of 
his philosophy interpreted as saying that experience was either discrete or 
continuous, Dewey remarked that this was but another false dichotomy, 
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I lay no claim to inventing an environment that is marked by both 
discreteness and continuity. Nor can I even make the more modest claim 
that I discovered it. What I have done is to interpret this duality of traits 
in terms of the identity of experience with life functions (Dewey, 1939/ 
1989b, p. 546). 
The socio-historical development of knowledge as a result of inquiry in 
problematic situations, and the use and application of this knowledge to 
resolve further problematic situations, was discussed under the 
pragmatist pillar of socially intelligent inquiry. In keeping with the 
pragmatist principle of antiscepticism, knowledge that has been 
successfully tested in terms of resolving different problematic situations, 
should not be questioned unless there is a functional crisis or problem that 
requires further inquiry. Reliance on tested knowledge is part of the 
pragmatist concept of rational decision-making. However, while some 
knowledge may be generalisable, the application of knowledge in any 
new situation will always require interpretation and judgement. There may 
not always be available, tested knowledge on how to resolve new 
problems, in this case, norms come into play. 
Role and nature of norms in pragmatist philosophy 
To address the problems posed by new situations, Dewey viewed norms as 
methods or instruments that could usefully organise and orient practice 
towards the resolution of problematic situations. He viewed norms as 
concepts or tools that developed through socially intelligent deliberation 
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or through resolving problematic situations. With Dewey's emphasis on 
learning and evolution, the resultant learning would have value beyond 
the specific situations in which the norms developed. For instance, moral 
and ethical norms, such as human rights standards, may make demands 
beyond immediate convenience or efficiency in a specific situation. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that these general ethical principles and 
standards provide a strong and agreed upon foundation for directing 
long-term social coordination and developing shared practices that are of 
value to individuals and societies, even if there is disagreement on the 
specifics of particular problematic situations. 
In the UNICEF partnership review (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007), across 
countries, civil society organisations (CSOs) emphasised that the 
principles outlined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
provided the most reliable and agreed-upon foundation for partnerships 
with UNICEF and governments. International organisations' and national 
governments' strategies and targets periodically changed with policy and 
planning cycles. CSOs had to pay attention to these changes for project 
funding and management purposes. However, the principles outlined in 
the CRC were widely agreed upon and comprehensive enough to 
accommodate more transitory, or specific, policy and programmatic 
changes. Thus the CRC provided a stronger basis for collaboration and a 
wider framework within which specific collaborations could be 
developed. 
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To identify norms that can, or should, guide public policy-making, 
pragmatism offers two main criteria, though these are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive or temporally ordered: evolutionary success and 
successful deliberation. First, norms used in rational decision-making 
should have had a long evolutionary history and have successfully 
withstood the test of time and different problematic situations. Norms that 
evolved in such a way may become 'imprinted' in the social consciousness 
and may thus appear 'eternal' or 'categorical'. Nevertheless, it is the long- 
term and continued success of such moral intuitions that guarantees their 
authority. Objections may, however, be raised by those who consider that 
norms such as human rights, basic liberties, and central moral tenets are 
fundamental and immutable and thus cannot be left open to the tests of 
history and evolution. However, this position would deny the opportunity 
to learn how norms can be further developed and applied to deal with 
continually changing situations and challenges. 
The second criterion that pragmatism provides (to assess norms) is that 
norms can rest on insight, deliberation and good justification (e. g. in the 
absence of tested solutions). The importance of establishing conditions of 
reasonable and accountable deliberation, in order to ensure fair and just 
processes in society, is stressed in the Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework (Daniels & Sabin, 1998). This and other normative frameworks 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. In pragmatist philosophy, this deliberative 
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approach to the development of norms comes with the proviso that the 
forms and methods of normative (e. g. moral) reasoning themselves are 
products of evolution and testing. 
As for the role of ideals - while Dewey appreciated that ideals could 
provide some sense of orientation, he cautioned against considering ideals 
as reliable norms or guides for rational agency. Since ideals cannot be 
tested in practice, and since they are so far removed from practicalities, 
they are also unreliable guides for practice. Habermas' (1987) ideal speech 
conditions or Simon's (1957) concept of rationality being'bounded' 
compared to some intangible ideal, are examples of ideals that may not be 
able to effectively guide practice or satisfactorily resolve 'real world' 
situations. In pragmatism, rationality is not held to some unrealistic, 
unattainable standard of rationality, but rather to the standard of helping 
individuals and societies successfully resolve concrete problematic 
situations in a way that also facilitates learning for the resolution of future 
problems. 
The paradox of institutions as conduits of both norms & change 
'Norms' in the fourth pragmatist pillar, is a nominal placeholder for a 
number of guiding/ orientating categories ranging from institutional 
structures and rules, to social conventions, legal injunctions, moral 
principles, virtues, values and goods. This list, though not exhaustive, 
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should convey the variety of principles and rules with normative 
character that guide and channel decision-processes. 
The concept of 'norms' is also a reminder that socio-political agency is not 
only driven by a powerful few, but is also shaped by social conventions 
and is further agreed upon through standards and institutional processes 
(some of which may have developed through the exercise of hegemonic 
power, but also others that developed through deliberations on 
aspirations and shared values in society, and popularly mandated 
reforms). This is an important concept for individuals to maintain hope 
and develop aspirations that they can control and contribute to, rather 
than being passively shaped by, or subject to, dominant socio-political 
forces. One example of this possibility is how human rights concepts were 
effectively used in the civil society movements to help overthrow 
authoritarian regimes in the Eastern European communist bloc (Falk, 
1999). 
Norms that are successfully used to resolve problematic situations may 
already be institutionalised or become institutionalised as part of future 
habitual situations. In a harmonious and functionally coordinated 
experience, Dewey saw that certain adaptive behaviours and norms were 
institutionalised, both to promote efficiency of habit and to guide 
individual and societal practice based on established and agreed upon 
standards and values. Just as institutions of science have standards to 
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guide and arbitrate scientific enterprise, Dewey saw public policy 
institutions and standards as guiding and regulating public deliberation 
and action. 
However, Dewey recognised that public organisations could become 
autonomous structures that protected, and propagated, their own agendas 
and interests even at the expense of matters of public concern (Dewey, 
1954/ 1927). Once there was extensive institutionalisation, ensuring 
responsive change would be difficult and resisted, as this would 
invariably require some reform of the institutions themselves. With 
progressive failures to change, institutional structures and practices would 
get ever more entrenched, rendering them almost intractable to making 
changes that were relevant and responsive to the public interest. Thus, 
pre-existing institutional structures and rules may inhibit or restrict 
ongoing actions and interactions in society and fail to respond to current 
needs. 
The influence of structure, such as institutions or norms, on agency and 
vice versa, is a fundamental area of inquiry in several fields, including 
policy science and sociology (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994; Ostrom, 1999). 
Structural factors that influence agency in policy-making include the 
degree to which policy networks are fixed or allow for new membership, 
the openness of policy institutions to new ideas and to change, and whose 
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ideas and interests are usually represented in policy processes (Buse, 
Mays & Walt, 2005; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; John, 1998; Ostrom, 1999). 
To ensure that the public interest was protected and to fully realise the 
potential of democratic inquiry, Dewey saw the need for ongoing 
interaction between individuals and public institutions, and for mutually 
informed change that grew out of socially intelligent inquiry. Dewey 
(1939/ 1989a) found it untenable that institutions remained unchanged in 
light of changing circumstances and new learning. He cited Thomas 
Jefferson to highlight the need for ongoing, and socially relevant, change 
in public institutions, 
I know that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress 
of the human mind ... As new 
discoveries are made, new truths 
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must change also and keep pace with the 
times... 
The idea that institutions established for the use of a nation cannot be 
touched or modified, even to make them answer their end ... may 
perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of a monarch, but is 
most absurd against the nation itself ... A generation 
holds all the rights 
and powers their predecessors once held and may change their laws and 
institutions to suit themselves (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, pp. 120-121). 
Jefferson went further to recommend institutionalising institutional 
change, in order to be responsive to societies' changing needs. 
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He [Jefferson] engaged in certain calculations based on Buffon, more 
ingenious than convincing, to settle upon a period of eighteen years and 
eight months that fixed the natural span of the life of a generation; 
thereby indicating the frequency with which it is desirable to overhaul 
"laws and institutions" to bring them into accord with "new discoveries, 
new truths, change of manners and opinions" (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 
121). 
Against this backdrop, Dewey was incredulous of the near idolatry of the 
American constitution, and institutions of government, in the name of 
Jefferson. It could be argued that the lack of a fixed constitution in Britain 
provides a basis for a more fluid and evolving basis of governance. 
However, institutions of British government that have become entrenched 
over centuries, and its monolithic public sector organisations, such as the 
National Health Service, may not be easily amenable to fundamental 
change. Some may argue that there is too much change in the NHS, but 
the extent to which this change is overarching, or fundamental, is 
debatable. 
The Ethical Postulate and moral deliberation 
There have been several criticisms of Dewey on the grounds that he 
provides no substantive guide for individual and societal development 
(Ryan, 1995; Schilpp & Hahn, 1939/ 1989). Dewey did not see human 
beings as inherently moral or immoral. Instead he saw moral development 
as an evolutionary process that resulted from learning and deliberation in 
problematic situations. Through this process of learning, Dewey was sure 
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that individuals and societies would find that a commitment to ethical and 
moral development was without parallel as a guide for rational agency, 
and as a means for social coordination that supported both individual and 
societal flourishing. 
Dewey (1939/ 1989b) did not see that it was up to philosophers and 
academics to say what moral standards should, or should not, be. Instead, 
in the process of socially intelligent inquiry and deliberation, certain 
precepts would stand the test of time, even if not all the time. There would 
need to be compelling reasons to doubt these evolutionary moral precepts 
(as doubt, just as belief, requires warrant in the pragmatist approach). 
However, pragmatists also recognise that the application of norms and 
rules will always require interpretation and judgement in response to 
particular problematic situations (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 1999). No norm 
or rule has such inherent authority and generalisability that it obviates the 
need for judgement and interpretation when confronted with specific 
situational challenges. This concept is played out in the legal system 
where laws, even if considered inviolate, have to be interpreted and 
applied with respect to the details of a specific case. In the event that 
existing laws do not successfully clarify and resolve problematic 
situations, they can be revised, but only through a rigorous process of 
inquiry and deliberation. 
165 
As with the concept of inquiry, Dewey (1922) had a specific definition of 
deliberation, which is different from the more colloquial use of the term. 
Given that there are always pluralistic perspectives, preferences and 
possibilities in relation to an indeterminate situation, Dewey (1922) saw 
deliberation as a rational method for 'trying out' diverse courses of action. 
The advantage of deliberation is that this 'trial' is based on reflection and 
imagination. Different strategies and consequences can be explored, 
'experienced' and evaluated through imagination, rather than by making a 
premature commitment to a strategy and having to face up to irretrievable 
consequences, before such exploration. 
Deliberation is an experiment in making various combinations of selected 
elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would 
be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt 
fact-Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids 
having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster ... 
The object 
thought of may be one which stimulates [action] by unifying, 
harmonizing different competing tendencies ... in a "sublimated 
fashion" 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002, pp. 190,194). 
Rawls' (1971/ 1999) "theory of justice" was based on the concept of 
reflective equilibrium, but he made a distinction between a more limited 
political concept of justice and a more comprehensive moral philosophy. 
In this and several other contemporary theories, justice is considered as 
the sphere of governance, and the morality an individual pursuit. Dewey's 
integrative philosophy rejected a distinction between individual and 
societal reflection and moral deliberation. 
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Reflective conscience must be based on the moral consciousness 
expressed in existing institutions, manners, and beliefs. Otherwise it is 
empty and arbitrary (Dewey, 1891/ 1999, p. 359). 
Dewey put forward The Ethical Postulate (a reconstruction of Hegel's 
Sittlichkeit). The Ethical Postulate was posed as a falsifiable statement that 
Dewey hoped individuals and societies would test through inquiry, and 
use to resolve problematic situations and evolve moral deliberation and 
democratic practice. 
In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed 
realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a 
member; and, conversely, individuals who duly satisfy the community in 
which they share, by that same conduct satisfy themselves. (Dewey, 
1891/ 1999, p. 322) 11 
This Ethical Postulate has elements of both 'egoism' and 'altruism', which 
have been identified as key motivators in contemporary social policy 
decision-making (Le Grand, 2003; Pinker, 2006; Titmuss, 1968). This link 
between pragmatist ethics and social policy, including health policy will 
be further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In the pragmatist perspective, based on the concept of the social self, these 
two dimensions of egoism and altruism are interrelated and integral to 
each other, and thus should be mutually referential in moral deliberation 
11 Note: changes made to more gender-neutral language. 
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and moral development. Dewey (1891/ 1999) considered that Polonious' 
advice to his son Laertes exemplified this sentiment. 
This above all: to thine ownself be true 
And it must follow, as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. 
(William Shakespeare, Hamlet Act I, Scene 111) 
In addition, the social aspect of pragmatist ethics goes beyond mere 
altruism, again because social considerations are connected to 
considerations of the self. As with inquiry, having a referent community 
is, therefore, an integral part of moral deliberation. However, finding a 
referent community for moral deliberation, and democratic practice 
overall, is a major challenge, and one that was recognised by Dewey 
(1954/ 1927, p. 213). 
It is said, and said truly, that for the world's peace it is necessary that we 
understand the peoples of foreign lands. How well do we understand, I 
wonder, our next door neighbors? ... A man who has not been seen in the 
daily relations of life may inspire admiration, emulation, servile 
subjection, fanatical partisanship, hero worship; but not love and 
understanding, save as they radiate from the attachments of a nearby 
union. Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly 
community... That happiness which is full of content and peace is found 
only in enduring ties with others, which reach to such depths that they go 
below the surface of conscious experience to form its undisturbed 
foundation. 
By referring to 'neighbourly community', Dewey was again emphasising 
the importance of having a 'reference community' that comprises face-to- 
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face communication, shared experiences and evolving understanding and 
relationships. 
Moral development, in this fourth pragmatist pillar, refers both to learning 
lessons and to being ethical. In this respect, Dewey and Tufts (1908/ 1999) 
saw that developing moral theory was important both to guide reflective 
moral deliberation and to provide a systematic approach for moral 
development. 
Realization that need for reflective morality and for moral theories grows 
out of the conflict between ends, responsibilities, rights, and duties 
defines the service which moral theory may render, and also protects the 
student from false conceptions of its nature. The difference between 
customary and reflective morality is precisely that definite precepts, rules, 
definitive injunctions and prohibitions issue from the former, while they 
cannot proceed from the latter. Confusion ensues when appeal to rational 
principles is treated as if it were merely a substitute for custom, 
transferring the authority of moral commands from one source to 
another. Moral theory can: 
i) Generalize the types of moral conflicts which arise, thus enabling a 
perplexed and doubtful individual to clarify his own particular problems 
by placing it in a larger context. 
ii) State the leading ways in which such problems have been intellectually 
dealt with by those who have thought upon such matters. 
iii) Render personal reflection more systematic and enlightened 
suggesting alternatives that might otherwise be overlooked, and 
stimulating greater consistency in judgement (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 
1999, p. LW. 7.166). 
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Additionally, for moral learning and development, a better understanding 
of human nature needs to be developed. This understanding is also the 
foundation for developing democratic practice overall; without this, 
democracy is meaningless because democracy, as conceptualised in 
pragmatist philosophy, is based on faith in shared human experience and 
potential. In this context, Dewey (1939/ 1989a, p. 83) described the 
evolution of democratic and moral thinking as a play with three acts. 
The fundamental difference between even ancient republican and modern 
democratic governments has its source in the substitution of human 
nature for cosmic nature as the foundation of politics ... 
The subject matter which follows is that of a drama in three acts, of which 
the last is the unfinished one now being enacted... The first act, as far as it 
is possible to tell its condensed story, is that of a one-sided simplification 
of human nature which was used to promote and justify the new political 
movement [based on an exaggerated view of individuals as being 
separate from the societies in which they lived]. The second act is that of 
reaction against the theory and the practices connected with it, on the 
ground that it was the forerunner of moral and social anarchy and the ties 
of cohesion that bind human beings together in organic union. The third 
act, now playing, is that of recovery of moral significance of the 
connection of human nature and democracy, now stated in concrete terms 
of existing conditions and freed from the one-sided exaggerations of the 
former statement. 
Dewey wrote his 'play in three acts' summary of moral and democratic 
development, before positivist, reductionist and mechanistic theories and 
technologies made their entrance. These entrances were often made on the 
arms of military, market and scientific players. The result of these recent 
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entries has been a major, even catastrophic, retrogression in moral and 
democratic thinking. Early liberalism, Dewey's 'first act', was guilty of a 
simplified and exaggerated concept of the individual, risking social 
anomie and anarchy. However, these theories were at least based on the 
concept of human dignity and a nod to trying to understand human nature. 
These early democratic and moral theories, in relying on natural rights 
instead of natural laws, also recognised the role of human beings as agents 
in their own destiny, rather than as mere instruments in some 
deterministic scheme of things. 
An informative and entertaining, albeit markedly polemical, programme 
on BBC 2 aired in March 2007, titled The Trap: whatever happened to our 
dreams of freedom? portrayed an almost endemic encroachment of 
reductionist, mechanistic thinking across all walks of life. For example, the 
programme highlighted the pernicious use of 'checklists' in psychiatry 
that comprised only measurable items and observable symptoms. These 
checklists ignored the causes of these symptoms and led to the 
management of the symptoms alone, through medication. This 
purportedly led to a medicalisation of even the most fundamental human 
experiences and emotions, such as grief, disappointment and loneliness 
(Curtis, 18/03/2007). 
Reassuringly, the programme also depicted the way in which human 
nature can, and does, transcend the 'madness'. Originators of these mental 
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health checklists, including John Nash (who was interviewed on the 
programme), now acknowledge that this approach was too simplistic and 
that it led to the over-identification of mental illness in society. 
The programme also commented on 'selfish' and mechanistic gene 
theories that now had to contend with alternative evidence showing that 
genes are edited based on environmental demands (and humans beings 
are now setting about modifying genes as well). Similarly, game theories 
of the self-interested, materialistic consumer had to contend with more 
complex theories of economic and social behaviour, with recent Nobel 
Prize winners in economics having focused their work on these more 
complex theories12. 
Of particular interest with respect to this thesis, was the programme's 
examples related to health and social policy (Curtis, 18/03/2007). To set 
the scene: in Britain, as a new government, New Labour had wanted to 
establish a freer, more meritocratic society. They set out to do this through 
the use of 'objective measures' and performance assessments. This 
approach was meant to signal a move away from a society based on elite 
control, entitlements and aristocracy. While this new aim was quite 
egalitarian, ultimately the means employed to achieve them were not. 
12 However, the fact that Dawkins' Selfish Gene theory involved cooperation from the 
genetic level to the level of organisms and systems and that some game theories also took 
into account factors such as altruism, were largely ignored in this particular 
documentary. 
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By drawing on the aforementioned 'dastardly' game theories and free 
market thinking (inspired by the use of the same by the Clinton 
administration), New Labour's implementation of 'objective 
measurements' relied on, and created a 'new elite'. Technocrats, 
consultants and think tanks came up with these 'objective' measurements, 
and were often the only ones who understood them. Ironically, new 
aristocracies were also formed through the free market with even less 
potential for social mobilisation than in the Thatcher years. Social 
4 
inequalities widened, including and with respect to infant mortality and 
life expectancy13. 
Nevertheless, human beings were once again shown to be more complex 
and enterprising than game theories would have them be; in essence, they 
started gaming the system. For instance, there were instances of gaming to 
meet NHS targets (Curtis, 18/03/2007)14. Wheels were taken off trolleys so 
they could be classified as beds and corridors were classified as wards so 
that they were not be taken into account in waiting time targets and 
calculations. Operations were scheduled for times when the concerned 
person was on holiday, which also brought down waiting times. NHS 
institutions were not the only 'culprits' in gaming the target system, some 
13 Here again, one could ask for more detail on what the director thought constituted the 
link between the use of objective measurements and growing social inequalities. 
14 Similar incidents were reported by the National Audit Office, for example as related to 
the "Inappropriate adjustments to NHS waiting lists": 
http: // www. nao. org. uk/publications/nao_reports/01-02/0102452. pdf 
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police stations classified certain crimes as'suspicious occurrences' to bring 
down crime rates and some schools mainly focused on teaching answers 
to exam questions to meet their targets. There was no real resolution of 
societal problems, only increasingly frenetic chases of seemingly arbitrary 
targets and measures (Curtis, 18/03/2007). 
Coming back from this Orwellian scenario to the pragmatist concept of the 
rhythm and resolution of real situations, it seems that the latter can 
provide a more meaningful approach to solving problems in societies, and 
one that is based on an understanding of human nature. While the use of 
targets and financial incentives may improve overall performance, it 
seems that the means by which these improvements are achieved, and 
their longer-term effects, also need to be considered; including whether 
these means and incentives are aligned with the morals and values 
considered important in a society. If deliberation on whether incentives 
and methods are seen as acceptable normatively can be explicitly 
integrated into public policy-making, moral development and democratic 
practice can again progress in an integrated manner. Having deviated 
from the script of the three acts Dewey described, the plot would have to 
be rewritten for our times. By getting moral development back on track, 
there would also be a development of a better understanding of human 
nature, both its positive and negative aspects, as well as an appreciation of 
human potential, creativity and relationships, which seems so much more 
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appealing than the technocratic, mercenary and mechanistic approaches 
earlier described. 
On making Dewey's vision more operative 
Dewey's philosophy was one of hope and faith in democracy and human 
potential. In this respect, Ryan (1995) considered Dewey as an unusual 
visionary; unusual in the sense that his focus was on the present, not on 
the future. 
Dewey was a curious visionary, because he did not speak of a distant goal 
or a city not built with hands. He was a visionary about the here and 
now, about the potentialities of the modern world (Ryan, 1995, p. 369). 
Lasswell (1971) and the other founders of the policy sciences recognised 
the potential of Dewey's vision to provide a reliable and inspirational 
guide for policy science and democratic practice. It seems high time to 
reclaim this vision; the consequences of not doing so can be a continued 
denigration of the very experiences and emotions that make us human, 
and the destruction of the hopes and dreams that we cherish. 
Making Dewey's philosophy operative for public policy is the focus of this 
thesis; however, this is not an easy task. Dewey himself was, and 
continues to be, widely criticised for not making his work more easily 
accessible and 'usable'. For instance, Caspary (1991, p. 175) recognises 
"Dewey's extensive and profound investigations of ethical deliberation, 
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judgment, and action". However, he notes that, "though Dewey himself 
took his theory of inquiry, systematized it and applied it ... 
he did not 
undertake a comparable project with regard to his theory of ethics. " Thus, 
a case can be made that Dewey's theory of ethics needs to be explicated 
and made operative before "accurate applications" are possible. Others 
have been less generous. William Galston (1993, pp. 149-150) described 
Dewey's views on democratic practice as comprising "his characteristic 
combination of high-minded moralism and practical ineptitude. " 
Ryan (1995, p. 327) poignantly captures both the optimism afforded by 
Dewey's vision, and the frustration faced in finding instructions on how to 
make this vision operative. 
The prospect Dewey offers is daunting. We are encouraged to seek a 
multi-causal, culturally and historically sensitive recipe for a liberal- 
democratic society built on a socialized economy, but we are told it will 
be exceedingly difficult. We are told we shall be tempted by monocausal 
individualism or laissez-faire, or by monocausal collectivism of either a 
Marxist or Fascist kin, but we must resist. Then we are left to work out for 
ourselves how to build a revived Jeffersonian democracy in the complex 
situation thus outlined. Marx ended the Manifesto with the cry "Workers 
of the world, unite! " The last sentence of Freedom and Culture reads: "At 
the end as at the beginning the democratic method is as fundamentally 
simple and as immensely difficult as the energetic, unflagging, unceasing 
creation of an ever-present new road upon which we can walk together. " 
It may be childish to wish that Dewey had raised his voice to the pitch of 
Marx's, but with the next war barely a year away, readers in 1938 must 
have hoped for more guidance than they could find here on how to build 
that road. 
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This thesis has the privileged perspective of a pragmatist view as well as 
of theoretical and empirical analyses in the policy sciences in the years 
following Dewey's work. It is hoped that by integrating these two views a 
more holistic and operative approach to public policy-making can be 
developed, one that keeps the faith in both scientific sense and democratic 
sensibility. It is with this objective in mind that a new integrative and 
normative theory of policy-making - the Decision Cell model is 
developed. As discussed in Chapter 1, earlier versions of this model were 
presented at a conference and introduced in two papers that were 
developed and published during this PhD (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 2007; 
Kuruvilla, 2005). The further development of this model was informed by 
feedback received on these papers and by further conceptual and 
empirical analysis undertaken during the PhD. The Decision Cell model is 
applied to health policy with a view to making it more operative in this 
context and is also analysed in relation to contemporary theoretical and 
empirical analyses in the policy science and health policy literature. The 
overall development, and analysis, of this new theory of rational policy- 
making - the Decision Cell model - is described in the succeeding 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4. The Decision Cell Model (I): dealing with 
indeterminate situations and coordinating rational agency 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Dealing with indeterminate situations and coordinating rational agency 
................................................................................................................... 
179 
The Decision Cell model ......................................................................... 
182 
Policy environments and indeterminate situations .............................. 
186 
Explanatory aspect: Policy environments and disrupted equilibrium 
................................................................................................................ 
186 
Normative aspect: The 'public' &a 'fourth approach' to policy- 
making ................................................................................................... 
189 
Forming rational agency ......................................................................... 
196 
Explanatory aspect: policy networks, participation and power ....... 
197 
Normative aspect: public coordination and functional participation 
................................................................................................................ 
205 
The centrality of communities and capacities ....................................... 
220 
Individual capabilities - health literacy .............................................. 
222 
Societal capacities .................................................................................. 
228 
178 
Dealing with indeterminate situations and coordinating rational 
agency 
Changes and the need for further change in democratic theory are connected with 
an inadequate theory of the constitution of human nature and its component 
elements in their relation to social phenomena. 
John Dewey, 1939, Freedom and Culture 
Social science at the present time has collected too many facts upon which it has 
not worked. It has gone about matters in the wrong way. Facts after all are not 
physical objects which can be caught, labelled and put in glass cases. The greatest 
collection of them so displayed will get us nowhere. Theories must evolve from 
them, otherwise there is no use in bringing them together. They must lead to 
control and action. 
John Dewey surveys the nation's ills: 
Woolf, 1932, An interview with John Dewey in the New York Times Magazine 
Over the years, the metaphor of cellular organisation has been used to 
describe, and prescribe, different aspects of socio-political organisation. 
Thomas Jefferson (1816/ 1947) described the desirability of political 
system that was grounded in decentralised decision-making. Decisions 
would then flow upwards, as nutrients would through the cellular 
structure of a plant from its roots, and thus prevent the centralised 
concentration, and abuse, of political power. 
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Dewey (1886), as discussed in Chapter 3, described the transactions of a 
well-organised society as analogous to those at a biological level of an 
organism: "The various sensory and muscular stimuli, almost infinite in 
number, are always co-ordinated and harmoniously combined ... there is 
due gradation and subordination of the various factors in the unity of the 
whole, as in a well-organized society. " 
In the planning literature, Friedman (1973) uses the metaphor of a cell to 
describe how networks of actors form around a policy issue. Network 
'membranes' demarcate an issue to facilitate related planning and 
coordination; the structure and permeability of the membrane frames both 
participation and inquiry. 
Maturana and Varela (1980) developed the concept of "autopoiesis" to 
describe self-creating and self-organising systems, such as cellular 
systems. In an autopoietic system, agency cannot be reduced to some 
central property. Rather, agency is both the interaction of components of a 
system self-referentially, and the way in which components relate to each 
other, the system as a whole and the environment. Systems of self- 
organised activity differentiate from other systems and the surrounding 
environment through the formation and modification of boundary 
structures (Maturana & Varela, 1980). 
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Changes in the environment can catalyse changes in the system, and the 
system's response is determined by its structure. This response, in turn, 
can effect structural changes in the environment; essentially, this view (of 
creative and interactive 'systems') of agency and change is aligned with 
the transactive nature of agency and change described in pragmatist 
philosophy. This concept of autopoietic systems is apt in policy science 
with respect to the organisation and interaction of diverse institutions and 
networks in a policy system; this concept has also been applied to biology, 
sociology, cognitive studies and systems thinking. 
The interplay between social structure and human agency is also a key 
concern in sociological analyses, as highlighted in this passage by Dixon 
and Dogan (2004, p. 574), 
In contention is whether agency and structure are interdependent, in a 
duality relationship as asserted by Giddens: "The reflexive capacities of 
the human actor are characteristically involved in a continuous manner 
with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the contexts of social activity" 
(1984, p. xxiii), or interdependent but different and thus distinguishable 
(in an analytically dualist; Bhaskar, 1975) or morphogenetic relationship 
(Archer, 1995), which means that, with time and power, social structure is 
both a cause and a consequence of agency (Parker, 2000). 
The cell metaphor, the systems view of transactive agency and the 
interplay between agency and structure, all are constitutive of the new 
theory of rational policy-making developed in this thesis: the Decision 
Cell model. 
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The Decision Cell model 
The template for the Decision Cell model corresponds to the template of 
the rhythm of situations, which is the foundation for rational agency in 
pragmatist philosophy (see Chapter 3). The rhythm of situations also 
provides the model with a time-dimension, where policy-making passes 
through stages of habitual, indeterminate and transformed situations (see 
Figure 6). 
Figure 6. The Decision Cell: an integrative model of policy-making 
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In response to an interruption of equilibrium, an indeterminate situation 
arises. Actors who can influence, or may be influenced by, an 
indeterminate situation and its potential consequences, initiate intentional 
action, or agency, in order to resolve this situation. The social and 
institutional structures involved in this process and the interactions 
therein, form the 'boundaries' of the Decision Cell. The boundaries delimit 
participation in the policy process and demarcate what is considered 
relevant for resolving the indeterminate situation, from the surrounding 
policy environment. These boundaries do not pre-exist, but form and 
change in response to the ongoing demands of the situation. Thus the 
depiction of the boundaries of the Decision Cell is somewhat fluid or 
flexible. The flexible boundaries indicate that there can be both structural 
and procedural changes occurring throughout policy-making. 
The internal structure of the Decision Cell is constituted by three decision 
activities: Define, Design and Realise. At the nucleus, or core, of the 
Decision Cell is a fourth decision activity, Deliberation that, along with 
norms and moral imagination, orients the overall process of policy-making. 
These four decision activities and the overall structure of the Decision Cell 
model broadly correspond to the dimensions of Dewey's logic, or theory, 
of inquiry: 
" Indeterminate situations 
" Institution or intellectualisation of a problem 
" The determination of problem-solutions 
183 
9 Deliberation and judgement 
9 Restoration of harmonious experience. 
The template of the Decision Cell model (of rational policy-making 
processes) incorporates the dimensions of indeterminate situations and 
the restoration of harmonious experience. The coordination of rational 
agency, as set out in the second pragmatist pillar of socially intelligent 
inquiry, forms the boundaries of the cell. Different actors may be involved 
in different decision activities at various points and to varying degrees, 
depending on the situation, the structure of the cell and the permeability 
of the boundaries to participation at different points in the process. 
The decision activities could be read in a linear mode, for example, 
following a sequence of 'Define' - 'Design' - 'Deliberation' -º 'Realise'. 
However, this is not the only, or even the most salient, depiction, as the 
decision activities could take place concurrently, separately or iteratively; 
additionally, they all influence each other. The fluid nature of the 
boundaries of the Decision Cell and ongoing interaction between the 'cell' 
and the policy environment further inhibits a linear reading of the model. 
The depiction of this policy model as a cell is also indicative of the 
transactive nature of pragmatist rationality, on which this model is based. 
The cell is constituted of interdependent elements that function together, 
and with reference to the surrounding environment, as a system. First, this 
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means that while the decision activities or modes may have individual 
functions, they are nevertheless interlinked, and influence each other and 
the nature of the cell itself. Second, all the decision-activities are 
considered as formative in policy-making, as opposed to the central, 
definitive 'point' of political decision-making in linear instrumental 
models of policy-making (Friedman, 1973). This transactive element of the 
Decision Cell model also focuses attention on the nature and effects of 
rational agency throughout the policy-making processes. 
The cell metaphor, however, cannot be overstretched. There are important 
limits to the similarities between organic cellular structures and the 
Decision Cell model. In particular, the criteria of persistence or viability of 
a cell is not a defining characteristic of this policy model. It would not be 
desirable to promote the notion of a structure that is self-referentially 
directed at creating conditions to ensure its own viability. Decision Cells 
should typically persist only as long as the problem-situations around 
which they are formed. Boundaries set by participants may be widened, or 
narrowed, depending on what appears relevant in the deliberation 
process. However, institutional structures, socio-political contexts and 
participants' capabilities present parameters within which decision-cells 
can form. Some decision'cells' may also dissipate, split into smaller 
components, or merge into other processes. 
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Overall, the Decision Cell model is a conceptual abstraction to illustrate 
key explanatory and normative aspects of rational policy-making 
processes in an integrated way. The integrative function of the model 
operates by bringing together diverse policy processes and considerations. 
This chapter describes the formation and coordination of rational agency. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the decision activities of define, design and realise. 
Chapter 6 will discuss the core of the Decision Cell, which comprises 
Deliberation, norms and moral imagination. 
To begin building the Decision Cell model, the template, or foundation, 
for rational agency, as in the pragmatist concept of rationality, is situations. 
Policy environments and indeterminate situations 
Explanatory aspect: Policy environments and disrupted equilibrium 
'Situations' are the foundational category for rational agency in the 
Decision Cell model. As described earlier - in the pillar on the rhythm of 
situations, a state of dynamic equilibrium comprises habitual, coordinated 
and instituted transactions. In describing policy processes, Kingdon (1995) 
conceptualised ongoing, parallel streams of policy activity in politics, 
problem, and policy streams. Hall (1977) characterised policy environments as 
having institutional, technological, legal, political, economic, 
demographic, ethical, ideological, ecological, and cultural dimensions. A 
descriptive model of policy-making, developed by the UK government 
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Cabinet Office (1999), circumscribes the policy environment using four 
concentric circles of policy processes and socio-political contexts: 
" Policy process focuses on understanding and addressing a particular 
policy issue. 
" Organisational context includes institutional, resource and incentive 
factors that influence policy processes. 
" Political context involves strategic considerations of who is involved, 
how evidence is framed and getting 'buy-&. 
" Wider public context addresses 'real world' needs, perceptions and 
the possible consequences of policy processes, and also extends to 
considerations of related evidence, including similar experiences in 
other countries. 
All these factors would comprise a policy situation. In a habitual situation 
of dynamic equilibrium, as described in the Decision Cell, there are 
habitual, well-rehearsed and functionally coordinated 'streams' of activity 
in policy environments and contexts. This does not mean that no problems 
arise or that there are no disagreements. What a habitual situation 
indicates, is that existing processes, knowledge and institutional 
arrangements are able to maintain functional coordination, including 
addressing problems and differences of opinion that periodically, and 
habitually, arise. For instance, the UK parliamentary system has been in 
place since the 14th century and several policy-making processes have 
been developed, tested and established through evolutionary success and 
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political agreement. It would not be necessary, and indeed would be 
inefficient, to change these processes every time a new problem or 
challenge arose. 
However, when existing processes, knowledge and perspectives are 
insufficient, or unable, to resolve an impasse or interrupted equilibrium, 
an indeterminate situation arises. Referring again to the UK, in 2007 
analyses indicated that social inequalities were at the highest level in 40 
years15. This potentially could constitute an indeterminate situation, and 
indicate that existing processes and policies were not 'working', thus 
necessitating policy inquiry and change. 
An indeterminate situation is therefore the basis for initiating 
sociopolitical inquiry and catalysing policy change. Habitual interactions 
and equilibrium can be interrupted for a variety of institutional, political, 
moral, and intellectual reasons (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Kingdon, 
1995). For example, indeterminate situations can come about when: 
  Important values, such as human rights are violated; 
  New benchmarks for policy processes are developed; 
  There is economic or social mobilisation; 
  Natural or socio-political crises occur; 
15 Wealth gap 'widest in 40 years' 
http; //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/6901147. stm 
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  Existing policy arrangements are unfavourably evaluated or 
compared to others; or 
  Policy issues are defined or framed differently. 
Knowledge also plays a role in developing indeterminate situations; for 
example when there is insufficient evidence to guide policy activity, say 
with regard to the logistics of implementing party manifestos. New 
knowledge can also overturn existing orthodoxies, necessitating changes 
in related policies and practices. For instance, a randomised controlled 
trial, published in June 2005, established that the widely accepted use of 
corticosteroids to treat head injuries could be harmful (Edwards, Arango, 
Balica, Cottingham et al., 2005). One key challenge for public policy- 
making is to determine when perceived disruptions of equilibrium require 
public policy intervention and when they can be resolved through other 
means. This question leads to the normative aspect of this part of the 
Decision cell model. 
Normative aspect: The 'public' &a `fourth approach' to policy-making 
As discussed in the pragmatist pillar of socially intelligent inquiry, Dewey 
defined the'public' as comprising situations where human acts had 
consequences that "extend beyond [those] directly concerned and affect 
the welfare of many others" thus requiring coordination by public officials 
and organisations (Dewey, 1954/ 1927, p. 13). In this view, it is 
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externalities that necessitate and authorise the role of public sector 
organisations. 
Externalities are one of the main reasons for market failure with respect to 
health care (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Ruger, 2006), which reinforces the 
importance of a 'public' role in this respect. Dewey, however, considered 
'externalities' in a broader socio-political sense, as in his definition of the 
'public' that was based on the societal consequences of acts, rather than in 
a narrower economic sense of production and consumption, or profit and 
loss. 
A priori contracts form the basis of several predominant political 
philosophies. In early liberalism and utilitarianism, contracts were based 
on agreements to inhibit either individual or state action (Boucher & Kelly, 
2003). Contractual theories that proceeded these were based on criteria of 
justice and fairness (Elster, 1989; Rawls, 1971/ 1999). In essence, 
contractual theories model public and political life as the outcome of pre- 
established, or hypothetical, consensus between free and consenting 
individuals, with externalities only being considered as exceptional 
occurrences. From a 'contractual' point of view, the costs and 
consequences of externalities are, literally, external to the immediate 
policy activities or transactions at hand. As a result, these externalised 
costs and consequences may be ignored, or dealt with through a 
patchwork of case-by-case remedial actions. This can result in a paralysing 
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'compensation culture' (with respect to cases of 'unforeseen' externalities) 
or result in precautionary and conservative approaches in public policy- 
making (in order to avoid these costs). 
Socially intelligent inquiry is an approach that is creative, forward-looking 
and responsible (with regards to both potential consequences and 
externalities). Along these lines, Kass (2001) highlights the need for a new 
framework of ethics for public health. Bioethics primarily focuses on 
issues related to individual autonomy and privacy with respect to health 
research and medical care. However, what is good for the individual may 
not necessarily be good for the public, and vice versa with respect to the 
potential impact of public health interventions. 
Interruptions of equilibrium that require public policy intervention will 
vary with context and require deliberation among those involved. For 
example, UK government initiatives on controlling smoking and alcohol 
consumption, promoting healthy nutrition and regulating child-care 
services have led some to accuse the government of interfering in 
individuals' private lives and of being a 'nanny state'. Others make the 
case that the consequences of smoking and alcohol, obesity, and 
inappropriate child-care could have long-term societal costs in terms of 
health and societal risks and health care costs. Underlying these debates is 
the need to understand and define what constitute problematic situations 
and what concepts are used to understand and resolve it. For example, 
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concepts such as 'binge-drinking' or 'teenage-mothers' are developed to 
help define and demarcate a public policy problem. 
Matters of public concern and the socio-political contexts in which they 
occur are also continually changing. Therefore, there is a need for ongoing 
deliberation and negotiation in society on what constitutes matters of 
public concern, the concepts used to define these concerns, and the criteria 
used to determine when situations require public policy-making. Thus 
another normative element of the Decision Cell is the procedural aspect of 
determining what is in the public interest, as proposed by Morrison (2004, 
P. 5), 
Due to the variable nature of individual interests, 'the public interest' ... 
is accounted for by ensuring the articulation of diverse values and 
interests in public policy. 
Considerations of pluralistic perspectives, and of who participates in 
policy-making will be elaborated in a following section on functional 
participation. 
A 'fourth approach' to rational public policy 
The view of rational agency as a response to an indeterminate situation, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, may imply a conservative or incrementalist 
approach to rational agency. A challenge thus posed would suggest that a 
Deweyan policy-maker would only respond to situations that had already 
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turned problematic, functioning as a kind of post hoc repair mechanic. By 
the same token it would be reasonable to worry that Deweyan policy- 
making would be incapable of effecting radical change and transformation 
and would instead just tinker around the edges of policy problems in 
order to maintain the flow and status quo. 
Dewey recognized a socio-historical continuum in the rhythm of 
situations, as did Lindblom (1959), in describing how policy processes 
rarely begin afresh, but are a continuation of ongoing policy activity. 
Where pragmatism diverges from incrementalism, is in the view that the 
changes resulting in problematic situations, and the responses to these 
situations, need not be only conservative or incremental, but also could be 
forward thinking and revolutionary. Rather than settling for 'muddling 
through', rummaging through 'garbage cans' or being led by an'invisible 
hand', pragmatism proposes that societies would benefit from adopting a 
more rational, forward-looking and purposefully coordinated approach of 
'socially intelligent inquiry'. 
Dewey saw problematic situations as developing as much from thinking 
differently about situations, or forecasting future scenarios, as from more 
immediate problems (Dewey, 1929/ 1999, p. LW. 4.182). Thinking is not 
something that takes place outside of situational transactions, and is an 
integral part of both situations and agency. A pragmatist policy-maker 
thus would not seek only to remedy symptoms of failure after they occur, 
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but also would proactively and creatively think about avoiding future 
impasses and sustaining social coordination and development. Thinking 
about the ramifications of anthropogenic climate change for future 
generations, or about challenges to pension and social security systems as 
a result of changing population demographics, may be posed as tangibly 
as any problematic situation - as a potential threat to equilibrium that 
needs to be addressed through policy-making. 
The pragmatist approach to identifying policy problems is thus more 
aligned with the mixed scanning model of decision-making than with 
incrementalism. Etzioni (1967) proposed 'mixed scanning' as a 'third 
approach' to decision-making, as an alternative to Simon 's 'bounded' 
technical or instrumental rationality, and Lindblom's incrementalism. 
Etzioni (1967) saw mixed scanning as a process whereby there is broad 
vigilance with respect to potential policy solutions and in-depth analysis 
of the most compelling options. This mixed scanning process could be 
extended to problematic situations in a process analogous to weather 
forecasting, where there is broad vigilance with respect to future 
problematic situations as well as more detailed investigation of specific 
changes in weather or situations that require more immediate attention. 
In describing forward-looking rationality, Dewey additionally 
recommended the use of 'imagination' and 'dramatic rehearsal'. The 
pragmatist approach to decision-making thus goes beyond the 
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identification of potential problems, to the development of new vision and 
purpose. Imagination can be defined as the ability "to see the actual in the 
light of the possible" (Alexander, 1993, p. 384). 
J. B. Mays (1968) in The Poetry of Sociology urged social scientists to 
remember the role imagination played in major scientific 'breakthroughs' 
in the natural sciences. He also highlighted the value of poetry to help 
understand the human experience and the role of imagination in learning 
how to enhance this experience. 
Through the imaginative faculty, the poet achieves a new synthesis of life 
... 
The imagination which is par excellence the poet's gift, is, moreover, 
the great instrument of the moral good, and so much poetry comes to 
comprehend all science ... 
If the world is to be refashioned, I hope I will not be a traitor to my 
profession if I say that I would not like this delicate and tremendous task 
to be entrusted to scientists alone - neither to the natural nor to the social 
scientists. I would ask that the poets be invited to be present also at this 
recreating ceremony and given some voice in the ordering of things ... 
(Mays, 1968, pp. 4-5). 
The role of the arts and poetry in policy processes, and the concepts of 
deliberation and moral imagination will be discussed in more detail in 
following chapters. 
This section discusses many specifics, but was crafted to introduce an 
important normative point: while scientific methods can synthesise the 
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facts related to a problem, it is also important to synthesise both the 
interpretive and emotive aspects of indeterminate situations that motivate 
agency. 
The unsettlement, going by the name of the conflict of science and 
religion, proves the existence of the division in the foundations upon 
which our culture rests, between ideas in the form of knowledge and 
ideas that are emotional and imaginative and that directly actuate 
conduct (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 128). 
The emotive dimension of knowledge is an important, often missing, 
element in contemporary polemics on 'real science' (c. f. Loius Wolpert) 
versus 'science as social construction' (c. f. Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar). Socially intelligent inquiry helps build a bridge between 
knowledge in the form of fact and information, and knowledge that is 
interpretive and imaginative, as both shape human experience and agency 
(as was discussed in the pragmatist pillar of via media in Chapter 3). 
Pragmatist rationality thus provides a 'fourth approach' to policy-making, 
going beyond bounded rationality, incrementalism and mixed scanning, 
and including the interpretive, empathetic and creative dimensions of 
human knowledge and agency. 
Forming rational agency 
Indeterminate, interrupted situations make it necessary to define and 
delimit the problem in order to systematically coordinate a resolution 
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through inquiry. Boundaries are framed by reflection and deliberation on 
the nature of the problematic situation as well as with respect to the actors 
involved. These considerations may change as the process of inquiry 
evolves. The formation of communities of inquiry, discussed in the 
pragmatist pillar of socially intelligent inquiry, is a primary act of rational 
agency and metaphorically constitutes the boundaries of the Decision Cell 
model. 
Explanatory aspect: policy networks, participation and power 
The idea of a boundary is key to the Decision Cell because a process of 
inquiry and policy change has to be distinguishable from more habitual 
interactions and events in policy environments. The boundaries of the 
Decision Cell develop in light of crystallising problem-definitions based 
on deliberations on who, and what, is considered relevant to 
understanding and resolving an indeterminate situation. The'membrane 
of the cell is therefore both a product and a process of defining the policy 
problem. Boundaries are shaped through ongoing inquiry and are 
permeable to changes in the external environment as well as to the 
participation of actors. This keeps the definition and scope of the Decision 
Cell flexible and responsive to changes in situations. This responsiveness is 
not seen in linear instrumental models where boundaries and problem- 
definitions are formed a priori and external to rational deliberation. 
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The pragmatist concept of the formation of rational agency and 
communities of inquiry is congruent with policy network and advocacy 
coalition theories (Heclo, 1978; Sabatier, 1988). In an analysis of British and 
Swedish welfare policies, Heclo (1978) concluded that policy change 
resulted not only from macro-factors in social, economic and political 
environments, but also from the interactions of experts within policy 
networks or communities. 
Heclo (1978) referred to some policy networks that were fixed or 
impermeable to outside participation, as "iron triangles" - usually 
comprising politicians, bureaucrats and established interest groups. 
However, more wide-ranging, formal and informal networks or 
'subsystems' were perhaps more common. Building on Heclo's work, 
Sabatier (1988, p. 139) analysed the US "air pollutions control subsystem" 
as constituted by the following actors: 
- The Environmental Protection Agency 
- Relevant congressional committees 
- Portions of peer agencies frequently involved in pollution control 
policy, such as the Department of Energy 
- Polluting corporations, their trade associations, unions, and, 
occasionally consumer associations 
- The manufacturers of pollution control equipment 
- Environmental and public health groups 
- State and local pollution control agencies 
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- Research institutes and consulting firms with a strong interest in air 
pollution 
- Important journalists who frequently cover the issue 
- On some issues such as acid rain, actors in other countries. 
Given the wide range of potential policy actors, Sabatier (1988) found that 
it was useful to analyse policy change from the perspective of "advocacy 
coalitions". Advocacy coalitions are groups that share "basic values, 
causal assumptions, and problem perceptions - and who show a non- 
trivial degree of coordinated activity over time". Such coalitions can be 
seen as epistemic communities, or'invisible colleges', with their own norms, 
paradigms and belief systems (Callon, 1993; Sabatier, 1988). 
From a pragmatist perspective, a priori belief systems of advocacy 
coalitions cannot be taken as 'given' or 'fixed'. With respect to 
indeterminate situations, beliefs and values may not be explicit and may 
change in the course of rational inquiry. In keeping with the idea of 
changing and flexible boundaries in the Decision Cell model, empirical 
analyses on decision-making indicate that actors, their interests and 
positions can, and do, change throughout the process (Brugha & 
Varvasovsky, 2000; Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Dugdale, 1999). Changes in 
networks and coalitions can influence both the substance and the process 
of policy-making. As Callon (1993, p. 413) observes, "change the 
composition of the collective, and you change the content of its 
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productions". Policy networks may comprise different epistemic 
communities, making the coordination and management of these 
networks a particular challenge in policy-making. 
In addition to networks, in Making health policy, Buse, Mays and Walt 
(2005) note that partnerships are becoming increasingly influential. 
Partnerships tend to have a more formal organisational connotation than 
networks, in that partners usually work together in the context of a 
particular policy, project or programme and collaborate on the basis of 
agreed upon objectives and principles, such as mutual trust and benefit 
(Balloch & Taylor, 2002). As discussed earlier, UNICEF relies on 
partnerships with civil society organisations to communicate with, and 
deliver services to, children and their communities (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 
2007). In the context of international health, public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) play a key role, for example, in programmes instituted to facilitate 
equitable access to anti-retroviral drugs. Advising the Prime Minister on 
the UK's role in Global Health Partnerships, Lord Crisp (2007, p. 92) 
highlights the role of NHS organisations, educational institutions and 
private organisations in development, and notes that, 
In each case they see benefit in reputation, in terms of their 'Corporate 
Social Responsibility', in the motivation of their staff or, in some cases, the 
more direct benefits of influence and of commercial advantage. 
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Partnerships should build on the comparative advantages of diverse 
groups - the public sector, multi-national corporations, civil society 
organisations and academia. However, while there are shared 
commitments and purposes in partnerships, as with networks, there are 
also differences in belief and incentive systems across diverse partnership 
groups that need to be understood and coordinated in the context of 
health policy deliberations and the implementation of health programmes. 
The exercise of power 
Powerful policy networks and partnerships, and powerful actors within 
these, can control the interpretation of a policy problem and thus 
determine the manner in which it is conceived and acted on (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1991; Sabatier, 1988). Political power operates not only by getting 
issues on policy agendas and shaping them, but also by keeping issues off 
policy agendas (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Crenson, 1971). 
Crenson (1971) undertook a comparative study of policy-making in cities 
with similar levels of air pollution. He showed that the presence of a 
powerful 'polluter' in a city, such as US Steel in Gary Indiana, continually 
kept pollution off that city's policy agenda compared with other cities 
where similar levels of pollution were a key policy concern. While no one 
particularly wanted to breathe polluted air, the perceived power of the 
industry inhibited attempts to get the problem of pollution onto policy 
agendas. However, members from the industry were not necessarily 
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directly involved either in the informal deliberations or in formal policy 
processes that kept the issue of air pollution off policy agendas; with 
respect to policy, this was non decision-making. Factors such as employees' 
fear of sanctions and unemployment contributed to keeping the issue of 
pollution off formal policy agendas (Crenson, 1971). 
While power in non-decision making may operate in a relatively implicit 
manner outside formal policy structures, there are also challenges posed 
by power differentials in more formal structures, such as partnerships 
(Balloch & Taylor, 2002): 
" Partnerships tend to leave existing power relationships intact, 
taking place at the margins of larger participating agencies, and 
focusing on specific initiatives or objectives, rather than on related 
systems change. 
" More powerful partners lay out the 'rules of the game', while others 
legitimise, rather than make, decisions. 
" Smaller partners may not have the financial resources to engage 
effectively in partnerships (through they often have other types of 
resources); they often lack the fall back positions that bigger 
partners take for granted, if the partnership fails. 
" Time spent on the mechanics of building partnerships takes smaller 
partners away from their constituencies and frontline work. 
" There are power issues in the way funding relationships in 
partnerships place smaller groups. in an inevitably dependent 
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position; one in which they may not feel like equals around the 
table. 
Interestingly, traditional patterns of power in public partnerships may be 
changing. For example, a significant proportion of development aid is 
now being channelled through larger international NGOs, rather than 
only through UN agencies or directly to governments (Hulme & Edwards, 
1997). World Vision,. one of the largest international NGOs, now has a 
larger budget in some countries than UNICEF. Even small national CSOs 
are increasingly able to 'hook into' global and regional networks. CSOs are 
therefore able to "weigh the relative benefits" before deciding to work 
with larger INGOs versus UN agencies (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). 
To constructively manage power in partnerships, partnerships need to be 
built on an analysis of the comparative advantages and strengths of the 
partners, and this was one of the main recommendations in the UNICEF 
review (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). UNICEF recognises that CSOs are 
increasingly influential is shaping public opinion and global public policy: 
Civil society has grown stronger and more vibrant and has been a leading 
force in lobbying for change and in providing much needed services to 
the poor. On a regional level, new advocacy and partnership 
opportunities exist in relation to bodies like the African Union, the former 
Commonwealth ... These new or newly energized groups are focused on 
norm-setting and norm-adherence and so, through them, closer and more 
critical light can be thrown on issues affecting children and on the 
responses and actions of leaders. They also provide forums where 
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constructive criticism or peer approval and international approbation can 
be aired (UNICEF, 2005, p. 5). 
In addition, on a more local level, the reach and relationships of CSOs 
with disadvantaged and vulnerable children and their communities is 
something that a large organisation, such as UNICEF, cannot match or 
replicate. 
At the same time, CSOs recognize that UNICEF brings considerable value 
to partnerships, beyond money, including access to governments, a 
validated country and global presence, technical capacity and a convening 
power to bring diverse actors together that CSOs can rarely match. Thus, 
to a large extent, both UNICEF and CSOs recognise that it is by working 
together, based on their comparative advantages that they can better hope 
to achieve their mutual goals of protecting and promoting the rights of 
children. 
Power in rational agency, thus does not need to have only negative 
connotations. There are several other factors that promote the influence of 
ideas and interests in policy-making including recognised comparative 
advantages, resources, reach and strategic collaborations (Buse, Mays & 
Walt, 2005; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Kingdon, 1995). Against this 
backdrop, Fischer (2003) proposes explicitly 'reframing public policy' to 
acknowledge the role of power in policy-making, with respect to both the 
'positive' standards against which creative, and critical, political agency 
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can be evaluated, as proposed by Habermas (1987), as well as in terms of 
the socio-historical influences, norms and institutions that may inhibit or 
constrain agency, as emphasised by Foucault (1984). Additionally, with 
potential changes in knowledge and the composition of networks during 
policy-making, the method by which power is exercised may change over 
the process, and these changes too need to be recognised and coordinated 
(Brugha & Varvasovsky, 2000; Drager, 2000; Walt & Gilson, 1994). 
In the Decision Cell model, the depiction of 'power' in the boundary of the 
cell acknowledges that it shapes the process, but carries no commitment to 
centralised or hierarchical forms of power. On the contrary, power as an 
element of the Decision Cell is more a reminder that all the individuals 
and groups involved in the different decision activities ('define', 'design , 
'realise', and 'deliberate'), and in surrounding policy environments, can 
potentially shape inquiry and contribute to resolving problematic policy 
situations. This potentially egalitarian dimension of power in the Decision 
Cell model influences all the decision activities. 
Normative aspect: public coordination and functional participation 
The need for public coordination 
In the preceding discussions on the formation of rational agency and the 
constructive use of power, the need for the coordination and management 
of policy-making was emphasised. Dewey saw government and public 
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organisations playing such a coordinating or facilitative role, but 
emphasised that democratic practice extended beyond governance 
mechanisms and institutions. 
The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified 
in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of 
association, the family, the school, industry, religion. And even as far as 
political arrangements are concerned, governmental institutions are but a 
mechanism for securing to an idea channels of effective operation. 
(Dewey, 1954/ 1927, p. 143). 
In this context, the Decision Cell broadens the scope of public policy 
inquiry beyond processes taking place in government institutions. For 
example, as will be further discussed vis-ä-vis the decision activity 
'Define', the role of the arts and media in defining public problems and 
capturing the public mood would be explicitly taken into account as well. 
To secure 'channels of effective operation' across diverse groups and 
pluralistic publics, there is a need for public institutions to play a strong 
coordinating role, especially in the areas of education and public health 
(Dewey, 1954/ 1927; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). 
Recent empirical analyses confirm that central coordination and support 
are required for effective decentralised health systems and public 
participation in the same. A survey across 45 local (municipio) health 
systems in Ceara, Brazil, where decentralisation is a core management 
tenet, indicated that good management practices led to good decentralised 
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local health systems rather than vice versa (Atkinson & Haran, 2004). 
Additionally, a regression analysis indicated that the association between 
decentralisation and performance seemed to be an artefact of factors 
relating to informal management practices and political culture. Similar 
findings resulted from an ethnographic study of participation in health 
services provision in Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi, 2005). The Uganda study 
also questioned the capacity and interest of groups, particularly CSOs, to 
participate in health services decision-making and concluded that, 
To succeed in the long term, devolution and participation must take place 
in the context of a strong state, able to ensure consistent regulation, and a 
well informed public backed up by a participatory political culture 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2005). 
The need for public sector organisations to play a stronger coordinating 
role in socio-political decision-making is increasingly recognised and 
endorsed (as discussed in relation to managing externalities in health care, 
for example). In the UNICEF review as well, CSOs stressed that they 
would welcome, and strongly endorse, UNICEF taking up a leadership 
and coordinating role in global, regional and national partnerships to 
promote and protect children's rights (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). This 
type of coordination was seen to be key, not only to enhancing the 
partnership relationship, but also to focusing partnership action and 
improving results. Instead, there was a perception that UNICEF was often 
competing with larger CSO/ INGO partners, and that there was 
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duplication of work, including with the work of smaller CSO partners. As 
one CSO respondent noted, 
Instead of being the coach and coordinating the game, UNICEF keeps 
getting onto the field, trying to be the fastest player ... acting like an NGO 
... and it often 
drops the ball. 
One key task for public policy institutions with respect to coordination is 
the management of policy networks and partnerships. 
Designing and managing networks and partnerships 
In the LSHTM study, researchers across the case studies identified that 
their involvement in research and policy networks and partnerships was a 
key factor influencing the impact of their work (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 
2007). These networks included other academic institutions, but also civil 
society organisations, government departments and the private sector. 
Researchers thought that there needed to be greater awareness and 
attention paid, at management and policy levels, to the importance of, 
investment needed and skills required for effective network management. 
The role and importance of partnerships in health policy-making, 
including public private partnerships, has also been highlighted in 
previous sections. One product of the UNICEF civil society review was a 
typology of public sector-civil society partnerships (See Figure 7) that 
aimed to: 
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i. Illustrate a range of potential partnership arrangements or modes, 
ii. Highlight the implications for UNICEF management associated 
with different partnership modes. 
Figure 7. Modes of partnership 
Capacity- Contracted l Cooperation/ Collaboration/ Community of 
building/grants Fee for services Resource-sharing Synergistic practice/Co- 
& training evolution 
Partnerships may operate (in respect to the different partnership modes) 
concurrently, sequentially or in iteration at different stages in a project in 
order to carry out different policy and programme tasks. This typology, 
therefore, does not put forward a fixed partnership hierarchy or 
progression, per se. This partnership spectrum illustrates a range of 
partnership modes that can be strategically employed depending upon the 
specifics of a policy situation. 
Two key challenges for policy coordination, with respect to both networks 
and partnerships, is the empirical problem of identifying and characterising 
these arrangements with respect to different policy situations, and the 
management problem of keeping this picture up to date and responsive to 
changing needs. For UNICEF, this means achieving the right balance 
between building a partnership relationship and managing a partnership 
task. Figure 8 sets out a 'grid' to help locate partnerships along these two 
axes. 
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(Adapted from Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007) 
The data of the UNICEF Review, suggest that most partnership 
arrangements move across quadrants as needs, resources and 
relationships change. Most CSOs prefer that their partnerships with 
UNICEF be in the two "high relationship" quadrants (B and D). This 
would allow them a more sustained, and administratively stable, focus on 
the long-term task of promoting children's rights and societal 
development, compared with that afforded by short-term contracts or 
limited collaborations in emergency situations. The partnership mode of 
PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLES 
A B 
High Task/Low Relationship High Task/High Relationship 
(HT/LR) e. g.: (HT/ HR) e. g.: 
  Some collaborations for   Communities of practice 
emergency relief. on CRC & child 
(Sometimes tasks cannot protection. 
be clearly delimited and " Collaboration for 
potential partners may HIV/ AIDS advocacy. 
* not be well known. ) R, % 
fC DV 
Low Task/ Low Relationship Low Task/ High Relationship 
(LT/LR) e. g.: (LT/HR) e. g.: 
  Contracted arrangements   Capacity support for 
for immunisation or information exchange. 
sanitation supplies. " Cooperation to arrange 
  Some research grants. f- -ý stakeholder meetings. 
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community of practice or co-evolution is most closely aligned with 
Dewey's idea of communities of inquiry, but is also perhaps the most 
difficult to manage through formal bureaucratic procedures and contracts. 
There was validation, by both UNICEF and civil society organisations, 
that partnership tasks needed to be grounded in Human Rights standards, 
as the objective of these tasks was the realisation of children s rights. There 
was also agreement that partnership relationships needed to be based on 
shared partnership principles. The following UN definition of 
partnerships was widely endorsed in the review. 
Partnerships are voluntary and collaborative relationships in which all 
parties agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or 
undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, 
competencies and benefits. In priority, principles of priority to partners 
are shared values, clear expectations, defined roles, specified 
contributions, joint decision-making, and mutual monitoring, evaluation 
and opportunities to learn. 
I 
Also confirmed, in the UNICEF review (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007), as 
integral to partnership are three mutually contingent 'partnership 
principles': 
" Core principles, especially shared values, trust, transparency and 
risk-taking; 
" Operational principles, especially mutual accountability, attribution 
of credit and joint monitoring and 
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" Management principles, especially consistency, commitment to 
standards and constancy of involvement. 
There are similar considerations with respect to the management and 
coordination of networks. In order to identify principles for the effective 
management of networks, Perri 6 et al. (2006) analysed networks across a 
range of sectors - defence, biotechnology, crime, health and social care. 
They identify three types of network management configurations: 
  Enclave networks which operate through cohesive forces 
connecting members by shared values, trust and commitment to 
certain goals. There is usually no central authority or 
institutionalisation. These networks have great value for mobilising 
support and creating 'bottom-up' legitimacy, but can be unstable 
owing to lack of resources and institutional support. 
  Hierarchical networks which have organisational structure and are 
coordinated by steering groups or other authoritative bodies. These 
networks can be efficient at coordinating and implementing 
predefined tasks, but may fail from over-regulation and 
bureaucratisation and the lack of a mandate to manage their 
members. 
  Individualistic networks are driven by single individuals or 
organisations that develop affiliations in relation to a particular 
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task, e. g. through procurement of services. Such networks can 
provide innovative and flexible means of working, but can result in 
conflict and competition, as there is no long-standing relationship 
to facilitate shared understandings and approaches. 
This multi-sectoral analysis concludes that rather than privileging any one 
type of network over another, organising and managing diverse networks 
is the most effective strategy for complex health policy and programme 
challenges (6, Goodwin, Peck & Freeman, 2006). 
Functional participation 
Dewey (1954/ 1927) emphasised that pluralism was both a reality and a 
rich resource on which societies could draw to resolve problematic 
situations. There are many ways in which people define themselves and 
the publics they form. Dewey strongly recommended, therefore, that with 
respect to coordinating socially intelligent inquiry to resolve 
indeterminate situations, publics be identified on a functional basis, rather 
than by a priori categorisations (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). 
The need for functional, rather than pre-defined, participation to resolve 
indeterminate policy situations extends to the perceived confines of geo- 
political boundaries. Indeterminate public policy situations are rarely 
confined within geo-political boundaries; therefore, it does not make sense 
that mechanisms to deal with these problems are thus delimited. For 
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example, in the UNICEF study, it was identified that recruitment of 
children to fighting forces took place across national borders in Liberia, 
Guinea and Sierra Leone. UNICEF country offices, however, maintained a 
primarily national focus, with a mandate to work alongside national 
governments. This made it difficult to generate a meaningful regional or 
community-based response to this problem and was identified by CSOs as 
one of the main reasons why UNICEF was failing to deal effectively with 
child protection issues (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007).. 
However, CSOs with more flexible structures and protocols were able to 
set up collaborations across country borders; for instance, WANEP (the 
West African Network for Peace Building) trained local communities in 
different countries to develop early warning systems of potential conflicts 
and to prevent child recruitment into armed forces. As a preventive 
measure, mediation and conflict resolution skills were taught both in the 
community and in schools. However, given the limited resources of these 
CSOs, the institutional integration of these types of activities in national 
policies and programmes is limited. 
Three analytical perspectives that can help public institutions to facilitate 
more functional participation in policy-making are: 
" Stakeholder analyses 
" Matching participation requirements and methods 
" Considering legitimacy 
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Stakeholder analyses and fairness of participation 
A stakeholder group can be defined as a group of people or institutions 
that are affected by a specific problem, have a common interest in a 
particular issue, or could influence a proposed policy in a similar way 
(Brugha & Varvasovsky, 2000; Drager, 2000; Reich, 1996). Stakeholders can 
be categorised on at least three levels, according to: 
  Affiliations with policy and civil society institutions, 
  Potential roles in relation to the issue being considered, e. g. as 
researchers, policy analysts, public officials, politicians, 
communicators and media, implementers, potential beneficiaries, 
and those potentially at risk, and 
" Specific positions taken in relation to a policy topics, e. g. in 
advocating or opposing particular policy options. 
Stakeholder analyses, however, are not simple tasks in the context of 
policy-making. There are concerns about the increasingly diffuse lines 
separating states, donors, civil society organizations, the business sector 
and a range of other sub-national, national and global actors; for example 
as a result of their collaboration in networks and partnerships (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Further, given the fluid nature of 
policy processes and the varying degrees to which stakeholder interests 
and roles are explicit, or may change, during the process, stakeholder roles 
and interests need to be carefully and periodically assessed and managed 
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throughout the policy-making processes. 
In setting out criteria for 'good decisions', Dietz (2003) proposes that 
criteria of fairness and proportionality also guide participation 
considerations. Referring to 'proportionality' as an ancient philosophical 
tradition, that was further developed in work by Dewey and Habermas, 
Dietz (2003, p. 35) suggests that participants be selected based on the 
extent to which actors stand to gain or lose from related decisions. Further, 
while all arguments should have a fair chance of being heard, he 
recommends that arguments be weighted in proportion to their 'logic', 
'sincerity' and 'persuasiveness'. These criteria pose further empirical and 
management challenges for stakeholder analysis and management, and 
would best be addressed through an overall process of inquiry and 
deliberation, with respect to particular indeterminate situations. 
Matching participation methods with requirements 
In discussing participation in policy-making, there seems to be an implicit 
expectation that the ultimate goal is to have everyone participating all the 
time, whereas this can be impracticable, inefficient and ineffective, and 
thus irrational (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Khan, 1999). Even in Switzerland, 
where there are national referenda on almost every topic, from genetics 
research to the colour of post-boxes, different modes of civil society 
participation are being explored to enable more effective, efficient and 
strategic methods of participation that are appropriate to different policy 
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topics and contexts (Butschi, Joss & Baeriswyl, 2002). 
One tool that can help policy-makers think through these issues is the 
public involvement matrix (See Figure 9); this was developed and tested 
with a set of European case studies on state-citizen political dialogue on 
health, education and city planning policies (Khan, 1999). This matrix 
helps match different participation methods to different policy and 
participation requirements. 







*\ 1ý Particularistic Health panels 
ýiý Nursery vouchers 
Individualistic 
(Khan, 1999) 
The public involvement matrix is structured along two axes. The first axis 
extends, vertically, from collectivistic to individualistic; collectivistic 
referring to whether everyone who may be affected by the policy 
participates, while individualistic refers to whether individuals can choose 
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to participate based on their interest in relation to specific topics or their 
requirements for different types of services. The second, horizontal, axis 
takes into account whether the mechanisms require people to think in 
holistic terms about the larger common good, or in terms of 
particularistic needs and interests related to a specific group, for example 
parents of school-age children. In their analyses, Khan et al (1999) show 
that, although participation mechanisms may be initiated in one of the 
cells, they can 'move' laterally or vertically along the two axes depending 
on the topic, the type of policy process involved and related consequences 
(similar changes were noted with respect to partnership modes in the 
Partnership Location Grid, Figure 8). 
Considering legitimacy 
A further issue in considering whether the 'right' people are involved in 
policy-making is legitimacy. Public institutions need to evaluate 
legitimacy of participation in order to ensure the legitimacy of the policy 
process itself. In 1947, Weber explicated three types of legitimacy: rational, 
traditional and charismatic. Brown (2001), in an analysis focused on CSO 
interactions, and describes four bases for CSO legitimacy in policy 
interaction: moral, technical, political and legal. Synthesising these 
approaches, legitimacy for participation in policy-making could 
potentially be established on the following bases (Kuruvilla, 2005): 
  Rational-legal, based on legal or formalised requirements for 
participation 
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  Traditional, in terms of customary or historical roles and positions 
held, for example by religious leaders 
  Charismatic, through compelling leadership and communication 
styles 
  Moral, by making explicit value statements or aligning with 
specific ethical positions 
  Technical, in terms of specialised functions performed that are 
required in the given context 
  Political, through persuasive political argument and action 
Representative would be an additional type of legitimacy where 
participants explicitly represent the interests of specific societal 
groups and are recognised by these groups to do so. 
  Resource-based, where participation is based on having the 
resources required to influence a problematic situation. As seen in 
the UNICEF study, this is one of the main sources of legitimacy for 
international NGO involvement in policy-making processes in 
developing economies. This is also the basis on which much 
corporate policy lobbying in more economically developed 
countries operates. 
While this categorisation provides some insight into possible approaches 
for ascertaining legitimacy, it is not always clear to whom and how 
different types of legitimacy can be 'proved' or what level of evidence or 
agreement is required (Pollard & Court, 2005). Further, different 
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legitimacy criteria may apply to different situations. This again is a 
consideration that needs to be deliberated on with respect to specific 
situations. What is considered to be legitimate participation in one 
situation may not be considered legitimate in another context. For 
example, while public-private partnerships to facilitate more equitable 
access to drugs may be seen to be legitimate, partnerships with the 
tobacco industry in research and policy-making related to smoking and 
public health, may not. 
There are also associated accountability implications that need to be 
established. For example, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of International 
NGOs, interviewed in the UNICEF project (personal communication), 
indicated that they were primarily accountable to their donors in 
industrialised countries. Their business models did not include being 
accountable to the governments, children and communities with whom 
they worked in developing countries. However, this was something these 
CEOs identified as an important area that needed to be developed, 
preferably coordinated by a public agency, such as UNICEF, that would 
have the networks and resources in place to institute such accountability 
mechanisms. 
The centrality of communities and capacities 
The pragmatist approach to rational policy-making, and to democratic 
practice overall, is founded on the concept of community (Dewey, 1954/ 
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1927; Ryan, 1995; Shields, 2003). In the Decision Cell model, community 
has been discussed as related to communities of inquiry, which also serve 
as 'reference communities' for moral deliberation. Building on the 
discussions so far, such communities could be built up and coordinated 
through policy networks, partnerships and intermediate organisations. 
In this context, one important strategy for public policy institutions in 
coordinating rational agency, is to build on existing community structures. 
This approach saves the costs required to set up new structures and also 
adds value, in supporting the development of local solutions and 
enhances policy and programme sustainability. A Ford Foundation study 
of civil society and democratisation in 22 countries identified the failure of 
donors to build on existing structures and processes in trying to 
strengthen civil society (Van Rooy 1998 cited in Howell & Pearce, 2001). 
This was a finding confirmed in the UNICEF review (Bernard & 
Kuruvilla, 2007). 
When we identified youth groups who were already doing HIV/AIDS 
prevention activities, we were able to really make a difference to their 
projects by supporting them with a small amount of money. These groups 
still carried on after our funding was over. When we spent a lot of money 
to set up new youth groups these were not as successful and many of 
them stopped when the funding was over (UNICEF Country Office staff). 
In Chapter 3, the possibility of intermediate organisations serving as 
communities of inquiry, and as reference communities for moral 
221 
deliberation, was discussed. Intermediate organisations can include 
professional institutes, religious organisations, ethnic associations and 
trade unions (Mays, 2000). The success of such intermediate organisations 
in health care was illustrated in the historical development of HMOs in 
the US; workers unions and cooperatives provided more responsive and 
cost-effective health care than did health care services with no such 
community affiliations (Oliver, 2004; Anthony Robbins, personal 
communication). 
Individual capabilities - health literacy 
To build strong communities of inquiry, both individual and social 
capacities need to be developed. A substantive focus in John Dewey's 
work was on building education systems that supported democratic 
practice and rational agency. His project was an integrative one, looking at 
the role of education alongside that of scientific progress, moral 
development and the production of goods as well as of history, culture 
and artistic enterprise and democratic practice. In an increasingly 
specialised world, these considerations are increasingly separated. For 
example, John Dewey's work on education and school systems is now 
both lauded and criticised, with little appreciation of the larger context of 
in which he situated discussions on education (Ryan, 1995). For Dewey, 
education, in a comprehensive sense, was integral to both scientific and 
democratic development and to realising potential in individuals and 
societies. 
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Aligned with this thinking, the Indian constitution states that it is the 
fundamental duty of citizens to "to develop the scientific temper, 
humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform" (Government of India, 
1950/ 2006). Similarly, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation recognises a 
crisis in the American education system and, based on the analysis of 
experts on education, recommends a more integrative and socially- 
oriented approach to building literacy, with the "New 3 Rs": Rigor, 
Relevance, Relationships (Gates Foundation, 2006). 
There is growing evidence of the impact of literacy specifically on health 
decision-making and health outcomes (Nutbeam, 1998; Zarcadoolas, 
Pleasant & Greer, 2005). Developing health literacy is seen to be a critical 
component for achieving the 'fully engaged' scenario for future health set 
out in the Wanless review of long-term sustainability of health spending 
in the UK (Wanless, 2004). 
In perhaps the first randomised control trials to study the effects of 
participation and health literacy on health outcomes, Manandhar et al. 
(2004) established that neonatal and maternal mortality in a poor rural 
population in Nepal significantly decreased through a low cost, 
community-based participatory intervention. This study facilitated 
women s group meetings every month to identify perinatal problems and 
to find ways to address them in an "action-learning cycle" (Manandhar, 
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Osrin, Shrestha, Mesko et al., 2004). What is important here, from the 
perspective of developing a model for rational decision-making, is that 
learning, in the Nepal study, occurred in relation to a particular 
problematic situation and was used to resolve it. 
Taking this functional view, 'health literacy' is defined as the skills and 
competencies that people develop and use to seek out, comprehend, 
evaluate and use health information and concepts to make informed 
decisions, reduce health risks and increase quality of life (Zarcadoolas, 
Pleasant & Greer, 2005). Health literacy can be considered as having the 
following dimensions (Nutbeam, 1998; Zarcadoolas, Pleasant & Greer, 
2005): 
  Fundamental literacy: reading, speaking and numeracy skills, and 
competence in comprehending print as well as spoken language. 
  Science and technology literacy: knowledge of science and 
technology and an understanding of scientific uncertainty and 
change. 
  Civic literacy: knowledge of sources of civic and policy information 
and how to interpret them. This includes media literacy skills and 
knowledge of civic and governmental processes. 
  Cultural literacy: recognising, evaluating and using socio-cultural 
knowledge, norms, worldviews and artistic expressions in order to 
understand, communicate and act on health information as 
appropriate to a given cultural context. 
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  Communicative literacy: cognitive and literacy skills which, with 
social skills, enhance participation in everyday activities and allow 
knowledge to be applied to new situations. 
  Critical literacy: skills that allow for a critical examination and 
application of institutions and information. 
Commenting on US schooling in the early 20th century, Dewey was of 
the view that schools tend to propagate "a systematic, almost 
deliberate, avoidance of the spirit of criticism in dealing with history, 
politics and economics ... the 
history and institutions of one's nation 
are idealised. " (Dewey, 1922/ 1999, p. MW. 13.333). Now, however, 
there are many sources of information in society beyond education 
systems. For example in the UK, critiques of the health system in the 
mass media seem ubiquitous and it is unlikely that students graduate 
with an unsullied idealism about the NHS, and neither should they. 
However, in this case, critical literacy skills need to be developed in 
order to evaluate different sources of information and the merit of 
different arguments. 
Two more dimensions of health literacy could be usefully added. While 
these may be covered in the previous health literacy categories, they are 
worth emphasising in the context of pragmatist inquiry: 
  Ethics literacy: refers to knowledge of ethical and moral reasoning 
for health decision-making. Public and patient participation is 
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increasingly sought in ethics review panels or priority setting 
exercises and patients and their families also have to make complex 
ethical decisions about health care (Crawford, Rutter, Manley, 
Weaver et al., 2002; Leshner, 2003; McIver & Ham, 2000). Ethics 
literacy is therefore a key requirement for health care decision- 
making. 
  Relational (ecological and emotional) literacy: Pragmatist 
philosophy views human beings and their interactions as part of 
nature and emphasises the interdependence of relationships in 
nature. Thus, how natural resources are used, the extent to which 
this use is sustainable and the interrelationship between the 
environment and human experience are key considerations. 
Research and policy debates on human activities associated with 
climate change are an obvious example where such a relational, or 
ecological, literacy will play a role. 
The concept of interdependent relationships also extends to human 
relationships. The importance of relationships was earlier stressed 
in the Gates Foundation's approach to promoting the new 3Rs in 
education. Collective intelligence, emotional intelligence and social 
intelligence are all topics receiving increasing attention for their role 
in facilitating better interactions including in 'communities of 
practice', for example in organisations (Damasio, 2006; Goleman, 
1995; Isaacs, 1999). Socially intelligent and interlinked communities 
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are a foundation for the pragmatist approach to rational agency. 
Dewey (1939/ 1989a), however, cautioned against efforts to improve 
literacy, without application to concrete situations and reference 
communities within which there can be ongoing learning. 
Schooling in literacy is no substitute for the dispositions which were 
formerly provided by direct experiences of an educative quality. The void 
created by lack of relevant personal experiences combines with the 
confusions produced by impact of multitudes of unrelated incidents to 
create attitudes which are responsive to organised propaganda (p. 41-42). 
One effect of literacy under existing conditions has been to create in a 
large number of persons an appetite for the momentary "thrills" caused 
by impacts that stimulate nerve endings but whose connections with 
cerebral functions are broken (p. 40). 
There is hope that an integrated scientific, democratic, moral and practical 
literacy can be developed, based on the perspective of a younger 
generation - as expressed in a winning essay in the Independent/ Bosch 
Technology Horizons Award 2006 (reproduced in Figure 10). However, 
there is also a marked disillusionment in this essay with current policy 
processes, and policy-makers, which needs to be addressed if public 
policy is to be seen as relevant, responsive and reliable. 
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Figure 10. The Independent/ Bosch Technology Horizons Award 
2006 Winning essay for 14-18 year olds, Sophie Walker 
In so many ways our own Brave New World is poised on the edge of an abyss. The Daily 
Shriek trumpets climate change, the miseries of AIDS and TB, globalisation, bio-warfare, 
twin-tower terrorism, the yellow peril of China, population explosion and - much worse - 
the end of cheap four-star. Surely, all is lost. 
I can't help smiling. In my mind's eye I see Isambard Kingdom Brunel in his big hat. He's 
not standing on the edge of that abyss, but hanging by his toenails to get a better look 
into it. In his hand, his trusty notebook. In his mind, the engineering solutions: tension or 
compression, iron or steel. The biggest hole in history is the best reason to build the 
biggest bridge, the longest span, the cheapest drug, and the cleanest fuel. Yes, it's the best 
reason to build a brighter future. 
And look at the tools that are coming on stream. What would IKB have made with 
energy from fusion, nano-technology, TCP/IP, petaflops, the double-edged light sabre of 
genetic engineering, and - nearly forgot - sudoku on the mobile phone. 
Well, we are going to find out because the world is now stuffed full of IKBs. A century of 
emancipation and education - only in the developed world, sadly, so far - has seen to 
that. The opportunities are truly endless but the bridge over the abyss has to be planned, 
paid for and built. "We the people" get the bill and the building. 
So who project manages the Great Work? Who is the mastermind who can plan the route 
ahead? Who decides whether your DNA is defective and must be terminated? Who 
decides who earns and who learns? Who controls the purse strings? George Bush and 
Tony Blair? Mega Conglomerate and Media Mogul? Now, that is scary. Tell me it's not 
so. Tell me there's a better way. 
Our political and economic world is simply not up to the job. Cringe at their first 
attempts at the 21st century: compulsory ID cards, epsilon-minus eugenics, crocodile 
concern for Africa's poor black oilfields, the hundred years' war on terror, no clean water 
for the world, no control over energy abuse. No hope. 
"If there's hope, " another George - Orwell - once wisely wrote, "it lies with the proles. " If 
we the people don't realise that we must take control of our own destiny, then all is 
indeed lost. We need new forms of government. Representative party democracy is a sick 
joke. Place your plant-dye cross on a scrap of tree bark and get back to the factory for 
another five years. You've just signed away all your rights to influence the important 
decisions. 
Compare that sterility with the vibrant political discussions on the internet. It is now 
possible for the people to make those decisions for themselves. True democracy is but a 
mouse click or SMS away. 
The future is indeed technologically challenged. But there is hope. The small man in the 
big hat is still here. And this time we are Legion. 
Societal capacities 
In promoting health literacy, it may seem easier to focus on providing 
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individuals with information about specific topics, say scientific 
knowledge about malaria control or controlling obesity. The fabric of 
society, however, is woven from many strands of knowledge - scientific, 
cultural, religious, ethical, artistic, political and economic. These strands 
are inextricably linked and can make a difference to how different issues 
are viewed in different contexts. For example, despite similar levels of 
scientific and economic development, Americans are generally more 
accepting of genetically modified foods than the British, while the 
converse seems true for therapeutic cloning, indicating that there may be 
differences in which factors influence health-related decisions in different 
contexts (Gaskell, Bauer, Durant & Allum, 1999). 
As different factors in society influence decisions related to health and 
policy, a more linked-up approach to the sharing and applying of different 
types of knowledge in society seems required. Three aspects of developing 
societal capacities to support rational policy-making, are discussed in the 
following sections. 
" Social capital 
" Systems and institutional linkages 
" Culture and art. 
Social capital 
The social capital literature provides a rich resource on building social 
capacities that support and are linked with, but not equal to, individual 
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capacities. For example, researchers have found associations between 
social capital and health outcomes (Campbell, Wood & Kelly, 1999; 
Kawachi, 2001). Social capital is measured through a variety of social 
research techniques, where the context of the assessment is an important 
consideration; however, many authors seem to agree on the importance of 
the following as measures of social capital (Campbell, Wood & Kelly, 
1999; Kawachi, 2001): 
" Degree of social engagement and cohesion (through social interaction, 
mobilisation and connections as well as the development of shared 
knowledge and concepts) 
" Level of self-efficacy and collective self efficacy (the ability and resources for 
problem solving at individual and societal levels) 
" Degree of trust (in other individuals and groups in society). For 
example, in a series of surveys in the UK on who people generally 
trusted to tell them the truth, doctors and teachers were listed first, 
scientists and the 'ordinary man/ woman in the street' were near the 
middle and politicians and journalists were at the bottom of the list 
(Worcester, 2003). Similar surveys have been carried out in other 
countries (Dierkes & von Grote, 2000), with trust identified as a key 
factor influencing deliberations on science, civil society and public 
policy. 
Systems and institutional linkages 
Another aspect of building societal capacity is at the systems level. Pang et 
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al (2003, p. 816), build on the concept of a'system' as a group of elements 
operating together to achieve a common goal to define a Health Research 
System as: 
The people, institutions, and activities whose primary purpose in relation 
to research is to generate high-quality knowledge that can be used to 
promote, restore, and/or maintain the health status of populations; it 
should include the mechanisms adopted to encourage the utilization of 
research. The definition includes all actors involved in knowledge 
generation, research synthesis, and using research results in the public 
and private sectors. 
This type of systems approach provides a platform to support and 
coordinate otherwise potentially isolated and disparate actors and 
activities, towards coordination on shared purposes and towards more 
integrative learning. 
The role of public institutions in promoting public interests and 
efficiencies of habit for functional coordination was discussed earlier. A 
key challenge is for institutions and systems to be responsive and ensure 
that habits change when what is in the public's interest changes, as 
knowledge develops and with respect to specific policy needs. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in their analysis of the Rothschild reforms, as 
they affected research in the UK health department, Kogan and Henkel 
(1983; Kogan, Henkel & Hanney, 2006) recommended that mechanisms at 
the 'interfaces' between research and policy systems needed to be further 
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developed in order to enable scientists and policymakers to work 
effectively in collaboration. Empirical evidence gathered since Kogan and 
Henkel's study supports their recommendations (Hanney, Gonzalez- 
Block, Buxton & Kogan, 2003; Lomas, 2000). 
In a review article on policy and research system linkages, Hanney et al. 
(2003) discuss the role of interfaces and knowledge brokers at different 
phases of the research to policy'cycle': research priority setting, research 
commissioning and resource allocation, research review processes, 
conduct of research, research syntheses and technology assessments, and 
research communication. The Canadian Health Services Research 
Foundation specifically focuses on building 'linkage and exchange' 
between researchers and policy-makers at different phases in order to 
enhance the utilisation and impact of research on policy as well as to 
evaluate this impact (Lomas, 2000). 
Since the Rothschild reforms, successive phases of NHS R&D reform have 
focussed on instituting wider linkages; including with the government, 
health services, research systems, patients and the general public (Black, 
1997; Buckland & Gorin, 2001; Oliver, Clarke-Jones, Rees, Milne et al., 
2004; Peckham, 1999). Efforts to address the problems of under-utilisation 
of research within the UK National Health Service also included 
pioneering research into methods to implement research. There was 
evidence of the uptake of effective practices, particularly in maternity 
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units (Haines & Donald, 1998; Wilson, Thornton, Hewison, Lilford et al., 
2002). However, linkage mechanisms with patients and the general public 
have been more difficult to implement and the effects more difficult to 
ascertain (Buckland & Gorin, 2001; Oliver, Clarke-Jones, Rees, Milne et al., 
2004). 
In the LSHTM study on describing the impact of health services and 
policy research, researchers noted how research and policy networks were 
a key factor influencing the commissioning, conduct and impact of their 
work. Researchers also emphasised that, "As knowledge users include policy- 
makers as well as the range of civil society organisations, it is important to 
develop networks both within and outside the formal bureaucracy" (Kuruvilla, 
Mays & Walt, 2007). However, linkage mechanisms, even within the same 
institution are seen to be lacking. For example, LSHTM researchers noted 
that there should be a more direct mechanism between the research and 
education programmes to ensure that curricula reflect advances in 
scientific knowledge and draw on related research resources at the School. 
The importance of institutional linkage and 'interface' mechanisms is 
highlighted in international analyses of Health Technology Assessments 
(HTAs), showing that the evidence will not necessarily be used in policy- 
making unless a receptor body for HTAs is properly established (Hanney, 
Gonzalez-Block, Buxton & Kogan, 2003). In the UK, receptor bodies, such 
as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the 
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National Screening Committee, provide strong demand for HTAs and also 
give authority to some HTAs, thus enhancing their use (Kogan, Henkel & 
Hanney, 2006). 
For example, in the LSHTM study on policy impact (Kuruvilla, Mays & 
Walt, 2007), the national tonsillectomy audit found that 'hot' surgical 
techniques for tonsillectomy (diathermy or coblation) had around a three 
times higher risk of complications than cold steel tonsillectomy. These 
findings led to NICE issuing guidance while the audit was still ongoing 
(The Royal College of Surgeons, The British Association of 
Otorhinolaryngologists - Head and Neck Surgeons Comparative Audit 
Group & The Clinical Effectiveness Unit - The Royal College of Surgeons 
of England, 2005), which may not have happened had there not been a 
'receptor body' for such information. 
One concern is that with respect to research topics external to clinical 
medicine, such as health policy research or research on health systems 
reform, similar receptor bodies may not exist. Thus, health policy studies, 
such as Kogan and Henkel's (2006) analysis of R&D systems reform, may 
not inform ongoing policy-making as efficiently as could have been done 
had there been stronger institutional mechanisms, or receptor bodies, to 
review, coordinate and promote health policy research. 
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Linkages are also required between sectors. In the UNICEF civil society 
partnership study, CSO partners expressed concern about UNICEF's 
vertical programming policies that were structured around specific topics, 
such as education or nutrition. CSOs' approach to working with children 
was, and had to be, more holistic and they requested that information and 
training be provided with this in mind. As one CSO interviewee 
remarked, "We cannot tell children we will work on your nutrition on 
Monday, but we will come back another time to look at your education" 
(personal communication). 
For the health policy system, mapping contemporaneous health policy 
issues and identifying the available institutional and intersectoral 
interfaces (including brokerage and receptor bodies) would be important 
to ascertain to what extent there is institutional support for linked-up 
policy-making. 
Culture and art 
Another way societal intelligence can be built is through culture and art 
(Dewey, 1954/ 1927; Kuruvilla, Mays, Pleasant & Walt, 2006). Culture 
refers to patterns of human learning and activity that lead to shared 
communication, artefacts and characteristics in societies; including 
language, patterns of behaviour, beliefs, identity, customs, traditions and 
other modes of expression (Boas, 1920). These learned characteristics 
enable group members to hold and communicate shared meanings. For 
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example, the boundaries between what is considered traditional medicinal 
practice and research-based evidence are continually renegotiated as is the 
concept what constitutes health and ill health (Durie, 2004; Foucault, 
1973/ 1963). 
Arts and entertainment is a particular area where there is interest in 
disseminating health information (Kirby, 2003). Some scientists serve as 
advisors on movies and TV shows. Scientific journals are also increasingly 
interested in arts and entertainment; for example, the journal of Public 
Health Policy (2006) reviewed the film The Constant Gardener. The film was 
based on John le Carre's book of the same title, in which the author 
mentions consulting Peter Godfrey-Faussett, a senior researcher at 
LSHTM, among others, in doing background research for the book. This 
review concludes with an observation of the potential impact of such 
work noting that, 
This one production will be seen by millions of people around the world 
[and] will have done more to present the pharmaceutical industry's 
obstacles to improving health in developing countries ... than all 
health 
and science journals can in a year (Robbins, 2006). 
The influence of science on art, and of art on science as well as on health 
and wellbeing, certainly bears further research (Hamilton & Petticrew, 
2003). However, the interpretation and communication of science through 
art is increasingly considered an important means of science 
communication. This is true not only in the mass media and movies, but 
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also in museum collections on art and health, as well as in art collections 
and programmes of major health research funders, such as the Wellcome 
Trust (2006). 
Access to information and the need for methods of inquiry and deliberation 
Dewey's criteria for assessing social intelligence were the level of 
pluralism in a society's intellectual resources, as well as the extent to 
which these resources were freely available and could be used in inquiry 
to resolve problematic situations. In addition to the linkages and resources 
discussed in preceding sections, one mechanism that seems particularly 
well suited to enable such linkages is the Internet, providing people have 
access to the technology and have the skills to use it. There is no doubt 
that a plethora of pluralistic perspectives is now available online and 
through multiple media sources, including 24/7 news from around the 
world. What is less clear is how useful this information is with respect to 
resolving problematic situations for individuals and societies. Writing 
before the Internet was developed, Dewey (1954/ 1927, pp. 162-163) 
cautioned, 
There has been an enormous increase in the amount of knowledge, but ... 
the development of a critical sense and methods of discriminating 
judgement has not kept pace with the growth of careless reports and of 
motives for positive misrepresentation. 
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This problem seems even more pronounced today. Part of the solution, as 
discussed earlier, is literacy and education; through this, people will 
develop the skills of inquiry and deliberation needed to facilitate rational 
decision-making. There is also the need for reference communities to 
facilitate functional participation in decision-making and support 
meaningful inquiry and deliberation with respect to concrete problematic 
situations. In Chapters 5 and 6, these factors of rationality - inquiry and 
deliberation - will be discussed in relation to the Decision Cell model. 
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Chapter 5. The Decision Cell Model (II): the decision 
activities of Define, Design and Realise 
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The decision activities of Define, Design and Realise 
The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and 
conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public. 
We have asserted that this improvement depends essentially upon freeing and 
perfecting the processes of inquiry and of dissemination of their conclusions. 
John Dewey, 1954, The Public and its Problems 
But yield who will to their separation 
My object in life is to unite 
My avocation and my vocation 
As my two eyes make one in sight. 
Only where love and need are one 
And the work is play for mortal stakes, 
Is the deed ever really done 
For Heaven and the future's sakes. 
Robert Frost, 1936, Two Tramps in Mud Time 
While rationality is a characteristic of human agency, not all agency is 
necessarily rational. Method helps apply and develop rationality; 
while there are many methods available, Dewey outlined an overall 
process, or logic, of inquiry to guide rational agency. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Dewey developed his logic of inquiry based on an analysis of 
the logic underlying different types of investigation and problem 
solving approaches, from scientific to 'common sense' methods. 
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The 'decision activities' in the Decision cell model correspond to this 
method of rational inquiry. Chapter 4 set out the template of the rhythm 
of situations, where inquiry is initiated by an indeterminate situation; to 
resolve it, agency is organised and coordinated for socially intelligent 
inquiry. This chapter focuses on the decision activities of define, design and 
realise, which broadly correspond to the phases of 'institutionalisation of a 
problem', 'determination of problem-solutions' and 'restoration of 
harmonious experience' in the logic of inquiry (Dewey 1938/ 1999). 
In the Decision Cell model, both explanatory and normative aspects of 
these decision activities are also shaped by theoretical and empirical 
analyses on policy-making and health policy that are related to these 
activities. Breaking with a linear reading of inquiry, the method of rational 
policy-making is instead described by the decision activities of define, 
design and realise, which all overlap with a core activity - deliberation. All 
these activities are mutually influential in policy-making, in what is often 
an iterative process of refinement of rational inquiry. 
Define 
The first task of rational agency is to understand the indeterminate 
situation and institute it as a policy problem, through the decision activity 
define. 
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Explanatory aspect: uncertainty, systemic agendas & pluralism 
Definition as a product, not precondition, of rational agency 
The decision activity 'Define' is aligned with agenda setting theories in the 
policy science literature. Define, however, goes beyond the idea of getting 
pre-existing, or pre-defined, problems or preferences onto policy agendas, 
as is the case in linear instrumental models. In the pragmatist model, it is 
an indeterminate situation that initiates rational agency. An 
indeterminate situation is, by definition, ill defined. The recognition of 
disequilibrium or imbalance, "just as does, say the organic imbalance of 
hunger 
... is 
but an initial step in institution of a problem" (Dewey, 1938/ 
1999, p. 107). 
In response to an indeterminate situation, different actors and networks 
set about defining the situation in order for it to be better understood, 
explored and addressed, making suggestions for possible 'problem- 
solutions'. Definition of policy agendas and problems is open to 
modification and refinement throughout the process of policy-making, 
based on the development of new understandings, as well as on the 
perceived success of the concepts used to resolve the situation. Definition is 
therefore a product, not a precondition, of rational agency. 
In the Decision Cell model, all actors and groups involved in a particular 
problematic situation can potentially influence how this situation is 
defined. The fluid nature of the Decision Cell boundaries are shaped and 
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reshaped based on evolving definitions (within and outside the Cell) of 
what the problem is, and of what is required to resolve it. 
In the LSHTM study (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007), one project 
highlighted how changing situations necessitated, or led to, changed 
definitions and conceptions of 'problem-solutions'. A few years ago, 
climate change was not considered a 'health topic'; thus, specific health 
research funding was not available for this topic and grants had to be 
sought from other sources, such as the Energy, Environment, and 
Sustainable Development (EESD) programme of the EU in this case. 
In 2003, mid-way through a project analysing the effects of climate change 
on health, there was a heat wave in Europe resulting in many deaths; in 
France alone, around 14,000 people died from heat-related causes 
(German Weather Service (DWD), London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine & WHO/Europe, 2004). This event raised the profile of climate 
change as a public health issue, and raised expectations that this research 
project would draw out the health policy implications and communicate 
them. This climate change research project resulted in protocols for multi- 
sectoral coordination of emergency response, particularly with respect to 
heat waves in the EU (German Weather Service (DWD), London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & WHO/Europe, 2004). 
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Systemic versus institutional agendas 
This interplay in definition between the socio-political environment and the 
constituents of the Decision Cell, is thus different from those agenda 
setting theories in the policy literature that focus primarily on 
government-related activities. For example, Kingdon (1995) in Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policy, defines agenda as "the list of subjects or 
problems to which government officials, and people outside government 
closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at 
any given time" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3). In a review of Kingdon's book 
when it was first published, Brodkin (1985, p. 165) observed that, 
[Kingdon's definition of] agenda is equivalent to what others have called 
the "institutional" agenda, in contrast to the "systemic" agenda, which 
includes subjects that do not crystallize into public issues. Because of its 
focus on the institutional agenda, this book misses an opportunity to 
directly challenge critics of pluralist theory who focus on the 
discrepancies between these two types of agendas in order to 
demonstrate that some issues and groups are systematically excluded 
from the political process. 
Other policy analysts, in particular Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and 
Crenson (1971) highlighted the importance of systemic agendas in their 
studies on'non decision-making' (discussed in Chapter 4). They showed 
how in non-decision-making, issues of salience, or problematic situations 
in societies are sometimes kept off policy agendas. This was seen in the 
example of how the problem of air pollution, in cities with powerful 
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industries responsible for this pollution, was kept off these cities' policy 
agendas (Crenson, 1971). 
Sources of information 
In response to an indeterminate situation, there may be multiple 
definitions developed and communicated through multiple sources of 
information in society. Research is conducted on a range of health topics. 
As the LSHTM study indicated, while some research was commissioned 
by government agencies, researchers reported working on topics that were 
of personal interest and related to ongoing work in the research networks 
in which they were involved (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007). This raises 
issues for management of heath research priority setting and coverage of 
health policy topics. One area for analysis is to determine how portfolios 
of researcher-initiated projects and commissioned research, compare with 
research priorities set by the institution and by national and international 
policy bodies. One LSHTM researcher posed as a hypothesis for further 
study, that researchers were more likely to promote, and be aware of, the 
social implications and impact of researcher-initiated projects than of 
commissioned projects. 
Researchers also raised concerns about accountability issues and the 
extent to which researchers can, or should, be held accountable for the 
impact of their work. Accountability concerns had been emphasised in the 
wake of the publication of findings linking the MMR vaccine with autism 
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that led to decreased immunisation rates and, ultimately, the loss of social 
trust. This raised questions about whether there were different standards 
of accountability for researchers and practitioners (Black & Carter, 2001). 
The influence of the mass media in both reflecting, and shaping, socio- 
political agendas is the subject of extensive research (McCombs & Shaw, 
1993). Many people increasingly get science and health information from 
the media (Brown & Walsh-Childers, 2002; Hargreaves, Lewis & Speers, 
2003). There is also growing evidence that the media influence health 
policy agendas, the utilisation of health research and health behaviours 
(Grilli, Ramsay & Minozzi, 2002). 
The way the media cover a public health topic, may be quite different 
from the way scientific evidence is framed. For example, again referring to 
the MMR controversy, there was significantly more scientific evidence 
showing that the vaccination was not linked to autism, than accounts that 
made this link (Hargreaves, Lewis & Speers, 2003). However, the media 
usually cover 'both sides of the story' and a survey indicated that the main 
impression the public had was that there were two sides to this issue. 
While there are trained science and health journalists, many other 
journalists may not have sufficient training in epidemiological concepts, 
for example, in order to accurately communicate findings related to 
relative risk (Hargreaves, Lewis & Speers, 2003). There are concerns about 
the credibility and accuracy of health information in the mass media, but 
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the media may have more checks in place to provide accurate information 
than, say, in informal networks. Furthermore, the issues covered in the 
media tend to reflect, or project, issues of societal importance (Hargreaves, 
Lewis & Speers, 2003; McCombs & Shaw, 1993). 
However, it is important to realise that mass media outlets and 
conglomerates are, in fact, businesses that need to sell news and 
advertising space; to garner such income, they can influence both the 
topics covered and the content of media information in order to sell 
stories. Further, there are considerable inequities regarding media access, 
both within and between countries, which can influence how different 
groups differently perceive policy issues. There are also differing levels of 
media fairness, bias and freedom, which need to be understood in 
analysing the agenda-setting role of the mass media (Brown & Walsh- 
Childers, 2002; Dierkes & von Grote, 2000; Pleasant, Kuruvilla, 
Zarcadoolas, Shanahan & Lewenstein, 2003). 
The role of the arts in helping people explore and communicate societal 
problems is also recognised. The importance and integral nature of 
emotions in rational agency was discussed in preceding chapters. The arts 
are particularly effective at communicating the emotive and 'big picture' 
dimensions of indeterminate situations that may not be as well 
communicated through scientific or technical reports. One example of the 
emotive aspect of a problem leading to policy change is the public 
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response in France to the film Indigenes. This film tells the story of North 
African soldiers who helped liberate France in World War II. Indigene 
depicted difficult social situations, such as the discrimination faced by 
these soldiers. In one instance, "Arab men sacrifice their lives to liberate a 
village in Alsace, but the survivors are ignored as official photographers 
snap the white French troops who arrive on the scene afterwards" 
(Sandford, 2006). Foreign soldiers who fought with the French army also 
received less than a third the pension of their French counterparts. This 
film visibly moved audiences, including French president Jacques Chirac. 
The need for public policy intervention to address this problem was 
recognised and this movie catalysed the French government's efforts to 
reform the pension system for foreign soldiers. 
Problem-solutions 
Define closely relates to the stage of developing 'problem-solutions' in 
Dewey's Logic of Inquiry (1938/ 1999, pp. 105-106). 
The statement of a problematic situation in terms of a problem has no 
meaning save as the problem instituted has, in the very terms of its 
statement, reference to a possible solution. Just because a problem well 
stated is on its way to solution, the determining of a genuine problem is a 
progressive inquiry. 
On a normative level, it is important to recognise that a particular 
definition of a situation is concomitant with a particular solution or type 
of solution. Analyses of US policy-making on the problem of disability 
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access usefully illustrate how different definitions are concomitant with 
different solutions. In this case, problems related to disability access had at 
least two alternative policy frames or definitions - as a transport issue and 
as an anti-discrimination issue (Kingdon, 1995; Richardson, 2002). Each 
definition had very different policy implications and consequences. 
Initially discussed under the Urban Mass Transportation Act in 1970, 
policy deliberations centred on the costs and efficiency of measures to 
meet special transportation needs. Thus, rather than investing in a massive 
redesign of all existing public facilities and vehicles, supplementary 
measures were proposed that included the provision of special vehicles 
and services for people who were elderly or had disabilities. Advocates, 
for the elderly for example, supported this approach, which included 
door-to-door transportation. 
As an anti-discrimination or civil-rights issue, however, the 
'mainstreaming' of people with disabilities in all walks of public life was 
the primary concern. In the mainstreaming approach, advocates 
championed making significant changes in public buildings and 
transportation services, irrespective of cost-effectiveness. Ultimately the 
second approach won out and was legislated in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (Richardson, 2002); though elements of the 
transport-focused strategy were retained. Thus the issue of disability 
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access was addressed, but the 'end' was not one envisaged when the issue 
was first identified twenty years earlier. 
Was the 'right' decision made? Did the process take the 'right' amount of 
time? There is rarely an'objective' answer to these questions; it is more 
often the case that determining the success of policy processes and 
outcomes is determined through deliberation by actors involved in the 
process and by empirical and historical analyses of the situation. 
Thus, there may be multiple definitions of the indeterminate situation put 
forward by diverse sources. Ideas not selected as immediately constitutive 
for the process may be taken up at a later stage or made available as 
resources for other problematic situations, as described in the 'garbage can 
model of policy-making (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). Different actors 
involved in defining problematic situations may only be loosely associated 
with each other, if at all, and definitions may only crystallise over time. 
Further, there also may be a range of differing and competing definitions 
of a particular indeterminate situation, each with very different policy 
considerations and consequences. Deciding how to move forward with 
rationally defining a problem to effectively resolve an indeterminate 
situation, is dealt with in the following section on the normative aspect of 
define. 
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Normative aspect: genealogy, synthesis & shared understanding 
The genealogy of knowledge 
With respect to the activity define, in order to understand a situation and 
effectively act to resolve it, there first needs to be both a socio-historical 
understanding of the evolution of definitions and concepts that could be 
used and an appreciation of the potential consequences of using them. 
Foucault (1984) analysed the dynamics and implications of 'truth and 
power' with respect to constituent objects "madness, criminality, etc... ". 
He stressed the importance of analysing the 'genealogy of knowledge' in 
order to recognise the power concomitant with shaping knowledge and to 
prevent abuses of this power. 
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject 
itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the 
constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what 
I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the 
constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without 
having to make references to a subject which is either transcendental in 
relation to the field of events or runs in empty sameness throughout the 
course of history (Foucault, 1984, p. 59). 
The field of literary criticism, in particular, provides some valuable 
insights into how concepts develop and shape public perspectives and 
actions. For example, Steele (2005) discusses how symbols and concepts 
develop through history and affect people's understanding of their lives, 
delimit their imagination and thus influence the nature of socio-political 
reasoning. He makes a case against political theorists and philosophers 
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alike, with particular reference to Habermas, for failing to take into 
account the historical evolution of public meaning and reasoning. 
As discussed in the pragmatist pillar of 'via media', it is the balance 
between antiscepticism and fallibilism that is key to socially intelligent 
inquiry (Putnam & Conant, 1995). The demands of the situation should 
determine whether existing definitions are useful or not. This approach 
was illustrated in Dewey's example of the possibilities, all 'true', of 
viewing a table as an object on which to eat or as a mass of subatomic 
particles in continuous motion. The rational choice of definition would 
depend on the demands of the situation, for instance whether the situation 
involved a family sitting down to dinner or a physicist conducting an 
experiment in a laboratory. Further, it would not be rational, or efficient, 
to deconstruct the concept of a table every time one is used. 
The emphasis in the decision activity of define is on developing an 
understanding of indeterminate situations and exploring possible 
solutions to resolve them. This is a mode where brainstorming, empirical 
and epidemiological analysis, concept development, narratives, poetry 
and film all have application. There are also specific 'problem-structuring 
methods' that have been developed and tested to support rational 
decision-making, including the definition of problematic situations and 
possible solutions (Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001). 
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Pluralistic perspectives and alternative evaluation criteria 
Having pluralistic perspectives to draw on, has been earlier mentioned as 
a rich resource on which societies can draw to resolve problematic 
situations (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). Further, Dewey (1922/ 2002) stressed that 
having 'more, not less passions', and preferences and perspectives, was 
the key to rationality. This left 'fewer stones unturned' and enabled 
diverse desires to be constructively and creatively unified through inquiry 
and deliberation. 
Drawing on creativity and pluralistic perspectives is key to a pragmatist 
approach to defining policy situations. As an example of how these 
perspectives influence definitions in health, the boundaries between what 
is considered traditional knowledge and research evidence, as well as on 
what constitutes health and ill health, are continually re-negotiated. For 
example, drawing on pluralistic perspectives, including both scientific 
research and indigenous knowledge, Maori researchers in New Zealand 
have found that they are able to develop more comprehensive 
understandings of health and illness (Durie, 2004). 
Pluralistic perspectives also help counteract partial perspectives and this 
idea can be extended to democratic practice in general. 
Civil societies become democratic when there are opportunities for 
people to learn the importance of listening to all views, even those they 
dislike, of 'working through' conflicting approaches to solving a problem, 
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and of building common ground for action (Mathews, 1998 cited in 
Ramaley, 2000). 
Methods and criteria used to analyse diverse sources of evidence and 
resolve contentions regarding the same, are also an important aspect of 
the define phase. There are several possible criteria that could be used to 
evaluate research. Each set of criteria is associated with a particular 
perspective or philosophy, though there may be some overlap between 
them (Mays & Pope, 2000; Patton, 2001). 
  Traditional scientific research criteria include validity, reliability, 
generalisability, minimisation of bias, methodological rigour, and 
testing causal hypotheses. 
  Social construction criteria include acknowledging and taking into 
account the development of and influences on research-generated 
knowledge, particularity - or doing justice to particular cases, 
transferability of knowledge across contexts, triangulation of 
perspectives, and enhanced understanding. 
  Artistic and evocative criteria include the extent to which new or 
novel perspectives are provided, aesthetic quality and 
interpretative vitality, creativity, authenticity, and the ability to 
connect with and move audiences. 
  Critical change criteria include an increased consciousness about 
inequalities and injustices: their sources and nature, representations 
of the perspectives of the less powerful, identification of strategies 
for change, clear historical and values context, and consequential 
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validity. 
  Evaluations standards criteria include utility, feasibility, accuracy, 
level of systematic inquiry, evaluator competence and integrity, 
ethics, responsibility, fairness, and respect for a diversity of 
interests and values. 
Using different research assessment criteria would necessitate addressing 
differences in the methodological and philosophical stances associated 
with those criteria (Mays & Pope, 2000; Patton, 2001). 
Dewey stressed the importance of developing pluralistic and alternative 
scientific accounts, not only because this would be the case anyway (even 
experts within the same field have been known to disagree), but also to 
avoid what he referred to as 'totalitarianism' in the social sciences. 
One example of an alternative account developed with respect to health 
policy, is the Global Health Watch. The People's Health Movement 
(PHM)16 - an alliance of CSOs, social activists, academics and health 
professionals from over 75 countries - views the data produced by the 
WHO (e. g. in its World Health Report) and by UNAIDS and other 
international organisations as deficient, particularly with respect to taking 
into account considerations of social justice and human rights. By 
publishing the Global Health Watch, PHM provides an alternative view 
16 www_phmovement. orQ 
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that takes into account these considerations with a view to holding 
national governments and international organizations accountable in this 
respect. For example, the 2005/2006 Global Health Watch "questions the 
success story painted by proponents of the current form of globalization, 
pointing to increases in poverty in Africa, eastern Europe, central Asia and 
Latin America and a rise in income inequalities in many countries 
(including wealthy ones) in recent years" (Global Health Watch, 
2005/2006). The report also critiques development aid strategies noting 
that, "even this small amount of aid can cause immense problems in 
poorer countries, as donor programmes are often uncoordinated and focus 
on specific diseases to the detriment of the health system as a whole". 
Synthesis and developing shared understandings 
There are two methods that could help unify the diverse sources of 
evidence at the define stage: 
" Synthesis and appraisal and 
" Collaborative approaches to developing shared understanding. 
Consider the volumes of available information generated on health. Just 
taking into account biomedical research, over two million journal articles 
of varying quality are published annually (Ad Hoc Working Group for 
Critical Appraisal of Medical Literature, 1987). There is clearly a need for 
critical review and synthesis of research evidence to inform health policy 
and practice. The Cochrane Collaboration, through its method of rigorous 
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systematic reviews mainly focuses on synthesising quantitative 
experimental data from randomised clinical trials, internationally, to 
establish the effectiveness of health interventions (Clarke and Oxman, 
2003). One challenge is bringing discrete sets of data together at a 
functional level for policy-making. For example, during the course of 
developing the ODI working paper, there was interest from colleagues in 
other disciplines in the systematic review method, as used in health 
research, and its potential to provide an overarching, evidence-based 
perspective on a topic. However, there was also some bemusement as to 
how the specific review topics were brought together on a functional level. 
One question posed was, "I came across a systematic review for treatment of 
neck injuries, but aren't neck injuries associated with head injuries? Who is 
responsible for putting the systematic reviews of head and neck injuries 
together? " 
Additionally, beyond clinical effectiveness data, in policy-making other 
factors need to be considered including, cultural acceptability, individual 
and societal values, cost-effectiveness, effect on health inequalities and 
context-specific logistics (Maclntyre, Chalmers, Horton & Smith, 2001; 
McIver & Ham, 2000). Health technology assessments (HTAs) mentioned 
earlier, are commissioned specifically to advise policy-makers on issues 
that need to be addressed in the health care system and go further than 
research syntheses in directly addressing policy considerations (Hanney, 
Gonzalez-Block, Buxton & Kogan, 2003). HTAs may use research 
257 
syntheses to establish the clinical effectiveness of proposed interventions, 
but also take into account cost-effectiveness and equity implications as 
well as public preferences (e. g. through using modelling techniques). 
There also may be appraisals of HTA findings by policy-makers, 
practitioners, patients and the general public. Appraisals include further 
deliberations on 'technical' findings with respect to implications for public 
policy. 
Information that influences, or requires, policy intervention, however, 
may not always be related to research data or scientific publications and 
may, in addition, be communicated through policy briefs, media coverage, 
art, websites and interpersonal communication. This requires the further 
development of methods of synthesis, from multiple information sources. 
Such methodological development is ongoing (Dixon-Woods, 2005; 
Hargreaves, Lewis & Speers, 2003; Mays, Pope & Popay, 2005; Pawson, 
Greenhalgh, Harvey & Walshe, 2005). However, as earlier discussed, 
meaningful synthesis of information for policy-making will need to go 
beyond a focus on empirical data, to considerations of emotion, meaning 
and motivation. Subsequently, developing 'supra-empirical' approaches 
to developing shared understandings is also important (Fischer, 2003; 
Wynne, 2003). 
An approach that could help with defining indeterminate situations with 
respect to empirical evidence, as well as to values and motivations, is a 
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more collaborative approach to setting policy agendas (Aldo Leopold 
Leadership Program, 2006; Innes, 1998). As one example in practice, The 
Aldo Leopold Leadership Program (2006) adopts an innovative approach 
in relation to understanding and communicating environmental policy in 
the US (Andrew Pleasant, personal communication). The program 
provides fellowships to leading researchers in environmental science. As 
part of the program, training sessions are organised in order to bring 
together scientists with media, policy specialists, business leaders, policy- 
makers and NGOs; the purpose of these meetings is to discuss key issues 
related to environmental policy that year. This allows diverse groups to 
share their views on current environmental concerns, negotiate positions, 
facilitate building shared understandings and support the formation of 
'communities of practice' that can engage with defining, and resolving, 
the ongoing 'public' problems identified (Aldo Leopold Leadership 
Program, 2006; Innes, 1998). Methods to facilitate developing shared 
understanding and collaborative planning are further discussed in 
Chapter 6 on Deliberation. 
With respect to health policy as well, systematic reviews indicate that 
ongoing communication to build shared understandings between research 
and policy-makers, or with consumers in agenda setting exercises have 
greater impact, compared with other modes of communication, including 
one-off consultations (Innvaer, Vist, Trommald & Oxman, 2002; Oliver, 
Clarke-Jones, Rees, Milne et al., 2004). These recommendations to 
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reconcile perspectives in the decision activity define, through 
communication, overlaps with concepts in deliberation, highlighting the 
interlinked nature of activities in the Decision Cell model. 
Design 
Explanatory aspect: technical formulations, constraints 8ý 
consequences 
Technical formulations and theory 
Design is an activity where possible solutions and strategies to resolve 
indeterminate situations (based on problem-solutions developed during 
the define phase) are explored and evaluated. Analysing available 
evidence, developing technical models and operational strategies, 
including allocation of resources and roles, assessing constraints and 
feasibility and formulating related policy options are part of the design 
phase. Design is probably the most technical or 'formal' phase in policy- 
making; this is not to say that this activity does not have exploratory and 
creative dimensions. Simon (1996), in a pragmatist turn, describes design 
as an activity that is enjoyable in and of itself. 
The act of envisioning possibilities and elaborating them is itself a 
pleasurable and valuable experience. Just as realized plans may be a 
source of new experiences, so new prospects are opened up at each step 
in the process of design. Designing is a kind of mental window shopping. 
Purchases do not have to be made to get pleasure from it. 
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One of the charges sometimes laid against modern science and 
technology is that if we know how to do something, we cannot resist 
doing it. While one can think of counter examples, the claim has some 
measure of truth. One can envisage a future, however, in which our main 
interest in both science and design will lie in what they teach us about the 
world and not in what they allow us to do to the world. Design like 
science is a tool for understanding as well as for acting (Simon, 1996, p. 
164). 
Thus while there may be various alternative design options generated, 
they need to be deliberated on till a way forward is clear. The decision 
activity of deliberation will be discussed in Chapter 6. Methods used in the 
design phase may include operational and strategic modelling, health 
technology assessments, cost-effectiveness analyses and policy 
formulation. 
Peter de Leon (1988), in his analysis of US policy-making during the 
Vietnam War, emphasised that the failures of strategic modelling to take 
into account moral and cultural consideration were among the key 
reasons for failures in this war. 'Technical' in the context of the Design 
phase of the Decision Cell model, should not be taken to mean 
'quantitative'. Technical here refers to Dewey's (1954/ 1927) concept that 
experts and scientists have the skills to organise the facts to inform policy 
deliberations, not that experts make policy decisions on their own. 
Further, part of this process is facilitating public valuation of the facts. 
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Products of the design activity usually have a technical, legal or policy 
form, for example, technical specifications and guidelines, operational or 
strategic models and scenarios, budgets, bills, treaties, legal contracts, 
policy directives and guidelines. Some explicit forms of design decisions 
would include those commonly associated with policy formulation (Buse, 
Mays & Walt, 2005; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Lomas, 1990): 
" Legislative decisions associated with laws and governance 
" Administrative decisions for resource allocation and organisation 
of services 
" Practice guidelines concerned with professional codes of conduct 
(to the extent that these are set through public mechanisms and 
" Technical specifications and models for strategies and processes. 
Determining constraints 
Another task in design is to analyse the constraints and feasibility of 
different policy options or strategies. In the pragmatist model of 
rationality, unlike in linear instrumental models, constraints are not 
considered as'fixed' or `given'. Majone (1989) discusses the need to 
understand how constraints are formulated in order to fully understand 
both the formulation and feasibility of policy options. He discusses 
different formulations of constraints to illustrate this point (Majone, 1989, 
p. 83). 
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" Objective versus self imposed constraints - some constraints may be 
objective (legal, resource, environmental), while others are self- 
imposed (heuristic, methodological, contractual). 
" Goals versus constraints - it is often contended that policy-makers are 
more concerned with feasibility than with the optimisation of values or 
goals. Majone (1989) recounts how Simon proposed that the distinction 
between a goal and a constraint was a matter of linguistic or analytic 
convenience, while Nozick disagreed. Nozick argued that while 
policy-makers would be willing to trade one goal, or value, for another 
end-state maximising one, constraints could not be traded-off. Thus if a 
particular value (at the margin) can be traded off against other values, 
then it should be treated as a goal; if not, as a constraint. 
" Short-term versus long-term constraints - analyses of constraints may also 
focus on the short versus long-term implications; for example the 
implications of pushing forward short-term agreements versus 
building long-term cooperation of policy actors. As another example, a 
low level of initial investment in research systems in early stages of 
national development may become a constraint later on. 
" Deterministic versus probabilistic constraints - with regards to policy- 
making the expectation is that the policy will work most of the time, 
not necessarily all the time; e. g. energy efficiency standards allow for 
some leeway with respect to constraints of extreme weather, fuel 
availability etc. 
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As in the discussion on the Define activities, both a sense of the genealogy 
of concepts used and deliberation on the same are often required to make 
analytical distinctions and administrative decisions on both strategies and 
constraints in policy-making. 
Considering consequences 
Dewey viewed externalities, and consequences, as the basis for identifying 
the need for public intervention and for developing and evaluating 
proposed solutions (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). Some policy analysts have noted 
that focusing on process alone as a guide for decision-making, without 
taking into account consequences, seems as irrational, and unethical, as 
the observation that, "The operation was successful, but the patient died" 
(Edelman, 1977). 
In an article in The Economist, on the Healthcare Commission's audit of the 
NHS ("The NHS fails its own bewilderingly complicated health check"), 
the question of whether the right things were being measured was raised 
(The Economist, 2006). In this article, Nick Black observed that, 
The commission is faced with the problem of auditing quality without 
any data on outcomes. So instead it asks whether hospitals are carrying 
out the processes it thinks they should be. 
Black noted that better measures of performance, particularly as related to 
assessing patient outcomes, could be relatively easily and efficiently 
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developed. For example, post-discharge questionnaires were one possible 
method suggested and a team was in place to look into the logistics of 
implementing such outcome assessment approaches. 
Yet even when outcomes are taken into account, for example, in cost- 
effectiveness measures, there are often further questions as to 'whether the 
right things are being measured'. In a critique of economic evaluation, 
particularly with respect to cost-effectiveness, Coast (2004) emphasises the 
need to understand the wider range of consequences that reflect societal 
needs and values. She suggests that 'optimal outcomes' in cost 
effectiveness measures, such as maximizing health and minimising costs, 
are probably only defined as such by economists, and only on a 
methodological level at that. She also points out that measures of cost- 
effectiveness, such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) gained per 
unit of resource, can be difficult to understand and use in policy-making. 
"When many decision makers do not fully understand the basis for 
QALYs, expecting them to identify their maximum willingness to pay for 
additional QALYs on behalf of society seems nonsensical" (Coast, 2004, p. 
1235). 
Coast (2004, p. 1235) proposes using 'cost-consequences', instead of 'cost 
effectiveness', to inform health policy-making. In considering cost- 
consequences, a range of stakeholders would identify the potential 
consequences related to a proposed intervention. A 'table of 
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consequences' could include factors such as anxiety and depression, pain 
control, carers' quality of life, costs to social services and accessibility of 
the intervention (Coast, 2004). Diverse effects could thus be taken into 
account, instead of attempting to use a single metric. 
In the LSHTM study on research impact, a similar approach was taken 
with respect to developing the Research Impact Framework (Table 2) 
(Kuruvilla, Mays, Pleasant & Walt, 2006). 









" Type of " Level of policy- " Type of " Knowledge, 
problem/ making services: attitudes and 
knowledge . Type of policy health/ behaviour 
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potential management " Social capital & 
" Research " Cost empowerment 
networks containment Culture and art Leadership and and cost 






(Kuruvilla, Mays, Pleasant & Walt, 2006) 
This framework identified potential areas of research impact through a 
review of literature as well as from researchers' experience and 
expectations. The framework was developed through an iterative process 
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of testing through developing 'one-page' structured impact narratives of 
the selected projects and by addressing the gaps, inconsistencies and 
required clarifications in the framework that were encountered en route. 
This relatively standard framework allowed researchers to more 
systematically describe, and think through, the impacts of their work. In 
addition, the structured narratives based on this framework, allowed for 
comparisons to be made across previously incommensurable project 
descriptions. This type of analysis was useful for management and policy 
purposes, for instance in identifying the potential need for more 
institutional support for the management of research networks, which was 
both a key concern across the projects and a key influencing factor of 
research impact (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007; Platt, 1987). 
Some desired impacts, or consequences, of both health research and health 
policy, for example, well being or sustainable development, may seem 
incalculable or as too long term prospects to guide current practice or to 
evaluate evidence and health policy in the short term. Dewey's definition 
of "ends in view" provides one indication for how consequences can be 
practically and progressively defined, at least with respect to particular 
indeterminate situations. Taking the long-term view is facilitated through 
'scenario development', a method further discussed in Chapter 6. The 
pragmatist focus on consequences and foresight in public policy-making 
also has implications for how change is managed. In this view, managing 
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consequences and change in policy-making are iterative and mutually 
constitutive processes. As Anderson (1975) stated, 
Policy is being made as it is administered and administered as it is being 
made. 
Normative aspect: beyond panaceas to pluralism and 
experimentation 
Addressing the tendency in social sciences towards "totalitarianism" 
In define, the need to develop and draw on pluralistic perspectives was 
emphasised not only as a valuable resource for policy-making, but also to 
avoid 'totalitarianism' in how policy issues were defined. Similarly, in the 
decision activity of design there is a need to go beyond the search for one- 
size fits all solutions or one-off institutional fixes (Irwin, 2001; Parsons, 
1995). 
Dewey cautioned against the search for panaceas, noting, for example, 
that advances in health had been made as a result of developing solutions 
to deal with specific problems. Dewey did not see why this was not the 
approach also used in socio-political and economic research. Instead, at 
one extreme, he noted there were "those who believe there is a necessary 
historical law which governs the course of events so that all that is needed 
is deliberate acting in accord with it" (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 129). In this 
context, he cautioned against the pervasiveness of "totalitarian 
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economics", for example, in Marxist accounts of materialism or in laissez- 
faire accounts of individualism (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 71). At the other 
extreme - from developing totalitarian theories - Dewey also saw that the 
social sciences tended to collect facts without organising them into 
theories or strategies that could help resolve social problems (Woolf, 
1932/ 1999). He recommended that some balance between these two 
extremes of totalitarian theorising and atheoretical empiricism be found. 
The more rational approach to design policy theory and strategy would be 
to have a range of concepts, explanations and methods, developed 
through inquiry with respect to specific problematic situations, in the 
policy 'toolbox'. The most appropriate tools to a particular situation could 
then be used to develop effective and relevant socio-economic 
interventions in that situation. Developing and testing a range of models 
and frameworks would best support public policy-making that is 
continually faced with diverse and changing circumstances (Dewey, 1939/ 
1989a). 
In developing and using theories in policy design, as with define activities, 
an understanding of the genealogy of knowledge and underlying 
assumptions is required. Pawson et al. (2005) suggest that a way forward 
is to explicate the theories and, often implicit, assumptions that underlie 
policy strategies and interventions. Evaluations can then be conducted, 
and evidence synthesised in relation to these theories and causal 
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assumptions. The research question that would guide such a realist 
approach to evidence synthesis and policy evaluation, as earlier 
highlighted, is not, What works? ' but instead, 'What works for whom, how, 
and in what circumstances? ' Explanatory principles then can be developed 
based on an analysis of the consequences of implementing different policy 
strategies, and also by developing new theories and hypotheses from the 
learning gained. 
Dobrow et al. (2006) suggest a related approach to guide research 
utilisation in policy-making. They ask, "Should the same evidence lead to 
the same decision outcomes in different decision-making contexts? " Based 
on an analysis of expert reviews of evidence to develop cancer-screening 
guidelines, they conclude that, 
The central challenge for evidence-based policy is not to develop 
international evidence, but rather to develop more systematic, rigorous, 
and global methods for identifying, interpreting, and applying evidence 
in different decision-making contexts (p. 1811). 
Methods identified in this analysis included the use of 'agreement-based 
consensus methods', Health Technology Assessments and decision 
support tools that are context, and topic, appropriate (Dobrow, Goel, 
Lemieux-Charles & Black, 2006). 
The Decision Cell model incorporates developing explanatory principles 
and testable hypotheses with respect to particular situations as well as 
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using 'global methods and knowledge' that can be applied across different 
decision-making contexts. Through application in concrete problematic 
situations, the validity and usefulness of the theories, strategies and 
hypotheses used can be tested and further developed. 
Thus part of the task of design is to develop theories, strategies and causal 
hypotheses that can guide policy implementation and evaluation. Bevan, 
Maynard, Holland and Mays (1988) in an analysis of phases of reform in 
the NHS caution that, 
Without research to illuminate further what such change might lead to, 
the UK would be repeating mistakes of previous reorganisations of health 
care. The NHS was reorganised in the 1970s on the basis of a belief in 
planning, and in the mid 1980s on a belief in management. These 
reorganisations have been based on passing fashions, rather than a well- 
researched argument about how to optimise the use of scarce resources 
available for health care for improved health. 
This analysis concluded that health care reform and policies be based on 
both 'research and experimentation, so that there would be more 
systematic approaches to policy design and development and more 
explicit policy assumptions that could be better understood and evaluated 
(Bevan, Maynard, Holland & Mays, 1988). 
It may not always be possible to design and evaluate policies and 
programmes as 'experiments' in a traditionally scientific, or academic, 
sense. However, this orientation would help focus attention on 
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'experiment-like' situations in policy-making; for example, in one of the 
projects analysed in the LSHTM research impact study, researchers noted 
that the different NHS strategies in England, Scotland and Wales could 
serve as a natural experiment for studying the processes and effects of 
different health policy strategies in the UK (Smith, Dixon, Mays, McLeod 
et al., 2005). The idea in design is to explicitly set out guiding strategies and 
causal assumptions so that different stakeholders can examine if policies 
and programmes are working the way they were intended. This 
experiment-oriented process in policy design can thus facilitate an overall 
process of socio-political inquiry and learning. 
Public valuation and shared vision 
All concerned actors may or may not be directly involved in the technical 
aspects of this decision activity and experts may indeed play a primary 
role here. However all actors can, and should, play a role by evaluating 
the proposed technical strategies, concomitant consequences and the 
extent to which the strategies are in keeping with desired social values vis- 
ä-vis the problematic situation. Dewey saw this type of interaction as 
important both to prevent authoritarianism and elitism in governance and 
as a means to build scientific sense and democratic sensibility across 
society. 
As an example of public valuation of proposed policy solutions, public 
commentary is a requisite component of federal rule making in the US. 
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Roth et al. (2003) analysed the written public commentary on FDA 
regulations to restrict the sale of tobacco to minors; they identified five 
ways in which policy proposals were framed and evaluated. 
  Scientific frames included evaluations of overall research quality 
and more specific arguments about problem definition, study 
design, measurement, and interpretation of results, including 
charges of bias, misinterpretation, and fraud. 
  Ideological frames invoked freedom of choice, human rights, and 
the necessity for, or threat of, government intervention. 
" Economic frames focused on the proposed rule's costs (for 
example, to government or to the tobacco industry), its potential 
impact on the local, state and national economies, and the costs of 
tobacco-related illnesses. 
  Political frames invoked federal pre-emption of state and local 
laws, enforcement of the proposed rule and the political 
implications of such enforcement. 
  Procedural frames invoked the adequacy, appropriateness or 
fairness of the rule-making process itself. 
  Cultural frames is a further category that could be used to frame 
issues and evidence. Referring to an earlier example, the approach 
used in New Zealand to integrate indigenous and scientific 
knowledge showed how more comprehensive, and relevant, 
understandings of health and illness could be developed in this 
cultural context (Durie, 2004). 
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The analysis of the US tobacco control legislative proposals showed that 
while government experts tended to use scientific or technical frames, civil 
society commentators tended to use political or ideological frames. Roth 
et. al. (2003, p. 36) concluded that, 
Though scientists and regulatory experts may identify and present 
scientific evidence to indicate proposed regulations' technical rationality, 
the social problems that these regulations address may always be 
reframed in moral terms that undermine the regulation's legitimacy. 
When these moral values are understood by the public - or, more 
specifically, the involved segment(s) of it - as more fundamental than the 
scientific evidence, the proposed rule will lack public credibility. 
Different groups can thus influence policy, even during the 'technical' 
design phase, by challenging and reframing the evidence on which policy 
strategies are based. Additionally, changes occurring through deliberation 
and from learning developed in the decision mode of Realise, may 
necessitate further iterations in both the Define and Design phases of 
policy-making. 
Earlier it was discussed that design is probably the most 'technical' phase 
of the Decision Cell model. The products of design, in terms of technical 
specifications, legislative decisions and administrative guidelines, may be 
more or less successful in communicating a shared vision on how an 
indeterminate situation can be resolved. Such a 'vision' is required to get 
buy-in from a range of stakeholders and to coordinate socio-political 
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agency. 
Russell Ackoff (2007), a pioneering 'management guru', talks about the 
need for managers to develop and communicate a shared vision. He 
makes a link with architecture to discuss this process. Architects rarely use 
formulae or technical details to communicate their plans. Instead they are 
able to convey a clear picture, or 'blue print', of the final product that 
clients can comment on and through which different groups are able to 
see their role in its realisation. 
Continuing with the architectural analogy, Collier (2006) makes a link 
between pragmatist philosophy and architecture, particularly with respect 
to the unification of function, aesthetics and ethics. In addition to being 
useful and a work of art, architecture involves ethics, as it can inspire 
(and/or otherwise influence) the way that people live, work and relate to 
an environment. 
With organisational processes becoming increasingly modularised and 
almost dehumanising, contributing to a shared vision helps engender a 
sense of purpose, community and meaning. This idea is well illustrated in 
the proverb about the two workers in a marble quarry, who were asked 
what they were doing. One replied that he was breaking up stones, the 
other that she was building a cathedral. 
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Thus developing and communicating a shared vision for public policy 
interventions is a key task in the design phase of policy-making. In an 
analysis of leadership, Howard Gardner (1995) noted that one common 
characteristic of great religious and military leaders, is their ability to tell a 
compelling story - both to emotively convey their vision and to get people 
to 'buy-in' to this vision. This is a lesson that could be well worth learning 
in public policy. This idea also reinforces the need for a 'supra-empiricist' 
perspective in rational decision-making, with respect to developing 
visions that can inspire and bring people together, not just to 
communicating empirical evidence. In the pragmatist view, this vision 
should also extend to the functional, aesthetic and ethical resolution of 
indeterminate situations in society. Such resolution should also be 
evolutionary, in building on learning from previous situations and 
contributing to new learning. The relationship between resolution, change 
and learning is discussed in the next decision activity, Realise. 
Realise 
Explanatory aspect: changes through implementation & learning 
Integrating doing, learning & change 
Realise, as the term suggests, incorporates elements of 'putting into 
practice', 'evaluating and learning', and 'change'. This activity is in line 
with the pragmatist concept of change wherein any effected change in a 
situation, is concomitant with changed experience in that situation, and a 
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changed situation (Dewey, Logic: Theory of Inquiry LW12). This breaks 
down the linear sequence between'implementing change', 'learning from 
experience' and then 'changing'. 'Learning by doing', would be an 
insufficient concept to sum up this interrelationship between experience, 
learning and change. In the pragmatist model, realise extends to the overall 
process of restoring harmonious experience, and equilibrium, through 
changes in the overall situation comprising agents, environments and 
transactions. 
The process of 'realising', corresponds to organisational change theories, 
such as Argyris and Schön's (1978) concept of "double loop learning". In 
this type of learning process, mutually influencing changes occur in 
actors' knowledge and values as well as in the organisational or policy 
environments. Dewey's concept of transactive change takes this mode of 
realisation forward into a transformed situation, where equilibrium and 
functional coordination are restored. 
Activities in this phase of realise include implementation of agreed upon 
approaches, agreement on benchmarks and evaluation criteria, and 
methods and strategies of evaluation, which could include collaborative 
assessment. Failure to realise hypothesised effects or to meet agreed upon 
benchmarks would require changes to be made. These changes can be 
achieved through informal decisions 'on the ground' or through a 
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coordinated process of policy inquiry, involving deliberation and changes 
in define or design activities. 
Discretionary decisions and iterative change 
Studies of policy implementation show that ongoing, discretionary 
decision-making by bureaucrats and managers at 'street-level' is inevitable 
in the implementation and administration of policies and programs 
(Lipsky, 1976; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). However, these 
discretionary decisions can render policies and programmes 
unrecognisable from their planned formulation. Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1984) described this phenomenon in their landmark study, evocatively 
titled, Implementation: how great expectations in Washington are dashed in 
Oakland; or why it's amazing that federal programs work at all, this being a saga 
of the Economic Development Administration as told to two sympathetic 
observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes. 
Explicitly recognising that ongoing discretionary decision-making is 
inevitable - even desirable - facilitates the coordination of ongoing 
decision-making throughout the process of policy-making. However, a 
further reason to integrate discretionary, or bureaucratic, decisions as part 
of an overall process of rational public policy is related to concerns about 
the extent to which these discretionary decisions are democratic and 
integrated with an overall process of socially intelligent inquiry, versus 
autocratic and arbitrary (Richardson, 2002). 
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As has been discussed so far, there is considerable overlap and iteration 
between the different decision activities and, in particular, iteration 
through processes of deliberation, at the core of the model. The only 
relatively stable temporal ordering in the Decision Cell model is the 
transition from indeterminate/ problematic phases to a stage of 
transformed equilibrium and functional coordination. Within the Decision 
Cell, activities take place according to the demands of the situation rather 
than according to any temporal ordering of stages. 
For example, the relationship between the three modes of activity define, 
design and realise in developing a strategy paper on a particular policy 
issue, need not be a linear, temporal one. There can be iteration between 
activities of concept development, data-collection, drafting, evaluation, 
feedback and rewriting. It may be helpful to distinguish these different 
types of activities in a linear way in planning the process and in 
presenting it subsequently e. g. in documentation. It is less helpful to see a 
move from drafting to identifying gaps and having to do more primary 
research as a 'step back' or as a deviation from a desired or fixed logical 
temporal ordering of tasks. 
The capacity and openness to inform and modify policy strategies based 
on ongoing experience and learning is a key component of rational policy- 
making. It would be irrational not to do so. Dewey viewed concepts such 
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as ends and means simply as organising tools to help resolve problematic 
situations. As discussed in Chapter 3, ends are but 'ends-in-view' based 
on current understandings, and in the long-term ends may be means to 
some other ends. Thus, deliberation on policy ends to ensure that they are 
congruent with ongoing learning, changing situations and public values is 
integral to rational public policy and democratic practice (Richardson, 
2002). 
Normative aspect: reasoned transactions versus `phantom publics' 
In public policy it is important to ensure that policy problems are resolved 
in a manner informed by scientific sense, democratic sensibility and moral 
imagination. To do so there needs to be explicit recognition of the 
integrative nature of inquiry, of facts and values, of internal and external 
change. Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1965) highlighted the interdependent nature 
of decision-making and change in policy systems in The Art of Judgement, 
with respect to what he called "appreciative systems". 
Appreciation involves making judgements of facts about the 'state of the 
system', both internally and in its external relations. I will call these 
reality judgements ... It also involves making judgements about the 
significance of these facts to the appreciator or to the body for whom the 
appreciation is made. These judgements I will call value judgements. 
Reality judgements and value judgements are inseparable constituents of 
appreciation ... for facts are relevant only in relation to some judgements 
of value and judgements of value are operative only in relation to some 
configuration of fact (Vickers, 1965, p. 40). 
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In Chapter 3, three types of change were discussed in the pragmatist 
concept of rational agency. In adaptation the focus is on changing 
conditions external to the indeterminate situation and process of inquiry. 
In accommodation, change is more of an internal process. Agents deal with 
a problematic situation by changing their own attitudes, beliefs and 
expectations towards a problematic situation or by learning to live with it, 
when inquiry shows that external elements cannot be changed. Adjustment 
is the third mode of change and involves both external and internal 
change. In pragmatist philosophy, this is a mode of change that goes 
towards constituting the character and beliefs of the agent and reflects not 
only who the actor is, but also who the actor would like to be. Here a 
fundamental change in prevalent beliefs and practice of agents occurs as a 
result of learning from the consequences of rational agency. 
Referring to the Decision Cell model, with adjustment, there is a 
fundamental change in the architecture of the 'cell'. Adjustment questions 
whether boundaries were correctly set between what is inside the cell and 
what is determined to be of low relevance to resolving the indeterminate 
situation. It also aims at intelligently reformulating and refraining those 
items that are considered to be relevant for inquiry, and thus re- 
determines the relationships between the constituents of the Decision Cell 
and the problematic situation. Adjustment thus changes both the character 
of agents and the structure of a problematic situation. 
281 
Theories of organizational change have developed in line with this 
integrative systems view. Maturana and Varela's (1980) concept of self- 
creating and self-organising, autopoietic systems was earlier discussed. This 
type of systemic change is also aligned with Argyris and Schöri s (1978) 
concept of "double loop learning"and Vickers' (1965) theory of 
"appreciative systems". 
"Creative destruction" is another theory of organisational change, 
introduced by Schumpeter in the 1940s, to describe how organizations 
change by periodically 'self-destroying', or reinventing themselves, in 
order to innovate and gain a competitive edge in the market. In public 
sector organizations, such as the National Health Service in the UK, the 
term 'creative destruction' has been more recently applied to recommend 
reform efforts where, 
The aim is to produce a system that will adapt itself to changing 
circumstances instead of constantly being driven by the government to 
reform (Ham, 2006, p. 985). 
However, change, in the pragmatist view, needs to be constructively 
informed and managed as part of an overall, reflective process of socially 
intelligent inquiry. As discussed in Chapter 4, effective inquiry and 
meaningful change can also be facilitated by intermediate organisations or 
reference communities, such as perhaps NHS trusts in the case of an 
adaptive NHS. However, central coordination is also required to provide 
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the overarching perspective and institutional support required to 
coordinate change and manage expernalities and consequences. If an 
overall process of inquiry does not inform change, there is danger of 
reform being undertaken for reform's sake, or as a 'knee-jerk' reaction to 
immediate, indeterminate situations. 
Another maladjusted approach, from the perspective of individual and 
societal flourishing, would be to rely on authoritarian, or elitist, drivers of 
change. Schumpeter (1942) was of the view that consumers, i. e. the general 
public, did not realise what they needed and were unaware of the 
possibilities for change. Innovative companies could therefore continually 
create new consumer needs and sell new products. Lippman (1927/ 1993) 
had a similar disdain for the publics' capacity to figure out what they 
wanted, and how to do so. Dewey saw that considerable effort needed to 
invested, to build scientific sense and democratic sensibility to support 
rational decision-making by the public. However, he stressed that it was 
imperative to do so to ensure individual and societal flourishing. 
With the US stock market crash in 1929 and its disastrous effect on 
societies, Dewey (1933/ 1999b) asked the public to heed the consequences 
of a misplaced faith in elite institutions to resolve their problems, in an 
essay titled, Imperative Need: A New Radical Party. 
Power today resides in control of the means of production, exchange, 
publicity, transportation and communication. Whoever owns them rules 
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the life of the country... In order to restore democracy, one thing and only 
one thing is essential. The people will rule when they have power, and 
they will have power in the degree that they own the land, banks, the 
producing and distributing agencies of the nation. Ravings about 
Bolshevism, communism and socialism are irrelevant to the axiomatic 
truth of this statement. They come either from complaisant ignorance or 
from the deliberate desire of those in possession of power and rule to 
perpetuate their privilege... This situation continues only because the 
mass of the people refuse to look facts in the face and prefer to feed on 
illusions produced and circulated by those in power with a profusion that 
contrasts with their withholding the necessities of life. The day that the 
mass of the American people awake to the realities of the situation, that 
day the restoration of democracy will commence, for power and rule will 
revert to the people (Dewey, 1933/ 1999b, p. LW9.76). 
Dewey (1954/ 1927) believed that individual and societal flourishing 
would be best supported by building up individual and social intelligence. 
Part of this process was guiding development through collaborative 
inquiry in concrete problematic situations faced by societies, rather than 
through change driven by elitist and capitalist ideas or by transient fads 
and propaganda. 
It would appear that Dewey lost the battles of political and capitalist 
propaganda in his time. But did he also lose the war of faith in science and 
democracy as the most reliable guides for human flourishing? One would 
hope this pragmatist faith is not misplaced. 
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Ultimately, the pragmatist faith in rational agency is a faith in the 
possibilities of human experience, and of bringing together the diverse 
dimensions of human experience in a meaningful and productive way. 
This sentiment was eloquently expressed by the poet Robert Frost 
(1936/2002, pp. 113-114) and quoted in the opening lines of this chapter, 
"but yield who will to their separation, my object in life is to unite, my avocation 
and my vocation ... only when 
love and work are one is the deed ever really done 
for heaven and the future's sake. " 
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Deliberation and 'good' policy theory 
As long as deliberation pictures shoals or rocks or troublesome gales as marking 
the route of a contemplated voyage, deliberation goes on. But when the various 
factors in action fit harmoniously together, when imagination finds no annoying 
hindrance, when there is picture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds, the 
voyage is definitely entered upon. This decisive direction of action constitutes 
choice. 
John Dewey, 1922, Human Nature and Conduct 
Deliberation is a way of evoking insight, seeing new options, exploring 
possibilities, examining choice and a way of reordering knowledge, particularly 
taken for granted assumptions or tacit norms. 
William Isaacs, 1999, Dialogue and the art of thinking together 
The dynamics of power and deliberation 
In previous (presented and published) versions of the Decision Cell 
model, power and influence were situated at the core of the model 
(Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla, 2005a; Kuruvilla, 2005). However, ongoing 
reading and conceptual analysis indicated that power was exercised in 
shaping the overall process of policy-making, for instance through non- 
decision making, which determines what sociopolitical problems get onto 
policy agendas, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; 
Crenson, 1971), or in the predominant definitions, norms and concepts 
used (Foucault, 1984; Lippman, 1922/ 1991). Power is also reflected, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, in the membership of epistemic communities and 
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policy networks, for instance closed iron triangles versus more open issue 
networks and advocacy coalitions (Heclo, 1978; Sabatier, 1988). 
It was also clear, at least in the context of social policy and health policy in 
particular, that while power shaped and circumscribed the policy process, 
deliberation was key to orienting and shaping policy change, including in 
the development of political opinion (Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague, 
2004). Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague (2004) studied the development of 
political opinion in policy networks. They found that in confrontational 
situations (for example during elections where different political parties or 
networks are pitched against each other) there was consolidation and 
stasis of political opinion, even within the networks. Confrontation was 
thus not conducive to the development of new ideas or policy change. 
However, their analysis indicated that in situations that were non- 
confrontational, diverse political opinions were deliberated on and 
developed, both within and between networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson & 
Sprague, 2004). 
These views on deliberation, as developing and orienting the policy 
process were also reflected in the empirical work conducted during this 
PhD. In both the LSHTM and UNICEF studies, deliberation (including to 
address conflicts) was central to orienting policy, e. g. in how different 
groups interacted in the development of the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child, or in developing policy briefs with reference to UK law-making 
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on home safety or with respect to drawing up international ethical 
guidelines for research with women and adolescents who are trafficked 
(Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007; Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007). 
Dewey explicitly recognised the ubiquity of conflict in problematic 
situations, but saw deliberation as being employed, and required, to 
understand and resolve both the problematic situation and the conflicts 
therein. 
Deliberation is a work of discovery. Conflict is acute; one impulse carries 
us one way into one situation, and another impulse takes us another way 
to a radically different objective result. Deliberation is not an attempt to 
do away with this opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount 
[quantity]. It is an attempt to uncover the conflict in its full scope and 
bearing. What we want to find out is what difference each impulse and 
habit imports, to reveal qualitative incompatibilities by detecting the 
different courses to which they commit us, the different dispositions they 
form and foster, the different situations into which they plunge us 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002, p. 216). 
As a result of these developing insights, in the current version of the 
Decision Cell model 'power' is depicted in the boundary of the cell, 
reflected in the formation and constitution of political agency and 
explicitly acknowledged as a key factor that shapes the entire policy- 
making process. 'Deliberation' plays a core coordination role between the 
different policy activities and provides orientation for policy change. 
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After these changes were made to the model, a classic policy study was 
suggested as a resource to help further contextualise the roles of 
deliberation and power in policy-making (Chris Ham, personal 
communication): Heclo's (1974) analysis of social policy-making in Britain 
and Sweden. In particular, Heclo emphasises the general tendency to 
overestimate the role of power and underestimate the role of deliberation 
in social policy-making; the following section summarises Heclo's 
argument using extended quotes from his analysis of political learning 
and policy change (Heclo, 1974, pp. 284-322): 
Politics as learning 
Tradition teaches us that politics is about conflict and power. Where there 
are conflicting opinions, there will be politics; where men agree (p. 305) 
about who gets what, when, and how, there is no politics. Governments 
reconcile conflict and through public policy give authoritative expression 
to the resulting courses of action; these policies change when there is a 
change in the possession and relationships of power among conflicting 
groups. 
This is a blinkered view of politics and particularly blinding when 
applied to social policy. Politics finds its sources not only in power but 
also in uncertainty - men collectively wondering what to do. Finding 
feasible courses of action includes, but is more than, locating which 
vectors of political pressure are pushing. Governments not only "power" 
(or whatever the verb form of that approach might be); they also puzzle. 
Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society's behalf; it 
entails both deciding and knowing ... This process is political, not 
because all policy is a by-product of power and conflict but because some 
men have undertaken to act in the name of others. 
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Axiomatically, a nonrevolutionary change in social policy required that 
external tensions in society find corresponding tensions within existing 
political institutions. But a pure power approach, like a circular "systems 
analysis" (input, blackbox, output, feedback), fails to flesh in how this 
actually occurred. 
The tension between power and deliberation in policy-making is by no 
means a 'settled' debate. Flyvbjerg (1996) in his analysis of Rationality and 
Power, views the two as antithetical based on assertions such as: rationality 
is context dependent, but power defines the context; the rationality of 
power has deeper historical roots than the power of rationality; rationality 
yields to power when there is open confrontation; the power of rationality 
is embedded in stable power-relations rather than in confrontations 
(Forester, 2001). 
Forester (2001, p. 265) in a strong critique of Flybjerg's theory of power 
vis-a-vis rationality, notes that even within such a unicausal theory it is 
important to 'flesh iri the details. 
Flyvbjerg has so generally connected his concepts of 'power' and 
'rationality' to planning practice or praxis that we cannot distinguish 
planning that serves established power from planning that resists it, or 
planning that rationalizes elite decisions from planning that rationally 
criticizes such decisions. 
Forester stresses the importance of analysing power at least from the 
perspectives of: the variation in political agents' practices not only as 
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passive bearers of a discourse, but to resist some forms of power while 
exercising others; the discrete and specific forms of power and rationality 
that can come into play in specific institutional and political contexts; 
conditions under which a rational critique of dominating power is possible; 
and different kinds of rationality that can blind or instruct planning and 
policy-making (Forester, 2001, p. 269). 
Heclo's (1974, p. 306) analysis proceeds with a similar view to Forester's 
on why it is important not to consider power as an overriding explanation 
of policy change, and highlighting the importance of pluralistic 
perspectives as well as of social deliberation and learning. 
To observe that particular policy contents have not flowed from innate 
qualities, interests, or demands of powerholders is not to say that power 
considerations have been negligible. It is to suggest that a great deal of 
policy development - its creation, alteration, or redirection - has been 
settled prior to or outside of substantial exercises of power. In the end, 
when analysis, deliberation, and persuasion have failed to achieve 
agreement - as in the case of Swedish superannuation in 1956-57 or 
British unemployment insurance in 1931 - political power has been 
resorted to and sometimes proven decisive. Yet these events, which 
onlookers in each country inevitably termed "crises, " stand out precisely 
because they are so rare. More frequently, changes in the relationships of 
power - wider political participation, elections results, party government 
turnovers, new mobilizations of interest groups - have served one variety 
of stimulus, or trigger, helping to spread a general conviction that 
"something" must be done. But there have been other triggers besides 
power contributing to these convictions and, in any event, the possible 
range of specific policy responses regarding what to do seems limitless. 
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The question is how can we adequately conceptualize the broad political 
process supplying this "what to do"? 
Our review of social policy development suggests the fruitfulness of 
viewing politics through the concept of learning. Learning can be taken to 
mean a relatively enduring alteration in behaviour that results from 
experience; usually this alteration is conceptualized as a change in 
response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus. Unfortunately, 
learning theory has concentrated almost exclusively on learning by 
individuals; our understanding of how groups learn is, to say the least, 
fragmentary. To speak of learning by society of groups should not imply 
reifying society into a discrete organic mind responding to holistic 
stimuli. Social learning is created only by individuals, but alone and in 
interaction these individuals acquire and produce changed patterns of 
collective action.... 
(p. 319) At some risk of oversimplification we may say that, in the policies 
considered, elites in each nation have functioned as the agents of 
institutional learning, while the plurality of interests and techniques of 
influence over time has functioned as the agent of social learning.... 
The significance of pluralism for political learning and policy has been at 
the societal rather than institutional level of analysis. The pluralism we 
have observed is not that usually assumed by American observers, that is, 
a large number of semi-independent power units at a fairly narrow cross- 
section in time. At various points policy has been decisively shaped by 
one or a very few principal actors. The plurality affecting the creations 
and development of modern social policy has been longitudinal. Over the 
course of policy development, no particular group, party, or 
administrative organ has finally captured a monopoly of influence on any 
policy; no one device of electoral determination, party competition, 
interest group pressure, or bureaucratic politics has provided "the" 
technique of policy-making. All have played an important part at one 
time or another ... 
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(p. 322) Much of social policy has remained at the level of chance 
discovery and ad hoc invention, with little attention to accumulated 
evidence, experimentation, or questions of how the learning process itself 
might be improved. Despite all this, the collective process of policy- 
making in Britain and Sweden has remained open, which is to say that it 
has retained the potential for future political learning. On the policies we 
have considered, what have been achieved are settlements rather than 
solutions. Democratic social politics has failed to provide or convince 
itself that it has any comprehensive, final answers to the profound issues 
of human welfare. In this failure may lie its greatest success. 
In order to both explain and explicate the process of socio-political 
learning and change, including the resolution of conflicts in the process, 
Deliberation is discussed in this chapter as the core of the Decision Cell. 
Heclo (1974) observed that "learning theory has concentrated almost 
exclusively on learning by individuals; our understanding of how groups 
learn is, to say the least, fragmentary", and that little attention has been 
paid "to accumulated evidence, experimentation, or questions of how the 
learning process itself might be improved". To address these concerns, 
this chapter focuses on systematising Dewey's concept of Deliberation that 
arguably provides such a normative orientation for public policy-making 
and sociopolitical learning. This discussion is further informed by more 
contemporary analyses and critiques on the topic of deliberation. 
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Systematising Dewey's concept of deliberation 
Deliberation is part of the pragmatist method for developing and testing 
strategies to rationally resolve indeterminate situations; it is the core of the 
Decision Cell. As seen in preceding chapters, the other decision activities - 
define, design and realise - continually refer to deliberation, as it is essentially 
the decision activity that unifies and coordinates diverse aspects of 
rational agency. 
Deliberation, as conceptualised in pragmatism, relies on imagination 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002). Through deliberation the consequences of different 
problem-solutions and design strategies can be safely, and 'virtually', 
examined. In this respect, deliberation is also a moral exercise. Even 
though deliberation is a method for rational agency, Dewey did not 
organise the different elements of deliberation into a methodological 
construct (as he did with inquiry) (Caspary, 1991). Nevertheless, he 
extensively analysed deliberation in relation to both rationality and moral 
development, for example in Human Nature and Conduct (1922/ 2002) and 
six main dimensions of deliberation can be synthesised: 
i. The role of passions and norms 
ii. Developing new insights versus confrontation or consensus 
iii. Dramatic rehearsal and scenario development 
iv. Valuation and reasoned choice 
v. Empathy and moral imagination 
vi. Aesthetics in action 
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I. A role for passions and norms 
In response to an indeterminate situation, acting on an overwhelming 
preference, or being a 'slave to passion, as linear instrumental models of 
rationality would have it, was not, in Dewey's view, reasonable. 
There is reasonable and unreasonable choice. The object thought of may 
simply stimulate some impulse or habit to a pitch of intensity where it is 
temporarily irresistible ... Then choice 
is arbitrary and unreasonable 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002, pp. 193-194). 
Dewey, however, did not ignore the influence of passion on agency. On 
the contrary, he saw passions and emotions as resources, or catalysts, for 
rational inquiry. 
'Cold blooded' thought may reach a correct conclusion, but if a person 
remains anti-pathetic or indifferent to the consideration presented to him 
in a rational way, they will not stir him to act in accord with them (Dewey 
& Tufts, 1908/ 1999, p. LW 7.269). 
This quote is congruent with findings in neurophysiological research, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, showing that without emotion, people are unable 
to make decisions on which they can act reasonably (Damasio, 2006). 
However, for Dewey more passions, not fewer, are required for rational 
deliberation. 
Deliberation is irrational in the degree in which an end is so fixed, a 
passion or interest so absorbing, that the foresight of consequences is 
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warped to include only what furthers execution of its predetermined bias 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002, p. 198). 
The pragmatist proviso for passions that play a role in rational agency is: 
that imaginative and intelligent deliberation should consider the nature 
and consequences of different passions and desires. Rationality, then, is 
"the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires" (Dewey, 
1922/ 2002, p. 196). This pragmatist approach of analysing different 
passions or preferences, and their consequences, is very different from 
linear instrumental rationality where passions and preferences are 
considered as'given and fixed. It could be said linear instrumental 
models are 'irrational' in that they are blindly lured by passions, instead of 
constructively channelling passion through inquiry and deliberation. 
Another less than rational response to an indeterminate situation might be 
to uncritically "download" previously established norms as a guide for 
rational agency. Some of these norms may have contributed to the 
problematic situation in the first place. Sabatier (1988) discusses three 
overlapping frameworks of norms, or belief systems, in policy-making: 
i. Ideologies and deep core beliefs 
ii. Basic political values or strategies 
iii. Specific policy measures. 
Sabatier (1988) also notes that specific policy measures are relatively open 
to negotiation and change; change, however, becomes increasingly 
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difficult when moving up the typology of norms, especially because 
changing core ideologies is a process akin to effecting religious 
conversion. 
As with unevaluated passions, in the pragmatist view, blindly following 
pre-existing norms and habits is not necessarily rational; this can also lead 
to 'dead ends' by preventing further learning and moral development. 
Habits are conditions of intellectual efficiency. They operate in two ways 
upon intellect. Obviously, they restrict its reach, they fix its boundaries. 
They are blinders that confine the eyes of mind to the road ahead. . . 
All 
habit-forming involves the beginning of an intellectual specialization 
which if unchecked ends in thoughtless action (Dewey, 1922/ 2002, p. 
121). 
As previously emphasised, following the pragmatist path requires 
keeping to the via media between fallibilism (recognising that no norm is so 
authoritative that it does not require interpretation and judgement with 
respect to its use in particular situations) and antiscepticism (recognising 
that it is inefficient to arbitrarily discard or ignore pre-existing norms, 
especially those developed through previous processes of rational 
inquiry). 
In pragmatist inquiry, norms are considered as "intellectual instruments 
to be tested and confirmed - and altered - through consequences effected 
by acting upon them"(Dewey, 1929/ 1999, p. LW. 4.221). In a way, making 
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normative judgements in policy-making can be compared to pastry 
making in to baking. It is a fundamental process, but requires the 
development of technique through practice and also the correct 
constituents and conditions, and an understanding of how these 'work' 
together. In addition, imagination and creativity can make the difference 
between a run-of-the-mill product and something exceptional. 
As a fundamental process in policy-making, making normative 
judgements should not be an implicit consideration in policy theory, 
formulation and analysis. Expertise in making normative judgements in 
public policy needs to be developed through explicit method, practical 
experience and evaluation. Pragmatism also recognises that imagination 
and intuition can make a real difference to both the processes and 
outcomes of policy-making. 
ii. Developing new insights versus confrontation or consensus 
To resolve indeterminate policy situations, individuals and groups 
coalesce and form networks or communities of inquiry, delineating the 
'boundaries' of the Decision Cell. They may then interact in a 'socially 
intelligent' process of inquiry or engage in an adversarial process of 
'beating down' alternatives till one is the victor. Several parliamentary 
systems are based on an adversarial system of political deliberation. 
However, empirical evidence, from the time of the Greek polis to 
contemporary studies on effective dialogue, shows that confrontation 
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prevents the development of new knowledge and understanding 
(Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague, 2004; Isaacs, 1999). 
Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague (2004) studied the development of political 
opinion in policy networks. They found that in confrontational situations 
(for example during elections where different political parties or networks 
are pitched against each other) there was consolidation and stasis of 
political opinion, even within networks. Confrontation was thus not 
conducive to the development of new ideas. Whereas in situations that 
were non-confrontational, diverse political opinions were deliberated on 
and developed both within and between networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson & 
Sprague, 2004). 
The experience of the MIT Dialogue Project, (Isaacs, 1999) highlights the 
importance of deliberation in developing new insights and new ways of 
thinking. Techniques of negotiation, conflict resolution and dialogue can 
all contribute to facilitating non-confrontational deliberation and the 
development of new understandings to resolve problematic situations 
(Drager, 2000; Isaacs, 1999). 
As part of a longstanding collaboration between the WHO and the 
Conflict Management Group, Drager et al (2000) analyse 'real-world 
experiences' of policy negotiations in over 40 developing countries, in 
health, planning, finance, development and other sectors. Identification of 
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'good' negotiation practices was part of this analysis and these practices 
reflect some of the other approaches, aligned with pragmatism, that have 
been discussed in earlier chapters: 
  Identify all parties involved, e. g. using a stakeholder analysis. 
  Consider the interests, priorities, hopes and fears of all parties. 
  Develop multiple options and scenarios, keeping in mind that 
circumstances change and the need to be flexible. 
  Apply criteria and standards that are independent and verifiable to 
help make ongoing decisions. 
There is also ongoing research on consensus development methods, 
especially as they relate to the development of clinical guidelines. In one 
study, Hutchings et al. (2006) assessed practitioners' use of Delphi and 
nominal group methods to develop consensus on mental health treatment 
guidelines. The study showed that while consensus was closer in the 
nominal group method (face-to-face), the results were more reliable with 
the Delphi method (where participants do not meet), suggesting that a 
hybrid of these methods could provide better results. 
However, to develop new insights and facilitate learning, there is a need 
to go beyond consensus, or compromise, on previously held perspectives. 
Dewey saw new understandings developing, not from competition, or 
even consensus, but through a 'sublimation' that integrated and 
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transformed constituent perspectives and preferences (Dewey, 1922/ 2002; 
Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 1999). 
The object thought of may be one which stimulates [action] by unifying, 
harmonizing different competing tendencies. It may release an activity in 
which all are fulfilled, not indeed in their original form, but in a 
"sublimated fashion", that is, in a way which modifies the original 
direction of each by reducing it to a component along with others in an 
action of transformed quality (Dewey, 1922/ 2002, p. 194). 
To develop new insights and shared understanding, developing and 
testing methods to do so is critical. Methods that have been shown to 
support 'thinking together' (Isaacs, 1999) and building shared 
understanding, include role plays (Innes, 1999) and scenario development 
techniques (detailed in the next section). 
iii. Dramatic rehearsal and scenario development 
Dewey defined deliberation as comprising a "rehearsal (in imagination) of 
various competing possible lines of action. . . an experiment in 
finding out 
what the various lines of possible action are really like" (Dewey, 1922/ 
2002, p. 190). One method that illustrates how dramatic rehearsal can be 
used in policy-making is scenario development. Scenarios have since been 
used in different policy contexts, including in climate change deliberations 
(Nakicenovic, Alcamo, Davis, de Vries et al., 2000). The UK Cabinet Office, 
in setting out core competencies for Professional Policy Making for the 
Twenty First Century (Cabinet Office, 1999), identifies scenario building as 
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'good practice' for developing forward looking and innovative policies, 
and for anticipating and managing policy change. The Wanless scenarios, 
earlier discussed, that described possible futures for the NHS and health 
outcomes in the UK are illustrative of this concept (Wanless, 2002,2004). 
In scenario development, a set of plausible 'futures' is developed, usually 
in the form of a matrix of alternative scenarios (Koehler & Harvey, 2004). 
The implications of these scenarios, indicators that one or the other 
scenario may already be playing out, and contingency plans to meet 
concomitant opportunities and risks are also considered. Scenario 
development also provides opportunities for people to consider their 
individual roles and interactions. Possible changes in policy environments 
are also taken into account, including international economic changes, 
technological breakthroughs, social value shifts, and environmental 
pressures in these alternative futures. 
A variant of scenario development is the normative scenario, or desired 
future. This type of scenario development "puts a face on" otherwise 
abstract sets of objectives. 
A well-crafted normative scenario allows an organization to become 
proactive, working specifically for their desired future, rather than sitting 
by and passively waiting for what ever the world delivers. It is a tool for 
allowing individuals and organizations to "create their own future, " a 
perspective that is often an epiphany for the participants (Arlington 
Institute, 2005). 
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Scenarios are not probability models or crystal balls in that they are not 
used to predict the future. Scenarios focus on conceptual and epistemic 
factors rather than computational complexity (Koehler & Harvey, 2004). A 
useful analogy for a scenario is a script for a play where certain 
circumstances are described and interactions in those circumstances 
explored. Scenarios thus enable actors and organizations to think through 
and respond more quickly and effectively to changing circumstances, 
marked by previously identified signposts. 
Some of the most powerful examples of scenario development in public 
policy relate to their use in guiding countries' transitions to democratic 
systems of governance, for example in South Africa and Guatemala 
(Commissariat General du Plan, 2004; Kahane, 2002). In 1991-1992, in 
South Africa, workshops were organised to project alternative scenarios 
for the country's future over the following decade. Workshop participants 
were from different racial, socioeconomic, political and occupational 
groups. While there were many disagreements on what South Africa's 
future should be, all the participants agreed on scenario development as a 
method to discuss this topic. 
Four scenarios were developed, each named after a type of bird to 
highlight key characteristics of the scenario for South Africa's future 
(Commissariat General du Plan, 2004). 
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" Ostrich brought to mind a scenario where international pressure 
was eased on the government that then decided no further reforms 
were required. There would be no progress save that of a big bird 
unable to fly that hid its head in the sand when danger, for example 
violent opposition, threatened. 
" Lame duck referred to a bird that limped along, unable to take flight 
despite trying. In this scenario, different groups would continually 
veto other groups' proposals, hindering progress. 
" Icarus was constructed around the idea of a democratically elected 
government trying to do too much too quickly (fly now, crash 
later). 
" Flamingo depicted a slow take off, but with the possibility of flying 
high and for a long time together with other flamingos. This 
scenario built on the idea of national and international coordination 
and taking a long-term view on social and economic development. 
While participation in the workshops was limited to a small group of 
people (from diverse parties and cultures), the four scenarios were 
presented in South African newspapers, discussed at political conferences, 
as well as with trade unions, universities and corporations. Phrases such 
as "Fly like a flamingo" or the threat of becoming a "lame duck" were 
soon part of socio-political discussions, including in church sermons and 
on radio talk shows. The 'Flight of the Flamingos' scenario was the one 
selected to guide South Africa through the country's period of governance 
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transition. The scenario development process was seen to help South 
Africans develop a shared vision for the future and guide action along the 
way (Commissariat General du Plan, 2004). 
There are some methodological concerns about scenario development, 
including participant selection and the somewhat arbitrary structure of 
the 2x2 matrix to organise scenarios (Koehler & Harvey, 2004). 
Nevertheless, scenario development has shown promise as a practical 
method to help develop imagination and foresight in resolving 
indeterminate situations (Cabinet Office, 1999). As with all methods of 
inquiry and deliberation, this method too needs to be applied, tested and 
progressively developed to facilitate rational use in policy-making. 
iv. Valuation and reasoned choice 
In considering different policy options and scenarios, deliberation 
involves making value judgements. Dewey defined valuation as a process 
of inquiry for the evaluation of moral consequences; "in some cases, the 
value of ends is thought of and in some cases the value of means" (Dewey 
& Tufts, 1908/ 1999, p. LW. 7.274). He made the distinction that moral 
deliberation "differs from other forms not as a process of forming a 
judgement and arriving at knowledge but in the kind of value that is 
thought about. " 
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The value is technical, professional, economic etc., as long as one thinks of 
it as something which one can aim at... as something to be got or missed. 
Precisely the same object will have a moral value when it is thought of as 
making a difference in the self, as determining what one will be, instead of 
merely what one will have (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 1999, p. LW. 7.274). 
Valuation thus reflects both current priorities and future aspirations. A 
key task of rational agency is to make a unified choice for action based on 
valuation of diverse preferences and options. 
Choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the 
emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences (Dewey, 
1922/ 2002, p. 192). 
To illustrate the process of valuation and choice as set out in pragmatist 
philosophy, Mousavi and Garrison (2003) discuss an ethnographic 
analysis of consumer behaviour in supermarket shopping. Following the 
rhythm of situations, shoppers engage in inquiry and deliberation when 
habitual actions fail to address problem situations. "If it were just a matter 
of making the calculation, then one would only have to acquire the habit, 
or the computing program" (p. 149). 
More typically, shoppers ascertain what is available in the store, take into 
account storage capacity at home and what can be bought without 
spoilage, assess nutritional values, appreciate the aesthetics of products or 
packaging, and consider ethical issues related to the mode of production 
before making a final decision on what to buy. The result is reasoned 
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choice, which, as defined by Dewey (1922/2002), is the emergence of a 
unified preference or strategy of action out of competing preferences and 
constraints. Thus, more than just making calculations based on pre- 
defined preferences and measurable values, as in rational choice or 
bounded rationality models, Mousavi and Garrison (2003, p. 131) argue 
that, 
A theory that can deal with deliberation regarding incommensurable 
values better explains economic behavior in the everyday marketplace. 
For Dewey, rational choice also required consideration of the 
consequences of choice and moral choice included taking responsibility 
for these choices. Choices have consequences both in terms of the potential 
to resolve immediate problematic situations as well as the extent to which 
the acts promote learning and facilitate rational agency in the future. 
v. Empathy, moral imagination and human nature 
In analysing moral imagination in the practice of architecture, Collier 
(2006) draws on Dewey's concept of empathy as "the animating mold of 
moral judgement". 
Empathy involves a going beyond ourselves and our concerns, imagining 
ourselves as the other so that we come to understand and sympathise 
with their aspirations, interests and worries. We feel not just for them but 
as they do (Collier, 2006, p. 313). 
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In architecture, moral imagination is required not only to meet clients' 
needs, and to be accountable to professional standards, but also to imagine 
and nurture "a truly human and sustainable home for us all. That is the 
vision" (Collier, 2006, p. 316). It seems obvious that empathy should play a 
role in public policy, at least for similar imperatives as in architecture. 
Constituted by sentiments such as empathy and aspiration, deliberation 
reflects character and projects hope, and therefore cannot be reduced to 
some simple quantitative construct. 
Deliberation is then not to be identified with calculation, or a quasi- 
mathematical reckoning of profit and loss. Such calculation assumes that 
the nature of the self does not enter into the question... Every choice 
sustains a double relation to the self. It reveals the existing self and it 
forms the future self (Dewey, 1994, p. 141). 
Empirical inquiry, moral imagination and practical experience need to be 
integrated in pragmatist rational agency. So rather than empiricist, or 
'post-empiricist', supra-empiricist is perhaps a more appropriate term to 
describe rational public policy in this context. Key to supra-empiricism, 
are qualities such as intuition, sympathy and empathy. Pragmatist 
philosophy is, after all, a commitment to appreciating and developing an 
understanding of the multiple dimensions of human experience and 
human nature, including emotion, intuition and creativity, rather than 
reducing all of human nature to an easily measurable, mechanistic model. 
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Dewey (1939/ 1989a, p. 83) recognised that a range of problems could 
arise from basing social, economic and political theories on faulty 
understandings of human nature. For example, he disentangles the 
implicit theoretical assumptions that connect capitalism and democracy, 
as if they were "Siamese twins, so that attack upon one is a threat directed 
at the life of the other". 
This type of theory claims ... that all social phenomena are to 
be 
understood in terms of the mental operations of individuals, since society 
consists in the last analysis only of individual persons. The practically 
effective statement of the point of view is found in economic theory, 
where it furnished the backbone of laissez-faire economics; and in the 
British political liberalism which developed in combination with this 
economic doctrine. A particular view of human motives in relation to 
social events, as explanations of them and as the basis of all sound social 
policy, has not come to us labelled psychology. But as a theory about 
human nature it is essentially psychological. 
It is, at the very least, unscientific to continue to base public policy and 
economic interventions on psychological and sociological assumptions 
about human nature, that have little empirical support. In the Journal of 
Economic Methodology, a series of papers discusses how pragmatist 
philosophy, based on a more empirically congruent understanding of 
human nature, can better explain economic behaviour, including 
consumer choice and economic entrepreneurship, than can mainstream 
economic theory (Mousavi & Garrison, 2003; Shook, 2003). This discussion 
has to be taken forward to avoid further reduction of the richness and 
complexity of human experience and agency to simplistic, easily 
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measurable and mechanistic models. Developments in neurological and 
psychological research offer some interesting methodological options, 
based on understandings of human nature, to guide rational agency. In 
this context, Damasio (2006) observes that the "organism has some reason 
that reason must utilise". In order for such utilisation to occur, Damasio 
puts forward the Somatic Marker Hypothesis to inform rational decision- 
making. 
Somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from 
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, 
by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. The 
automated signal protects you against future losses, without further ado, 
and then allows you to choose from among fewer alternatives (Damasio, 
2006, pp. 173-174). 
This description of somatic markers may have, correctly, brought to mind 
the phrase 'gut feeling'. Somatic markers may also be more implicit, as at 
the level of neuromodulator responses related to dopamine and oxytocin. 
Damasio does suggest caution; stating that this method, just like others, 
requires understanding, development and testing. In the pragmatist view, 
somatic markers would be considered as one among many inputs in an 
overarching, and integrated, process of inquiry. 
There is also growing interest in the science and psychology of emotions, 
as evinced by Goleman's (1995) best selling book, Emotional Intelligence: 
why it can matter more than I. Q. Emotional intelligence, including empathy 
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is a key component of both socially intelligent inquiry and moral deliberation 
in the pragmatist concept of rational agency. 
Assessing how policy-making could build on, and be informed by, human 
nature-related findings in the health and social sciences, poses a very 
interesting challenge for the theory and practice of health policy. Perhaps, 
in addition to surveys, electroencephalographs (EEGs) could help define 
people's policy preferences (as one factor in an overall process of socially 
intelligent inquiry). Additionally, the role of intuition and empathy could 
be more explicitly acknowledged and accounted for in policy theory and 
analyses; for instance, it is generally acknowledged that great politicians 
have an ability to 'intuitively sense the mood of the public' or that 
sometimes policies are only publicised on determining whether they 
would 'smell right' to the public. More research on the neurophysiological 
and emotional aspects of rational decision-making, particularly as related 
to public policy-making, is warranted. 
vi. Using the Ethical Postulate as a moral compass 
In chapter 3, Dewey's Ethical Postulate was introduced as a falsifiable 
statement to be tested in problematic situations, restated here as a 
reminder. 
In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed 
realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a 
member; and, conversely, agents who duly satisfy the community in 
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which they share, by that same conduct satisfy themselves. (Dewey, 
1891/ 1999, p. 322) 17 
The pragmatist test of this postulate would be with respect to its ability to 
successfully guide moral deliberation and democratic practice in resolving 
problematic situations and supporting individual and societal flourishing. 
It was also discussed how the Ethical Postulate has elements of both 
'egoism' and 'altruism', which have been identified as key motivators in 
social policy decision making (Le Grand, 2003; Pinker, 2006; Titmuss, 
1968). This particular body of literature provides a very useful link 
between pragmatist philosophy and public policy. 
For example, Robert Pinker's (2006) synthesis of issues related to egoism, 
altruism and social policy discusses how the apparent discrepancies 
between the two characteristics of altruism and egoism have led to 
contentious debates and dissension on the nature and objectives of social 
welfare policies in Britain. Richard Titmuss made a passionate case for 
welfare systems to be based on altruism. This case was supported by his 
analysis of The Gift Relationship of voluntary blood donation. His 
empirical, and normative, analysis showed that the quality and quantity of 
blood received in this way, from people's altruism towards a "universal 
stranger", was superior to that obtained by more competitive or 
commercial means. Titmuss' treatise, was thus, "also a passionate 
17 Note: changes made to more gender-neutral language. 
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indictment of the corrupting influence of competitive markets across the 
whole field of social policy" (Pinker, 2006, p. 13). 
Others, like Arthur Seldon, strongly disagreed with Titmuss, saying that 
he "did not understand how markets worked or the indispensable role 
they played in the efficient allocation of resources, the extension of choice 
and the enhancement of welfare. " (Pinker, 2006, p. 12). Pinker himself held 
that, 
In their extreme forms, altruism and egoism are marginal phenomena. As 
I suggested in The Idea of Welfare 'for the egoist social life is meaningless, 
and for the altruist it is impossible . (Pinker, 2006, p. 14) 
Pinker's vision for social policy, is remarkably similar to that proposed by 
Dewey with respect to moving away from unitary solutions to recognising 
the pluralistic and interdependent nature of human values and social 
relationships. 
The problem with the unitary model of social welfare is that it cannot 
respond with sufficient sensitivity to the diversity of human aspirations 
and needs and this will be the case, irrespective of whether the sole 
providers of services are statutory, voluntary or private sector agencies... 
Good social policies ought, therefore, to be designed to complement and 
reinforce the qualities of interdependence and reciprocity. These are the 
ideals by which most people try to order their social relationships (Pinker, 
2006, pp. 17-18). 
However, Pinker acknowledges that a shortcoming of just focussing on 
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the nature of citizenship and interdependence, was a lack of focus on the 
motivation and agency that influenced these relationships. Le Grand's 
(2003) exposition on Motivation, Agency and Public Policy, was seen to 
effectively bring these considerations together. 
Le Grand considers that human nature comprises both altruistic and 
egoistic dimensions that are differently influenced by incentives and costs, 
including opportunity costs. Therefore, 
Positive service outcomes are more likely to be optimized when social 
policies work with the grain of human nature and take account of the 
duality of our moral sentiments (Pinker, 2006, p. 21). 
In order to optimise social policies, to bring out the best of altruism and 
egoism in people, Le Grand recommends providing, 'robust incentives' for 
health care workers, more choice for parents of school children and, 
radically, "the provision of a universal capital grant of £10,000 to all young 
people on reaching the age of eighteen. " He also highlighted the need for 
state oversight to mitigate negative tendencies and to prevent or redress 
harmful consequences (Pinker, 2006, p. 21). 
All of this complements pragmatist philosophy quite well, save for the 
emphasis paid to two fundamental concerns. The first difference is that in 
pragmatist philosophy, the basis of rational agency is neither altruism nor 
egoism, but rather the rhythm of situations. An indeterminate situation 
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necessitates agency and a search for ways to act to resolve it. In this 
context, altruism and egoism may play a role, along with a host of other 
diverse motivations and pluralistic imperatives. The recommendation for 
public policy would be to coordinate a process of socially intelligent 
inquiry, including on the design of incentives, with respect to particular 
problematic situations in society. 
The second gap is the basis for understanding human motivation using 
considerations of altruism and egoism. In pragmatist philosophy, there is 
a strong sociological basis for understanding human motivation. It is with 
respect to reference communities that individuals develop, thus also forming 
social relationships and reference communities. These reference 
communities influence how altruistic and egoistic tendencies, among 
other human characteristics, develop and are expressed, and also provide 
a backdrop against which scenarios of moral imagination can be projected. 
Without such a reference point, altruism and egoism are but disparate and 
disjointed considerations. Caspary (1991) emphasises Dewey's principle of 
anticipating the responses of other people and of oneself in moral deliberation. 
Caspary (1991) considers the case of a young woman who is pregnant. She 
may deliberate on her choices about carrying the baby to term or having 
an abortion, by considering the responses of her partner and parents to 
these choices. She would also have to consider her own responses to those 
elicited from others, for example whether she would rebel or respond 
positively (Caspary, 1991). 
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Given the pluralistic nature of individual lives and social relationships, 
reference communities can change with different situations. The role of 
'intermediate organisations' (Mays, 2000) to provide legitimate reference 
communities (both for inquiry and moral deliberation) was also earlier 
discussed. In this context, the role of the state would be to: 
" Support inquiry and deliberation at the level of reference 
communities, such as intermediate organisations, 
" Manage externalities, either by promotion or control, at a more 
overarching level and 
" Ensure that learning from societal inquiry and deliberations is 
organised and shared across society through institutional and 
societal linkages. 
Both Titmuss and Pinker refer to importance of social and community 
relations in social policy decision-making, and to how individuals' 
spheres of interest widen from the family to the community as they 
mature (Pinker, 2006). The extent to which later theories, including Le 
Grand's, take into account considerations of community is less clear. 
Given the interdependent nature of considerations of self and society, 
perhaps Le Grand's recommendation of a £10,000 grant to young people 
18, could be usefully supplemented by schemes for young people to 
18 Le Grand proposes providing a universal capital grant of £ 10,000 to all young people 
on reaching the age of eighteen. Such a scheme would be financed from the proceeds of a 
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provide some similarly substantive service to communities that they 
would consider as reference communities, be they related to 
neighbourhood, school or other reference point. 
Dewey and Tufts (1908/ 1999) set out the development of moral theory as 
a systematic way to guide moral development. Moral theory, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, would help provide a generalisable account of the types of 
moral problems encountered, provide information on solutions used to 
resolve these problems in different situations, and support a more 
systematic process of moral development (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 1999). 
With respect to health policy, McIver & Ham (2000) recommend 
developing a system similar to 'case law' to systematically develop 
learning with respect to ethics-related health care decision-making, 
especially as related to contested decisions. A key forum for ethics-related 
deliberation, explicitly related to case law, is the human rights system that 
is ratified in international law. Links can be usefully made between health 
and human rights, including cross-cultural ethical considerations (Beyrer 
& Kass, 2002; Hunt, 2003). The human rights framework and other 
normative and ethics frameworks for health policy are further analysed in 
Chapter 7. 
reformed inheritance tax. Le Grand describes the scheme as a policy of 'asset-based 
egalitarianism'. It is asset-based insofar as the capital grants would be invested and 
managed by public trustees. Withdrawals of cash would be subject to trustees' approval 
and might be restricted to such purposes as payment of educational fees, down- 
payments on house purchases, the start-up costs of small businesses or investment in a 
personal or stakeholder pension. It is egalitarian insofar as the scheme would redistribute 
from rich to poor and enable more people to become asset-owners in their own right 
(Pinker, 2006, pp. 20-21). 
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vii. Aesthetics in action 
Dewey defined the successful outcome of rationality as that which 
achieves a working harmony between diverse values, desires and their 
consequences. He saw this as a 'consummation', or bringing together of 
the diverse dimensions of human experience. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the idea of a unification of diverse desires and perspectives through 
rational agency has an aesthetic akin to the classical Greek composite of 
ens, bonum, verum, pulchritudum; or of experience, ethics, science and art. 
This is neither a deterministic nor a natural end, but a possibility of 
rational agency - one of the main promises of pragmatist rationality. 
Contemporary theorists and analysts have also recognised the value of 
unified and integrated experience. For example, Habermas (1987) and 
Isaacs (1999) view participation, literally (based on the Greek root of the 
word), as a way of reengaging with the whole. 
Unifying experience in a Deweyan perspective, however, requires both an 
appreciation of aesthetics and the courage to act accordingly. Agency, by 
definition, involves action and the final result of rational agency should be 
consummated experience in practice, not just in reflection or imagination. 
There are however vices of reflection as well as of impulse. We may not 
look far enough ahead because we are hurried into action by stress of 
impulse; but we may also become over interested in the delights of 
reflection; we become afraid of assuming the responsibilities of decisive 
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choice and action, and in general be sicklied over by a pale cast of 
thought. We may become so curious about remote and abstract matters 
that we give only a begrudged, impatient attention to the things right 
about us. We may fancy we are glorifying the love of truth for its own 
sake when we are only indulging a pet occupation and slighting demands 
of the immediate situation (Dewey, 1922/ 2002, p. 198). 
This discussion on the consummation of experience through rational 
agency concludes the development of the Decision Cell model. This model 
illustrates how a pragmatist revision of rationality can be transposed to a 
theory of policy-making. 
Barriers to functional participation and deliberation 
While the potential power of sociopolitical deliberation has been 
established, there are implications in how deliberation is designed and 
operationalised, that warrants caution and evaluation. A politically 
successful argument, or consensus position, may not necessarily 
successfully solve the problem it seeks to address; as in Edelman's (1977) 
analysis of Words that succeed and policies that fail suggesting this was 
equivalent to the expression 'the operation was successful, but the patient 
died'. Beyond effectiveness concerns, political discourse has power and 
equity implications. Edelman (1977) also argues that political and media 
agendas are dominated by ideas and interpretations put forward by 
political elite invariably reinforcing the status quo and disenfranchising 
those with less political power and voice. 
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In addition, while more inclusive policy processes may help address 
equity concerns, there is nothing intrinsically moral in collective political 
discourse and action. The ethos of moral theories indicates that ethical and 
moral standards are products of strong socio- political imperatives and 
values (Hacking, 2000). However, history demonstrates that some of the 
most powerful political discourses and societal actions have not always 
been the most ethical or moral. 
From a pragmatist view point, functional participation in deliberative 
processes refers to the effectiveness of these processes with respect to 
resolving a problematic situation and in promoting socio-political learning 
and flourishing. However, there are several barriers to ensuring functional 
participation in policy deliberation. On a conceptual level, the construct of 
participation in deliberative and decision-making processes is not clearly 
defined and can refer to tokenistic or manipulative exercises, as well as to 
initiatives where participants control agendas and contribute to decision- 
making (Arnstein, 1969; Litva, 2002). 
On a practical level even though the right to participation in public affairs 
is a human right (UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007), this right may not be enjoyed 
because of the lack or misallocation of resources, and the lack of 
institutional processes to ensure the realisation of that right. For instance, 
if every citizen has a right to participate, a basic requirement to monitor 
321 
the realisation of that human right is that every citizen is counted; yet data 
from registration of births and deaths or censuses are patchy at best in 
many countries (Tomasevski, 2001); and registering citizens to vote poses 
similar challenges, even in more developed economies. Even if the right to 
participate is protected in law, the legal framework for enforcement may 
have inherent biases with regard to access or itself involve corruption 
(Jenkins, 1978). 
Adequate education and access to information can pose further barriers to 
participation in policy-making as discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to 
health literacy. Formal and informal education systems need to provide 
individuals with a basic knowledge set as well as with the skills to access, 
understand and use information (Zarcadoolas, Pleasant & Greer, 2006). 
However, not all education systems function effectively and not all people 
have access to even basic education. Access to education and information 
has implications for the extent to which individuals' participation is 
informed (Jenkins, 2002). 
The role the media plays in disseminating information in society was 
discussed in Chapter 5. However, the media may be driven by agendas 
that are difficult to ascertain, including commercialisation, and thus 
provide information of varying credibility (Hargreaves, Lewis & Speers; 
McCombs & Shaw, 1993). The extent to which the media system is 
developed in a country, and the degree of press freedom from political 
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and special interest powers has implications for the quality of information 
available to citizens 19. The Internet is increasingly used as a forum to 
mobilise participation, facilitate access to information and services, and 
demand accountability (Jenkins, 2002; Kuruvilla, Dzenowagis, Pleasant, 
Dwivedi et al., 2004). However, there are huge disparities in the level of 
connectivity across and within countries as well as in the skills and 
resources required to use it. 
Thus while activism for increased participation is often associated with 
calls for decentralisation, strong political institutions, infrastructure and 
coordination are required to enable effective participation (Cornwall, 
2000); a finding supported by empirical studies of centralisation and 
decentralisation in health systems, as earlier discussed with reference to 
studies in Brazil and Uganda (Atkinson & Haran, 2004; Golooba-Mutebi, 
2005). 
While institutional structures are both a reality and required to facilitate 
effective participation and deliberation, it is also important to recognise 
the limits these structures impose. On a pragmatic level some national 
constitutions require that certain governance functions, such as those of 
the civil service and judiciary, are not subject to amendments by public 
deliberation or popular choice (Scruton, 1982). Inherent social and 
institutional biases may exacerbate existing inequities or create new ones. 
19 ICCPR General Comment 25, para 25 
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For example, land reform programs in Latin America systematically 
excluded women from the process as land was allocated by household 
and the deals operationalised through the 'male head of the household' 
(Tomasevski, 2001). 
Participation mechanisms can also maintain the status quo by 
bureaucratising diverse societal 'voices' into existing institutional 
processes and structures in an organised way (Mosse, 2001). The 
bureaucratisation of participation is also evident in the phenomenon of 
'development ventriloquism' where bureaucrats and academics interpret 
and present the views of other stakeholders (Ngokway Ndolamb 1991). It 
is further observed that broad or 'representative' participation is 
sometimes used by those in power to dilute dissent of smaller, more vocal 
opposition groups to proposed policies and programs (Hailey, 1999). 
Individuals' participation in public affairs cannot be romanticised as this 
may be influenced by transient fads and trends (Cooke, 2001). As 
discussed earlier, it is not clear to what extent individuals' participation is 
'informed'. Furthermore, people may act primarily to satisfy their 
individual needs exclusively, despite evidence that collective action leads 
to both public and individual benefit. The resultant loss for individuals 
themselves and society as a whole is referred to as the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968). 
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The outputs of group processes also cannot be romanticised. The inherent 
morality of a group cannot be assumed and participants' motivations need 
be examined carefully. Analyses show that people may think and act 
differently in group-settings by taking more risky decisions (Cooke, 2001). 
Critical independent opinions may be suppressed by 'group think' where 
individuals defer to the perceived dominant opinions of the group (Janis, 
1972). The extent to which participants have fixed opinions and the extent 
to which these opinions are explicit in the participatory process is unclear 
(Brugha & Varvasovsky, 2000; Dugdale, 1999). 
It is also imperative to develop a better understanding of the logistics of 
participation as the physical environment, communication tools, and even 
refreshment breaks could all affect the substance, nature and outcomes of 
the process (Dugdale, 1999; Innes & Booher, 1999). Who participates and 
the methods used can also affect the nature and outputs of group 
processes (Brodie, 1996; Kuruvilla & Joseph, 1999). Earlier in this chapter, 
research on testing consensus development methods was described in the 
context of clinical guidelines (Hutchings, Raine, Sanderson & Black, 2006); 
such research could be usefully extended to other areas of deliberation in 
health and public policy-making. 
Feminist critiques of deliberative theories, and links with pragmatism 
Fischer (2003) notes that while knowledge and societal discourse are 
critical dimensions of political power, most models of policy-making 
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strangely seem to ignore the deliberative dimension of sociopolitical 
decision-making. He proposes refraining public policy to explicitly 
acknowledge discursive and deliberative power. Fischer draws on 
Habermas's theories of communicative action and 'ideal speech' as 
standards against which political discourse can be evaluated (Fischer, 
2003; Habermas, 1987). He also uses Foucault's (1984) theories of power to 
'anchor discourse' in socio-historical processes, particularly through 
genealogical analyses of the constructs and structures of power that shape 
political discourse and societal action (Fischer 2003). A tension arising 
from those two theoretical perspectives is whether the main objective of 
analysis is improved understanding, better quality and morality of 
political discourse, or changes in societal power structures and the extent 
to which those aims are linked. This tension constitutes a 'problematic 
situation' with respect to deliberation that has been extensively addressed 
in feminist critiques of deliberative theories, particularly as related to 
Habermas' work. 
Seyla Benhabib (1986) developed a fundamental critique against 
Habermas' earlier deliberative theories that were based on a 'universal' 
ethic. Habermas' communicative ethics required participants to ignore 
their individual perspectives, practices and values in order to enter into 
deliberations based on more general principles on which there could be 
wide agreement. This general ethic implied that individual, situated 
perspectives were somehow morally inferior, and were to be less 
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privileged in deliberation. 
Benhabib's critique is aligned with Dewey's views on the importance of 
plural perspectives in moral deliberation (see also Benhabib, S and Fraser, 
N, Eds. (2004). Pragmatism, critique, judgment). Making a similar critique to 
Benhabib's, Shook (2004, pp. 40-41) discusses Dewey's concept of moral 
deliberation in relation to Rawls' and Habermas', 
Habermas believes that if people were allowed to include in discussion 
some appeals to their actually held ethical values and norms, then that 
discussion would be irredeemably distorted away from genuinely 
rational and morally acceptable discourse. But from Dewey's perspective, 
democratic deliberation should primarily concern the diversity of 
respected and pursued social goods and norms. Dewey would obviously 
agree with Habermas that democratic discourse should be free from 
coercion and violence. But Habermas, like Rawls, goes too far in seeking a 
democratic forum that requires a person to suspend or ignore her genuine 
values and norms. Nothing is more deserving of public deliberation than 
our most cherished values. 
Issues related to moral deliberation are further analysed in Chapter 7. 
Another feminist critique of Habermas' work is based on his model of a 
single public (bourgeois) sphere for deliberation. Nancy Fraser (1992) 
disagreed with this depiction and proposed that sociopolitical 
deliberations were conducted by multiple publics, who could be 
characterised as either strong or weak publics (this concept was later taken 
up by Habermas as well c. f. 'Facts and Norms'). Eriksen and Possum 
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(2002) build on Fraser's description of multiple publics, but redefine weak 
publics as general publics, referring to the public sphere where a variety of 
opinions are deliberated on and formed, but not necessarily oriented 
towards, or included in, formal policy-making processes. 
In the context of this discussion, this thesis is specifically focused on 
public policy-making processes, and thus focuses more on the strong 
publics dimension. However, the general publics view is also explicitly 
recognized as interacting with, and influencing, ongoing policy processes, 
for instance as depicted in the permeable boundaries of the Decision Cell 
model, as discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to non-decision-making and 
the need to recognise both systemic and institutional agendas (Brodkin, 
1985; Crenson, 1971), and also as highlighted in Chapter 2 in the 
distinction made between NGOs and CSOs on the basis of the political 
orientation of the latter (Blair, 1997). 
Young (2000; 2001) further develops the idea of multiple publics to 
propose that deliberative and democratic processes cannot be consistently 
identified with a particular policy perspective or institutional context. She 
cautions against the idea that diverse groups can be brought together 
under some pre-existing unifying principle or monolithic understanding 
of political processes. 
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Young also discusses how publics' perspectives change and be 
transformed through deliberation. 
Most proponents of deliberative democracy emphasize that this model 
conceptualizes the process of democratic discussion as not merely 
expressing and registering, but as transforming the preferences, interests, 
beliefs, and judgement of participants (Young, 2000, p. 26). 
That this type of transformation through deliberation occurs in practice is 
borne out by the experience of the MIT Dialogue Project (Isaacs, 1999) and 
in scenario development exercises (Commissariat General du Plan, 2004), 
both of which were discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The transformative nature of deliberation is reflected in Dewey's (1922/ 
2002) definition of the same; which views deliberation as leading to new 
understandings and integrating diverse considerations in a transformative 
manner. Further, Dewey (1954/ 1927) consistently stressed the importance 
of pluralism in societies, both as a reality and as a resource for 
sociopolitical inquiry and deliberation. 
Young (2000; 2001) cautions that in modem, pluralistic societies, the extent 
to which understandings can be shared to satisfactorily resolve conflicts or 
be truly transformative given existing institutional boundaries, cannot be 
taken for granted. These concerns relate to earlier discussions with respect 
to the barriers to participation and deliberation in general. 
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A case can be made for explicitly including gendered perspectives into the 
foundation on which pragmatist understandings of socio-political agency 
are developed (Mahowald, 1997). For instance, Dewey explicitly 
acknowledged Jane Addams as a key influence in his thinking, worked 
with her at Hull House and on various resettlement and education 
projects, and he even named his daughter after her. Mahowald (1997, p. 
44) discussing the influence of Jane Addams on pragmatist philosophy 
notes that: 
Jane Addams educated herself informally through extensive, critical 
reading and through contact with well-respected academics who admired 
her intellectual strengths ... John Dewey described her manuscript of "A 
Modern Lear" [an analysis of the Pullman strike] as "one of the greatest 
things I ever read both as to its form and its ethical philosophy" (Lasch, 
1965, p. 176). After reading The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets, James 
wrote to Addams: "You are not like the rest of us, who seek the truth and 
try to express it. You inhabit reality" (Lasch, 1965, p. 84). Had he framed 
his compliment in pragmatic terms, James might have written: You are 
more of a pragmatist than we because in you the dichotomy between 
theory and action is not simply critiqued but dissolved. 
However, despite acknowledging her influence in his life, Jane Addam's 
writings do not figure prominently in Dewey's work; reflecting perhaps 
the general position of women's writing in academia at the time 
(Mahowald, 1997). Further, it can be seen that Dewey's position on the 
World Wars as the lesser of two evils, was considerably different from that 
of Addams, who thought that war should never be an option in civilised 
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societies (she later became the first American woman to win the Nobel 
Peace Prize, for her activism, political analyses and peace work). 
While updating pragmatism with gendered perspectives of experience is a 
valuable idea, and indeed could quite easily be done (Seigfried, 1996), the 
pragmatist update should not be thus limited. Dewey's emphasis on 
pluralism can be used to integrate diverse and pluralistic practices and 
perspectives on, and in, socio-political deliberations. This view is 
consistent with Amartya Sen's (2006) thesis on identity, where he 
recognises that there are multiple ways in which people define themselves 
and the choices they make, rather than any one definitive categorisation or 
lens; Sen's views on pluralistic identities are further discussed in Chapter 
7. This view is also consistent with that of those feminist scholars who 
recognise that especially in the context of law and politics, inclusion of 
women and gendered perspectives, while important, need not necessarily 
be sufficient to make political processes more attuned to women's 
perspectives and needs. Attention to a diverse range of 'socio-cultural 
practices, perspectives and choices may be more politically useful, even 
for women, than attention to singular 'identities'. Diversities in socio- 
cultural practices cannot be reduced to a single identifying category and 
cannot find adequate protection under such categories, even within 
human rights or anti-discrimination law (Charlesworth & Chinkin, 2000). 
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Overall, pragmatist philosophy and feminist studies are quite compatibly 
aligned. In Pragmatism and feminism: reweaving the social fabric, Charlene 
Haddock Seigfried (1996, p. 21) discusses the past divergence of the social 
sciences from pragmatist philosophy and notes: 
But from my perspective it [pragmatist philosophy] seems to have been 
criticized and eventually relegated to the margins for holding the very 
positions that feminists today would find to be its greatest strengths. 
These include early and persistent criticisms of positivist interpretations 
of scientific methodology; disclosure of the value dimension of factual 
claims; reclaiming aesthetics as informing everyday experience; linking of 
dominant discourses with domination; subordinating logical analysis to 
social, cultural, and political issues; realigning theory with praxis. 
Certainly, Dewey intended that pragmatism would be tested and evolve 
past his time in order to make it relevant to contemporary deliberations; 
this type of socio-political learning being a central tenet of pragmatist 
philosophy. Thus he would have welcomed the challenges, critiques and 
correlations with pragmatist philosophy raised by later feminist studies. 
The Decision Cell: a `good' policy theory? 
It now remains to consider whether the Decision Cell model can make a 
contribution to policy theory, based on criteria set out for 'good policy 
theory' by some leading policy theorists, particularly Lasswell (1951), 
Sabatier (1999) and Fischer (2003). 
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Harold Lasswell (1951) set out four requirements for the development of 
the policy sciences (Fischer, 2003; Sabatier, 1999), against which the 
conceptual model of policy-making presented in this paper can be 
evaluated. These requirements were that theoretical and analytical 
developments in the policy sciences should be: 
1. Multidisciplinary 
2. Problem solving 
3. Explicitly normative, with an emphasis on human dignity 
4. Contextually oriented. 
Sabatier (1999) put forward additional criteria for good policy theory. 
These overlap with Lasswell's criteria, for example, in that policy theory 
should provide normative orientation. In addition, he recommends that 
policy theory should: 
5. Address broad sets of factors that political scientists traditionally 
consider important 
6. Provide causal explanations and be testable or falsifiable. 
A third set of criteria for good policy theory is put forward by Fischer 
(2003) who stresses the need to Reframe Public Policy by incorporating: 
7. Critical theory criteria, wherein policy theory should address 
sources of social inequalities and promote approaches whereby 
those who are not in positions of political power can also influence 
socio-political change. 
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8. 'Post-empiricist' criteria, where post-empiricism is defined as: 
An orientation that seeks to move beyond an 'objectivist' conception of 
reality. Stressing the subjective foundations of social reality, 
postempiricist scholars seek to overcome the objective-subjective dualism 
imposed by 'positivists' or 'neopositivist' epistemological 
doctrines... (Fischer, 2003, p. 12). 
As with the previous sets of criteria for good policy theory, critical 
theories are required to be explanatory, practical and normative. 
Finally, a pragmatist test of a good policy theory would be its: 
9. Value in practice to help understand and guide human experience 
with respect to resolving concrete problematic situations. 
The Decision Cell model is now assessed against these nine criteria to see 
whether it stands up as a good policy theory. 
1. Multidisciplinary 
First, with respect to drawing on multidisciplinary perspectives, the 
development of the Decision Cell model is explicitly multidisciplinary. In 
addition to philosophy and policy science, concepts from other fields, 
including biology, communication, sociology and organisational theory, 
have been analysed to inform the development of the model and elucidate 
related concepts. The model is also multi-disciplinary in that it allows for 
an integrated approach across different levels of disciplinary analysis; for 
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instance, on the roles of individual actors to organizational processes, with 
respect to formal and informal relationships, theories of democratic 
participation and the framing and evaluation of evidence in policy 
making. 
This model could also be considered multidisciplinary from the 
perspective that there is a possibility for different disciplines to see what 
role they play in resolving indeterminate public policy situations. For 
example, researchers may feel more aligned with activities in the 'define' 
or 'realise' phases where the nature of the problem and possible solutions 
are explored or evaluated. Economists and policy analysts would perhaps 
feel more at home with the tasks done in the segments 'define' and 
'design', whereas the central area of deliberation may be a domain where 
lawyers and politicians and civil society groups feel more competent. A 
pragmatist reading of the model, however, would not favour such 
allocations, because this would only serve to further the (mistaken) 
impression of disciplinary boundaries between different segments and 
activity modes. Perhaps an essential message accompanying this model is 
that disciplinary boundaries should matter less than they do currently. 
In dealing with concrete problems, inquiry cannot be separated into 
orderly stages and offices. For instance, both civil society groups and 
economists could have essential contributions to make to what typically 
goes on in the decision mode of 'define'. During the 'realisation' phases of, 
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say, a project in preventative care, understandings developed by social 
scientists, could be as formative of policy implementation as the services 
provided by medical personnel. 
2. Problem-solving 
The second criterion addressed is the focus on problem solving. The 
primary focus of the Decision Cell model is on the resolution of 
problematic situations where a previously successful state of habitual 
equilibrium has been challenged. However, as emphasised earlier, the 
'problem orientation' of the Decision Cell model should not be 
misinterpreted as being initiated by a given problem or fixed end ('end', 
as used here, is a positive formulation of 'problem'). Disequilibrium is not 
quite the same as having a fully defined problem. The central intuition in 
the Decision Cell model is that the definition of problems and ends is itself 
an act of rational agency and that this is an evolving and iterative process 
throughout the policy-making process. 
The specific problem that the development of the Decision Cell model 
itself addressed was the need for an integrative, explanatory and 
normative theory of policy-making. By building on a pragmatist 
foundation on what comprises rational decision-making, the Decision Cell 
model is able to integrate current empirical and theoretical 
understandings on policy-making. 
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3. Normative and based on human dignity 
With respect to the criterion that a good policy theory should be 
normative, the Decision Cell model is, in essence, a normative model of 
policy-making that integrates scientific sense, democratic sensibility and 
moral imagination. Normative orientation for policy-making is also 
provided by Dewey's Ethical Postulate, with an emphasis on human and 
social dignity, where the flourishing of individuals and societies is 
mutually referential and best supported by moral deliberation and moral 
development. Finally, the Decision Cell model provides an overarching 
structure and method to guide evaluation of other normative frameworks, 
as can be seen in Chapter 7. 
4. Contextual orientation 
The final criterion with respect to Lasswell's blueprint for policy science, is 
that of contextual orientation. As described in the first 'pillar of 
pragmatism , the concept of the rhythm of situations is explicitly context- 
specific. This rhythm of situations is the foundation for the entire Decision 
Cell model. A pragmatist concept of rational agency is inseparable from 
the concept of situation. The situation poses the challenge and necessitates 
the formation of agency. In turn, rational agents produce distinctions, such 
as between means and ends, as tools to define and resolve problematic 
situations. 
337 
The category of 'situation' thus provides the context in which concepts, 
norms and strategies are formulated, tested and developed. All strategies 
and all theoretical distinctions applied to a particular situation must be 
interpreted as functions to cope with the challenges posed by that 
particular context. In this sense, the Decision Cell model is definitively 
'context-specific' since it is embedded within the 'rhythm of situations'. 
This contextual orientation extends to considerations of the self and 
society in context, and of situations themselves being embedded in socio- 
historical and environmental contexts. 
5. Addressing contemporary concerns 
Building on Lasswell's criteria, Sabatier (1999) additionally recommends 
that good policy theory should address broad sets of factors that political 
scientists looking at different aspects of policy-making have traditionally 
deemed important. As described in the preceding chapters, the Decision 
Cell model addresses and accommodates current theoretical and empirical 
perspectives, including on policy institutions, networks, agendas, norms 
and change, all of which are traditionally considered important topics in 
policy science. However, this is a very inward looking, or academic, 
criterion. In the pragmatist view this criterion would extend to concerns of 
politicians, bureaucrats and the various publics who are all involved in 
different policy situations. The Decision Cell model does facilitate such a 
holistic and inclusive view on contemporary concerns in public decision- 
making. 
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6. Testability and causality 
Sabatier (1999) also adds the demand, in line with the requirements for 
scientific theories in general, that policy theory includes causal 
explanations that are testable or falsifiable. Dewey's core approach to 
rationality was to integrate precept with practice through the relation of 
causes to consequences (Dewey, 1938/ 1999). The Decision Cell model 
itself can be read as an unfolding causal story of policy-making, initiated 
to resolve challenges to the equilibrium of previously stable policy 
interactions. Rational agency is used to resolve indeterminate situations 
and leads to new learning and further (temporary) equilibrium. 
Additionally, the decision activities in the model, define, design, realise and 
deliberate, are predicated on a 'scientific' method, Dewey's logic of inquiry. 
Thus, policy-making processes and change are described in causal and 
empirically testable terms in the Decision Cell model. Finally, even one of 
the most prescriptive elements of pragmatist philosophy, with respect to 
ethics and moral development, is posed in terms of an Ethical Postulate. 
This postulate is intended to be applied and tested as a guide to resolve 
problematic situations and to support individual and social flourishing. 
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7. Critical theory and social change criteria 
Fischer (2003), drawing on Habermas, Foucault and other theorists of 
deliberative democracy, discusses the need to evaluate policy theory 
against 'critical and social change criteria' (similar criteria were discussed 
in Chapter 5 in relation to research evaluation). These criteria address the 
extent to which policy theory is able to include perspectives of the less 
powerful, identify the need for and strategies of change, have a clear 
historical context and explicitly take into account values and 
consequences. These criteria are key concerns in pragmatist philosophy 
and are explicitly included in the Decision Cell model, for instance in 
highlighting the socio-historical context of situations and the need to 
promote socially intelligent, and inclusive, inquiry. The constructive use of 
power and the importance of ethics in guiding rational agency are further 
normative considerations in the Decision Cell model that address these 
critical and social change criteria. 
8. Postempiricist criteria 
Fischer (2003) also recommends evaluating policy theory and analysis by 
post empiricist criteria, highlighting the need to go beyond reductionist, 
positivist analyses and trying to find unitary metrics and explanations of 
policy problems and situations. Instead Fischer stresses the need to 
appreciate pluralistic, 'subjective' perspectives that construct social 
realities, which may not be as easily measurable. 
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The pragmatist approach of integrating inquiry into concrete problematic 
situations with pluralistic perspectives and moral deliberation, is aligned 
with this post-empiricist view. As described in the pragmatist pillar of 'via 
media (in Chapter 3), Dewey described situations as comprising both 
existential and interpretational, or functional, dimensions (i. e. both 
'objective' and 'subjective' qualities). Pragmatism thus also goes beyond 
'technical rationality' to emphasise the importance of imagination, 
emotions and empathy to guide rational agency. However, Dewey 
emphasised the value of both empirical inquiry and 'post-empirical' 
intuitions as part of an integrated approach to developing and guiding 
rational agency. Therefore, rather than 'postempiricist', perhaps 'supra- 
empiricist' would be a more appropriate term to describe the pragmatist 
approach that is reflected in the Decision Cell model. 
9. Pragmatist test of theory in practice 
While the Decision Cell model stands up well against these policy science 
criteria for good policy theory, the most important pragmatist test of 
theory is its value as a both a practical 'tool' and guide; in the sense that it 
can be used to resolve concrete problematic situations and further develop 
knowledge. 
The Decision Cell model, in order to meet this pragmatist criterion, must 
be applied and tested in practice. The theory also needs to be open to 
revision and refinement; in this respect through the course of this PhD, the 
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Decision Cell model has gone through several iterations, made with 
reference to ongoing reading and new insights on policy theory and 
pragmatist philosophy, and based on feedback on the emerging concepts 
from peer reviewers, colleagues and thesis committee members. Thus the 
Decision Cell model has passed through a process of criticism and 
refinement, and has a certain theoretical robustness. With respect to 
contributing to academic discourse, and facilitating a better understanding 
of policy-making, the feedback, including that from peer reviewers and 
colleagues, has been largely positive. 
However, evaluating the utilisation and utility of this policy theory in the 
practice of policy-making, poses a considerable challenge. For example, 
applying this theory in practice or analysis would require funding to 
undertake such a project and/or a cooperative and interested policy 
agency and community. While there are no definitive answers that can be 
provided here as to how this practical challenge may be tackled, getting 
the Decision Cell model into the policy science literature seems a good 
starting point with respect to its eventual utilisation and evaluation. 
This chapter has only evaluated the Decision Cell model in relation to 
selected criteria for policy theory. Chapter 7 compares this model with 
other normative frameworks for health policy and Chapter 8 concludes 
with a detailed assessment of the potential advantages and challenges that 
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may be faced in using the Decision Cell model and the pragmatist 
approach to rational policy-making. 
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Comparing norms and ethics for health policy 
Morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. Morals means growth 
of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion of meaning which 
is consequent upon observation of the conditions and outcome of conduct. 
John Dewey, 1922, Human Nature and Conduct 
Though justice be thy plea, consider this, 
That, in the course of justice, none of us 
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy; 
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render 
The deeds of mercy. 
William Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I 
In this chapter the Decision Cell model will be compared with selected 
normative frameworks related to health policy. The aim here is not to 
provide an exhaustive review or comparative analysis of these 
frameworks; instead, the idea is to examine different normative 
frameworks in light of pragmatist rationality. This will help ascertain the 
way in which the Decision Cell model can 'enter into a dialogue' with 
other normative frameworks and to analyse how norms can be evaluated 
using pragmatist criteria to guide and orient health policy. 
Potentially, any normative frameworks related to health policy could have 
been used in this discussion. In the interest of honing the scope and focus 
of this chapter though, the following six frameworks were selected - based 
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on their relevance to health policy as well as correspondence to, not 
necessarily agreement with, the pragmatist concepts discussed in this 
thesis. These selected normative frameworks, while not usually referred to 
as frameworks per se, are termed as such in this discussion for simplicity, 
as they cover a range of normative codes, accounts, models, frameworks 
and ethics for health policy: 
i. Accountability for Reasonableness (Daniels & Sabin, 1998), a normative 
framework that draws on Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. 
ii. The Capability and Health Account (Ruger, 2006), a relatively recent 
framework is based on Sens and Nussbaum's Capability Approach. 
iii. The Ethics Framework for Public Health (Kass, 2001), developed to 
address ethical concerns specific to public health, particularly to 
address the tensions between population-based health interventions 
and their effects on individual autonomy. 
iv. The Good Decision Criteria, based on a review of the literature on 
decision-making and developed in the context of environmental policy 
(Dietz, 2003). 
v. Human Rights standards, as set out in treaties ratified in international 
law (UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007), focusing on standards related to 
participation and accountability in public affairs. 
vi. Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century, a framework 
of competencies developed by the UK Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office, 
1999). A related, independent analysis of policy-making processes in 
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the Department of Health (DH) is also considered in this discussion 
(Alvarez-Rosete, 2005). 
Summaries of six normative frameworks for health policy 
a. Accountability for Reasonableness 
The Accountability for Reasonableness framework is one of the more 
well-known frameworks in the health policy literature. This framework 
was developed by Norman Daniels, a philosopher, and James Sabin, a 
physician, in the context of analysing The Ethics Of Accountability In 
Managed Care Reform (Daniels & Sabin, 1998). This framework was 
conceived as a meeting point between theoretical concepts of justice, 
particularly with respect to Rawls' (1971/ 1999) Theory of Justice as 
fairness, and concrete concerns about the design of health systems and the 
equity of health services. Indeed, Rawls (1985) had also emphasised that 
his conception of justice was both political and practical. 
Rawls (1971/ 1999) based his theory of justice on the original position, 
which was a reference point that could be used to justify, or account for, 
institutional and policy arrangements. The 'original position' was a 
hypothetical scenario, or 'thought experiment', wherein individuals 
entered into a socio-political contract behind a 'veil of ignorance'. This veil 
precluded knowledge of individuals' social or economic success. Rawls 
(1971/ 1999) posited that from this original position, the only rational 
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choice, or contract, that individuals could make was in favour of a fair 
system that allowed the maximising of the greatest benefit for the least 
advantaged. 
Rawls' (1985, p. 227) theory of justice as fairness operates on two key 
principles. First the equality of liberty principle states that "each person has 
an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties" and that these liberties should be extended to everyone. The 
difference principle states that "social and economic inequalities are to 
satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, 
they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society". The second condition is also referred to as the Maximin principle, 
where ensuring the greatest amount of benefit to the least well off in 
society should be the guiding tenet of public decision-making. These 
principles are lexically ordered, that is that the second principle follows 
from the first and there can be no trade-offs. 
Rawls' concept of equality of opportunity underpins the Accountability for 
Reasonableness framework (Daniels, 2001). This principle prohibits 
discriminatory barriers in access to offices and positions in society, and 
promotes measures to address opportunity inequities, such as those that 
arise through lack of education, socio-economic inequalities and ill-health. 
Daniels (2001) sees health care as supporting normal functioning and thus 
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enabling access to opportunities, but he also recognises the influence of 
wider social determinants of health. Addressing inequities related to the 
social determinants of health requires addressing the fairness or justice of 
related social and economic policies. Fair process in developing policies is, 
therefore, one of the main rationales for the Accountability for 
Reasonableness framework. 
Accountability for Reasonableness has been applied and evaluated in a 
range of health care settings to guide and assess decision-making; for 
example - to compare health care priority setting methods (Gibson, 
Mitton, Martin, Donaldson & Singer, 2006), discuss strengthening 
consumer voice in health care decision-making (Sabin & Daniels, 2001), 
analyse contested treatment decisions (McIver & Ham, 2000) and to 
develop benchmarks of fairness to evaluate proposals for health systems 
reform in both industrialised countries (Daniels, Light & Caplan, 1996) 
and developing economies (Daniels, Flores, Supasit, Ndumbe et al., 2005). 
These analyses yielded recommendations in the form of modifications to 
the Accountability for Reasonableness framework; these will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
The Accountability for Reasonableness framework sets out four conditions 
to help ensure fairness, legitimacy and accountability for reasonableness, 
in health care decision-making. 
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  Publicity condition - information on decisions and their 
rationales should be made publicly available. 
  Relevance condition - the rationales on which decisions are 
based should be ones that all 'fair-minded parties' can agree are 
relevant. 
  Appeals condition - there should be available mechanisms to 
challenge and dispute decisions. 
  Enforcement condition - voluntary or public regulation for the 
first three conditions should be in place. 
As this framework is based on concept of distributive justice and fairness, 
there is an overarching assertion that "costs matter" with respect to cost- 
savings, cost-effectiveness and fairness in health care resource allocation 
(Daniels & Sabin, 1998, p. 53). 
b. Capability and Health Account 
The Capability and Health Account was developed by Jennifer Ruger 
(2006), based on the philosophical foundation of Amartya Sen 's Capability 
Approach and Martha Nussbaum's related work that draws on Aristotle's 
political philosophy. 
Nussbaum and Sen (1993, p. 1) introduce their edited book Quality of Life, 
with a story from Dickens' Hard Times. In response to the schoolmaster's 
question of whether "fifty millions of money" would make a prosperous 
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nation, Sissy Jupe had no easy answer. She thought it would depend on 
who had the money, and whether any of it was hers; this, however, was 
not the approved answer. 
The Capability Approach similarly includes considerations of 'who has 
what', but goes beyond this to ask 'what they do' and 'are' and 'want to 
be', the freedom they have to make these choices and the 'functionings' 
and 'capabilities' they have to realise them (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). 
Functionings represent parts of the state of a person - in particular the 
various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The 
capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings 
the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one 
collection. The approach is based on a view of living as a combination of 
various 'doings and beings', with the quality of life to be assessed in 
terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings (Sen, 1993, p. 31). 
Sen (1993, p. 30) makes a link between the Capability Approach and the 
Aristotelian concept of dunamin that was used "to discuss an aspect of the 
human good, which is sometimes translated as 'potentiality' and can be 
translated also as'capability of existing or acting... " He also 
acknowledges Martha Nussbaum s role in'illuminating' and developing 
this connection. Another Aristotelian principle, key to the Capability 
Health Account, is that of proportionality, whereby like cases should be 
treated similarly and unlike cases treated differently in proportion to their 
difference. " (Ruger, 2006, p. 142). 
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There are some differences between Nussbaum's and Sen's approaches to 
capabilities. Clark (2005) points out that Nussbaum draws on Aristotle's 
work to develop a list of 'central human capabilities' that include bodily 
health, emotions and political and material control over one's environment. Here 
Sen 's work diverges from Nussbaum's, as he does not value, or validate, 
developing a predetermined, theoretical list of capabilities (Clark, 2005, p. 
7). Sen thought that such decisions should emerge from public reasoning 
and deliberation in specific contexts. 
The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting 
on one predetermined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists 
without any general social discussion or public reasoning. 
The Capability Health Account transposes the Capability Approach to 
health care and comprises six key principles (Ruger, 2006): 
  Health capability ties in with health agency, which is individuals' 
ability to work toward health goals they value and health norms that 
influence agents' values and behaviour (Ruger, 2007). More than 
seeking end-state utilities or goals, such as 'health' and 'equity', health 
services should focus on promoting individuals' capabilities to attain 
the same, in order to support ongoing human flourishing and 
wellbeing. 
  Basic capabilities to avoid premature death and to avoid escapable 
morbidity should be prioritised above 'secondary capabilities' in 
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health care decision-making (what comprises secondary capabilities is 
not defined). Here Ruger (2006) is more aligned with Nussbaum's 
approach than with Sen 's approach (as earlier discussed), in making an 
a priori distinction, or prioritisation, of health capabilities. 
 A joint scientific and deliberative approach should be used to judge 
the value of health care interventions with regards to capabilities and 
health. 
  Shared concepts of capability should be used to make decisions for 
individuals and societies, and practical models of agreement or 
consensus used to resolve conflict. 
  Shared health governance should include equal access to "high- 
quality health care". Responsibilities should be shared in building 
capabilities and achieving health goals between the state, institutions 
and individuals. It is therefore not enough to provide health care 
without also expanding health agency and capabilities to participate in 
governance. 
  Costs and equity considerations should be needs-based, 
Cases should be considered alike if they have the same health need and 
unlike if they have different health needs... further, healthcare must be 
medically necessary and medically appropriate. This theory supports the 
allocation of resources to those with health needs in efforts to bring them 
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as close as possible to a threshold level of functioning as their 
circumstances permit. Thus, the quality of health care provided to all 
should be measured by its ability to address the functional impairment 
arising from injury or illness" (Ruger, 2006, p. 142). 
This principle resembles utilitarian welfare economics, in valuing 
costs and outcomes, but it additionally includes equity considerations. 
A priori weightings should not be used, for example with regard to 
disability, as these factors should be evaluated at individual and 
policy levels based on medical necessity, appropriateness and futility. 
c. Ethics Framework for Public Health 
Nancy Kass (2001) develops the Ethics Framework for Public Health to 
address a gap in bioethics, where the primary focus has been on medical 
care and human research, and on prioritising individuals' autonomy in 
these contexts. With public health aimed at societal, rather than 
individual, health interventions and effects, Kass makes the case for a 
specific ethics of public health. A '6-step' framework is set out to help 
public health professionals think through the ethical implications of policy 
proposals, public health research and programmes. 
  1. What are the public health goals of the proposed program? Social 
programmes can have a range of potential benefits, for example 
promoting literacy, reducing social inequalities and improving access 
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to health care. In this framework, unless programs explicitly contribute 
to the "combined goal of the reduction of morbidity and mortality" 
(Kass, 2001, p. 1778), either individually or as part of a larger initiative, 
they cannot be considered as public health programmes. 
  2. How effective is the program in achieving its stated goals? This 
ethical consideration focuses on ascertaining the validity of the 
assumptions underlying public health strategies and interventions. The 
level of evidence supporting program strategies and generated in, 
program evaluations, also needs to be considered. 
As a rule of thumb, the greater the burdens posed by a program - for 
example, in terms of cost, constraint of liberty, or targeting particular, 
already vulnerable segments of the population - the stronger the 
evidence must be to demonstrate that the program will achieve its goals 
(Kass, 2001, pp. 1778-1779). 
Programs should be stopped, or modified, if they do not meet their 
goals. 
  3. What are the known or potential burdens of the program? Ethical 
burdens will vary based on who benefits and how; for example, as 
relates to partner notification programmes in tuberculosis control or in 
'paternalistic' programmes, such as those for seat-belt enforcement. 
There are three broad categories of possible burden, or harm, related to 
public health activities (Kass, 2001, p. 1779): 
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i) risks to privacy and confidentiality, especially in data collection 
activities; 
ii) risks to liberty and self-determination, given the power accorded public 
health authorities to enact almost any measure necessary to contain 
disease and 
iii) risks to justice, if public health practitioners propose targeting public 
health interventions only to certain groups, for example, "certain 
populations are disproportionately disadvantaged or privileged 
through research participation" (Kass, 2001, p. 1780). 
  4. Can burdens be minimised? Are there alternative approaches? If 
potential risks or burdens are identified in step 3, there is an ethical 
responsibility to minimise them. If there are two relatively comparable 
approaches, the one that poses fewer risks with respect to moral 
considerations - such as privacy, liberty and justice - should be 
chosen. 
  5. Is the program implemented fairly? Distributive justice is a key 
ethical concern in public health. Considerations include the extent to 
which individuals and communities are aware of the public health 
risks they face, whether new vulnerabilities or risks are created 
through the intervention, and the resources available to mitigate these 
risks. Kass (2001) discusses a range of different approaches that are 
used to address distributive justice in public health: Rawls' allocation 
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of resources to benefit the least well-off; and Daniels' emphasis on 
enabling an equal level of functioning to facilitate equal access to 
opportunities in society. In addition, Kass discusses that there are also 
approaches that make a distinction between situations where 
intervention is owed, because of past or present unfair social practice, 
and other situations where misfortune is considered 'just 
circumstantial' and there is no moral obligation to intervene. 
  6. How can the benefits and burdens of a program be fairly 
balanced? The final step in the Ethics Framework for Public Health is 
based on due diligence with respect to the preceding five steps. Given 
that there are pluralistic values and perspectives in society, there will 
inevitably be differences in interpreting public health benefits and 
burdens. A democratic process should be employed to understand and 
resolve differences, and to consider cases of dissent. The norms and 
criteria that guide democratic processes may vary across contexts, and 
procedures should be appropriate to the context in which they take 
place. 
d. The Good Decision Criteria 
The Good Decision Criteria, identified by Dietz (2003) in the context of 
environmental policy, is based on a review of the literature associated 
with what constitutes good decision-making. Interdisciplinary linkages 
between the health and environmental sectors are increasingly recognised 
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(Kuruvilla, Mays, Pleasant & Walt, 2006; Wright, Parry & Scully, 2005); 
therefore, it seems apposite to discuss this normative framework here. 
This framework explicitly references Dewey in the criteria developed and 
also draws on the work of other philosophers, including Popper and 
Habermas. Dietz (2003) proposes six criteria of good decision-making. 
  Human and environmental wellbeing - decisions about the 
environment should aim to achieve some balance between human 
wellbeing and the wellbeing of the biophysical environment, including 
that of other species. 
  Competence about facts and values - methods of making decisions 
should be competent with regard to dealing with both uncertain 
science and uncertain values. Methods should also support dealing 
with complex, adaptive and indeterminate systems, such as those in 
the social and environmental sciences. 
  Fairness in process and outcome - all those who have an interest in, or 
are affected by a decision, should have a say in that decision. There 
should be procedural fairness in which all arguments should have 
equal chance to persuade as well as fairness of outcomes, including 
with respect to minority groups. 
  Relying on human strengths rather than weaknesses - human 
intelligence is a social or linguistic intelligence based on pattern 
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recognition, language processing and learning from each other in 
discussion. Decision methods need to build on these strengths, but 
they also need to be supplemented by methods to filter distorted 
communication, including in advertisements, 'sound bites' and 
political rhetoric. Other tools can help deal with tasks such as complex 
algebraic calculations. 
  Chance to learn - good decision processes should involve both 
individual and social learning within a process and over time, and 
learning should evolve, including with respect to reflection on values. 
  Efficiency - good decision-making should use resources as efficiently 
as possible. However, care must be taken not to assume that economic 
measures or market mechanisms can alone address efficient resource 
use. Efficiency has to be taken into account in the context of other, not 
as easily measurable, factors such as values, including equity, and 
norms. 
We should not let "bad numbers drive out good paragraphs" or even let 
good numbers displace what can only be expressed qualitatively (Dietz, 
2003, p. 36). 
e. Human Rights 
The Human Rights framework has had a longer history and wider scope 
of application than any of the other frameworks discussed in this chapter. 
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There are differing accounts as to the origin and evolution of Human 
Rights thinking and Edmundson (2004) provides an instructive 
introduction. Human rights were not explicitly referred to before the 
Enlightenment and its associated rebellions against monarchy, aristocracy 
and the subsequent recognition of individuals' dignity and 
acknowledgement of their right to participate in decisions that affected 
their lives. Since then, there have been two main periods when human 
rights discourse was particularly prevalent. The first period was in the 
latter part of the 18th century, linked to the American Declaration of 
Independence and the French Revolution. The second period was in the 
mid-20th century, in the aftermath of the Second World War and linked to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
There have been heated debates about the extent to which such rights are 
universal and inalienable versus the product of socio-political reactions 
and developments (Edmundson, 2004). Bentham held the latter view, as 
he made plain in a commentary on the instability of rights in the evolution 
of the French Declaration (Edmundson, 2004, pp. 52-53). 
Compare the list of rights, whoever they belong to, whether to the man 
and the citizen, or the man in society, we shall find, that between the year 
1791 and the year 1795, inalienable as they are, they have undergone a 
change. Indeed, for a set of inalienable rights they must be acknowledged 
to have been rather unstable. In 1791, there were but two of them - liberty 
and equality. By the time the second article of [the 1791] declaration was 
framed, three new ones had started up... viz. property, security, and 
resistance to oppression: total, four... not five; for in the same interval an 
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accident had happened to equality, and somehow or other it was not to be 
found. 
However, human rights, founded on the idea of individual rights and 
human dignity, were seen as a welcome alternative to Bentham's 
utilitarianism where individuals were but a means to some aggregate 
social utility. Other contending views also exist, for example, human 
rights have been seen by some as a cultural and political imposition by 
Western industrialised nations. Others, including Amartya Sen, have 
argued that there are analogous concepts in Eastern cultures and 
developing economies, both historically and as current concerns 
(Edmundson, 2004). 
International human rights treaties were widely ratified despite their 
content running against the ethos and practice in some countries; this has 
been attributed to the lack of foreseeable enforcement of such a regime 
(Falk, 1999). Human rights, however, provided civil society groups 
(including those in communist states and developing countries) with a 
platform on which to hold governments accountable; in particular, they 
provided validation and backing for change toward more democratic 
systems of governance. States can also hold each other accountable for 
human rights violations, for example, by 'naming and shaming', by 
withdrawing development aid, by imposing sanctions, or by withholding 
membership of international unions, as is currently the case with respect 
to deliberations on Turkey's entry to the European Union or of Zimbabwe 
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in the British Commonwealth. Over the years, human rights concepts have 
entered the lingua franca of global politics. There are now Human Rights 
related to topics as diverse as the environment, health and the treatment of 
prisoners of war. 
It is no longer possible to clearly identify one clear philosophy of human 
rights to which all groups subscribe. Nevertheless, Human Rights treaties 
have been ratified by a majority of countries and were developed through 
deliberations across governments, academia and civil society groups 
(UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007). For instance, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) evolved through wide-ranging deliberations with UNICEF, 
governments, academics and child rights groups, over a 60-year period 
and is now the most widely ratified international treaty (Child Rights 
Information Network (CRIN), 2007). The CRC has been signed by all 
countries (192 countries) except the US and Somalia. The US has its own 
human rights legislation in the Bill of Rights and has since signed the 
optional protocols to the CRC. Somalia, due to governmental instability, 
has not been in a position to ratify international treaties, but political 
parties there are amenable to signing the treaty when this situation 
changes. 
Under the human rights system, countries are required to regularly 
submit reports to UN Human Rights Committees, comprised of 
independent and internationally recognised experts. For each country, 
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separate reports may be filed by national governments, international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations to provide the 
committee with alternative views on the human rights situation in the 
country. Committees make an assessment of the country's policies and 
programmes with respect to progress on meeting the state's human rights 
obligations. Policy issues and outcomes considerably vary across contexts. 
The human rights monitoring and reporting process itself is still evolving, 
for example, through treaty body reform. For instance, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child requires that the Committee meets once a year, but 
"the CRC became a victim of its success in terms of the volume of work 
and backlog that resulted" (personal communication, NGO Committee for 
the CRC). To address these issues, the Committee has met thrice a year 
since 1995 20. In 2003, the Committee was expanded to 18 members and 
since October 2004 has met in two chambers to divide the workload 21. 
Each session of the Committee comprises a three-week scrutiny period 
with an additional week for the pre-session working groups. These 
changes have significantly helped in dealing with the workload of the 
CRC Committee. 
There are international human rights treaties on civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, including the Convention of the Rights of the 
20 Report of the 5th session of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. A/49/41 
21 CRC/C/118,30th Session, May 2002. Recommendation: Committee to work in two 
chambers. 
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Child, discussed earlier. Across these treaties, human rights standards that 
are linked to policy-making, particularly with respect to participation and 
accountability in public affairs include22: 
  Right to participate in public affairs - the basis for governance should 
be the will of the people, ascertained through genuine, universal, equal 
suffrage, as well as through representation. This right also includes the 
right to hold public office, equal access to public services, participation 
in cultural activities and in non-governmental and international 
organisations' work, with special provisions made for the participation 
of vulnerable groups such as migrant workers and children. 
  Right to self-determination - people have the right to freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development, both within their own country and with respect 
to other countries. 
22 Based on an explication and synthesis of human rights standards related to 
participation and accountability in public affairs, drawn from six core international 
human rights treaties: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), 1965; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), 1966; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
1966; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), 1979; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989; International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (ICRMW), 1990. As described in Chapter 1, this explication and synthesis of 
human rights standards, currently a draft working paper, was developed during this 
thesis in collaboration with Amarjit Singh from the Law Department at LSE. 
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  Freedom of expression and access to public information - this is a 
right for individuals to hold and communicate opinions, have full 
access to public information that may affect the exercise of a right, 
including mass media resources that should be made accessible to 
different groups, and international cooperation in the production, 
exchange and dissemination of information related to rights. 
  Freedom of assembly and association - individuals have the right to 
form associations and to strike, but cannot be compelled to belong to 
any association and no organisation should incite racial discrimination. 
  Right to remedy - competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities should provide and enforce effective remedies for acts that 
violate human rights. 
  Access to competent, independent and impartial tribunals - 
individuals should have access to competent, impartial, independent 
tribunals established by law, including the right to public hearings and 
judgements that are made public, except when restrictions are in effect 
(restrictions are detailed in a following point). 
  Right of non-discrimination - an overarching human right to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights without distinction of any kind, such as 
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race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Key principles that guide the implementation of the Human Rights 
framework are: 
  Circumstances where rights may be restricted - In certain 
circumstances, rights may be restricted, as provided by law, to respect 
the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national 
security or of public order, public health or morals. 
  Progressive realisation of rights - "The international code of human 
rights recognizes that many human rights will be realized 
progressively and are subject to the availability of resources" 
(OHCHR, 2004, p. 22). However, even if resources are limited, there is 
nevertheless an obligation on states to use all appropriate means and 
maximum available resources to ensure the realisation of rights in a 
progressive manner, by states individually and through international 
assistance. 
Non-regression - Any deliberately retrogressive measures require the 
most careful consideration and need to be fully justified with reference 
to the totality of the rights provided for, and with respect to the full use 
of maximum available resources. 
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  Margin of discretion - States can determine the manner in which they 
fulfil their human rights obligations, within the context of the political, 
economic, religious, cultural and other characteristics of the state. 
Nevertheless, the state remains under a duty to act and is accountable 
to the international community for its implementation of this 
obligation. 
" Interdependence of rights - There are a range of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural human rights, including the right to 
participate in public affairs and the right to health. No single right is 
absolute or takes precedence over another; rights overlap in their 
scope, and are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Steiner & 
Alston, 2000). 
  Typology of obligation - With regards to human rights, states 
have different dimensions of obligation that include the duty to 
respect, protect, and fulfil/ promote the rights of its citizens. This 
implies respecting citizens' practice of their rights without 
interference, protecting the exercise of these rights from 
interference external to the individual, and to promote the 
development and ultimate realisation of these rights. 
f. Professional Policy Making 
The Professional Policy Making framework was published by the UK 
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government in a report titled, Professional Policy Making for the 21st Century 
(Cabinet Office, 1999). This framework was developed through a process 
of peer consultation, literature review and by building a descriptive model 
of policy-making. This model was also used to audit practice in different 
government departments, including the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the Department of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food and the Office of Science and Technology. An independent analysis 
was conducted to test the model using selected case studies in the 
Department of Health and highlighted challenges faced in implementing 
this framework (Alvarez-Rosete, 2005). 
The Professional Policy Making framework puts forward three 'themes' to 
characterise effective policy-making: vision, effectiveness and continuous 
improvement. There are also four concentric spheres of policy activity. The 
inner sphere is the policy process, which is situated within an organisational 
context, a political context and a wider public context. 
There are 'nine core competencies' identified as good practice for 
professional policy-making. 
  Forward looking - takes a long-term view, based on statistical 
trends and informed predictions, of the likely impact of policy. 
  Outward looking - accounts for factors in the national, European 
and international situation and communicates policy effectively. 
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  Innovative and creative - questions established ways of acting 
and encourage new ideas. 
" Evidence based - uses the best available evidence from a wide 
range of sources and involving key stakeholders at an early stage. 
  Inclusive - ascertains the impact of policies on the needs of all 
those directly or indirectly affected by the policy. 
  Joined up - looks beyond institutional boundaries to the 
government's overall strategic objectives. 
  Evaluation - conducts systematic evaluation of early outcomes of 
the policy. 
  Reviews - keeps established policy under review to ensure it 
continues to deal with the problems it was designed to tackle, 
taking account of associated effects elsewhere. 
  Learns lessons - learns from experience of what works and what 
does not. 
A pragmatist analysis of normative frameworks for policy-making 
The normative frameworks summarised above are now analysed with 
respect to the key components of the Decision Cell model. It is worth 
clarifying here, that a detailed critique of the selected frameworks is not 
what this chapter sets out to do; there are volumes of analyses in the 
literature serving this function. The function of the analysis in this chapter 
is to ascertain how the Decision Cell model can be used to analyse 
normative frameworks for policy-making, given that the core of the model 
369 
includes deliberation on norms. Areas of commonality between the 
selected frameworks are evident from the summaries above. The 
integrative capacity of the Decision Cell model allows for such an 
integrated discussion of these frameworks. 
The discussion regarding normative frameworks for health policy is 
structured according to six main components of the Decision Cell model: 
i. The interdependence and rhythm of situations as a template for 
rational agency. 
ii. Individual and societal capacities for rational agency and public policy 
participation. 
iii. Decision activities of define, design, realise and deliberation. 
iv. Moral orientation, vis-ä-vis the Ethical Postulate, and moral 
development. 
v. Operational links, including associated methods and mechanisms. 
vi. Managing the paradox of coordinating change and instituting learning. 
I. The interdependence and rhythm of situations 
In the Decision Cell model, the rhythm of situations is the template for 
rational agency. This is an alternative to means-ends rationality, where 
ends and problems are given or fixed (as are constraints) and means are 
then employed to reach these ends, be they good or bad. In the pragmatist 
approach, situations are often modelled according to human beings acting 
and transacting in habitual ways amongst themselves; for example, in 
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economic and cultural transactions, and within physical and socio- 
political environments. Habitual interactions are formed based on 
previous experiences and learning. Situations in the pragmatist view are 
thus characterised by interdependence on ecological, socio-economic and 
socio-historical dimensions, among others. 
When there is there is a disruption of functional, habitual activity - 
disequilibrium arises. This necessitates a shift from habitual to intentional 
activity to resolve the indeterminate situation. To aid this resolution 
methods of pragmatist rationality that can be used are inquiry and moral 
deliberation. Equilibrium is restored when diverse desires are evaluated in 
imagination and unified in action, resulting in a transformed situation, as 
described in Dewey' (1922/ 2002) definition of rationality. In the process, 
both agents and their environments change internally, externally or 
mutually. With change and new experience, new habits are instituted and 
contribute to new, transformed situations of dynamic equilibrium. 
First, with respect to recognising the interdependent nature of agents and 
environments, the Good Decision Criteria framework (Dietz, 2003) 
emphasises the need to achieve a balance between human well being and 
the well being of the biophysical environment, and between policy and 
project demands and natural resource scarcity. A similar claim can be 
made with reference to the principle of the interdependence of human rights 
(Steiner & Alston, 2000). Interdependence of rights means that the right to 
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participation in public affairs is linked to the right to health and to the 
rights to a safe and healthy environment and sustainable development. 
Rights cannot be traded-off against each other and they are considered to 
be equal and interlinked. The Capability Health Account recognises the 
importance of environmental factors on health, including of 'public 
goods', such as clean air and water (Ruger, 2006). 
The UK government's Professional Policy-Making framework (Cabinet 
Office, 1999) recognises the need for government to be outward looking and 
joined up, but these criteria seem to refer more to boundaries between 
policy institutions, rather than a more holistic joining up, for instance with 
respect to the environment. The recent 'greening' in the UK government, 
with some politicians wanting to be seen cycling to work etc., could lead 
to some changes in this respect. 
There is growing awareness, research and evidence on the linkages 
between health and ecological factors; for example, on the links between 
heat waves, morbidity and mortality and the need for a mulitsectoral 
policy response (German Weather Service (DWD), London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & WHO/Europe, 2004), as detailed in an 
earlier example. Normative frameworks in health policy-making would 
do well, therefore, to include considerations of ecological interdependence 
that may extend beyond institutional jurisdictions. 
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Many of the frameworks make an effort to acknowledge that economic 
resources are limited and that resource allocation is a key concern in 
policy-making; specifically, more resources to one area or group may 
mean less for another. Efficient and ethical ways of resource distribution 
are therefore a key concern. In some of the frameworks, economic 
considerations are explicit categories, covering issues of cost-efficiency, 
distributive justice and proportionality in the allocation of resources 
(Daniels & Sabin, 1998; Dietz, 2003; Ruger, 2006). In other frameworks, 
economic considerations are part of other categories. For example, in the 
Professional Policy Making Framework (Cabinet Office, 1999), the use of 
'evidence' includes using evidence on the "costings of policy options and 
the results of economic or statistical modelling" (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 
7.1). A key principle guiding Human Rights implementation is the 
progressive realisation of rights where it is recognised that the realisation of 
rights is subject to the availability resources (OHCHR, 2004). However, 
this principle also requires that maximum available resources be 
dedicated to ensuring progress towards the realisation of rights. 
Recognising the socio historical interdependence of situations is also 
important in pragmatist agency. This consideration is covered in the 
selected frameworks to the extent that they explicitly include analyses of, 
and address, causes of social injustice (Kass, 2001; UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007) 
or include foresight, learning and improvement as part of the decision- 
making process (Cabinet Office, 1999; Dietz, 2003). Daniels and Sabin 
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(1998, p. 58) assert that "meeting the four conditions [of Accountability for 
Reasonableness] converts accountability into a process of interactive 
education among all parties. " 
With respect to the rhythm of situations, to some extent, all six normative 
frameworks could be interpreted as being responses to indeterminate 
situations; for example, as related to inequity and injustice, threats to 
individuals' autonomy and rights, and the need for better health 
capabilities. The Good Decision framework (Dietz, 2003), explicitly 
mentions that causal pathways are usually unknown in complex social 
interventions, which is aligned with the concept of an indeterminate 
situation. Similarly, the Professional Policy Making framework includes 
considerations of finding out what the problems are, developing 
alternative scenarios and analysing trends (Cabinet Office, 1999). Other 
frameworks do recognise that there may be plurality of perspectives and 
conflicts of interests and moral values, and stress the need for deliberation 
to resolve these conflicts (Daniels & Sabin, 1998; Kass, 2001; Ruger, 2006). 
However, there is a sense across most of the frameworks that both the 
problems are known or 'given ,a priori, and that solutions are available; 
for instance, inequity requiring fair process or poor health status requiring 
improved health capabilities. Despite this seeming assurance, there is no 
sense of imminent, or even potential, resolution of these problems. On the 
contrary, resolution seems distant, and even unattainable, in light of 
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overwhelming goals such as equality, justice and health, not least because 
these goals themselves need clarification. 
The closest the frameworks come to being aligned with a rhythm of 
situations is in the discussions of 'cases', where with respect to a particular 
case, problems may be defined, solutions tested, learning developed and 
the case resolved. With respect to a specific case, it may even be possible 
that goals are achieved; for example, all those involved in a particular case 
may agree that justice was done in this instance. 
However, in general, there is a danger that the a priori norms and goals set 
out in these frameworks could themselves become fixed ends, which are 
antithetical to the pragmatist construction of rational agency. Dewey 
(1939/ 1989a) noted that with the scientific 'enlightenment' and 
technological advancement, ideas of authoritarian edicts and 
deontological moral ends were replaced with ideas of rights, goods and 
justice. This change, ironically, created new standards that became as 
'fixed' and 'categorical' as those in any ancient moral regime. 
In modern government, the increasing specialisation of policy institutions, 
for example a Ministry of Health, further entrenches this idea of 
predefined goals and outcomes that policy institutions have to achieve; 
this prejudges the situation. There is thus a danger that normative goals 
and ends, as in linear, means-ends rationality, will not be subject to 
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rational deliberation. Nussbaum and Sen (1993), propose capabilities as an 
alternative goal to end-state utilities such as health, justice and equity; 
however, here too people may not always have a clear idea of what they 
want to do or be, or of what 'functionalities' they need to get there. If 
public services were to be directed to support the building of human 
capabilities, it seems to be a prudent and ethical approach to do so on the 
basis of rational deliberation in specific situations, as described by Irwin 
(2001) in the localised model of socio-political deliberation (discussed in 
Chapter 3). Further, as situations comprise a range of actors' intentions, 
interactions and valuations with respect to particular situations, there is 
always a plurality of perspectives that may also continually change with 
situations, requiring different or evolving capabilities. 
Dewey did see value in the "general notions of health, disease, justice, 
artistic culture", but only as "tools of inquiry into the individual case and 
with methods of forecasting a method of dealing with it. " (Dewey, 1920/ 
1999, p. MW. 12.176). The application and development of moral concepts 
and norms with respect to a particular situation is analogous to the 
application and use of medical concepts and norms by a physician with 
respect to an individual case. Pragmatism stresses that no norm is ever 
above the need for interpretation and application with respect to its use in 
particular situations. Norms should not be placed above the possibility of 
revision and improvement; to do so would be to deny the possibility of 
learning, growth and evolution. 
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ii. Agency: self & society & functional coordination 
The pragmatist concept of the social self recognises that society and 
individuals are mutually constitutive and referential (Dewey, 1954/ 1927; 
Mead, 1913/ 1982). The impossibility of aggregating individual 
preferences to constitute social purposes has been discussed in earlier 
chapters (Arrow, 1963; Dewey, 1954/ 1927). However, most of the 
frameworks discussed in this chapter are predicated on the idea of 
discrete individual capacities and rights that translate to the societal level, 
with the state fulfilling a regulatory or contractual role. 
Rawls' (1971/ 1999) theory of justice is predicated on hypothetical 
decisions made by individuals who exist independently of society, before 
entering into a political contract with it. The Ethics Framework for Public 
Health takes into account that what is considered 'good' at the public 
health level, need not necessarily be so at the level of the individual, and 
highlights the need to achieve a balance between the two (Kass, 2001). 
There are similar tensions in human rights; for example, as seen in the 
trade-off between protecting individuals' civil liberties and national 
security concerns. In pragmatist philosophy, considerations of the good of 
individuals cannot be separated from considerations of the good of 
society, and vice versa; this forms the basis of the Ethical Postulate. This 
point is further discussed in the analytical category on morals and ethics. 
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With respect to capacity building, developing individuals' capabilities 
(Ruger, 2006), protecting their rights (UNHCHR, 1996 - 2007) and 
promoting their functioning to facilitate their access to equal opportunity 
and political participation (Daniels & Sabin, 1998) are strong 
considerations across most of the frameworks. In a notable exception - the 
Professional Policy Making framework does not include considerations of 
capacity building, beyond that of government departments. However, in 
the report on Securing good health for the whole population, Wanless (2004) 
stresses that a strong government role in building individuals' health 
literacy was key to realising a fully engaged scenario, which was associated 
with improved health services quality and efficiency and better health 
outcomes overall. 
In addition to promoting individuals' skills and capacities, Dewey (1954/ 
1927) highlighted the need to build societal capacities and intelligence. 
Societal capacities, in the pragmatist view, are not equal to aggregated 
individual capabilities or intelligence; instead, they are based on 
pluralistic resources available in society and the extent to which these are 
freely available for learning and the resolution of problematic situations 
(Dewey, 1954/ 1927). Isaacs (1999) introduces the concept of collective 
intelligence, or CQ, which is the capacity to develop new, shared 
understandings and purposes through collective deliberation rather than 
mere consensus on pre-existing views or aggregation of individual 
understandings and preferences. 
378 
The Good Decision Criteria framework (Dietz, 2003) explicitly recognises 
that human intelligence is social and linguistic, and recommends that 
decision processes build on human nature and human strengths. The 
Human Rights framework has traditionally been associated with 
respecting, protecting and fulfilling individuals' rights. However, more 
recent human rights treaties have developed in order to consider'group 
rights', particularly the rights of marginalised and vulnerable groups in 
society, such as migrant workers, indigenous peoples and children 
(OHCHR, 1996 - 2007). Through related treaties, such as the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (ICRMW), the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the 
Human Rights Framework explicitly addresses building capacities at both 
individual and social levels. In addition, states are the main duty holders 
in the Human Rights framework and in this respect, building capacities at 
the level of the state to realise both individual and group rights, is also a 
function of the framework (OHCHR, 1996 - 2007; Steiner & Alston, 2000). 
In pragmatist philosophy, pluralism is seen both as an empirical fact and 
as a rich resource on which individuals and societies can draw to resolve 
problematic situations (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, 1954/ 1927). There are many 
ways in which people define themselves and the 'publics' they form in 
different situations. In discussing Identity and violence, Sen (2006) 
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emphasises that people define themselves across multiple dimensions of 
what is relevant in their lives, "occupations, social status, languages, 
politics, and many others, " and not only by their religious or national 
affiliations. He points out the pernicious effects of simplistic and 
polarising categorisations, such as in the so-called 'clash of civilisations' 
between Islamic and Western civilisations. To search for one powerful 
categorization, he says, is to deny the role of reasoning and choice. 
The descriptive weakness of choiceless singularity has the effect of 
momentously impoverishing the power and reach of our social and 
political reasoning. The illusion of destiny exacts a remarkably heavy 
price. 
Given the pluralistic nature of public life, Dewey recommended that 
'publics' be identified on a functional basis with respect to the problematic 
situation at hand, rather than by a priori categorisations (Dewey, 1954/ 
1927). This requires public officials and organisations playing a 
coordinating role. 
All the selected frameworks include some element of coordinating 
functional public participation through deliberation or consultation. 
However, the recommendations related to participation can be quite 
general. The Human Rights framework states that every individual has a 
right to participate in public affairs, directly or through representation. 
The Accountability for Reasonableness framework notes that all 'fair- 
minded' parties should agree that the criteria used in decision-making 
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were fair. The Professional Policy-Making framework includes 
consultations with stakeholders and considers inclusiveness as key to 
policy processes. The Capability and Health Account (Ruger, 2006) 
highlights the need for shared governance and responsibility with respect 
to promoting individuals' health agency and functioning. This framework 
does take a more 'functional' view on participation when it recommends 
that disability considerations in health care decision-making should not be 
made a priori, instead these decisions should be based on shared 
definitions of capabilities and through shared decision-making at 
individual and policy levels based on "medical necessity, appropriateness 
and futility". 
Dietz (2003), in setting out the Good Decision Criteria, addresses the 
issues of fairness and proportionality in relation to participation and 
persuasion in policy-making. 
Fairness suggests that all those having an interest in or affected by a 
decision should have say in that decision. It further suggests that each 
person should have equal say, or perhaps a standing with weight 
proportional to what they stand to gain or lose. This is an ancient 
democratic principle that is very widely accepted in the contemporary 
world and has been extensively theorized by Dewey and Habermas... 
Not all arguments will be given equal weight in making a decision but 
rather that the weight given a position should be proportional to its logic 
and sincerity. Some arguments are more persuasive than others, but all 
arguments should have equal chance to persuade. This is procedural 
fairness (Dietz, 2003, p. 35). 
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Thus, Dietz (2003) extends concerns of 'fairness' and 'proportionality' to 
considerations of participation and persuasiveness. This differs from 
Ruger's (2006) application of the concept of proportionality, wherein like 
cases should be treated as like and unlike cases differently. This is also 
different from Daniels and Sabin s (1998) approach to fairness, in that in 
Accountability for Reasonableness, fairness is related to the justification of 
a decision, not necessarily to the process of making the decision itself. 
Effectively coordinating pluralistic participation to resolve indeterminate 
situations also requires a reference community that supports the 
development of plural identities and facilitates coordinated inquiry, 
learning and moral deliberation (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). The concept of 
social capital, including social cohesion and trust as well as self-efficacy 
and collective efficacy, is increasingly viewed as a desired resource to 
build 'healthy' communities and individuals (Campbell, Wood & Kelly, 
1999; Kawachi, 2001). Related studies have also found associations 
between social capital and health outcomes. The importance and influence 
of communities such as policy networks and partnerships in policy- 
making has also been clearly established (6, Goodwin, Peck & Freeman, 
2006; Sabatier, 1999). 
Some of the normative frameworks discussed here make a link with the 
social determinants of health literature (Daniels, 2001; Kass, 2001; Ruger, 
2006), but mainly with regards to public goods, environmental factors and 
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policies. This link could be usefully extended to considerations of building 
communities of inquiry (Shields, 2003), functional public coordination via 
membership of intermediate organisations (Mays, 2000)(that could also 
serve as reference communities for inquiry and deliberation) and 
management of networks and partnerships in health policies and 
programmes (6, Goodwin, Peck & Freeman, 2006; Bernard & Kuruvilla, 
2007). 
A final analytical consideration related to rational agency is Dewey's 
criterion that 'public' intervention was required when consequences of 
acts had the potential to affect people and conditions external to those 
carrying out, or directly involved in these acts (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). Such 
acts required a 'public capacity' - be it through control, coordination or 
promotion. Thus, Dewey's recommendation was that public interventions 
be based on awareness of externalities, with a view to their management, 
rather than on a priori social contracts or goals. In the contractual 
approaches, externalities are treated as exceptions and have to be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis, rather than with a strategic view to their 
management. That externalities are a key reason for market failure in 
health care (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Ruger, 2006), as discussed in 
Chapter 4, further reinforces the need for a public policy to play a role in 
this respect. 
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By focusing on developing alternative scenarios and monitoring trends, 
the Professional Policy Making framework is oriented towards foresight of 
consequences and managing externalities. The Ethics Framework for 
Public Health explicitly sets out steps to think through the externalities 
concomitant with public health interventions and the Good Decisions 
Framework extends this perspective to ecological considerations. The 
Accountability for Reasonableness, Human Rights and Health Capability 
Account are, largely, contractual approaches to public policy-making with 
the state responsible for providing, or regulating, certain public goods and 
processes. 
iii. Decision activities: define, design, realise and deliberate 
The Professional Policy Making framework (Cabinet Office, 1999) ticks all 
the boxes, as it were, with respect to decision activities set out in the 
Decision Cell model. Perhaps this is because this framework evolved 
through'on the ground' policy-making experiences, with a view to 
improving the process; this is an approach both employed and 
recommended in pragmatism to develop methods and norms. Most of the 
other normative frameworks also include a wide range of the decision 
activities set out in the Decision Cell model, with the possible exception of 
the Accountability for Reasonableness framework, which mainly focuses 
on activities related to deliberation. The Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework stresses publicity and relevance conditions, which are 
recognised in pragmatism as key to democratic practice. While experts 
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may organise facts to inform deliberations, the public should be made 
aware of these facts and deliberate them (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). 
With respect to other decision activities, however, in the Accountability 
for Reasonableness framework, certain process assumptions seem to be 
made. For instance, one interpretation of the approach could be that 
irrespective of who is involved in making the initial 'decision', or based on 
what evidence, as long as 'fair-minded parties' can agree on the decision, 
the process will be fair, and will result in a fair outcome. 
McIver and Ham (2000), used the Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework to analyse cases of contested decisions related to treatment 
provision. They highlighted how evaluations of these decisions varied, 
based on the values and priorities of different groups (patients and their 
families, clinicians, health authorities and lawyers and courts involved in 
dispute resolution). Based on their analysis, McIver and Ham (2000), 
recommended that Accountability for Reasonableness criteria also extend 
to 'agreement on the standard of proof' and 'evidence of effectiveness' to 
ensure fair process. These criteria would also align with considerations in 
the design and realise sections of the Decision Cell model. 
How different frameworks deal with the issue of evidence is another 
analytical point. The Capability Health Account stresses the need for a 
joint scientific and deliberative approach. However, 'scientific' and 
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'deliberative' are not mutually exclusive in the context of public policy- 
making (Ruger, 2006). In the Professional Policy-making framework as 
well (Cabinet Office, 1999), evidence seems to be considered as something 
external to, or as the raw material for, deliberation and decision-making, 
rather than as evolving through these processes. 
The logic underlying scientific and deliberative approaches, as explained 
in the pragmatist logic of inquiry, are similar and interlinked, though the 
methods used may vary. Dewey saw science as involving deliberation (for 
example in developing methods, interpreting data and publishing papers) 
and deliberation as involving inquiry (for example, with respect to 
exploring the value implications and consequences of policy proposals) 
(Dewey, 1922/ 2002,1938/ 1999). In fact, in the context of public policy- 
making, this distinction is difficult to make. 
There is a significant general difference between the kinds of process in 
which scientific laboratories make their interventions in the world outside 
through technological artefacts and their associated disciplines and 
consequences, and those in which the wider interventions occur and recur 
through discursive networks and narratives of scientific knowledge for 
policy, such as in'risk management' public policy issues and decisions. 
As studies of the latter kind of issue emphatically demonstrate, 
contestation is rarely only about propositional truths, but is more usually 
also, if more obliquely, about what is the proper public meaning and 
definition of the issue(s) being contested (Wynne, 2003, p. 404). 
Evidence in policy-making involves interpretation and argument that is 
developed and formulated in the context of specific policy issues and 
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public imperatives (Majone, 1989). Thus, in a pragmatist analysis, 
considerations of effectiveness in decision-making should also extend to 
the effectiveness of methods used to deliberate and reach agreement on 
meanings and contentious issues. Additionally, evidence of effectiveness 
should extend not only to the intervention being considered, but also to 
the effectiveness of the decisions made, in terms of outcomes and 
consequences and ultimately to resolving 'problematic situations'. With 
regards to activities of implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and 
learning (i. e. aligned with the realise activity in the Decision Cell) these are 
explicit considerations in the Ethics Framework for Public Health (Kass, 
2001) and the Professional Policy Making framework (Cabinet Office, 
1999). 
Finally, all the frameworks include some form of deliberation, ranging 
from consultation (Cabinet Office, 1999) to shared governance (Ruger, 
2006). The primary focus of the Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework is on conditions to ensure fair deliberation on policy proposals 
(Daniels & Sabin, 1998). However, the nature of the deliberative processes 
described in the frameworks is somewhat different to that envisaged in 
pragmatist philosophy. For the most part, deliberation, as described in 
several of the frameworks here, seems tinged with contention, legality and 
the pulling of inhibitory policy reins. 
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In pragmatism, deliberation is seen as a creative and collaborative process 
(Caspary, 1991; Dewey, 1922/ 2002). It involves trying out strategies in 
imagination, which means that it is not concomitant with dire 
consequences if one scenario or the other fails. While there may be dire 
problems to be addressed, perhaps creativity and imagination would not 
go amiss in facilitating collaborative inquiry and 'trying out' different 
solutions. Of all the frameworks discussed here, only the Professional 
Policy Making framework explicitly refers to the need for innovation and 
creativity, and specifically mentions scenario development as 'best 
practice' to envision strategies as well as to prepare for and manage 
change. 
iv. Ethics and moral development 
The normative frameworks discussed here are aligned with different 
philosophical traditions: the Accountability for Reasonableness 
Framework (Daniels & Sabin, 1998) with Rawls' Theory of Justice; the 
Capability Health Account (Ruger, 2006) with Sen 's and Nussbaum's 
Capability Approach and Aristotle's political philosophy; and the Human 
Rights framework with early theories of liberal democracy. Good Decision 
Criteria (Dietz, 2003) draw on a range of philosophical sources, including 
Dewey and Habermas to discuss, for example, the need to ensure 
participation that was proportional to potential influence and impact. The 
Ethics Framework for Public Health (Kass, 2001) draws on the discipline 
of bioethics as well as on a review of ethics in public health. The 
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Professional Policy Making framework (Cabinet Office, 1999) does not 
make explicit reference to ethics or moral considerations, however, there 
are some implicit ethics-like considerations; for example, considerations 
related to consulting individuals or groups who may be affected by a 
particular policy. 
In general, the pragmatist response would be to appreciate the value of 
such diverse frameworks that provide rich, pluralistic resources for moral 
deliberation and orientation for public policy. However, one pragmatist 
caution is that moral development should be based on an understanding 
of human nature and experience. Another caveat is that norms should be 
considered as methods and tools, and not as teleological or totalitarian 
edicts that obviate the need for intelligent inquiry in specific problematic 
situations or deny consideration of alternative approaches in order to 
resolve problematic situations. Further, pragmatist philosophy does differ 
in substantive aspects from the moral approaches in the frameworks 
discussed here. 
A couple of differences on points of moral philosophy are discussed here 
to illustrate the directions a more comprehensive, comparative analysis of 
moral philosophy may take. The Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework is closely aligned with Rawls' theory of justice. Pragmatism 
would endorse Rawls' move away from utilitarianism, in rejecting the 
treatment of individuals as a means to some general social end, to 
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recognising the dignity of individuals and the need for fairness of process. 
However, Rawlsian philosophy poses two particular problems from a 
pragmatist point of view. The first is with respect to the basis of social 
philosophy - in this case, the theory of justice as fairness, which makes a 
distinction between a more limited political concept of justice and a more 
comprehensive moral philosophy; the former being considered as the 
purvue of governance and the latter a private or personal pursuit. This 
distinction is, to a greater or lesser extent, a factor in all the frameworks 
considered here. Concerns have been raised in about the general tendency 
in public policy-making, and in the context of medicine in particular, to 
divide "problems into public and the private, urging consensus as the goal 
of the one, and an unconstrained notion of happiness as the goal of the 
other" (Tollefsen, 2004). 
Second, the theory of justice and the Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework are mainly procedural. Both John Stuart Mill and Dewey took 
issue with having fixed prescriptions for justice in processes that did not 
also take the justness of consequences into account (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, 
1954/ 1927). The consideration of consequences is an important guide for 
rational, and moral, agency. Dewey defined pragmatism itself with 
respect to the consequences of operations instituted to resolve problematic 
situations. 
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The proper interpretation of the word "pragmatic, " [is] namely, the 
function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions 
provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as 
to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations (Dewey, 1939/ 
1989b, p. 571). 
While Dewey agreed with Mill on the importance of consequences in 
moral agency, he did not view consequences in utilitarian terms, as 
measured by an aggregate utility or end (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, 1954/ 
1927). Consequences in pragmatist inquiry are viewed both in terms of the 
ability of acts to resolve immediate problematic situations and the extent 
to which previous and current acts render the environment favourable for 
such acts. This is a very different position from the more commonly 
adopted view of consequences as related to achieving some pre-defined 
end, desire, utility or outcome, be it health, equity or another social end. 
The pragmatist view of consequentialism is perhaps most aligned with the 
Capability Health Account, with regard to improved functioning. The 
difference between the two is that in pragmatism, growth and flourishing 
occur through rational inquiry and the resolution of problematic 
situations. This approach would not be congruent with developing 
capabilities as an end in and of themselves, in support of individual goals 
to the exclusion of social goals, or towards desired capabilities that are 
themselves not subject to rational inquiry. In pragmatism, growth and 
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development are seen as occurring through collaborative inquiry which 
then supports both individual and societal wellbeing. 
Another illustrative point on substantive philosophical differences 
between pragmatism and the selected frameworks is with regard to 
normative theories that consider that individuals and society are distinct 
and separate. As discussed under the category of agency, society and 
individuals influence and are integral to each other. Theories associated 
with contractarian theories of early liberalism, such as the Human Rights 
Framework, are based on the view of individuals as separate entities with 
rights who, through a priori contracts with the state, were entitled to 
protection of their rights. Dewey saw that such contracts and entitlements 
led to an exaggerated sense of the individual in relation to society and an 
inhibitive rather than progressive approach to governance and moral 
development. Instead, Dewey believed the best way to support both 
individual and societal development, was by fostering an overarching and 
integrative ethical and moral development. He put forward "The ethical 
postulate" (a reconstruction of Hegel's Sittlichkeit) as a hypothesis to 
guide rational agency and orient democratic practice: 
In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed 
realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a 
member; and, conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in 
which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself (EW 3: 322). 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, putting the Ethical Postulate into practice 
would require an integration of individual and institutional moral codes 
as well as an integration of altruistic and egoistic considerations, among 
others, with respect to a reference community. 
As a final point of discussion on substantive philosophical differences, in a 
review of Sens and Nussbaum's book Quality of Life, Rae (1993) makes 
note of a discrepancy between on the ground realities, political and 
administrative concerns, and academic or philosophical deliberations on 
moral theory. 
The distinguished philosophers and economists... possess uneven and 
sometimes very thin news about doings [and difficulties faced by people 
on the ground] ... and very 
little direct experience in delivering ideas to 
policy-makers. Here, the common discourse centers largely on the 
resurgence of academic moral theory and the extension of certain results 
from social choice theory. Over recent generations, these discourses have 
grown richer in abstraction and poorer in human narrative - open, in 
principle, to any configuration of human needs but attentive to no specific 
real ones (Rae, 1993, p. 1007). 
The normative frameworks discussed here, all address 'real world' 
problems. However the moral thinking has developed primarily in 
academic settings, with two notable exceptions. The Professional Policy 
Making framework, developed in a government department, makes no 
explicit moral claims, which perhaps reflects a general gap in 
contemporary moral theory and administrative practice (DeLeon & 
393 
Longobardi, 2002; Garrison, 2000). With the Human Rights Framework, 
different groups, including experts, policy-makers and non-governmental 
organisations, have contributed to, and can influence, the development, 
implementation and monitoring of the normative and moral standards 
therein (Chinkin, 1998). However, the extent to which, and process 
whereby, it is possible for individuals and groups to change these 
standards once these are codified in international law, is variable. 
However, such change is possible and the process by which different 
groups contribute to the development, monitoring and implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child is described in a following 
section. 
The other frameworks also recognise the need for deliberation, not 
necessarily on the frameworks themselves, but as part of the process 
recommended by them. For example, the Ethics Framework for Public 
Health recognises that pluralistic perspectives define public health values 
in different contexts, and stresses the need for deliberative processes to 
develop a better understanding of these issues in different situations 
(Kass, 2001). 
In the pragmatist approach to socially intelligent inquiry, there is a role for 
experts to play in organising facts to inform public deliberations, but not 
in making all the decisions thereof (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). The current 
inequity in how different groups contribute to ethics and moral 
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deliberation in society carries the risk of reversion to the discriminations 
of the Aristotelian polis. In describing an ideal state, Aristotle made a 
distinction between an inferior class of labourers or 'natural slaves' who 
produced material goods and an elite class that contemplated civil and 
moral affairs (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 1999). In contemporary society, 
similar distinctions could be made, for example, between the general 
public, corporate and production sectors and academic experts and 
ethicists. 
Such divisions between the material and the moral not only lead to 
discriminatory practices, but also compound what Dewey referred to as 
the problems of "materialism and brutality of our economic life" (Dewey, 
1920/ 1999, p. MW. 12.178). He felt that, in order to integrate economic and 
moral development, considerations of morals had to be reintegrated into 
economic and production processes. Failure to adopt an inclusive and 
integrative approach to societal development (both material and moral), 
not only went against the very idea of democracy, but also gave "aid, 
comfort, and support to every socially isolated and socially irresponsible 
scholar, specialist, esthete and religionist" (Dewey, 1920/ 1999, p. 
MW. 12.178). 
Dewey did not see human beings as inherently moral or immoral, but 
instead regarded moral development as an evolutionary process resultant 
from learning (a product of both the reasoning in and the resolution of 
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problematic situations). Through a commitment to cooperative learning, 
Dewey was sure that individuals and societies would find that a 
commitment to ethical and moral development was without parallel as a 
guide to inquiry and as a means for social coordination as well as 
individual and societal development. Ethical and moral standards in turn 
would evolve through inquiry within particular problematic situations 
and because of the consequences of the same. In this process of 
evolutionary moral development, Dewey saw that certain precepts would 
stand the test of time-and thus there would need to be very compelling 
reasons to doubt them; a position that Daniels and Sabin (1998) are 
aligned with. 
However, fallibilism is also a key pragmatist tenet. The interpretation and 
application of norms and rules is always a matter of valuation and 
judgement in response to problematic situations (Dewey & Tufts, 1908/ 
1999). No norm or rule has such inherent authority, or generalisability, 
that it obviates the need for judgement and interpretation with regard to 
its application in specific situations. Therefore careful deliberation is 
required in every situation, striving for a balance between antiscepticism 
and fallibilism in using norms, and ensuring that moral deliberation is an 
inclusive and socially integrative process. 
v. Operational links: methods and mechanisms 
There is a need for normative frameworks to be linked with operational 
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methods if they are to be used and effective in guiding public policy. 
Many of frameworks discussed in this chapter have been tested in practice 
with varying degrees of success. The Accountability for Reasonableness 
framework was tested in different countries with respect to developing 
'benchmarks of fairness' to evaluate the fairness and equity of proposed 
health sector reforms (Daniels, Flores, Supasit, Ndumbe et al., 2005). These 
benchmarks were developed during the Clinton administration 
deliberations on health sector reform in the US; they were found to be 
useful in developing economies as well. For example these benchmarks 
were used to evaluate donor agencies' proposals for health sector reforms 
in countries (Daniels, Flores, Supasit, Ndumbe et al., 2005). 
To analyse the extent to which the UK Cabinet Office framework was in 
operation, Alvarez-Rosete (2005) studied two cases of policy making in the 
Department of Health, as related to the Mental Health Bill and the reform 
of generic medicines policy. 
Drawing on evidence from these two case studies (with additional 
insights from others), our conclusion is that progress on modernising 
policy making in health care has been uneven. The DH has taken the 
modernisation of policy making seriously and has substantially improved 
it in many aspects. It has become more inclusive than before; it has 
improved cross-cutting work; it applies different statistical techniques in 
order to plan ahead... 
But, on the other hand, there are still signs of the prevalence of old 
practices and a hierarchical, closed and reactive policy making style. 
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Consulting stakeholders and the public, although now assumed to be a 
necessary step in the policy process, does not necessarily imply listening 
to them. 
This report concluded: what was required in the Department of Health 
was a more responsive style of policy-making based on "a more active 
style of network management" (Alvarez-Rosete, 2005). This fits in with the 
recommendations made in Chapter 4 for socially intelligent inquiry and 
with respect to the public sector's role primarily being one of 
coordination. 
The Human Rights framework has the greatest degree of 
operationalisation of all the frameworks considered within this chapter. 
For example, with reference to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
countries are required to submit reports to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child with respect to progress made towards the realisation of rights, 
particularly as set out in the CRC and CEDAW (there are similar 
provisions for other human rights treaties). Governments submit a 
national report, CSOs develop an alternative report and UNICEF, and 
other international organisations as relevant, submit reports to the 
Committee as well. The 18-member committee of experts meets thrice a 
year in Geneva in two chambers to analyse the different reports. Based on 
their analysis, the Committee presents their Concluding Observations to 
guide further implementation and evaluation. 
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The Committee, however, is limited by the information it receives. For 
example, it was noted in the review that the Concluding Observations 
"used to be quite general, for example, one of the recommendations to a 
country was to provide buses to improve school access. The issue was that 
there wereri t roads for these buses, but this information was not provided 
to the Committee. Now the Committee increasingly asks for specific 
information, encouraging details on the 'what and how' of progressive 
realisation of rights. " (NGO Committee for the CRC, personal 
communication). However, it is also important to realise that data on 
human rights indicators is difficult to obtain. In some countries, even basic 
systems for registering births and deaths are not in place, which severely 
limits the effective functioning of human rights monitoring processes 
(Tomasevski, 2001). 
The lack of effective methods for democratic practice was also a concern in 
Dewey's time and work. In fact, he was subject to excoriating criticism 
from some of his colleagues for advising the US government to join the 
First World War. Dewey's defence at the time was that there were no 
methods available to facilitate international deliberation and resolve 
differences between countries (Bullert, 1989). One of the expected results 
of the First World War was to bring about anew world order', and 
indeed the League of Nations was established subsequently, and the 
United Nations established after World War II. However, going by the 
dreadful images of war in the daily news, it does not seem that much has 
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changed with respect to effective methods of international coordination 
since then. 
Finding methods of democratic coordination are critical to a democratic 
way of life. As Dewey said, "democratic ends require democratic means" 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989a, p. 133). Perhaps the way forward is through 
intermediate organizations and through networks of organisations 
involved in a particular problematic situation, such as Public Private 
Partnerships as discussed in Chapter 5, or Public-Civil Society 
partnerships as discussed in the UNICEF review. This approach would be 
congruent with the evidence on the effectiveness of intermediate 
organisations, deliberative forums and other such 'reference communities' 
to bring about relevant, and responsive, socio-political change (Mays, 
2000; Glasius, 2005). The role of public sector organisations would then be 
one of coordination instead of coercion (Dewey, 1939/ 1989a). These and 
other democratic solutions need to be tested and further developed. The 
costs of undemocratic alternatives, often in terms of life itself, cannot 
justify their continued use. 
vi. The paradox of coordinating change & Instituting learning 
Change, in pragmatist philosophy is linked with implementation, 
consequences and learning. Change may be a matter of external adaptation, 
internal accommodation or systemic adjustment (as discussed in earlier 
chapters). The objective of change, in the pragmatist sense, is to regain 
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functional coordination and equilibrium. Once functional change is 
achieved with respect to resolving a problematic situation, this change 
becomes habit - and this is a matter of intellectual efficiency - and new 
learning gets instituted in transformed situations and new dynamic 
equilibrium. 
Each of the normative frameworks discussed in this chapter address some 
element of learning, change and institutionalisation. For example, the 
Accountability for Reasonableness framework has appeals and 
enforcement conditions to follow up on justifications made. The Good 
Decision Criteria framework proposes that good decision-making should 
offer a 'chance to learn' and the Professional Policy-making framework 
stresses the importance of learning from experience of 'what works and 
what does not. The Capability Health Account focuses on building 
individual capabilities based on the concept of individuals as agents of 
change, and also recommends that a "deliberative process should also 
update its recommendations continually to account for changes in medical 
knowledge, technology, and costs when determining what probability of 
success would make an intervention worthwhile" (Ruger, 2006, p. 158). 
With regard to the process of human rights monitoring through the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the UNICEF review found that this 
is generally thought to be a useful process. The CRC reporting and 
recommendations process feeds into treaty body reform, as well as into 
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legal commentary and case law, as the standards, mechanisms, and 
information on the realisation of rights is further developed. However, 
one of the strongest recommendations made, and one of the most critical 
gaps identified, by CSOs was that the Committee's Concluding 
Observations be widely communicated through society and be integrated 
into the design, implementation and evaluation of projects related to 
children's rights, which was currently not the case (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 
2007). 
An overall challenge with respect to managing change is with respect to 
developing moral and ethical norms to keep pace with technological 
changes. In health, for example, this concern is highlighted by the 
advances in biotechnology and genomics research, with recognition that 
ethical standards have not sufficiently developed along side. 
Mental and moral beliefs and ideals change more slowly than outward 
conditions. If the ideals associated with the higher life in our cultural past 
have been impaired, the fault is primarily with them. Ideals and 
standards formed without regard to the means by which they are to be 
achieved and incarnated in flesh are bound to be thin and wavering. 
Since the aims, desires and purposes created by a machine age do not 
connect with tradition, there are two sets of rival ideals and those which 
have actual instrumentalities at their disposal have the advantage. 
Because the two are rivals and because the older ones retain their 
glamour and sentimental prestige in literature and religions, the newer 
ones are perforce harsh and narrow (Dewey, 1954/ 1927, p. 141). 
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Still, coordinating normative change that reflects socio-political concerns is 
possible. For example, in the LSHTM study on research impact, 
researchers identified the need to develop new ethical guidelines for 
research with women and adolescents who had been trafficked. Their 
health and safety had to be taken into account, particularly with regard to 
their anxiety related to being interviewed. Considerations of anonymity 
and confidentiality related to safety and protection also had to be taken 
into account. Therefore, one of the main recommendations of this study 
was that people who were trusted by the interviewees, even if these 
people were not researchers, should conduct the interviews. These 
findings led to the development of WHO ethical guidelines for research on 
women and adolescents who were trafficked (World Health Organisation, 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & Daphne Programme 
of the European Commission, 2003). These new guidelines are now being 
used to train journalists who conduct interviews on this topic and are also 
used in police training courses in several countries to deal with this 
growing problem (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007). 
As discussed in earlier chapters, institutional change is often difficult to 
bring about, but it is critical; it ensures institutions' responsiveness to the 
public interest. Further, institutions can only support both individual and 
societal development, if there is corresponding change and evolution in 
the institutions themselves. Thus public policy institutions have to 
manage the paradox of both instituting learning and coordinating change. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, the Decision Cell model structured an analysis of six 
normative frameworks related to health policy. While this is a very rough 
comparative sketch, a table of the main points of analysis will help 
summarise the key similarities and dissimilarities between the 
frameworks (See Table 3) that could service as potential points of dialogue 
between the different frameworks, and on ethics and normative 
development in health policy. 
The Human Rights Framework gets the 'top score', but just a couple of 
overall points separate the frameworks. This comparison of normative 
frameworks is based on the 'coverage' of pragmatist criteria. The 
analytical points have been allotted on the basis that the different 
analytical factors were addressed in the frameworks, not on whether they 
were in agreement with pragmatist philosophy on this point. 
Earlier chapters have highlighted the differences between a pragmatist 
understanding of human nature and agency, compared with that in 
human rights or in theories of justice that are based on an exaggerated 
concept of individualism with respect to society. However, since a key 
pragmatist tenet is that moral development be based on an understanding 
of human nature, in this analysis, frameworks have been scored if they 
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include this consideration, whether this understanding is in agreement 
with pragmatist philosophy or not. 
Table 3. Coverage of pragmatist criteria for rational policy-making 
DCM23/ pragmatism A4R CHA EFPH GDC PPM HRF 
I. Situations 
- Ecological + + + 
- Economic + + + + + + 
- Socio-historical + + + + + 
- Indeterminate v. ends + + + 
2. Agency/'public' 
- Individual capability + + + + 
- Societal capacities + + + 
- Coordination + + + + 
- Community/ networks 
-'Public' definition + + + 
3. Decision activities 
- Define/ evidence + + + + + 
- Design/ strategies + + + 
- Realise: implement & + + + + + + 
- Resolve + + + 
- Deliberation + + + + + + 
- Imagination + 
4. Morals/ethics 
- Orientation + + + + 
- Human nature + + + + 
- Moral development + 
5. Institutions/ operations 
- Operational norms + + + + + + 
- Managing change + + 
- Tested methods + + + + 
Total: 21 11 12 12 13 14 15 
23 Acronyms used in Table 3.: DCM - Decision Cell Model; A4R - Accountability for 
Reasonableness; CHA - Capability Health Account; EFPH - Ethics Framework for Public 
Health; GDC - Good Decision Criteria; PPM - Professional Policy Making framework 
and HRF - Human Rights Framework. 
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Additionally, the analytical factors have not been weighted and this 
would have made a difference in the overall analysis. For example, as one 
of the frameworks with the highest 'score' - the Professional Policy 
Making framework, neither explicitly takes into account moral and ethical 
factors, nor does it explicitly take into account understandings of human 
nature, all of which would be 'deal breakers' in a pragmatist analysis. 
Further, if the analytical factors had been weighted against causal 
assumptions, for instance those set out in Wanless' scenarios for health 
(Wanless, 2004), then the failure of the Professional Policy Making 
Framework to emphasise the importance of building individual and social 
capacities, would be a critical flaw. 
One overarching concern in this thesis has been the issue of 
'mainstreaming' ethics and moral development in policy-making. One 
way to do this would be through integration with related processes that 
are already institutionalised. In this respect, the Human Rights 
Framework has unparallel institutional support, as well as buy-in from 
different groups and different countries. In this context, Beyrer and Kass 
(2002, p. 246) recommend integrating human rights concerns with health 
research ethics. 
Although the human rights movement and the sphere of research ethics 
have overlapping principles and goals, there has been little attempt to 
incorporate external political and human rights contexts into research 
ethics codes or ethics reviews. Every element of a research ethics 
review -the balance of risks and benefits, the assurance of rights for 
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individual participants, and the fair selection of research populations - 
can be affected by the political and human rights background in which a 
study is done. 
Additionally, as earlier discussed, through the monitoring and reporting 
process on human rights, different groups have the opportunity to 
contribute to, and influence, the process and findings (Bernard & 
Kuruvilla, 2007; Chinkin, 1998). Perhaps the Human Rights system, 
particularly through the expert Human Rights Committee reviews, can 
provide an institutional, and international, forum to deliberate, test and 
develop normative orientation for both health and general public policy. 
Since human rights are explicitly linked to international law, this would 
also be an appropriate forum to develop 'case law' related to health 
policy-making; developing case law being a recommendation made by 
McIver and Ham (2000) in the context of contested health care decisions. 
However, to play such a mainstreaming role human rights would need to 
be better integrated and instituted into broader socio-economic policies 
and programs, as conceptualised in the Rights Based Approach to 
development (Uvin, 2004); but this type of integration is far from being 
realised. Perhaps in this respect, the Human Rights Framework may be 
seen to be too 'political' or as a separate concern from established 
'everyday' policy processes. More 'technical' frameworks, such as 
Accountability for Reasonableness, Capability Health Account and the 
Ethics Framework for Public Health, may be better received, and therefore 
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more used, by policy institutions. Perhaps integration of ethics in policy- 
making could even come about through adherence to professional 
standards for policy-making, such as those set out in the Good Decision 
criteria or in the UK Cabinet Office model, if these were explicitly 
extended to considerations of ethics and moral development. 
Given what ultimately matters - that moral considerations are integrated 
in policy-making - it is reassuring to see that there are several points of 
similarity across the frameworks. These similarities reflect Peter Singer's 
(1993) conclusions in'A companion to ethics' - that comprises a range of 
writings on ethics, including from 'Western' and 'Eastern' schools of 
thought, 
Ethics is not a meaningless series of different things to different people in 
different times and places. Rather, against a background of historically 
and culturally diverse approaches to the question of how we ought to 
live, the degree of convergence is striking. Human nature has its 
constraints and there are only a limited number of ways in which human 
beings can live together and flourish (Singer, 1993, p. 543). 
However, while there may be "only a limited number of ways in which 
human beings can live together and flourish", there may be an infinite 
number of journeys taken along these routes. To ensure that ethics and 
moral norms serve as relevant and useful guides for rational agency, 
norms require specification, interpretation, application and development 
with respect to specific situations. As Dewey (1922/ 2002) noted, morality 
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is a continuing process, rather than a fixed achievement. Moral codes can 
atrophy and that moral disagreement is the basis for deliberation. Perhaps 
the differences between the normative frameworks described in this 
chapter, can provide the impetus for further research and deliberation on 
norms and ethics for health policy. 
Finally, as set out in an introductory quotation to this chapter, Portia 
makes an evocative plea to the merchant of Venice to look beyond 
considerations of justice as the 'quality of mercy' would bless "both him 
that gives and him that takes"(Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act IV, 
Scene I). Pragmatism also proposes that both individual and societal 
flourishing would be best served by including qualities such as empathy 
and imagination in moral deliberation. A further consideration is to 
integrate, and harmonise, moral considerations across individual and 
institutional considerations so as to create a mutually supportive (rather 
than divisive) process of moral development in society. Thus, while justice 
may be a good starting point for moral deliberation in public policy- 
making, it should not be its only end. 
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Conclusion: advantages, challenges & looking forward 
If is not the business of political philosophy and science to determine what the 
state in general should or must be. What they may do is to aid in the creation of 
methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly, less at the mercy of 
accident, more intelligently, so that [individuals and societies] may learn from 
their errors and profit by their successes. 
John Dewey, 1954, The Public and its Problems 
In the end, pragmatist philosophy could be characterised as being naively 
optimistic about the ability of individuals and societies to rationally 
deliberate on, and effect, social change in a way that ensures individual 
and societal flourishing (Bernstein, 1998; Ryan, 1995). As Bernstein notes, 
this optimism could definitely be viewed as a fault, but he stresses that 
Dewey's was a qualified optimism (Bernstein, 1998, p. 149) 
If Dewey was to be faulted, it is because, at times in his reliance on 
metaphors of harmony and organic unity, Dewey underestimates the 
conflict, dissonance, and asymmetric power relationships that disrupt 
"the harmonious whole". I do think that at times Dewey is excessively 
optimistic about the real social and political possibilities of resolving 
serious social conflicts by open communication. Although this is a 
weakness in Dewey's thinking, we can read him in a different way. For 
we can interpret Dewey as telling us that it is precisely because conflicts 
between different groups run so deep, that it becomes all the more urgent 
to develop those habits and virtues by which we can intelligently seek to 
negotiate and reconcile differences ... Though Dewey was committed to 
the belief that all human beings can develop their 'creative intelligence' 
and practical judgement, he did not think that rational discussion itself is 
sufficient to bring about genuine social reform. It is not accidental that 
Dewey rarely speaks of 'reason. ' He always stresses the ongoing creative 
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task of nurturing the habits of intelligence - habits that can only be 
sustained in critical, open, tolerant communities. 
It could be argued that the social and political transformation in Northern 
Ireland occurred through ongoing deliberation between the different 
parties involved, with the alternatives of fighting and terrorism proving 
too destructive and costly in terms of livelihoods and lives. Similarly, 
while coercion and corruption are widely recognised as influencing 
sociopolitical decisions, deliberation and social learning seem to be 
preferable alternatives. The challenge, as Dewey (1954/ 1927) observed, 
continues to be the "improvement of the methods and conditions of 
debate, discussion and persuasion". To meet this challenge there are 
several contemporary studies to develop, test and evaluate methods of 
deliberation and rational decision-making overall, that were discussed 
throughout the thesis. 
On a personal note, with over 12 years' work experience at different levels 
of health decision-making: from hospitals, to rural community health 
programs and universities, to working with national governments, 
international organisations, the private sector and civil society 
organisations, I am certainly more than aware of the myriad difficulties, 
inequities and dissensions that can restrict policy deliberations. 
Nevertheless, I have also seen instances where people have come together, 
in policy deliberations that resulted in changes that were greater than the 
sum of the individual interests and perspectives brought to the table, to 
412 
shape policies that could potentially bring about more moral and 
meaningful social change. One of the main questions initiating this PhD 
was how policy-making processes could be better designed and 
coordinated to support individual and social development. Indeed, this 
question itself is predicated on a certain sense of hope, but were such 
learning and social change inconceivable, it would also be inconceivable 
for me to continue working in the field of public policy; to this end if 
pragmatism offers some sense of optimism for public policy-making, I am 
grateful. 
Reviewing the thesis 
This thesis has met its primary goal; specifically, to demonstrate that 
rationality, as defined in pragmatist philosophy, provides common 
ground on which one may build integrative policy theory. It further shows 
that pragmatist philosophy is an empirically congruent and normative 
foundation for public policy-making and democratic practice. In order to 
make the philosophical concepts more operative, a new theory of policy- 
making - the Decision Cell model was developed. This model was 
structured by key pragmatist 'pillars' and shaped by theoretical and 
empirical analyses of policy-making, particularly in health policy. 
The Decision Cell model stands up favourably against criteria of good 
policy theory, including of being integrative, problem solving, explanatory 
and normative. The integrative capacity of the model is evinced in its 
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ability to bring together diverse considerations of policy environments, 
processes and participation. The model is explicitly problem-oriented, 
based as it is on the pragmatist template of the rhythm of situations, where 
rational agency is initiated and coordinated in order to resolve 
indeterminate and problematic situations. Through the resolution of 
indeterminate situations, learning is gained, new habitual efficiencies are 
developed and a renewed dynamic equilibrium achieved in policy 
situations. This view also provides an explanatory perspective on policy 
contexts and change. 
The Decision Cell model also serves as a normative guide for policy- 
making. This normative orientation is not with regard to specific policy 
topics per se, but in developing a method, or a 'blue print' for policy- 
making. Such a 'blue print' helps to develop shared understandings and to 
coordinate rational agency, "so that experimentation may go on less 
blindly, less at the mercy of accident, more intelligently, so that 
[individuals and societies] may learn from their errors and profit by their 
successes" (Dewey, 1954/ 1927). The Ethical Postulate provides a moral 
compass for rational decision-making based on the idea that individual 
and societal flourishing are interrelated; as a postulate, this pragmatist 
moral compass is meant to being used and tested in practice. The Decision 
Cell model also proves a robust reference point for deliberation on 
alternative normative and ethics frameworks for health policy. 
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The practice of, and potential for, pragmatist rationality 
Throughout this thesis, concrete examples were used to illustrate how 
different aspects of this new policy theory can be made operational. At the 
conclusion of this thesis, a discussion on how scientific sense and 
democratic sensibility can come together in practice is warranted. 
Reassuringly, there are many examples that can be used. Caspary (2000), 
in Dewey on Democracy, provides a range of concrete, contemporary 
examples of pragmatist policy-making. He traverses a range of policy 
contexts in discussing these examples: from macro-level social 
experiments, such as those associated with the New Deal in the US, the 
adoption of Keyensian economics, to the success of micro-level social 
welfare initiatives, such as those of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and 
the evolution of the worker managed Mondragon cooperatives in Spain. 
Other examples include deliberation and conflict resolution mechanisms 
that have been used successfully in the corporate sector, in international 
peace settlements and in national truth and reconciliation processes, the 
success of which was demonstrated in South Africa (Caspary, 2000). 
In Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together, Isaacs (1999), while not 
explicitly referencing Dewey, discusses the MIT Dialogue project where 
corporate cultures were beneficially transformed as a result of developing 
the 'art of dialogue'; an approach that is closely aligned with Deweyan 
inquiry, deliberation and moral imagination. Collier (2006) specifically 
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discusses the application of the pragmatist composite of ethics, aesthetics 
and functionality in architecture. 
Other examples were discussed in this thesis to show how public policy 
could be usefully aligned with pragmatist perspectives. For example, 
different groups' participation affords pluralistic perspectives to be 
considered in the monitoring and reporting process of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC). These groups also collaborate to resolve 
specific indeterminate and problematic situations in countries, in some 
instances by developing partnerships that serve as communities of practice 
(Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). 
The CRC process is one based on the progressive realisation of children's 
rights, which is aligned with the pragmatist concept of ends-in-view. 
However, aspects of this process clearly need to be modified, for example 
with regard to developing functional participation, rather than participation 
pre-defined by national boundaries; this is especially true in light of cross- 
border trafficking and armed recruitment of children (Bernard & 
Kuruvilla, 2007). There is also a need to further incorporate a scientific 
approach to synthesising evidence and to developing and testing 
proposed solutions (rather than mainly collecting data related to targets). 
In addition, systematic opportunities to develop and communicate 
learning and for an integration of normative and ethics considerations 
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across institutional and individual practice would also be considered as 
important from a pragmatist perspective. 
In the UK, there is an 'indeterminate situation' with regard to the quality 
of NHS services and of the status of people's health and well being 
(Wanless, 2002,2004). This situation was explored in the Wanless 
scenarios -a technique aligned with pragmatist deliberation. The 
recommended solution is one that requires full public engagement, and 
includes building health literacy and institutional linkages, for example 
between health and education authorities; this kind of approach would be 
aligned with the pragmatist concept of 'public' policy. 
The 'success story' chosen for this concluding chapter is one where I have 
had the privilege, over the past decade or more, of knowing some of the 
main people involved 24. Through them, I have learned firsthand about 
social transformations that can take place when scientific sense and 
democratic sensibility meet in policies and programmes for health. 
A story of when scientific sense and democratic sensibility meet 
In a remote tribal area of India, the 1991 census indicated a fall in 
population due to high mortality, particularly from malaria. The staff of a 
community health programme, MITRA, in a mission hospital in that area 
24 This account was also published in the ODI working paper I wrote (Kuruvilla, 2005). 
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realised that medical anti-malarial strategies of distributing chloroquine 
were not making a difference. The MITRA team reviewed the literature for 
alternative options in combating malaria (e. g. from Africa) consulted 
malariologists, studied endemic sites and identified the predominant 
mosquito vector, while ascertaining that people in the villages believed 
that drinking contaminated water was the cause of malaria. Given the 
impracticability and undesirability of deploying bio-environmental 
measures in the hills and streams where the tribes lived, the team 
determined from the evidence that the most effective strategy would be 
personal protection adopted on a mass scale: a "people's movement 
against malaria" (Oommen, Henry & Pidikaka, 1999). 
MITRA launched a public awareness campaign to convey the "essentials 
of the epidemiology of malaria in a demystified, digestible form". 
Alternative plans for malaria prevention were put in a menu format, from 
which the people chose insecticide-treated mosquito nets and education 
strategies. There were no subsidies, so the people themselves were 
responsible for the production and purchase of the mosquito nets. 
Although health education programmes continued, health services were 
not provided unless sought by the villagers. 
Over the next decade, through MITRA (which means relationship or 
friendship) a partnership for health was forged across 48 villages, 
addressing malaria control and other public health problems. The 
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programme worked with government services, trained health workers, set 
up a primary school, obtained expert help in giving the tribal language a 
script, and promoted the development of various economic schemes, e. g. 
related to the production and sale of tribal craft. By 2002, MITRA had seen 
a significant reduction in morbidity in participating villages and an over 
40 percent decrease in mortality compared with the rates in 1991. The 
morbidity and mortality in surrounding villages that were not part of the 
programme continued to be extremely high (Oommen, 2003; Oommen, 
Henry & Pidikaka, 1999). 
Upon learning about the success of the MITRA programme, government 
and donor agencies approached the team and proposed scaling up the 
programme to other regions. Dr John Oommen, head of the community 
health programme, was at a loss as to what advice to give. 
Asking us to scale up MITRA is like asking someone to identify 10 of their 
closest friends and then giving them money to go out and make 100s of 
friends in exactly the same way while explaining to others how to do the 
same (Oommen, 2003; personal communication). 
The MITRA story, while an emblematic example of how civil society and 
scientists interacted in decision-making that led to improved services and 
health outcomes, also highlights a paradox for research and policy on 
complex social interventions. Replicating complex social interventions can 
be impracticable, yet some form of generalisability, and shared 
understanding, is required to develop and coordinate policy interventions, 
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and to facilitate the 'social extension of knowledge (Dewey, 1954/ 1927; 
Mays, Wyke & Evans, 2001; Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey & Walshe, 
2005). 
What pragmatist philosophy, and the Decision Cell model based on 
pragmatist tenets, offers is both a generalisable account and method for 
rational public policy-making. Thus, while the specifics and substance of 
different policy situations will vary, this overarching pragmatist 
understanding and method can help support and orient public policy 
processes across situations. 
This methods-based approach is in keeping with Dewey's (1954/ 1927) 
recommendation that the role of experts is to organise facts and develop 
method to inform and support public deliberations, not to make the 
substantive decisions about what the public should, or should not do, in 
this or that situation. However, as with any other conceptual account or 
practical method, there are both advantages and challenges associated 
with integrating pragmatist rationality into policy theory and practice. In 
order to inform how this pragmatist model and other methods for rational 
agency can be taken forward (in theory and practice), the advantages and 
challenges of adopting pragmatist rationality and the Decision Cell model 
need to be discussed. 
Since the Decision Cell model was depicted about 200 pages ago, it is 
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reproduced here as a reminder (see Figure 11), and to orient this 
discussion on the advantages and challenges of adopting pragmatist 
rationality in public policy-making. 
Figure 11. The Decision Cell model: a reminder 
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Seven possible advantages, and seven potential challenges of applying 
pragmatist rationality25 and the Decision Cell model are discussed. An 
equal number of advantages and challenges is presented, because to 
decide which side the balance will tip may only be determined through 
use of the model in concrete policy situations. 
25 This discussion on advantages and challenges also draws on the analysis in the paper, 
described earlier in this thesis, on the pragmatist reconstruction of rationality (Dorstewitz 




Advantages of adopting pragmatist rationality 
i. Competency with uncertainty 
As a first advantage, the Decision Cell model explicitly recognises that 
policy processes are often initiated in response to ill-defined and 
indeterminate situations, and that these situations are continually 
changing. Diverse ends may be defined with respect to the problematic 
situation, but these ends need to be deliberated on, as they may not be 
rational or beneficial in and of themselves (Dewey, 1922/ 2002; Elster, 
1989; Richardson, 2002). Rather than promoting the illusion of an 
abundance of clear and constant purposes, pragmatist rationality allows 
for, and supports, the definition and examination of ends. Further, "ends- 
in-view" can be modified based on openness to learning and 
responsibility with respect to the consequences of chosen strategies. 
Through deliberation, the consequences of different policy strategies can 
be explored without committing to them in practice; for example, through 
the use of techniques such as scenario development, pragmatist policy- 
making provides 'safety' in exploring alternative options and associated 
consequences. This process also facilitates the development of shared 
deliberation on, agreement to, and understanding of, proposed policy 
strategies. The rational coordination and management of policy change is 
also facilitated, both with respect to preparation for a range of potential 
consequences and the possibility of rational deliberation to integrate 
learning and recognise change through an awareness of ongoing 
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transactions with policy environments - as depicted in the fluid 
boundaries of the Decision Cell. Thus, rather than ignoring uncertainties 
as linear instrumental models of rationality tend to, pragmatist rationality 
helps develop competencies in policy-making with respect to dealing with 
uncertainties and change. 
ii. Rationality that is not `bounded', but 'fit for purpose' 
In order to address constraints and complexities, theories of "bounded 
rationality" were developed as 'real world' concessions to some abstract, 
ideal standard of rationality (Simon, 1957). Bounded rationalities, by 
definition, lead a subordinate parallel existence to some never fully 
understood ideal standard of rationality. In pragmatist philosophy, 
'bounded' modes of reasoning are not inferior to abstract ideals. In fact, 
'real world' rationality could be considered as superior in that it is 
developed and tested in practice to appropriately deal with the specific 
challenges. Thus 'real world' rationality serves as practical and functional 
. guide 
for human agency, unlike abstract ideals that are far removed from 
practicalities. An earlier example described the framing of the policy 
problem of 'disability access', as a transport and as a civil rights issue 
(Kingdon, 1995; Richardson, 2002). The issue was not so which perspective 
was right or wrong, or on whether there was some ideal policy solution to 
be aspired to. What mattered was finding the best solution with respect to 
the actors and factors comprising this particular policy situation -a 
solution that best served the demands of this situation. 
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Pragmatist rationality thus makes the distinction between a 'perfect' 
abstract rationality and practical 'real world' heuristics less tenable. Where 
formulations of perfect standards have any bearing, they only serve as 
tools or manufactured devices that help to orient and formulate reasoning 
in response to problematic situations. In this context, there is no reason to 
regard 'so-called' bounded methods of rational decision-making as 
defective adaptations of some ideal standard. This would be analogous to 
asking Delia Smith to demote her specialised, 'cutting edge', set of chefs' 
knives to an inferior makeshift solution, just because Sir Thomas Mallory 
had once written about the magical sword Excalibur. 
iii. Creativity and innovation 
Pragmatist rationality moves beyond the notion of efficient maximisation, 
or optimisation, of predefined ends where constraints are 'given. Instead, 
the need to continually find creative solutions to resolve continually 
changing problematic situations is emphasised. This creative aspect of 
pragmatist rationality truly provides a role for people as agents in making 
decisions about their lives and influencing the situations in which they 
live Goas, 1996). Creativity in pragmatism is also associated with 
imagination and deliberation with respect to 'sublimating' diverse desires, 
previous habits and status quo responses, and coming up with new and 
innovative solutions (Dewey, 1922/ 2002). 
424 
In a commentary on entrepreneurship in the Journal of Economic 
Methodology, Shook (2003, p. 181) highlights the advantages of the 
pragmatist approach with respect to innovation and entrepreneurship, 
Entrepreneurship cannot be explained by any economic theory that 
isolates innovation from ongoing social processes or locates creativity in a 
space of given, fixed values. Unfortunately, mainstream economics has 
committed these mistakes, rooted in instrumentalist and antidemocratic 
notions of consumption and rationality that permits reasoning only about 
means toward given ends. Genuine innovation is, on Dewey's pragmatic 
approach to values, the intelligent modification of both means and ends 
for experimental action ... Entrepreneurship is democratic 
experimentation in the economic realm. 
iv. Intelligent social coordination 
Key to the Decision Cell model, and pragmatist philosophy, is the concept 
of functional participation in, and coordination of, rational agency. With 
respect to a particular indeterminate situation, there may be inquiry in 
relatively 'decentralised' communities of inquiry, for instance in networks or 
partnerships of academics, civil society organisations, corporate 
executives or policy-makers. However, Dewey (1954/ 1927) recommended 
that there be 'public' coordination in order to organise and make 
knowledge available across society, to provide an overarching perspective 
and to manage externalities. This pragmatist position is supported by 
empirical analyses showing that for effective decentralised participation to 
be realised, central coordination is necessary (Atkinson & Haran, 2004; 
Golooba-Mutebi, 2005); Additionally, the externalities associated with 
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providing and promoting public goods and services, including in health, 
necessitate a strong public sector role in coordinating health care decision- 
making and provisioning (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005; Ruger, 2006). 
Pragmatist rationality does not leave social coordination to the vagaries of 
'invisible hands' or 'muddling through', or rummaging through'garbage 
cans'. The pragmatist integration of decentralised collaborative inquiry 
and centralised, functional coordination offers a more intelligent and 
purposive approach to socio-political coordination. In addition, the idea of 
intermediate organisations (Mays, 2000) providing a locus for inquiry, and 
reference for moral deliberation, was discussed in relation to functional 
participation in the Decision Cell model. These intermediate organisations 
can further facilitate 'intelligent' public coordination, by providing a link 
between 'on the ground' perspectives and more overarching policy 
considerations. 
Building both individual and social intelligence is also critical to 
supporting intelligent rational decision-making and social coordination. 
Throughout his work, Dewey (1954/ 1927) emphasised the importance of 
education to rational agency and democratic practice. He also viewed 
pluralism as a valuable resource on which individuals and societies could 
draw. More than an aggregation of individual capacities, social 
intelligence is determined by the extent to which there are diverse 
intellectual resources in a community and the extent to which there are 
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shared and contribute to developing new knowledge in society. However, 
he identified that there was an essential need to develop and test methods 
and mechanisms to support and socially intelligent inquiry (Dewey, 1954/ 
1927). It is with this imperative in mind that the Decision Cell model was 
developed. 
v. Ecological sensitivity 
Pragmatism regards human beings as embedded in a system of nature; 
they are part of this system and depend on it for their existence. 
Transactions between human agents and the natural environment shape 
each other, with ramifications throughout a continuum of experience. This 
means that the basic structure of instrumental rationality models, in which 
natural resources are considered as external to human agency and can be 
used or exploited for the benefit of human agents without being affected 
themselves, is problematic. In this respect, a pragmatist rationality is an 
'ecological' theory as it emphasises the interdependent transactions and 
effects with, and within, the system of nature. In addition, this perspective 
fosters an awareness of, and responsibility for, the use of resources in 
public policy programmes. 
A. Scientific sense, democratic sensibility & moral deliberation 
These precepts of scientific sense, democratic sensibility and moral 
imagination, are the crux of this thesis. Pragmatist rationality explicitly 
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offers a unification of these diverse dimensions of rationality and therefore 
also affords integrity, versus fragmentation, with regards to the different 
dimensions of human nature and agency. 
Dewey rejected the stark separation between a higher and a lower 
knowledge (scientific 'truth' versus practical, heuristic skills). This 
separation lies at the heart of the schism between a scientific sphere of 
inquiry and practical processes of problem solving; Deweyan pragmatism 
bridges this gap. There is a role for expertise in organising knowledge to 
inform those socio-political deliberations as well as to carry out specific 
technical functions. Dewey also recognised the role of public valuation of 
information and the role of the state in facilitating those deliberations and 
protecting the public interest. 
A pragmatist reconstruction of rationality is also capable of bridging 
ethical and technical concerns. By avoiding a priori distinctions between 
ultimate purposes and tasks of establishing facts and selecting means, 
pragmatist rationality leaves technical problems open to ethical 
deliberation. In this context, moral reasoning ceases to be a parallel and 
competing shadow mode of rational deliberation compared with'hard' 
economic and 'factual' considerations. Dewey proposed that value 
judgments cannot be considered as independent from their interpretation 
and use in concrete problematic situations (Dewey, 1922/ 2002). He 
considered valuation as one of the central accomplishments of human 
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intelligence and rational judgments as a matter of ethical inquiry within 
problematic situations. This moral orientation is dear, for example, in 
terms of the need to be cognisant of consequences of actions and proposed 
solutions. Dewey's Ethical Postulate proposes that rational agency be 
guided with a view to mutually reflective considerations of the individual 
and of the reference community of which the individual is a member. The 
reference community, however, may change with different situations, 
given the pluralistic nature of people's lives. 
vii. Satisfaction from unified experience 
A final advantage discussed here is the promise that pragmatist rationality 
can be consummatory within a concrete situation, and also with respect to 
the continuum of human experience. The experience of restoring 
equilibrium, or achieving closure of a problematic situation, is akin to the 
experience of a job well done, or a game well played. Pragmatist 
rationality aims at unifying diverse desires through cooperative 
intelligence and inquiry. This approach also facilitates the integration of 
diverse actors - policy-makers, scientists and citizens - and diverse 
dimensions of human life, experience, art, science and ethics. Equilibrium 
is achieved, not in the classical Greek sense as part of some preordained 
natural order, but through recognising that unification of human 
experience is possible through rational inquiry. Further, pragmatist 
rationality is explicitly situated in a socio-historical context, both with 
respect to building on previous inquiry and in being guided by agreed 
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upon norms, but also in developing new knowledge and through change 
that is constituent of future situations. 
The pragmatist approach to rational decision-making does entail 
considerable effort, and Dewey referred to this as a continual and 
laborious reworking and achievement. Nevertheless, the results of 
pragmatist rationality seem more satisfactory, tangible and evolutionary 
than the dubitable allure of some aggregate audits of utility or the 
inevitable inferiority complex resulting from forever being 'bounded' with 
respect to some intangible ideal of rationality. 
Challenges of adopting pragmatist rationality 
Having discussed a range of potential benefits of adopting pragmatist 
rationality, there are also a number of challenges to translating the 
Decision Cell model from theory to practice. 
I. Objectivist and relativist critiques, and the word `rationality' 
As discussed in Chapter 3, pragmatism is accused, implausibly, of being 
both relativist and foundationalist. One of the main critiques levelled 
against pragmatists is that a rationality based on problematic situations 
would lead into an objectivist understanding of problems in decision- 
making. As discussed in the pillar of via media, however, Dewey explicitly 
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rejected the idea that situations had the quality of being problematic only 
by virtue of a subjective evaluation or interpretation: 
A variety of names serves to characterize the indeterminateness of 
situations. They are disturbed, ambiguous, troubled and confused, full of 
conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. 
It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the 
situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are not 
evoked by and that are not relative to some existential situation are 
pathological (Dewey, 1938/ 1999, p. LW. 12.109). 
Then Dewey made it very clear that what is experienced with an 
interruption of habitual equilibrium, is not a ready-made problem, but an 
indeterminate, often ill-defined situation. 
If we assume, prematurely, that the problem involved is definite and 
clear, subsequent inquiry proceeds on a wrong track (Dewey, 1938/ 1999, 
p. LW. 12.112). 
An indeterminate problematic situation can be structured and defined in 
various ways, so there may be pluralistic perspectives on defining the 
situations and designing policy options. Dewey's epistemology continually 
reminds us that definitions and descriptions have as much a part in 
determining the quality of a problematic situation, as do physical 
phenomena. This corresponds well with deliberative theories of policy- 
making (Fischer, 2003). 
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If the only guides for rational agency were those established through 
definitions in specific situations, then there would no available criteria to 
judge and discriminate between better or worse types of inquiry (or, 
indeed, better or worse systems of policy-making). In the pragmatist pillar 
relating to norms, these relativistic critiques were addressed, noting that 
they ignored the fact that pragmatist inquiry is rooted in processes 
learning and socially intelligent inquiry where knowledge is shared. In 
addition, a key tenet of pragmatist rationality is maintaining a balance 
between antiscepticism (wherein doubt requires justification just as much 
as belief) and fallibilism (wherein there is no metaphysical guarantee to be 
had that any norm or belief can be held above revision and further 
development) (Putnam & Conant, 1995). 
Finally, it is not clear that all the baggage carried around by the word 
'rationality' can be sufficiently lightened to allow this revised version of 
the concept to move forward. Perhaps a more elaborated concept is 
required, for instance, one that explicitly refers to the intuitions of 
'scientific sense', 'democratic sensibility' and 'moral imagination'. 
ii. Moving beyond conservative readings 
Another critique posed against pragmatism is that it may be dangerously 
conservative. The concern is that rationality, if it is solely reactive to 
problematic conditions, will be a case of 'too little, too late', in addressing 
important problems. Problems such as anthropogenic climate change or 
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the potential shortages in a pension system cannot simply be put on hold 
till they are somehow in play. 
Dewey's answer to this challenge to pragmatist rationality was that, 
A disciplined mind takes delight in the problematic, and cherishes it until 
a way out is found that approves itself upon examination. The 
questionable becomes an active questioning, a ... quest for the objects by 
which the obscure and unsettled may be developed into the stable and 
clear. The scientific attitude may almost be defined as that which is 
capable of enjoying the doubtful; scientific method is, in one aspect, a 
technique for making a productive use of doubt by converting it into 
operations of infinite inquiry (Dewey, 1929/ 1999, p. LW. 4.182). 
Thinking is not something that takes place outside our habitual co- 
ordinations, but is part of this process. Thus, an awareness of a potential 
catastrophe can result in a disruption of equilibrium as strong as any 
present phenomenon. In addition, all the decision activities in the Decision 
Cell model, explicitly take a view on the potential consequences of 
proposed definitions and designs used in policy-making. In deliberation, 
there is an explicit emphasis on the role of imagination in projecting 
possible future scenarios, and basing valuations of the potential 
consequences of these scenarios. Further, this forward-looking practice 
also facilitates a preparedness for change, and a capacity to constructively 
manage it. 
iv. On East and West ... and whether the twain can meet 
A further challenge to pragmatism is related to the tension arising from 
Dewey's ideas of evolution, progress and human flourishing, contrasted 
with his conception of the rhythm of habitual and problematic situations. 
The concept of 'growth' has connotations of a typically Western need for 
progress toward bigger and better things. One critical exchange with 
Bertrand Russell indicates how Dewey viewed criticisms of this nature 
(Dewey, 1939/ 1989b). In response to Russell's imputation that the "love 
of truth is obscured in America by commercialization of which 
pragmatism is the philosophical expression, " Dewey retorted that, 
The statement to me seemed to be of that order of interpretation which 
would say that English neo-realism is a reflection of the snobbish 
aristocracy of the English and the tendency of French thought to dualism 
an expression of an alleged Gallic disposition to keep a mistress in 
addition to a wife ... 
And I still believe that Mr. Russell's confirmed habit of connecting 
pragmatic theory with obnoxious aspects of American industrialism, 
instead of with the experimental method of attaining knowledge, is much 
as if I were to link his philosophy to the interests of the English landed 
aristocracy instead of with a dominant interest in mathematics (Dewey, 
1939/ 1989b, p. 257). 
In fact, Dewey's conception of the rhythm of situations and the idea of 
regaining lost equilibrium and restoring harmony is more reminiscent of 
Eastern ways of thinking, for instance Taoism, Zen Buddhism and Yoga 
have harmony and equilibrium as guiding principles. For instance, as 
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mentioned in the introductory chapter, in appreciation of the relevance of 
Dewey's philosophy in China, he was referred to there as a 'second 
Confucius' (Ryan, 1995; Westbrook, 1991). 
In order to resolve the tension between the concepts of equilibrium and 
growth in pragmatist philosophy, both perspectives need to be viewed 
from a more comprehensive concept of evolution (Dewey, 1910/ 1997). 
Evolution favours neither imbalanced nor stagnant processes; the concept 
of 'equilibrium' does not imply a return to previous habitual practice. 
Rather, it means finding a new equilibrium, one that incorporates learning, 
enables better functioning and leads to an increased readiness to meet 
future challenges. 
v. Integration of empiricist and supra-empiricist methods 
There are challenges and questions regarding this revised concept of 
rationality that are not easily answered. For instance, in the Decision Cell 
model, both empirical and so-called supra-empirical methods are 
discussed. Accordingly, there is a need to integrate seemingly disparate 
worldviews: experimentation with imagination and evidence with 
empathy. Even within science, there are 'wars' between competing 
methodological and disciplinary camps Qasanoff, 2000). Extending these 
concerns to the wider range of modes of inquiry, intuitions and 
understanding in society poses a real challenge. 
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Nevertheless, this type of integration is possible, as seen in the synthesis of 
literature-based and indigenous definitions of health and illness in New 
Zealand (Durie, 2004); it is within the scope of pragmatism to come up 
with a more comprehensive and culturally appropriate understanding of 
such concepts and approaches. There are promising advances in 
neurophysiological research showing the importance of emotions in 
rationality (Damasio, 2006). There is also a growing interest in the science 
of 'emotional intelligence' (Goleman, 1995) and in the potential of 
'collective intelligence', for instance in corporations looking to build 
supportive and creative work cultures (Isaacs, 1999). 
In addition - knowledge is power, and those with privileged knowledge 
with respect to policy-making, may be unwilling to give up this position. 
However, if, guided by the Ethical Postulate, it were possible to establish 
that control could be replaced by collaboration, in the interest of all 
concerned, then some change may be possible in this respect. 
A. The mobilising power of morals 
Dewey's faith that moral considerations provide a sufficient incentive to 
guide individual and societal action may be seen as naive. Ryan (1995, p. 
314), for instance, appreciates Dewey's 'moral socialism', but cautions that 
"it is difficult to motivate workers to do a good job by presenting them 
with moral incentives; public spirit and revolutionary zeal can achieve 
things that self-interest cannot, but over a long haul they are inferior to 
self-interest as motivating forces". The proof of either position will be in 
the testing. 
However, this thesis has highlighted examples of how norms and moral 
considerations can be a powerful means of social coordination, from 
protests against war or for debt relief in developing economies (DeLeon, 
1988; Glasius, 2005). In the UNICEF review, civil society organisations 
identified that the precepts of the Conventions on the Rights of the Child, 
and human rights standards, provided a stronger foundation for 
collaboration than did specific policy or programmatic formulations 
(Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007). In the LSHTM study of research impact, 
some of the most far-reaching impacts resulted from the development of 
new ethical guidelines for interviewing women and adolescents who had 
been trafficked (Kuruvilla, Mays & Walt, 2007; World Health 
Organisation, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & 
Daphne Programme of the European Commission, 2003). Police, 
journalists, civil society organisations as well as researchers are now using 
these guidelines, again indicating that moral considerations can cut across 
sectoral, societal and disciplinary boundaries. 
vii. Logistics of building and coordinating reference communities 
Dewey (1954/ 1927) saw communities of inquiry being built and sustained 
through face-to-face communication and shared experiences. It is not clear 
what effects increasingly mediated communication (e. g. through the mass 
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media and the Internet) would have on how individuals interact, 
deliberate, and collaborate. Additional challenges to cohesive 
communities of inquiry are posed by increasingly fragmented 
'globalisation in the production of goods and provision of services, the so- 
called 'clash of civilisations' and growing social inequities around the 
world. 
It is not yet clear how best reference communities may be supported in 
order to facilitate social cohesion and flourishing. The literature 
increasingly offers some promising perspectives on these issues. For 
example, the possibilities of intermediate organisations, deliberative 
forums as well as a range of socio-political partnerships (for example, 
public-private, public-civil society organisation partnerships) was 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Bernard & Kuruvilla, 2007; Glasius, 2005; Mays, 
2000). There is also a need for collaboration across academic disciplines 
researching participation and communication (including political 
philosophy, sociology, psychology, science studies, media studies and 
literary criticism) in order to better understand and inform policy-making 
and democratic practice overall. 
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In conclusion 
In keeping with the pragmatist ethos, questions related to both the 
advantages and challenges discussed above can only be answered either 
through practice or through ongoing rational deliberation. To this end, the 
pragmatist concept of rational agency and the Decision Cell model offer 
an orientation -a method to guide and coordinate socially intelligent 
inquiry, moral deliberation and democratic practice. 
Chapter 3 discussed how criticisms have been levelled against pragmatist 
treatises for their failure to succinctly sum up the key messages. This 
thesis will conclude with an attempt at such succinctness, using selected 
summary phrases and words to convey the ethos of pragmatist rationality. 
These words and phrases are just signposts and cannot, in any way, be a 
substitute for the richness of the journey undertaken in pragmatist 
philosophy and public policy. 
First, the key tenets of pragmatist rational agency could be summed up 
using 5 'Es': 
Experience, Experiment, be Ethical, Educate and Evolve. 
The 4 pillars of pragmatist philosophy would also serve as a useful 
summary: 
  The rhythm of situations 
  Socially intelligent inquiry 
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  Via media between foundationalism and relativism 
  Deliberation, norms and moral imagination 
The 3 'signature' phrases in this thesis can be used to convey the key 
intuitions of the Decision Cell model: 
scientific sense, democratic sensibility and moral imagination. 
Finally, to take forward the project of rational public policy-making, one 
word serves as a definitive launching pad. This word has resonance the 
world over, and conveys a belief in the 'here and now' and in human 
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